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 Abstract 
Many philosophers hold that moral agency is defined by an agent’s capacity for 
rational reflection and self-governance. It is only through the exercise of such 
capacities, these philosophers contend, that one’s actions can be judged to be of 
distinctively moral value. The moral phenomenology of the Danish philosopher and 
theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-1981), currently enjoying a revival of interest 
amongst Anglo-American moral philosophers, is an exception to this view. Under the 
auspices of his signature theory of the ‘sovereign expressions of life,’ Løgstrup 
provides a rich moral phenomenology aimed at establishing the ethical value of 
‘spontaneous,’ non-deliberative actions, such as those exemplified in the showing of 
trust and acts of mercy. In this thesis, my aim is to investigate what mode of moral 
agency, if any, is compatible with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the sovereign 
expressions of life. I argue that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is compatible with 
a distinctive medio-passive mode of agency. According to this conception of moral 
agency, the subject’s agency is constituted not through her capacity to stand back and 
make a judgment on how to act, but rather in the way the subject comports herself in 
relation to situations and encounters that are experienced first-personally as 
overwhelming and encompassing. I will proceed by providing detailed analyses of the 
core aspects of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology and his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life. In the process, I will elucidate the decisive influence that thinkers 
such as Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther and Søren Kierkegaard had on Løgstrup’s 
way of thinking about ethics. Thus, in this thesis my aim is to contribute both to 
Løgstrup scholarship and to central on-going debates in moral philosophy and the 
philosophy of action.
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Preface: Løgstrup and the Phenomenology of Moral 
Agency 
0.1. St. Kevin and the Problem of Moral Agency 
And then there was St Kevin and the blackbird. 
The saint is kneeling, arms stretched out, inside 
His cell, but the cell is narrow, so 
 
One turned-up palm is out the window, stiff 
As a crossbeam, when a blackbird lands 
And lays in it and settles down to nest. 
 
Kevin feels the warm eggs, the small breast, the tucked 
Neat head and claws and, finding himself linked 
Into the network of eternal life, 
 
Is moved to pity: now he must hold his hand 
Like a branch out in the sun and rain for weeks 
Until the young are hatched and fledged and flown. 
                                      * 
And since the whole thing’s imagined anyhow, 
Imagine being Kevin. Which is he? 
Self-forgetful or in agony all the time 
 
From the neck on down through his hurting forearms? 
Are his fingers sleeping? Does he still feel his knees? 
Or has the shut-eyed blank of underearth 
 
Crept up through him? Is there distance in his head? 
Alone and mirrored clear in love’s deep river, 
‘To labour and not to seek reward,’ he prays, 
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A prayer his body makes entirely  
For he has forgotten self, forgotten bird 
And on the riverbank forgotten the river’s name. 
(Heaney 1998: 410-11) 
 
Seamus Heaney’s meditation on the traditional story of St. Kevin and the 
blackbird presents a powerful image: an ascetic monk who, upon becoming the nesting 
place for a blackbird and her chicks, maintains prayerful posture for weeks on end, 
through rain and beating sun. St. Kevin is moved by pity; his actions, in the language 
of the Christian tradition from which the story is drawn, are expressive of agapic love. 
That is, a love of God for man and of man for God, extended to a love of all creation.1 
Heaney meditates on St. Kevin’s posture, wondering: is his pose effortful and 
deliberate? Or is he self-forgetful; a conduit ‘mirrored clear in love’s deep river?’ Is St. 
Kevin’s posture active? Is it a posture he is trying to keep, for the sake of the blackbird 
and for the sake of God? Or, is he passive? Has he been overcome by some beatific 
peace and dissolved into ‘the network of eternal life’?  
These are not idle questions. Agapic love is a regulative ideal in Christian 
ethics. And, more generally, the image of spontaneous other-regarding care serves as 
a powerful ethical ideal across many cultures and moral philosophies: selflessness and 
altruism are often seen to be of superior ethical value to ratiocinative and calculated 
action. And this estimation attaches to the mundane just as much as it does to the 
                                                          
1 Cf. Augustine’s canonical definition: ‘All the commandments of God, then, are embraced in love, of 
which the apostle says: ‘now the end of the commandment is charity, out of pure heart, and of a 
good conscience, and of faith unfeigned’ [1 Tim 15]. […] But whatever is done either through fear of 
punishment or from some other carnal motive, and has not for its principle that love which the spirit 
of God sheds abroad the heart, is not done as it ought to be done, however it may appear to men. For 
this love embraces both the love of God and the love of our neighbour […]. And this applies both to 
present and future. We love God now by faith, then we shall love him through sight’ (Augustine 1996: 
139-140). 
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extraordinary; to one’s spontaneous showing of trust to a stranger just as to St. 
Kevin’s sanctified self-sacrifice. Importantly, Heaney’s question is not why agapic love 
is so highly esteemed – although this is itself an interesting and worthy question – 
but rather how such love is manifest. This latter question presents a powerful 
philosophical puzzle. For, agapic love and its secular counterparts occupy a curious 
status when considered as actions or the products of an agent. Consider, again, St. 
Kevin’s pose. On the one hand, it seems that St. Kevin’s keeping himself in stasis is 
something he did – and something he did for a good reason, namely, out of love for 
creation. And yet, on the other hand, St. Kevin appears to be curiously passive in his 
posture; he was, firstly, moved to pity – it is not something he chose. Moreover, he was 
self-forgetful to the point where even the motivating reason of love had been forgotten. 
Importantly, this passivity and selflessness, this sense of being overwhelmed or 
encompassed by the needs of another seems to be constitutive of what we think of 
when we think of agapic or selfless actions. Yet, how, if at all, can we capture this 
puzzling and delicate class of action in terms of a conception of moral agency?  
This question has no doubt been taken up by countless theologians and 
philosophers. However, it is to the little-known Danish philosopher and theologian 
Knud Eljer Løgstrup (1905-1981) that I turn to in this thesis. In his later philosophy, 
under the auspices of his theory of the sovereign expressions of life, Løgstrup has 
provided a rich and expansive – if unfinished – phenomenology of spontaneous moral 
acts; of the possibility of agapic love. Does Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology have the 
resources to respond to Heaney’s queries? 
0.2. Introducing Løgstrup as a Phenomenologist and a Theologian 
Opening this thesis with a poem is not a matter of mere ornamentation: it is 
motivated by Løgstrup’s own approach to moral philosophy. Løgstrup’s writings are 
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replete with lengthy discussions of novels and imaginative fiction. In fact, appealing 
to literary examples in elucidating his ideas was something of a methodological 
principle for Løgstrup. As David Bugge notes, Løgstrup  
saw literature as having an advantage or even precedence over psychology, 
philosophy, and theology. Whereas these disciplines much too often tend to 
become reductive, abstract, or even contrived, literature remains complex and 
concrete. (Bugge 2017: 216) 
More generally, Løgstrup’s ‘homiletic attention to the moral and religious 
significance of everyday experiences’ (Dews 2017: 104) is one of the most striking 
aspects of his philosophy. And it marks him out as a resolutely phenomenological 
philosopher, in the broadest sense of that term. That is to say, Løgstrup’s way of 
thinking about ethics is fastidious in its attempt to remain within the concrete 
complexity of human life. And it is through his attempts to accommodate and disclose 
ethical life in all its complexity, rather than attempting to construct a systematic 
moral theory, that his appreciation of problems such as those raised in light of the 
story of St. Kevin can be found.  
Beyond this, however, a central interpretive claim of this study is that 
Løgstrup is a phenomenologist in a more substantive sense as well. Løgstrup was 
decisively influenced by the phenomenological tradition that emerged in the wake of 
Edmund Husserl. In particular, he was greatly influenced by the work of Martin 
Heidegger and Hans Lipps, under whom he studied during the first half of the 1930s. 
The definition of phenomenology according to this tradition goes beyond rich 
descriptions of what experiences are like, and is defined by an attempt to account for 
the basic structures or the ‘essence’ of human experience and understanding from the 
first-person perspective. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
Phenomenology is the study of essences, and it holds that all problems amount 
to defining essences, such as the essence of perception or the essence of 
consciousness. And yet phenomenology is also a philosophy that places 
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essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to understand 
man and the world is by beginning from their “facticity.” Although it is a 
transcendental philosophy that suspends the affirmations of the natural 
attitude in order to understand them, it is also a philosophy for which the 
world is always “already there” prior to reflection – like an inalienable presence 
– and whose entire effort is to rediscover this naïve contact with the world in 
order to finally raise it to a philosophical status. (Merleau-Ponty 2012: lxx) 
Løgstrup often refers to his method as being phenomenological, and in a late 
lecture he provides a definition of phenomenology that broadly accords with Merleau-
Ponty’s.2 However, Løgstrup’s approach is on the whole marked by an absence of any 
explicit methodological considerations. Thus, an important task taken up in this study 
is to make some of the methodological commitments underlying Løgstrup’s writings 
explicit, where this will help in clarifying some of his more obscure claims.  
In suggesting that, methodologically, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
follows the kind of existential analysis spearheaded by Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology, we can appreciate a fundamental respect in which Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology constitutes an innovative and unique intervention into the tradition 
of phenomenology. A long standing problem facing those who sympathize with 
Heidegger’s existential analytic, for instance, concerns the ambivalence Heidegger 
expressed towards the concerns of practical philosophy within his analyses. As Jean-
Luc Nancy has observed, this has led many to ‘deny that there is any ethical dimension 
to Heidegger’s thinking, basing their claims on his own objection to ethics as a 
‘discipline,’ on the corresponding absence of ‘moral philosophy’ in his work, and on 
his refusal of any moral interpretation of the analytic of Dasein’ (Nancy 2002: 65). 
Indeed, one need not search far in Heidegger’s writings to get the impression that he 
                                                          
2 Cf. ‘[Phenomenology] precisely consists in bringing into the light of day the understanding of human 
nature and relations in the world that lie hidden in pre-philosophical knowledge. The philosophizing 
person is therefore not merely interested, but involved. It is one’s own knowledge and one’s own 
possibilities and one’s own world, which one occupies oneself with in order to reveal one’s own 
nature and the world’s character. The philosopher has always already understood the world, his own 
life and his life with the other’ (FP: 117). 
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was largely dismissive of the domain of practical philosophy, which he viewed as an 
‘ontical’ or epiphenomenal matter rather than something ‘ontological,’ that is, 
something  fundamental to Dasein’s mode of being.3 While some commentators, such 
as Nancy himself, dispute this assessment, Løgstrup takes Heidegger at his word.4 
But rather than simply resigning himself to Heidegger’s word, Løgstrup seeks to 
provide an ontological account of what he takes to be the basic structures of ethical 
experience which, whilst taking certain key methodological insights from Heidegger’s 
existential phenomenology, departs from Heidegger in other respects. Principally, 
Løgstrup’s departure from Heidegger emerges out of his analysis of the ‘facticity’ of 
human interdependence and its primordial ethical significance. It is in this relation 
that we can best understand Løgstrup’s avowed claim to be doing ontological ethics, or 
so I will claim.  
There is a further reason why Heaney’s poem provides an fitting way in to 
Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics: its religious setting. In addition to being a 
philosopher, Løgstrup was also a theologian: he held the position of professor of 
Ethics and Philosophy of Religion in the faculty of Theology at the University of 
Aarhus. As with his approach to philosophy, Løgstrup was resolute in his opposition 
to systematic approaches to theology. In his article ‘Systematisk Teologi,’ for 
                                                          
3 Cf. Heidegger (2001): ‘Not only…does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this 
understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time; 
accordingly, there are many ways in which it has been interpreted, and these are all at Dasein’s 
disposal. Dasein’s ways of behaviour, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, have been 
studied with varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and ‘political 
science’, in poetry, biography, and the writing of history, each in a different fashion. But the question 
remains whether these interpretations of Dasein have been carried through with a primordial 
existentiality comparable to whatever existentiel primordiality they may have possessed. Neither of 
these excludes the other but they do not necessarily go together. Existentiel interpretation can 
demand an existential analytic, if indeed we conceive of philosophical cognition as something 
possible and necessary. Only when the basic structures of Dasein have been adequately worked out 
with explicit orientation towards the problem of Being itself, will what we have hitherto gained in 
interpreting Dasein get its existential justification’ (SZ: 16).  
4 Cf. KHE: 51. 
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instance, he is highly critical of the theological language of the then prominent 
theologian Karl Barth and his followers. He writes:  
[I]n German systematic theology they now and then speak a totally mad 
workman jargon: Deus absconditus and deus relevatus are theological 
‘entities’ which are to be manipulated correctly, the crucifixion of Jesus is the 
theological ‘theory’ of knowledge etc. – Kierkegaard defined the artistic as the 
reduplication of the content in the form, so, to put it mildly, this intolerable 
language is inartistic. (Løgstrup, cited in Bugge 2017: 221) 
In contrast to the systematic theology of Barth and others, Løgstrup’s 
theology emerges out of his detailed phenomenological analyses of human existence - 
which Løgstrup believes, according to his enigmatic slogan, ‘suggest a religious 
interpretation’ (M1: 90). Thus, in Løgstrup’s thinking, the religious and the 
philosophical tend to be closely intertwined: no sharp line is drawn between these two 
domains of enquiry.5   
Viewed in one way, this ambiguity might mean that neither the theologian nor 
the philosopher will be satisfied with Løgstrup’s phenomenology: from a theological 
perspective, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology must look like an attempt to secularize 
Christianity. And from a philosophical perspective, some of Løgstrup’s more 
obviously Lutheran commitments, such as his claims that human beings are 
inherently wicked and that life is a gift, may appear rather hard to justify 
philosophically. Yet, viewed in a different way, Løgstrup’s embracing of the ambiguity 
of the religious with respect to the ‘strictly human’ can be seen to be remarkably 
                                                          
5 Cf. Løgstrup’s response to a criticism concerning his approach to the ‘human’ and the ‘Christian’ 
spheres: ‘I believe that ontological, and also fundamentally ontological, problems belong within 
philosophy, just as they belong within theology. […] And let me add yet another consideration. I 
utterly fail to see how it should be “demeaning” for a philosopher to let himself to be inspired by 
theologians. I cannot see anything wrong in an existential philosopher being inspired by 
Kierkegaard…or by Luther and Augustine…If what Hillerdal claims is true, namely, that existential 
philosophy is, to a great extent, very suitable as an interpretation of Luther’s teachings concerning 
the things already demanded by “the natural law,” then certainly it indicates that this philosophy is 
philosophically right – provided, that is, that the law Luther speaks of is indeed natural (universal)’ 
(BED: 14). 
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prescient in a world that is increasingly being referred to as ‘post-secular.’6 Indeed, in 
this regard, Løgstrup’s phenomenology is comparable with the proponents of what 
has been latterly dubbed the ‘theological turn’ in French phenomenology, such as 
Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricœur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry and others, who 
have all sought to re-configure traditional theological notions and problems in 
phenomenological terms.7  
At the core of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is a claim. A primitive 
normative claim made on the self by the other just in virtue of the other’s living 
vulnerability. This is the claim disclosed by the proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth, 
namely, in the commandment of agapic love: to love one’s neighbour as oneself. And 
Løgstrup’s mature philosophical project, spanning over some 30 years, can without 
much exaggeration be said to consist of an ‘attempt to give a definition in strictly 
human terms of the relationship to the other person which is contained within the 
religious proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth’ (ED: 1). The difficulty that attends this 
project - at least from Løgstrup’s perspective - is that, addressed to the will, the 
commandment to agapic love is an impossible, unfulfillable demand: conceived of as 
something one ought to do or as a principle or rule that one is duty-bound to act on, 
agapic love becomes distorted; it becomes ersatz, introverted and reflective rather than 
authentic, spontaneous and other-regarding. We might say that the utter self-sacrifice 
required by agapic love cannot be achieved through the exertion of the will, for through 
its very exertion the will always already precludes the possibility of utter self-sacrifice.  
A traditional theistic response to this kind of worry would be to appeal to some 
form of theological voluntarism, perhaps suggesting that agapic love can be realized 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Habermas (2008); and Caputo (2001) §2. 
7 See Janicaud (2000) for a helpful - if resolutely critical - overview of the theological turn.  
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– but only by God, who can work through us and set our own wills to one side. Yet, 
Løgstrup’s phenomenological method precludes theistic presuppositions of this kind. 
Thus, in his later philosophy, Løgstrup develops his signature theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life as a phenomenological response to the question concerning how 
agapic love can be realized in our relations with others. The sovereign expressions of 
life, comprising phenomena such as trust, mercy and openness of speech, designate 
modes of relating to others that manifest agapic love. According to Løgstrup they 
precede the will and they are pre-moral; they designate modes of immediate and 
spontaneous responsiveness to the needs of the other.  
Yet, for all its phenomenological perspicuity, Løgstrup’s theory remained 
incomplete at the time of his death. As a result, some of Løgstrup’s formulations are 
often imprecise and, in places, contradictory. This is particularly evident when it 
comes to questions of whether and how human agency is involved in the realization 
of the sovereign expressions of life. In some places, his position looks to be highly 
deterministic: evoking aspects of Luther’s doctrine of justification, he presents the 
sovereign expressions of life as phenomena which overwhelm and overmaster the 
agent. In other places, he allows that the sovereign expressions of life involve a 
decision by the agent. In yet others, he characterizes the relation between the agent 
and the sovereign expressions of life and the agent as one of the agent’s surrendering. 
Given these ambiguities, a central task of this thesis is to develop and elucidate one 
possible way of interpreting Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life that 
both preserves the important contribution Løgstrup makes to our understanding of 
ethical spontaneity – viz. the possibility of agapic love as manifest in good works - 
whilst showing how this contribution is compatible with a plausible conception of 
moral agency. More specifically, in this thesis, I will argue that Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of the sovereign expressions of life is compatible with what I shall 
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call, following the work of Béatrice Han-Pile, a medio-passive mode of moral agency. 
In prosecuting this argument, I will be making contributions to two areas of 
philosophical research. Firstly, I will be contributing to the nascent English language 
reception of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology and, secondly, I will be contributing 
to contemporary debates concerning the nature and constitution of moral agency.  
0.3. Chapter Outline 
I begin in chapter one by animating what I shall call the problem of moral agency for 
Løgstrup’s ethics. Outlining first a standard view of moral agency which enjoys 
acceptance across a wide variety of different moral theories, I go on to provide a 
preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. The upshot of this 
preliminary sketch is that, on the one hand, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
captures an important dimension of ethical life. Yet, on the other hand, Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology looks to be flatly incompatible with the standard view of moral 
agency. Given this incompatibility, the following dilemmatic worry presses. If 
Løgstrup’s putative phenomenology of ethical comportment is incompatible with 
moral agency, then the overall plausibility of his phenomenology is cast into doubt. 
Conversely, if Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology captures an important dimension of 
ethical life, then the seeming failure of the standard view of moral agency to be able 
to account for it potentially proves the standard view to be lacking. In the face of this 
looming dilemma, I present two strategies for defusing the apparent incompatibility 
between Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology and the standard view of moral agency. 
The first comes from a broadly Kantian perspective, the second from a broadly 
Aristotelian perspective. I conclude, however, with the suggestion that, ultimately, 
neither defusing strategy will prove successful. 
In chapter two, I begin by providing a reconstruction of Løgstrup’s conception of 
trust understood as a sovereign expression of life. Based on this, I develop an 
11 
 
argument as to why the Kantian defusing strategy is unsuccessful, where, in so doing, 
I enrich and add detail to the preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
provided in chapter one. Here my focus is on elucidating Løgstrup’s theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life. More specifically, I argue that whilst the Kantian 
defusing strategy constitutively involves that the moral agent regulates an incentive 
for action according to the agent’s second-order commitment to the right, Løgstrup’s 
theory of the sovereign expressions of life emphasizes the immediacy of the encounter 
with the other, whereby one’s responsiveness to the other and their needs is not 
regulated by any second-order commitments of the agent. This observation, of course, 
leads to the following worry. How can immediacy be compatible with moral agency? 
Surely moral agency presupposes some form of mediating second-order awareness on 
the part of the agent of the good making properties of any given primary incentive? 
In responding to this worry, I propose a reading of the immediacy of the sovereign 
expressions of life along the lines of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. More 
specifically, I suggest that the sovereign expressions of life can fruitfully be construed 
as hermeneutic conditions where, by contrast to second-order commitments to the good, 
the sovereign expressions of life are best seen as existential conditions constitutive of 
the way the other shows up to us as another living being who makes a primitive 
normative claim on us just in virtue of their living vulnerability.  
In concluding the second chapter, I note a potential further worry in providing a 
positive response to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. Namely, that 
by construing the sovereign expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions, the possible 
compatibility of the sovereign expressions of life with a plausible conception of moral 
agency now appears even more remote: the sovereign expressions of life now appear 
to be features of our existence in relation to which we are completely passive and, 
thus, they seem to fall outside of the domain of moral agency. In chapter three, I return 
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to the Aristotelian defusing strategy as potentially providing a way of overcoming 
this worry. On an Aristotelian defusing strategy, the sovereign expressions of life are 
re-configured as virtues that can be cultivated and developed, where this then 
provides a model of moral agency that looks prima facie to be compatible with 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. The main burden of this chapter is to show why, 
given the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics, the 
Aristotelian defusing strategy is deeply incompatible with Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology. In a word, this is because, on Løgstrup’s view, the human being is 
inherently wicked and is incapable of improving itself through practices of virtuous 
striving and self cultivation. Rather, for Løgstrup, the human being is radically 
dependent on factors out of its control for the possibility of realizing the sovereign 
expressions of life and their works. Yet, with this additional aspect of Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology in hand, the chances that Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life can be seen to be compatible with a plausible conception of moral 
agency appears greatly diminished. In investigating this issue further, I adopt a 
heuristic strategy: I consider two attempts to provide conceptions of moral agency 
that are compatible with the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s thought, where 
I argue that whilst both of these attempts mark important advances in our 
understanding of Løgstrup – particularly with respect to the question of moral agency 
- they are ultimately unsatisfying. Through my discussions here, my aim is to clarify 
the Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology with a view to opening 
up the conceptual space for providing a positive answer to the question of moral 
agency.  
In chapter four, I will offer my positive response to the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics. Building on the findings of the previous two chapters, I argue 
that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is compatible with a medio-passive conception 
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of moral agency. In prosecuting this argument, I begin by suggesting that Løgstrup’s 
understanding of the constitution of agency can be elucidated in terms of his critical 
appropriation of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self. The key move here is to claim 
that the self qua agent on Løgstrup’s view is relational rather than ‘substantivist.’ That 
is, the self is constituted modally in the way it relates to the other, either through self-
assertion or through the sovereign expressions of life. On this reading, the self can 
constitute itself in a mis-relation to itself, where it takes itself to be sovereign over its 
existence and the existence of the other. Or, conversely, the self can be constituted as 
an agent in a transparent relation to its fundamentally interdependent existence. It is 
only in this latter case, where the self comes into identity with the sovereign 
expressions of life in its encounter with the other, that the sovereign expressions of 
life can be realized in good works. Next, I argue that, whilst the constitution of moral 
agency in this latter case is not the product of the will or the agent’s choice, it is not 
something that simply happens to the self either; it does not fit neatly into the binary 
of activity/passivity that underwrites the standard conception of moral agency. 
Rather, my suggestion will be that the constitution of the self in Løgstrup’s ethics can 
be seen to be compatible with a medio-passive mode of agency, whereby the self, in its 
encounter with the other, integrates its experience of interdependence and passivity 
in that encounter in the way it responds to the other and their situation. Drawing on 
Løgstrup’s terminology, I characterize this medio-passive mode of moral agency in 
terms of surrender.  
In the fifth and final chapter, I conclude by defending my medio-passive account 
of Løgstrupian moral agency against some likely criticisms. One type of criticism 
considered here concerns the plausibility of my account of Løgstrupian moral agency 
as an account of moral agency, where I offer a defence of its plausibility through 
illustration. Coming from the opposing side, a second type of criticism I consider 
14 
 
concerns the genuine distinctiveness of my account of Løgstrupian moral agency to the 
standard view. This second type of criticism has two prongs. Firstly, it concerns 
whether my account of Løgstrupian moral agency remains faithful to the 
distinctiveness of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. And secondly, it concerns 
whether – if faithful to Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology – my account shows 
Løgstrup to have made a distinctive contribution to our understanding of what it is 
to be a moral agent. I frame these latter criticisms in terms of a Levinasian-style 
objection and an Adornian-style objection, thus, performing a secondary task of bringing 
Løgstrup’s moral philosophy into dialogue with two relevant comparators, Emmanuel 
Levinas and Theodor Adorno, respectively.   
Whilst the chief aim of this thesis is to develop a plausible conception of moral 
agency that is compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, my hope is that it 
can also be read in another way. Chapters two to five all include extensive comparative 
discussions of Løgstrup’s philosophy in relation to his philosophical and theological 
influences and relevant comparators. Chapter two examines the influence of 
Heidegger on Løgstrup’s so called ‘ontological ethics;’ chapter three looks at the 
Lutheran themes and presuppositions present in Løgstrup’s work; chapter four 
considers Løgstrup’s fraught and often polemical relation to Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
and theology and chapter five brings Løgstrup into dialogue with Levinas and 
Adorno. By framing my chapters in this way, my intention has been to situate 
Løgstrup within more familiar contexts, where the hope is that in so doing I will not 
only illuminate the tradition within which Løgstrup was working but also the ways 
in which his thinking is innovative and genuinely distinctive.
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1. Løgstrup’s Ethics and the Question of Moral Agency 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to raise the following question with respect to 
Løgstrup’s ethical philosophy. What conception of moral agency, if any, is compatible 
with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment? In animating this question, 
I will firstly define what I shall refer to as the standard view of moral agency, that is, 
a thin definition of the core features of moral agency accepted across a wide variety of 
different moral theories (1.1). Next, I will offer a preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology aimed, minimally, at establishing its plausibility. Here I will 
focus on Løgstrup’s illuminating reconstruction and analysis of the parable of the 
Good Samaritan (1.2). Based on this sketch, it will emerge that prima facie Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment is incompatible with the standard view of 
moral agency. This result will then be used to animate the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics (1.3). Put in the form of an inconsistent triad, the issue is this. (i) 
Any plausible account of moral action must include an account of moral agency. (ii) 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment appears plausible as an account of 
moral action. (iii) But Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment looks to be 
incompatible with standard accounts of moral agency. Therefore, taking (i) to be 
axiomatic, either (ii) Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is false or (iii) the standard 
view of moral agency is wanting. Thus, the question of moral agency: what conception 
of moral agency, if any, is compatible with Løgstrup’s ethical philosophy? In the final 
section (1.4.), I will canvass two strategies which attempt to defuse the question of 
moral agency by suggesting that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology can in fact be seen 
to be compatible with the standard conception of moral agency. In further chapters 
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(§§2-3), however, I shall argue that these defusing strategies fail to do justice to the 
radical and genuine challenge that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology presents to the 
standard view of moral agency. 
1.1. The Standard View of Moral Agency 
Agency is sometimes conceived of as the capacity to perform intentional or goal-
directed actions.1 On this conception, agency can be attributed to non-human animals, 
humans and even groups in cases of so-called ‘shared’ or ‘collective’ agency. Moral 
agency, by contrast, is typically thought to involve more demanding criteria. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, one such criterion is moral insight or moral awareness. That is to say, 
that some conception, knowledge or awareness of the good or the right, whether 
conceived of in agent-neutral or agent-relative terms, is a necessary and constitutive 
condition for moral agency to obtain. Furthermore, for an event to count as an 
instance of moral agency, it is thought that the agent’s moral insight must play a role 
in the intentional actions performed by the agent. That is, in order for an event to 
count as a moral action, the agent’s moral insight must be incorporated into the 
performance of that action by the agent in some way. There is wide-spread 
disagreement amongst moral philosophers concerning the details of how moral 
insight is incorporated into action by the agent and I do not wish to diminish the very 
real issues at stake in these debates. Nonetheless, I believe it is possible to identify 
two thinly defined features that provide the core of a wide variety of different accounts 
of moral agency. These are: (F1) Self-Regulation and (F2) Self-Governance. I will 
discuss each in turn.  
                                                          
1 For two classic statements see Elizabeth Anscombe (2000), who defines intentional action as ‘…ones 
to which a certain sense of the question ‘why?’ has application’ (Anscombe 2000: §6), and Donald 
Davidson who proposes the following definition of agency: ‘A man is the agent of an act if what he 
does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional’ (Davidson 1980: 46).  
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The term self-regulation aims to capture the sense in which a moral agent is said 
to evaluate, approve of, endorse, commit to etc. a desire, motivation, mental state, 
incentive or reason according to his or her moral insight. That is, F1 aims to capture 
what we might term the cognitive dimension of moral agency. By way of illustration, 
take two variants of F1 representative of two dominant approaches to moral 
philosophy, Humean and Kantian.  
In Humean moral psychology, self-regulation (F1) is sometimes conceived of in 
terms of a species of meta-cognition whereby the agent approves of or disapproves of 
occurent mental states according to the agent’s moral insight. As Julia Driver puts it, 
Moral agency, as opposed to mere or simple agency, is the agency that 
underlies distinctly moral action. This is understood in contrast to other sorts 
of agency. So, for example, what I term “mere” agency is the sort of agency 
that one sees in animal behaviour as well as a good deal of human behaviour. 
This is the result of features of psychology such as beliefs and desires, motives, 
intentions. However, mere agency is not regulated fully in the same way as 
moral agency. I may regulate mere agency in the following way: I desire an 
ice cream cone, and believe that I can get one at the local supermarket. It turns 
out that the local supermarket has stopped selling ice cream cones. Once I find 
this out, I change my plans. That’s a kind of regulation in which agency is 
sensitive to new information...However, the sort of self-regulation involved in 
distinctly moral agency involves approval or disapproval of the mental states 
themselves. And the approval/disapproval is of a distinctly moral sort – rather 
than, say, aesthetic. (Driver 2014: 124) 
On this broadly Humean view, self-regulation is viewed as a distinctly moral 
mode of meta-cognition in which an agent approves or disapproves of an occurent 
mental state according to their moral insight. Importantly for Humeans such as 
Driver, self-regulation need not involve conscious deliberation; it can also be more 
(although not wholly) ‘automatic,’ as with the adjustments of one’s attitudes ‘via cues 
that we get from others we are interacting with. A frown, a lifted eyebrow, a sceptical 
sound…’ (Driver 2014: 126). 
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By contrast, on the synthesised Kantian-Aristotelian view presented by 
Christine Korsgaard, self-regulation is seen to be almost co-extensive with the 
deliberative stance: 
The view which I take Kant and Aristotle to share is this: when human beings 
act, we are not driven or directly caused to act by desire, passion, inclination, 
or instinct. Some incentive, to use Kant’s language, presents a certain course 
of action to us as eligible – it suggests to us that we might undertake a certain 
course of action to realize a certain end. But reason gives us the capacity to 
stand back, form a view of this course of action as a whole, and make a 
judgment about its goodness. This isn’t a judgment about whether it is useful. 
It is a judgment about its goodness considered as an action, not as a mere 
production. (Korsgaard 2008: 192) 
Here, self-regulation is described in terms of the agent’s taking up a reflective, 
deliberative stance in relation to an incentive for action in order to evaluate its 
goodness, where the implication is that for Korsgaard more ‘automatic’ self-regulation 
would not count as moral in the required sense. Despite these differences there is a 
central point of convergence between these two competing conceptions of self-
regulation which justifies the following definition. 
(Def) F1: Self-Regulation = the evaluation of one’s desires, mental states, 
motivations or incentives according to one’s moral insight. 
F1 alone, however, is not a sufficient condition for moral agency to obtain. 
Whilst F1 provides a sense in which moral agency is distinctively moral, it does not 
account for the sense in which moral agency is conative, efficacious or, more broadly, 
agential – even though this conative dimension may be implicit in some descriptions 
of F1. Thus, F1 is often combined with some variant of (F2) Self-Governance, where 
this term stands for what has been ‘characterised by turns as autonomy, reflective self-
control, guidance by the agent, direction by the agent, rational control, agential authority, and 
so forth’ (Katsafanas 2011: 222). That is, the term self-governance designates a mode 
of activity constitutive of moral agency whereby the agent can be seen to actively 
bring about or perform actions on the basis of F1.  
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Two canonical iterations of F2 can be found in the philosophies of Aristotle 
and Kant, respectively. Aristotle conceives of moral agency as constituted in part by 
the capacity for voluntary action. That is, briefly, a moral agent is seen to be the cause 
or origin of an action in the sense that the action she performs or the behaviour she 
expresses conforms to her reasoned judgment.2 And, though he takes the idea in a 
different direction, F2 is even more readily associated with Kant, for whom moral 
agency involves the agent’s capacity to act on the basis of a law she gives to herself.3  
In contemporary debates, commentators coming from a broadly Kant-inspired 
perspective such as R. Jay Wallace, Michael Bratman, J. David Velleman, Joseph Raz 
and, of course, Korsgaard herself advocate for strong variants of F2.4 Thus, for 
instance, Wallace writes that 
Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent’s acknowledgement of 
reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the 
alternatives for actions that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose 
that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who 
possess certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to 
beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the 
higher animals are arguably capable. (Wallace 2004: 141) 
And Velleman argues that 
The agent is moved to his action, not only by his original motive for it, but 
also by his desire to act on that original motive, because of its superior rational 
force. This latter contribution to the agent’s behaviour is the contribution of 
an attitude that performs the functions definitive of agency; it is therefore, 
functionally speaking, the agent’s contribution to the causal order. (Velleman 
2000: 141) 
Both Wallace and Velleman, then, advocate a strong variant of F2 in which the 
moral agent is seen to hold the capacity to exert a high degree of active control in the 
performance of her actions. Moreover, in the above quoted passages, one can clearly 
see how F1 and F2 combine in the constitution of moral agency: the agent’s 
                                                          
2 See e.g. Broadie, S., 1991: §3 and Raffoul, F., 2010: §1. 
3 See Kant, I., 2008: e.g. 4:432-433 and e.g. Allison, H., 1993: §5.  
4 See Wallace (2004); Bratman (2007); Velleman (2000); Raz (1999) and Korsgaard (2008).  
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acknowledgement or approval of  reasons, desires or incentives for action as being 
normative (F1) is integrated into the agent’s performance of an action through the 
agent’s self-governing or autonomous ‘volitional powers’ (F2).5 
Similarly, Philippa Foot, who propounds a naturalistic neo-Aristotelian 
account of ethical life, also appears to adhere to a variant of F2: 
[T]o speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his 
body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational 
will [Fn. As an approximation, we may say ‘will as controllable by reason’]. 
(Foot 2001: 14) 
Here, Foot contends that when we appraise others according to moral 
predicates, what we are appraising is not – or should not be – their accidental 
attributes, but rather their exercising of their rational will. Clearly, there exist 
significant differences between Foot’s own view of the nature and ground of F2 and 
Kant’s, but she nonetheless agrees with him that some variant of F2 is a central feature 
of our lives as moral agents.  
The capacity for self-governance is sometimes interpreted as bringing with it 
a sense that in acting on the basis of F1, human agents are not only self-consciously 
‘taking control’ of their beliefs and actions, so to speak, but they are also ‘constituting’ 
the selves they strive to be and the practical identities they inhabit in a distinctly 
normative way. Christine Korsgaard, for instance, claims that 
The capacity for normative self-government brings with it another 
distinctively human attribute, normative self-conception, perhaps more than 
anything else the thing that makes being human both an adventure and a 
curse. For an action is a movement attributable to an agent as its author, and 
                                                          
5 The terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ are incredibly protean. For the sake of simplicity, and given 
the context of my discussion, I follow Korsgaard’s (1996) use the terms to denote the moral authority 
or bindingness of a reason (in the case of Korsgaard) or another person (as we shall see is the case for 
Løgstrup) for action. Thinkers such as Stephen Crowell (2013) and Sacha Golob (2014) use the terms 
to describe the ‘rules’ constitutive of the concept of an object or activity which provide standards 
against which a given object or activity can be judged. On this view, for instance, the ‘rules’ governing 
the concept of being a teacher provide normative standards against which a teacher can be judged. I 
do not primarily have this latter meaning in mind when I use the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ 
in the present study.  
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that means that whenever you choose an action – whenever you take control 
of your own movements – you are constituting yourself as the author of that 
action, and so you are deciding who to be. (Korsgaard 2009: xi) 
This sort of view resonates strongly with neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, where 
great emphasis is placed on the importance of character formation and virtuous self-
cultivation. As we shall see below, Alasdair MacIntyre propounds a view of this sort.6 
Philosopher’s inspired by Hume’s moral psychology are typically more 
ambivalent about the scope and power of F2. Yet, even these more parsimonious 
accounts of moral agency often maintain a variant of F2 – albeit in a weaker form. 
Thus, Harry Frankfurt, for example, employs the compatibilist notion of ‘second-
order volition’ to denote the capacity of the moral agent to identify herself with a first-
order desire, which in exemplary cases governs whether or not that first-order desire 
is efficacious.7 And even the so-called ‘morality critic,’ Bernard Williams, allows for 
some version of F2, as is evident when he writes that: 
A clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that 
one has reason to φ because φ-ing would be the most convenient, economical, 
pleasant, etc. way of satisfying some element of S [one’s motivational set], and 
this of course is controlled by other elements in S, if not necessarily in a very 
clear or determinate way. But there are much wider possibilities for 
deliberations…As a result of such processes an agent can come to see that he 
has reason to do something which he did not see he had reason to do at all. In 
this way, the deliberative process can add new actions for which there are 
internal reasons, just as it can add new internal reasons for given actions. The 
                                                          
6 Another way of construing this thought is as the supposition natural to us moderns that ‘we ‘have’ 
or are ‘a self’ [and] that human agency is essentially defined as ‘the self’ (Taylor 1989: 177). Naturally, 
there are differences in how this thought is fleshed out. Some argue, directly, that ‘to speak of a 
self…is to speak of an agent, that is, some principle of activity and volition’ (Zahavi 2005: 100). On this 
view, then, the self, insofar as it names a foundational ‘principle of volition,’ is a precondition for the 
possibility of moral action (see e.g. Heinrich (1994)). Others, such as MacIntyre, conceive of the 
relation between the self and agency in ‘narrativist’ terms, whereby the term ‘self’ designates ‘an 
enduring agent with a determinate past and an open-ended future’ (Zahavi 2005: 18). According to 
this view, the self emerges as a referent within the narratives and stories we tell ourselves in 
rendering our actions intelligible. Thus, the self is a requirement for intelligible actions, where this, of 
course, has implications for the possibility of rational moral action. Of course, some deny that there is 
such a thing as a self, perhaps suggesting with Daniel Dennett that the self is an illusion, and thereby 
throw into question any relation of requirement between the self and agency (c.f. Zahavi 2005: pp. 
110-112). As we shall see in §4, how Løgstrup conceives of the self and its relation to agency will be of 
critical importance in answering the question of moral agency.   
7 See Frankfurt, H., 2007: §2.  
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deliberative process can also subtract elements from S. (Williams 1981: 104-
5) 
Whilst Williams disagrees with thinkers such as Korsgaard as concerns issues 
such as the source of normativity and the nature of practical reasoning, he appears to 
agree that some form of self-governance – i.e. the agent’s capacity to actively 
contribute to the performance of actions in light of her moral insight - is a constitutive 
feature of moral agency.  
With these examples of three dominant approaches to F2 in hand, we can 
venture the following definition: 
(Def) F2: Self-Governance = The capacity for the agent to actively bring him 
or herself into identity with his or her moral insight in the performance of 
actions. 
These two features, F1 and F2, form the core of what I am calling the standard 
conception of moral agency, or, for short, moral agency1. In other words, they are 
features often taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions for the constitution of 
moral agency.  
Naturally, there are exceptions to the standard view.8 But it nonetheless forms a 
dominant view in the domain of practical philosophy. And we might think that this is 
the case with good reason. After all, it is natural to suppose that some of our basic 
moral concepts depend on some combination of F1 and F2 for their intelligibility. Take 
just one example: responsibility. As the above-cited passage from Foot suggests, our 
everyday practice of holding others responsible seems to rely on an implicit 
                                                          
8 Here we might think, for example, of incompatibalists such as P. F. Strawson (2008) or of certain 
passages in Nietzsche which appear to suggest that agency is an illusion. Cf. ‘We laugh at him who 
steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says, ‘I will that 
the sun shall rise’; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: ‘I will that it shall roll’; and at him 
who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: ‘here I lie, but I will lie here!’  But, all laughter aside, are 
we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression: ‘I will’’ (Nietzsche 
1997: §124). 
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commitment to the truth of moral agency1, namely, that we moral agents have the 
capacity to govern the actions we perform in light of our moral evaluation and 
endorsement of occurent desires, mental states, incentives or motivations for action.9 
For Foot, like many others, it is with respect to this capacity that we typically 
distinguish between spheres of life that are legitimately open to moral praise and 
censure, and spheres of life that are not. 
1.2. A Preliminary Sketch of Løgstrup’s Phenomenology of Ethical 
Comportment 
In this section, my aim will be to provide a preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment such as can serve as a minimally plausible 
position against which I can raise the question of moral agency (in 1.3.). I shall begin 
with the parable of the Good Samaritan, which is seen by Løgstrup as a paradigm of 
ethical action. The parable is a didactic story told by Jesus and recorded in Luke 10: 
25-37 in which Jesus eludes to the nature of agapic love as demanded by God’s law. In 
it we learn of a Jewish traveller attacked by robbers while on the road from Jerusalem 
to Jericho. Left to languish by the side of the road, he is passed first by a priest, and 
then by a Levite who pay him no heed. Finally, he is approached by a Samaritan, a 
traditional enemy of the Jews. The Samaritan has mercy on the injured traveller, 
administering aid, providing transportation, food and shelter to the traveller at his 
own expense. In a word, the Samaritan’s merciful actions exemplify agapic love; they 
show what it is to love one’s neighbour.10   
                                                          
9 Another, more contentious, example would be the principle ‘Ought Implies Can.’ That is, the 
practice of making and accepting moral and social demands is often thought to imply that the agent 
subject to the demand has the active capacity to meet those demands. As we shall see, Løgstrup’s 
conception of the ethical demand contravenes this principle. For an interesting challenge to this 
principle relevant to Løgstrup’s ethics see Martin (2009; 2017). 
10 N. B. In Løgstrup’s native Danish, the Good Samaritan is known as the merciful Samaritan (den 
barmjertige Samaritan). 
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Løgstrup repeatedly appeals to this parable in his later writings as a paradigm 
case of spontaneous ethical action or ‘good works’ (BED: 76; 144-5).11 And I take this 
appeal to be uncontroversial; after all, in a certain sense, the parable of the Good 
Samaritan is supposed to represent a paradigm of ethical action. The issue here, then, 
is not whether the parable of the Good Samaritan is plausible as a paradigm of ethical 
action, but how Løgstrup interprets the parable and whether his phenomenology of it 
is plausible.  
In his most sustained discussion of the parable, Løgstrup disambiguates the core 
of his own phenomenological approach to the Good Samaritan’s showing of mercy by 
contrasting it with what he calls the ‘ethics of custom’ [sædelighed/Sittlichkeit] and 
the ‘ethics of duty’ [moral/Moralität], respectively. 12  This key passage is worth 
quoting in full: 
Hegel and Kierkegaard are incorrect in thinking that once the ethics of the 
community has been undermined, the existence of the good or the recognition 
of it are conditional on the human capacities for abstraction, for thinking in 
generalities, for relating to the idea, with a relational duplication of the spirit 
being required for the attainment of the ethical. In any given situation, before 
duty can begin to be relevant, the spontaneous expression of life – trust, mercy, 
sincerity, and so on – is called forth. Not that it is a matter of engaging with 
                                                          
11 Although I do not want to prejudge Løgstrup’s use of the term spontaneity at this early stage in my 
discussion, it is nonetheless important to block a potential misunderstanding right away. When 
Løgstrup uses the term spontaneity [spontanitet] he does not mean a volitional capacity to freely give 
oneself the law, as with Kant. Løgstrup’s use of the term spontaneity, however, is protean and we will 
only be able to grasp it when we have a more comprehensive picture of Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology in view.   
12 Bjørn Rabjerg (forthcoming) has noted that Løgstrup’s analysis encourages a terminological 
distinction between ethics and morality in which ethics would denote a pre-cultural standard and 
morality, a cultural set of norms. Løgstrup himself, however, does not consistently follow this 
terminological distinction. In contrast to Rabjerg, I have chosen not to impose his proposed 
terminological distinction in my interpretation of Løgstrup. This is because there is a complicating 
factor at play, namely, Løgstrup’s important discussion of sædelighed, i.e. Sittlichkeit, and moral, i.e. 
Moralität, discussed here. As the translator of Løgstrup’s text has noted, ‘Løgstrup uses the Danish 
terms moral and moralsk to refer indiscriminately to both traditional and reflective morality’ (BED: 81 
fn. 4). Furthermore, in the English translation the term ‘ethics’ is used both in rendering sædelighed 
as well as rendering the primitive normativity contained within the sovereign expressions of life. 
Because of these complications, rather than making a strict terminological distinction between 
‘morality’ and ‘ethics,’ I allow the varying contexts in which these terms come up give definition to 
their usage.  
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the expression of life, as though it were that we needed to relate to. So doing 
would be tantamount to turning it into a duty with the duplication to which 
duty gives rise, as Hegel and Kierkegaard correctly observe. No, the call to us 
is to engage with the situation – through the corresponding sovereign 
expression of life. As the story comes down to us, it was not a question of the 
Good Samaritan engaging with his own mercifulness in his exercise of it as his 
duty; rather, in his mercifulness, he took charge of the man who had been set 
upon and lay wounded by the roadside. What occupied the Samaritan’s 
thoughts (if we simply take the story as it stands) were the needs of the victim 
and how best to help him. We are told nothing of the Samaritan’s relating to 
his own mercifulness in a recognition that it was something he was duty-
bound to show. (BED: 75-76) 
Much of what is discussed in this passage will only become fully intelligible as 
we proceed: I will discuss the sovereign expressions of life in detail in chapter two, 
and Løgstrup’s interpretation of Kierkegaard will be considered in chapter four, for 
instance. However, a central claim can be parsed from this passage already.  
Løgstrup situates his discussion of the parable within the context of the well-
worn enlightenment narrative of our emergence from a circumscribed pre-
enlightenment world. In the pre-enlightened world, so the story goes, the individual 
agent was bound by customs and norms solely in virtue of their traditional authority. 
The enlightenment breakthrough, however, dared the agent to use her own 
understanding, her own practical rationality, to work out her moral duties. 
Employing the language of Hegel, Løgstrup avers that the enlightenment 
breakthrough inaugurated an ‘age of reflection’ (BED: 75) in which moral agency 
came to be thought of as a matter of engaging one’s capacity for rational reflection, 
rather than merely as a matter of rote conformity to custom and traditional authority.  
Løgstrup invokes the parable of the Good Samaritan here as a challenge to a 
central assumption built in to this narrative.13 Namely, that once the yoke of 
                                                          
13 With respect to his critical stance on the enlightenment, Løgstrup’s position is comparable to those 
of Theodor Adorno and Alasdair MacIntyre (See §5 and §3, respectively, for further discussion). Cf. 
Fabian Freyenhagen’s (2013) discussion of Adorno: ‘…in pre-modern times, people did not need to 
consider the categorical imperative to know what they should morally do – the circumscribed 
universe in which they lived assigned each person a station in life with clear duties (and even if there 
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traditional authority has been shrugged off, the recognition of the good constitutive 
of moral action is revealed to require a particular kind of second-order reflection. We 
find Løgstrup almost satirizing this view with his caricature of the ‘Kantian 
Samaritan’ who, upon encountering the injured traveller – whose needs are in a sense 
obvious - ‘pauses to consider mercy as a duty’ (BED: 76) rather than ‘taking charge’ 
of the injured traveller. Against this enlightenment narrative, Løgstrup claims that 
some ‘ethical contexts,’ such as the Samaritan’s encounter of the injured traveller,  
are not well illuminated if one contents oneself with a concentration on the 
tension between the radical ethical demand and juridical, moral, and 
conventional norms: between the abstract, undetermined self and the ethics of 
custom. A third phenomenon has a part to play: the sovereign expressions of 
life. (BED: 75) 
In other words, Løgstrup is claiming that the binary putatively characteristic 
of enlightenment thought – that is, the binary between rote conformity to social 
norms and the reflective moral agent of enlightenment - is unsatisfactory. And 
Løgstrup sees the parable of the Good Samaritan as illustrating the need for a more 
nuanced conception of ethical life and moral agency. More generally, Løgstrup can be 
seen to be rebuking a dominant tendency he sees in modern European philosophy of 
characterizing moral agency in either overly abstract, formal terms or else, in a 
relativizing mode, dismissing the self’s agency as mere adherence to the public norms 
of ‘the crowd.’14 
                                                          
was doubt in a particular case, there was a clear arbitration mechanism in matters of morality – for 
example asking the local priest). It is our modern social world that both makes it more pressing to 
have a mechanism for finding out what to do (for it is no longer self-evident within this world) and 
makes such mechanisms – including the categorical imperative but presumably also consequentialist 
tests – even more impossible to use, for this world has become so vast and complex in its working 
that it has become harder to identify causal factors and likely consequences as well as to apportion 
individual responsibility’ (Freyenhagen 2013: 113-4). Cf. MacIntyre (2007a) §§4-6.  
14 Commenting on Kierkegaard in his Berlin lectures, for instance, Løgstrup writes that ‘an opposition 
that one always confronts in engaging with Kierkegaard’s work, and which appears to permeate his 
thought completely, expresses itself in the alternatives of either living as an individual or going under 
in the crowd […] in [the crowd] a decision in the proper sense can never be made. The decision, which 
is essentially only to be found in the individual, is looked for outside the self, in the opinion of the 
social environment, in public opinion, in village gossip. Or, in other words, man cannot here ever act 
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By contrast, the core of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan rests in the deceptively simple claim that the Good Samaritan’s merciful 
responsiveness to the needs of the injured traveller reflected a form of pre-cultural, 
non-reflective spontaneous responsiveness to the needs of the traveller. The 
Samaritan’s mercifulness is, for Løgstrup, irreducible to either to conformity to 
traditional authority and custom (recall, the injured traveller was a traditional enemy 
of the Samaritan) or to abstract moral reflection (on Løgstrup’s interpretation, the 
Samaritan simply got on with the task at hand, rather than reflecting on the right and 
the good).  
More specifically, Løgstrup goes on to characterize the spontaneous 
responsiveness of the Good Samaritan’s showing of mercy as ‘pre-moral’ (BED: 77). 
What he means by this puzzling locution is not that the Samaritan’s showing of mercy 
fell outside of the domain of ethics. Indeed, a paragraph before invoking the term ‘pre-
moral,’ he implies that the Samaritan’s showing of mercy represents ‘morality in the 
best sense of the word’ (BED: 76).15 The spontaneity ‘accruing’ (BED: 80) to the 
Samaritan’s showing of mercy is pre-moral in the sense that the Samaritan’s merciful 
responsiveness to the situation of the injured traveller was not the product of a 
distinctly moral sort of meta-cognition or a self-regulating deliberative process 
whereby, for instance, the Samaritan is seen to have represented ‘mercy’ to himself as 
a worthy motivation for action. Rather, mercy was elicited purely by the situation and 
circumstances of the injured traveller: The Good Samaritan’s merciful comportment 
                                                          
in an ethical sense. For action in a real sense, sensu eminenti…is the inner action of the decision’ 
(KHE: 9-11).  
15 Moreover, in later texts he claims that sovereign expressions of life such as mercy are ‘inherently 
ethical’ (BED: 135) in that they are ‘ethically descriptive phenomena’ (BED: 114), that is, they are 
phenomena that cannot be described in a ‘value-indifferent mode;’ ‘the conception of them as 
good…cannot be detached from their descriptions’ (ibid.). 
28 
 
to the injured traveller was not mediated or regulated by the thought that ‘mercy’ is 
a morally appropriate disposition or incentive in the given context. 
Clearly, one upshot of this claim is that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan contrasts sharply with the feature of moral agency I 
have labelled F1: on Løgstrup’s view, the Samaritan’s actions were not regulated by a 
distinctly moral kind of meta-cognition or rational deliberation; they were 
spontaneous. Indeed, a central claim of underlying Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
is that phenomena such as mercy cannot withstand being treated as normative reasons 
for action that the agent takes up or acts on in light of their normative force: to treat 
mercy in this way will result in ersatz or inauthentic versions of the genuine 
phenomena.16  
Moreover, in this description we can also begin to see how Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of the parable of the Good Samaritan contrasts with F2. As we shall 
see in more detail as we proceed, an important aspect of Løgstrup’s phenomenology 
of ethical comportment consists in the claim that in cases such as the Good 
Samaritan’s, the agent’s freedom is not expressed in terms of a freedom for self-
governance; a freedom to bring oneself in line with one’s moral insight through the 
                                                          
16 Cf. ‘[B]y calling mercy spontaneous, we mean that acts of mercy are elicited solely by the condition 
or situation in which the other finds himself, without the merciful agent deriving any benefit from his 
deeds, not for himself nor for any third party or institution. Mercy is spontaneous because the least 
interruption, the least calculation, the least dilution of it in the service of something else destroys it 
entirely…Its radicalness consists not in any masterly feat but simply in the fact that the least ulterior 
motive is excluded. If the sovereign expression of life is wanting, it does not mean that we must 
abandon the outcome of agency to which it was directed. That can still be aimed at, except that, with 
the attitude of mind falling short, it is now aimed at as an outcome demanded’ (BED: 85). John D. 
Caputo has captured the core intuition lying behind the kind of thought Løgstrup is articulating here 
well in relation to love, writing that ‘if a man asks a woman (I am quite open to other permutations of 
this formula) “do you love me?” and if, after a long and awkward pause and considerable 
deliberation, she replies with wrinkled brow, “well, up to a certain point, under certain conditions, to 
a certain extent,” then we can be sure that whatever it is she feels for this poor fellow it is not love 
and this relationship is not going to work out. For if love is the measure, the only measure of love is 
love without measure (Augustine again). One of the ideas behind “love” is that it represents a giving 
without holding back, an “unconditional” commitment, which marks love with a certain Excess’ 
(Caputo 2001: 4). 
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performance of actions. Rather, on Løgstrup’s view, the Samaritan was ‘overwhelmed’ 
(BED: 68) by mercy and, thus, his capacity for autonomous self-governance was 
incapacitated, so to speak. That is, on Løgstrup’s interpretation, the Samaritan’s 
showing of mercy is not expressive of his capacity for self-governance, but, 
conversely, of his having been overtaken by the mercy called for in the interpersonal 
encounter.   
Intuitively, I take this point to be phenomenologically compelling considering 
the class of phenomena Løgstrup is interested in. It is natural to suppose that merciful 
actions, loving actions, trusting actions etc. are not governed by the self to the same 
degree that, say, dutiful actions are. Martha Nussbaum has captured an intuition of 
this kind acutely in her writings on emotion. In Upheavals of Thought, she writes of 
their [i.e. the emotions’] urgency and heat; their tendency to take over the 
personality and move it to action with overwhelming force; their connection 
with important attachments, in terms of which a person defines her life; the 
person’s sense of passivity before them; their apparently adversarial relation 
to “rationality” in the sense of cool calculation or cost-benefit analysis; their 
close connections with one another, as hope alternates uneasily with fear, as a 
single event transforms hope into grief, as grief, looking about for a cause, 
expresses itself in anger, as all these can be the vehicles of an underlying love. 
(Nussbaum 2001: 22) 
Now, we must be cautious in drawing a direct analogy between Løgstrup’s 
sovereign expressions of life, such as mercy, and affective phenomena such as 
emotions or even moral sentiments.17 However, it is nonetheless instructive to 
compare Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the Good Samaritan’s mercifulness with 
                                                          
17 There is a risk that in interpreting the sovereign expressions of life in such a way as to present them 
as emotions, one ends up portraying Løgstrup as a kind of moral sentimentalist. The nature of 
Løgstrup’s divergence from moral sentimentalism is principally methodological. Thus, we will only 
come to see the nature and extent of this divergence as we move on to consider Løgstrup’s 
methodology in more detail in the next chapter. Yet, in order to block any potential 
misunderstanding, it is worth noting Stokes’s insightful comment that ‘what Løgstrup claims to offer 
is nothing less than an account of the wellspring of ethics, grounded in certain experiences that 
present themselves as normatively compelling prior to and independently of our evaluations of them. 
Løgstrup seeks to locate a normative experiential substratum for ethical discourse, but one that is 
phenomenologically self-validating (unlike the “moral sentiments” of Hutchison and Hume, whose 
normativity can be affirmed only through theoretical evaluation)’ (Stokes 2017: 275).  
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Nussbaum’s descriptions here. The key points of convergence are that Nussbaum’s 
emotions and Løgstrup’s expressions of life overwhelm the self; they render the self 
seemingly passive to a significant degree and disable the agent’s capacity for 
‘“rationality” in the sense of cool calculation.’ The difference is that Løgstrup, in his 
phenomenology of the parable of the Good Samaritan, is concerned to disclose a 
distinct class of immediate and spontaneous ethical actions (good works) that are 
driven not by social norms, moral principles or sentiments, but rather by a primitive 
normativity inherent in the structure of interpersonal interaction. 
With this preliminary sketch in hand, we can already begin to see the extent 
to which Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment differs from the standard 
conception of moral agency. On Løgstrup’s interpretation, the Good Samaritan’s 
responsiveness to the situation of the injured traveller is not well described in terms 
of self-regulation (F1) and self-governance (F2), but is rather expressive of a 
spontaneous and self-forgetful responsiveness to a primitive normative claim. In order 
to sharpen these points of contrast and to increase the plausibility of Løgstrup’s 
position, I will illustrate what I take Løgstrup’s basic position to be by way of an 
example.  
Consider the following scene from Vasily Grossman’s harrowing novel about 
the battle of Stalingrad, Life and Fate: 
Some German prisoners were carrying out Russian corpses from the cellar of 
a two-storey building that had once been the headquarters of the Gestapo. In 
spite of the cold, a group of women, boys and old men were standing beside 
the sentry watching the Germans lay out the corpses on the frozen earth. […] 
On the stretcher lay the corpse of an adolescent girl. Her body was shrivelled 
and dried up; only her blonde hair kept its warm life and colour, falling in 
disorder round the terrible blackened face of a dead bird. The crowd gave a 
quiet gasp. 
The squat woman let out a shrill cry. Her voice cut through the cold air like a 
blade. ‘My child! My child! My golden child!’ 
[…] 
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The woman got to her feet and strode towards the officer. Everyone was 
struck by the way she kept her eyes fixed on him and yet at the same time 
managed to find a brick that wasn’t part of a great frozen heap – a brick that 
even her poor hand could pick up, her poor weak hand that had been deformed 
by years of labour, that had been scalded by boiling water, icy water and lye. 
[…]  
The woman could no longer see anything except the face of the German with 
the handkerchief round his mouth. Not understanding what was happening to 
her, governed by a power she had just now seemed to control, she felt in the 
pocket of her jacket for a piece of bread that had been given to her the evening 
before by a soldier. She held it out to the German and said: ‘There, have 
something to eat.’ 
Afterwards, she was unable to understand what happened to her, why she had 
done this. Her life was to be full of moments of humiliation, helplessness and 
anger, full of petty cruelties that made her lie awake at night, full of brooding 
resentment. 
[…] 
At one such moment, lying in her bed, full of bitterness, she was to remember 
that winter morning outside the cellar and think: ‘I was a fool then, and I’m 
still a fool now. (Grossman 1985: 803-6) 
This scene exemplifies mercy in a way that parallels the parable of the Good 
Samaritan in certain key respects. Firstly, its context is an interaction between 
enemies, a Nazi soldier and a Soviet mother whose daughter had presumably been 
killed at the hands of the Nazis. And, secondly, it portrays an ethical act in the sense 
that the Soviet mother treats the Nazi soldier not as a Nazi soldier, an enemy and a 
monster, but rather as a neighbour.  
Beyond these initial points, from a Løgstrupian perspective this scene captures 
a mode of responsiveness to the plight of another, that is, a form of ethical 
responsiveness, which cannot be easily accommodated by the standard conception of 
moral agency. Firstly, the Soviet Mother’s actions do not appear to have been 
regulated or mediated by her moral insight. In fact, she thought herself a fool for 
acting as she did: giving bread to the Nazi soldier was not something she felt duty-
bound to do, nor was she moved by a distinctly moral form of meta-cognition to help 
the pitiful solider. And her self-sacrifice certainly did not accord with the social or 
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cultural norms of her milieu. Rather, from a Løgstrupian perspective, the Soviet 
Mother’s responsiveness to the Nazi soldier was pre-moral and spontaneous; it was 
not regulated by the Soviet Mother’s moral insight about what she ought to do or 
what would be good and right (as per F1) - and yet it was expressive of an elemental 
ethical responsiveness to the suffering of others, namely, mercy. 
Furthermore, the scene from Life and Fate illustrates Løgstrup’s contestation 
of F2. Consider in this relation Grossman’s description of the moment that the Soviet 
mother reached for the bread in her pocket. He writes that she did not understand 
what was happening to her and that she was ‘governed by a power she had just now 
seemed to control.’ That is, the Soviet mother did not have autonomous self-control 
at the moment where she reached for the bread in her pocket; it is not something she 
chose to do or controlled in any straightforward way. We might say that the 
mercifulness out of which the Soviet mother acted governed her just as much as – 
perhaps even more than - she governed it. This kind of observation is of critical 
importance in Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, as we shall see in further chapters: 
as concerns situations such as the Soviet mother’s, the agent typically does not 
exercise the kind of self-governing control as described in F2. Hence, a central claim 
that emerges in his moral phenomenology is that concerning merciful actions it is the 
phenomenon (i.e. mercy) that is ‘sovereign’ and not the agent who realizes them.  
In this section I have sought to preliminarily establish two things: (1) that 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment is at least minimally plausible, i.e. 
that his interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan to some extent rings true 
and (2) that his phenomenology of moral comportment, as exemplified by his 
interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan, appears prima facie incompatible 
with moral agency1. I have suggested that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the parable 
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of the Good Samaritan aims to capture a mode of primitive and immediate ethical 
responsiveness – viz. mercifulness – that precludes both F1, in the sense that, on 
Løgstrup’s view, the Samaritan’s mercifulness was not regulated by his moral insight, 
and F2, in the sense that, according to Løgstrup, the Samaritan’s actions were not 
expressive of autonomous self-governance, but rather of being overtaken by the 
ethical task at hand. In clarifying these points by appealing to an illustration external 
to Løgstrup’s thinking, I hope to have increased the initial plausibility of Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Thus, we can make the 
following claim: 
(Claim) Løgstrup presents a plausible phenomenology of moral comportment 
that is prima facie incompatible with moral agency1.18   
In the next section, I will use this claim to animate the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics.  
1.3. The Question of Moral Agency for Løgstrup’s Ethics 
In this section, my aim is to animate what I shall call the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics, namely, (Q1) what conception of moral agency, if any, is 
compatible with Løgstrup’s ethics? I will begin by disambiguating Q1 from two other 
closely related questions; (Q2) the normative question and (Q3) the problem of free 
will. Then I will establish that Løgstrup is committed to providing a positive response 
to Q1, before suggesting that, given the apparent incompatibility of his moral 
phenomenology with moral agency1, Løgstrup confronts a dilemma precisely in 
providing a positive response to Q1.  
                                                          
18 It is important to stress that Løgstrup does not deny that moral agency1 might accurately describe a 
mode of moral agency. Indeed, he appears to affirm it (BED: 77-79). Rather, he is denying that moral 
agency1 exhaustively accounts for moral action; specifically, he denies that moral agency1 can 
account for spontaneous ethical action.  
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Firstly, disambiguation. In this thesis I am interested in establishing whether 
there is an account of the constitutive conditions and fundamental structures of moral 
agency that is compatible with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment, as 
sketched in 1.2. We have already encountered some potential difficulties in 
disambiguating this question from other, broader questions. We have seen, for 
instance, that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology centres around his articulation of a 
distinctive normative foundation for morality, viz. the sovereign expressions of life. 
Therefore, it is necessary to be absolutely clear about what question I am trying to 
answer in the thesis and what questions I am not trying to answer.  
Firstly, then, I am not trying to answer what Korsgaard has dubbed ‘the 
normative question:’ 
(Q2) ‘[W]hat justifies the claims morality makes on us’ (Korsgaard 1996: 9-
10)? 
That is, I am not attempting to show that Løgstrup’s appeal to phenomena such as 
mercy, love, trust etc. provides a justification for the normativity of morality in the 
face of sceptical worries. Nor am I defending Løgstrup’s claims that the sovereign 
expressions of life constitute the source of normativity. This does not mean that I 
uncritically accept Løgstrup’s claims on this issue; however, I am bracketing questions 
concerning the sources of normativity in order to focus on the question of agency. 
Secondly, I am not trying to answer the problem of free will: 
(Q3) Is it possible to reconcile an element of freedom within a causally 
determined natural world? 
The need to disambiguate Q1 from Q3 arises from the issues surrounding Løgstrup’s 
commitment to certain aspects of Luther’s theology, which I address in §3. More 
specifically, we shall see that Løgstrup appears to be committed to a version of 
Luther’s claim that the will is not free with respect to its justification or salvation, 
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where this places a constraining condition on the will’s capacity to bring about ‘good 
works’ (i.e. spontaneous ethical action (BED: 69)), such as the merciful action 
exemplified by the Good Samaritan, through its own efforts. However, what is at stake 
in Løgstrup’s discussions here is not primarily the question as to whether the will is 
free or determined, but rather questions of human nature and our capacity for 
normative self-governance. In a word, the problem that animates this part of 
Løgstrup’s ethic is: is the self wholly wicked? And, if so, what possibilities remain for 
moral action? Given the peculiarity of this kind of question to the modern, secular 
mind and the importance of Løgstrup’s conclusions with respect to it for his moral 
philosophy, I do attempt in §3 to render Løgstrup’s claims concerning the wickedness 
of the self intelligible. However, this work is ancillary to answering Q1, which iterates 
the chief problem of this study: 
(Q1) What plausible conception of moral agency, if any, is compatible with 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment?  
Q1 naturally arises from my preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of 
ethical comportment in 1.2. There we saw what Løgstrup takes to be a paradigm of 
ethical action, viz. the merciful action of the Good Samaritan. But we also saw that his 
phenomenology of the Good Samaritan’s mercifulness appears incompatible with 
moral agency1. Q1 arises from the following premise: 
(Premise1) Moral actions presuppose a moral agent or, what is the same, moral 
agency.  
The thought here is simple: in order for something to count as a moral action it must 
be the product of a moral agent. If Løgstrup’s position is that good works are not the 
product of moral agency, then his position immediately risks incoherence. So, the first 
step in animating Q1 involves showing that Løgstrup is committed to Premise1.  
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Evidence for this can be found in the article ‘Ethics and Ontology’ (1960), 
where Løgstrup stakes out his own ‘ontological’ approach to ethical theory in contrast 
to deontological and teleological moral theories. The key passage is this: 
For Kant only the purely formal determination of the will by reason is 
unconditioned; otherwise the will is conditioned by inclinations such as in 
natural causality. Kant cannot see the third possibility, namely determining 
the will that is neither purely formal (as is that of reason) nor through natural 
causation (as is that of inclinations), but is rather material and at the same time 
obligatory because it arises from the basic givens of existence. (ED: 289-90) 
Again, Kant is his target. For our purposes, however, the significance of this 
passage lies in the fact that it reflects Løgstrup’s commitment to providing a 
distinctive account of moral agency, that is, an account of the constitutive structures 
of moral action, as part of his ‘ontological ethics.’ It is worth noting that Løgstrup’s 
discussion here parallels his discussion of the enlightenment narrative, discussed in 
1.2. In both cases, Løgstrup frames his philosophical task as articulating a sphere of 
agency which differs from deflationary moral theories which reduce moral agency to 
either rote conformity to social norms or psychological determinism (ED: 26619) on 
the one hand, and from moral theories which cast the moral agent as the sovereign, 
autonomous master of her moral actions on the other. He is, in short, searching for a 
‘third possibility’ for accounting for moral action. 
Moreover, there is evidence throughout Løgstrup’s discussions of the 
sovereign expressions of life that strongly suggest he is committed to Premise1. Take, 
for instance, Løgstrup’s assertion in Norm og spontaneitet that ‘the expression of life 
does not determine the behaviour or dictate the action, and it does not preclude 
                                                          
19 The ‘teleological ethics’ he has in view in ‘Ethics and Ontology’ is the following: ‘Often teleological 
ethics is explained in terms of psychological desires. That means: in our attempts at understanding 
what is distinctive about ethical existence, we must respect what science, and in this connection, 
psychology, says about human beings. It reports that human existence is built on a number or 
desires: our entire active life arises from these desires and is moved by them. A human being acts 
thanks to his or her desires as sure as having desires implies wanting to satisfy them’ (ED: 266).  
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rational reflection or judgment. On the contrary, it demands them’ (BED: 132). And 
his claim in Opgør med Kierkegaard that: 
Once a person is under [the] sway [of, e.g, jealousy], agency [handlingen] is 
driven by contingencies. Action is reactive, not sovereign. The individual is 
simply a function of  the situation, whereas in what concerns the sovereign 
expressions of  life the situation is a function of  the agent: we turn the situation 
round through trust, through mercy, through openness. (BED: 53, my 
emphasis) 
These passages strongly suggest that Løgstrup views the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life in spontaneous action in terms of agency rather than in 
terms of determined behaviour, where it is then reasonable to infer that Løgstrup is 
committed to Premise1. 
However, what is less clear is in what way sovereign expressions of life such 
as mercy are related to agency for Løgstrup. Or, in other words, on Løgstrup’s view 
what contribution does moral agency make in the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life and the performance of good works? We have seen in 1.2. that his 
phenomenology of moral comportment is prima facie incompatible with the core 
features of moral agency1. Thus, the contribution of the moral agent to the 
performance of a moral action on Løgstrup’s view prima facie cannot be accounted for 
in terms of F1 and F2 in some combination. An immediate query, thus, presents itself: 
is there any conceptual space in Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology for a plausible 
conception of moral agency?  
In order to animate this dimension of Q1, I will add a further premise: 
(Premise2) All plausible conceptions of moral agency must adhere to the core 
features of moral agency1. 
Clearly, Premise2, while being suggested by my discussion in 1.1., would be 
hard to fully defend. I invoke it here to play a heuristic function. For what it helps us 
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to see is that if Løgstrup is committed to Premise1 but his moral phenomenology is 
incompatible with Premise2 he confronts a dilemma: 
(Dilemma) Either Løgstrup’s paradigmatic case of ethical action presupposes 
moral agency1, in which case his phenomenology is false, or his 
phenomenology is correct but as a consequence his paradigmatic case of ethical 
action turns out not to be ethical action but ‘mere’ or simple action.  
We can add colour to this dilemma by turning to a well-known discussion of moral 
action found in Korsgaard (2008). In this discussion, Korsgaard contrasts two cases 
of action. In the first case a Lioness protects her cubs from a marauding male Lion. In 
the second, a boy called Jack travels to Chicago in order to be with his ailing mother. 
The first case is taken by Korsgaard to represent ‘mere,’ that is, non-moral, action, 
where the second case represents moral action. Now, while Korsgaard accepts that 
both the actions of the Lioness and the actions of Jack can be seen as ‘good’ third-
personally in the sense that they reflect the proper functioning of the form of life to 
which they belong, she argues that only Jack’s action is good in the further, deeper 
sense that justifies calling it moral action. This is because, for Korsgaard, Jack was 
‘motivated by the idea that [his] motives [were] good,’ where ‘this is just a way of 
saying that [moral] action is action that is self-consciously motivated, action whose 
motivation is essentially conscious of its own appropriateness.’ She adds: ‘It is this 
property – consciousness of its own appropriateness – that the Lioness’s motivation lacks’ 
(Korsgaard 2008: 214).  
Admittedly, Korsgaard’s line of argumentation here is controversial and does not 
enjoy the kind of broad assent that moral agency1 does. Nevertheless, it represents a 
dominant view, and one which helps add colour to the above stated dilemma. Since, 
from what we have seen of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment so far, 
it is clear that he would reject Korsgaard’s analysis of Jack’s actions as an explanation 
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of the Good Samaritan’s merciful actions. Yet, in so doing, a burden of proof falls on 
Løgstrup to show what then distinguishes the Good Samaritan’s merciful actions as 
moral actions rather than ‘mere’ non-moral actions, such as the Lioness’s instinctual 
behaviour. Bluntly, given Premise1, the dilemma concerns whether Løgstrup can 
explain why the Good Samaritan’s merciful actions were moral actions without 
appealing to moral agency1.  
Ultimately, I will resolve the dilemma by denying Premise2 and arguing that 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is compatible with what, following the work of 
Béatrice Han-Pile, I shall call a medio-passive mode of agency. Thus, I will provide a 
positive answer to Q1 by suggesting that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is 
compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency, albeit one that differs 
significantly from moral agency1. However, before doing so I will canvass two 
strategies for defusing the dilemma which grasp the first horn of the dilemma, namely, 
that Løgstrup’s paradigmatic case of moral agency presupposes or should presuppose 
moral agency1, but in ways that purport to do minimal damage to Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology. In the following chapters (§§2-3), however, I will argue that these 
two defusing strategies are problematic.  
1.4. Two Strategies for Defusing the Dilemma Raised by the Question of 
Moral Agency for Løgstrup’s Ethics 
1.4.1. A Kantian Defusing Strategy 
Throughout our discussion in 1.2., we saw that Løgstrup often uses Kant’s ethics 
as a foil for elucidating his own moral phenomenology. This is no more evident than 
where he contrasts his own account of the Good Samaritan with a character that he 
dubs the ‘Kantian Samaritan:’  
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[W]e can easily amplify the story and imagine that the Samaritan was 
tempted in the same way as were the priest and the Levite and, eschewing 
engagement with the situation, needed to overcome his resistance by letting 
the duty to duty enter as a fresh and necessary motive. In the deliberations 
prompted by the temptation to pass by and leave the assault victim to his fate, 
the Kantian Samaritan pauses to consider mercy as a duty, which may result 
in conveying the assault victim to the inn and tending his wounds not from 
mercy by from duty…[This] is morality as a substitute… (BED: 76)20 
The contrast Løgstrup is seeking to leverage between the Good Samaritan 
and the Kantian Samaritan concerns F1. And the thought is that if the Good 
Samaritan’s mercifulness was mediated or regulated by his conception of the right, 
where this provided mercifulness – considered as a motivation – with its normativity, 
then the merciful action performed by the Samaritan would no longer be performed 
out of mercy but rather out of duty. And this, Løgstrup argues, amounts to an 
‘introversion’ of the initial merciful motivation in the sense that the Samaritan is no 
longer focused on the injured traveller and their needs, but on his own dutifulness.  
In his paper, ‘“Duty and Virtue are Moral Introversions:” On Løgstrup’s 
Critique of Morality,’ Robert Stern challenges Løgstrup’s line of argumentation 
here.21 Ultimately, the aim of Stern’s paper is to argue that ‘sympathetically viewed, 
both Løgstrup’s Good Samaritan and Kant’s dutiful Samaritan will end up being 
characterized in much the same manner, so that Løgstrup has failed to show that there 
is some ethical element missing in the latter that is present in the former’ (Stern 2015: 
227). In the present context, however, I am not so much interested in the veracity of 
Løgstrup’s claim that the Kantian Samaritan is somehow ethically ‘inferior’ to the 
Good Samaritan. Rather, I am interested in the implications of Stern’s argument as it 
                                                          
20 The locution ‘duty to duty’ employed by Løgstrup here is an allusion to Hegel and his criticism of 
the formalism of Kant’s moral philosophy. See e.g. Hegel 2008: §§133-5. 
21 It is important to note that Stern’s interpretation of Kant differs dramatically from Korsgaard’s. The 
difference, at root, turns on the fact that whereas Korsgaard interprets Kant to be a moral 
constructivist, which would leave him more vulnerable to Løgstrup’s criticisms, Stern interprets Kant 
to be offering a ‘hybrid’ theory, which integrates an element of realism when it comes to the right 
and an element of anti-realism when it comes to obligation. It is on the basis of this interpretation of 
Kant that Stern brokers a rapprochement between Kant and Løgstrup.    
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concerns the consistency of Løgstrup’s putative rejection of F1 in his moral 
phenomenology. For what Stern’s argument suggests is that Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology can be seen to be in fact compatible with a Kantian variant of F1, so 
long as we don’t build any caricatures of Kant into this view.  
Stern begins, then, by dismissing Løgstrup’s claim that on the Kantian view, 
duty acts as a ‘substitute’ motivation for the Kantian Samaritan in place of the needs 
of the injured traveller, where the Kantian Samaritan then supposedly acts ‘not in 
order to save them, but in order to have performed his duty.’ By contrast, Stern argues 
that on a more nuanced Kantian view 
[A]t the primary level, the dutiful agent need not act from duty as a motive, 
perhaps because they are motivated to act by some feeling such as mercifulness 
(Herman, Baron), or because they are simply motivated by the suffering of the 
victim (Stratton-Lake); nonetheless, they only treat this feeling or state of 
affairs as reason giving insofar as they take it to be in line with duty or what 
is right for them to do, where therefore duty functions as a secondary motive, 
regulating the primary one. (Stern 2015: 228) 
Thus, Stern suggests that Løgstrup is wrong to think that the Kantian 
Samaritan is primarily motivated by duty rather than the needs of the traveller. This 
need only be the case if Kant held primary and secondary motivations to be mutually 
exclusive; but Stern claims he did not. Rather, it is consistent with a Kantian view to 
think that both the Good Samaritan and the Kantian Samaritan alike can be seen to 
be motivated by the needs of the traveller at the primary level, where the secondary 
level performs the function of treating the primary motivation as normatively reason 
giving.  
However, a genuine difference between the two conceptions might still obtain 
as concerns the very existence of a secondary level of motivation, where on Stern’s 
interpretation of the Kantian Samaritan it is only in light of a second-order 
commitment to the right that the needs of the other show up as normatively reason 
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giving. Løgstrup’s likely rejoinder here would be that it is in fact precisely this appeal 
to a secondary level of motivation that he has in mind with his characterization of the 
Kantian Samaritan and how he differs from the Good Samaritan. Anticipating this 
rejoinder, Stern argues that while Løgstrup is clearly suspicious of a certain kind of 
second-order activity on the part of the Samaritan, namely, a kind that ‘introverts’ the 
situation by making it about one’s duty rather than the injured traveller, he does not 
appear to be opposed to second-order activity per se. After all, even on Løgstrup’s own 
account, the Samaritan is committed to the good of the injured traveller – he is not 
merely a ‘moral automaton,’ causally moved by the situation.22 In support of this view, 
recall the above-cited passage where Løgstrup suggests that ‘the expression of life 
does not determine the behaviour or dictate the action, and it does not preclude 
rational reflection or judgment. On the contrary, it demands them’ (BED: 132). This 
passage could be seen to allow for a kind of second-order commitment to the good as 
being central to moral action. Indeed, if Løgstrup were to deny even this kind of 
morally-inflected reflection, it would become hard to see in what sense the Samaritan’s 
actions were ethical actions at all, as distinct from the instinctual non-moral behaviour 
of Korsgaard’s Lioness.  
Stern, thus, appears to be on both philosophically and interpretatively sturdy 
ground when he suggests that so long as one does not caricature Kant’s view, the 
claim that the motivational structure of Løgstrup’s Good Samaritan differs 
substantively from a suitably nuanced version of the Kantian Samaritan appears to 
                                                          
22 Cf. ‘The expression of life is what kindles deliberations of the imagination and the intellect about 
what to do’ (BED: 72) and ‘Neither the unconditionality of the expression of life nor the “ought” of 
the norm renders reflection and argument superfluous. The expression of life gives rise to actions, 
and just as unconditional as the expression of life is, so conditional on the given situation and 
circumstances are the actions to which it gives rise. And just as conditional as the action is on the 
situation and its circumstances, so numerous will the reflections and arguments required in the given 
situation be for anyone seeking to determine the right action. In one situation the right course of 
action is obvious, in another it is almost impossible to determine, and in between lie a wide range of 
situations that are more or less clear’ (BED: 130-1). 
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dissolve: since the Kantian Samaritan’s commitment to the right can now be seen to 
operate in much the same manner as Løgstrup’s Good Samaritan’s focus on the good 
of the injured traveller. The upshot of this is, of course, that it reveals Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology to in fact be compatible with F1 – and even that it might yet be 
compatible with a suitably nuanced Kantian version of moral agency1.  
Nothing in this argument, however, addresses the seeming incompatibility of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology with F2. Yet, an implication of Stern’s argument is 
that this seeming incompatibility might now be seen to reflect a contingent difference 
between the respective ‘motivational stories’ of the Good Samaritan and the Kantian 
Samaritan rather than a difference in the kind of moral agency underpinning each 
figure. That is, the real difference between the Good Samaritan and the Kantian 
Samaritan is that the Kantian Samaritan was tempted by a heteronomous inclination 
to pass the traveller by, whereas the Good Samaritan was not. Hence, the Kantian 
Samaritan was, therefore, required to exert his rational will in order to bring his 
actions in line with the right. Stern goes on to note that the fact that both Løgstrup 
and Kant identify this difference as being morally significant perhaps yields yet more 
common ground between Løgstrup’s and Kant’s ethical views. For just as Løgstrup 
invokes the two contrasting Samaritans in order to show the ethical failings of the 
Kantian Samaritan in contrast to the exemplary actions of the Good Samaritan, 
Kant had his own grounds for treating the dutiful [i.e. Kantian] agent as less 
than ethically ideal in certain crucial respects: for, the fact that duty and 
obligation figure so centrally in our moral lives is for Kant the result of our 
ethical limitations and the ethical inadequacy of our natures, much as it is for 
Løgstrup. To this extent, therefore, both may be said to share the Lutheran 
view that the law exists not for the righteous, but only for the unrighteous. 
(Stern 2015: 235) 
That is, both see the need for willed self-governance and self-control (F2) as being 
symptomatic of our ethical limitations where, in contrast, the paradigmatic and 
undivided activity of the Good Samaritan did not need to exert such self-control.  
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In sum, then, Stern’s argument challenges Løgstrup’s putative rejection of F1. 
Once the caricatured Kantian variant of F1 is dismissed, it appears that Løgstrup, like 
Kant, is committed to a variant of F1. And admitting this would help Løgstrup get out 
of the problem of moral agency since it would provide a criterion by which moral 
action could be distinguished from ‘mere’ action.  Of course, there remains a lingering 
difference between the two thinkers concerning the possibility of realizing 
paradigmatic moral actions which may show the two thinkers to be talking at cross 
purposes as concerns the issue of moral agency. Namely, that whereas for Stern’s Kant 
the regulative ideal of a perfect coincidence of inclination and duty is the preserve of 
the holy will alone and is not a real possibility for human agents, Løgstrup’s 
interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan, and his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life which it illustrates, aims at establishing precisely the ‘reality’ of the 
kind of undivided, immediate other-regarding action that the commandment of 
neighbour love calls for.23 I will not discuss the implications of this difference here 
(see §2). However, identifying this lingering difference brings me neatly to the second 
defusing strategy.  
1.4.2. An Aristotelian Defusing Strategy 
As well as being critical of an ethics of duty, Løgstrup was also critical of virtue 
ethics – for much the same reason: 
When we turn an act into a duty we discount the motivation that consists in 
our being gripped by the objective of the action. We no longer count on our 
caring enough to get the thing done. The same applies to virtue, in that the 
motivation for which it is the disposition, namely, the thought and the sense 
                                                          
23 Cf. ‘Kant draws a distinction between the holy will and a will such as ours throughout his ethical 
writings, and in his lectures on ethics. The actual difference he points to is in essence a simple one, 
and obviously relates to standard theological conceptions of our ‘fallen’ nature: whereas a divine will 
acts only in line with the good, and has no inclinations to do otherwise, we have immoral desires and 
inclinations, that mean we find ourselves drawn to adopt immoral courses of action. As Kant puts it: 
‘The dispositions [Gesinnungen] of the deity are morally good, and those of man are not. The 
dispositions or subjective morality of the divine are therefore coincident with objective morality’, but 
ours are not’ (Stern 2015: 16).  
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of the rightness of the action, is a substitute for an engagement in what will 
be achieved through one’s action, which is the only natural and genuine 
motive. Just as duty is a substitute motive, virtue is a substitute disposition. 
(BED: 78) 
In contravention to this, Alasdair MacIntyre has provided some arguments 
intended to show not only that certain key features of Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology can be made compatible with MacIntyre’s brand of Thomist-
Aristotelian virtue ethics, but that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology needs to be 
integrated into an ethical framework such as MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian 
framework on pain of incoherence. In contrast to the Stern’s Kantian defusing 
strategy, then, which sought to foster a rapprochement between a suitably nuanced 
conception of the Kantian agent and Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, MacIntyre’s 
Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy aims to integrate some key features of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology into a Thomist-Aristotelian conception of moral 
agency while jettisoning some of Løgstrup’s seemingly less plausible claims - without 
thereby compromising the richness of that phenomenology.24 Moreover, in contrast 
to Stern’s Kant, MacIntyre, like Løgstrup, is cautiously optimistic about the 
possibility of paradigmatic moral action for human agents.  
I will consider MacIntyre’s engagement with Løgstrup in some detail in §3. 
Thus, in this section my aim is to provide a basic outline of the direction in which 
MacIntyre seeks to take Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. MacIntyre’s approach to 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is, in essence, simple. He appreciates Løgstrup’s 
                                                          
24 MacIntyre is fully aware that the respective traditions out of which his ethical philosophy and 
Løgstrup’s ethical philosophy developed are in certain respects undeniably incompatible. Cf. ‘The 
concepts central to that Thomistic moral philosophy are those of the common good and the natural 
law. The concept central to Løgstrup’s thought is that of the singularity of the ethical demand. And on 
a first scrutiny – indeed even on a second or a third – if what Løgstrup says about the ethical demand 
is true, then the Thomistic concepts are nothing but sources of illusion, while, if what the Thomists 
assert is true, then what Løgstrup offers is a distorted and perverse account of the claims of morality’ 
(MacIntyre 2010: 1-2). I discuss the nature and importance of this deep incompatibility to the 
question of moral agency in §3. 
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emphasis on spontaneous ethical action, such as that exemplified in the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. However, he is deeply critical of Løgstrup’s dismissive attitude 
towards the value of moral reflection and virtuous self-development when it comes to 
the constitution of such action. Specifically, MacIntyre claims that Løgstrup has a 
‘misconception of the virtues [and] the part played by the virtues in those actions 
that exemplify…spontaneity’ (MacIntyre 2007: 153).25 MacIntyre’s suggestion is that 
when Løgstrup’s misconceptions of the virtues are placed to one side, Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of good works can in fact be seen to be compatible with a Thomist-
Aristotelian brand of virtue ethics – and, indeed, it is only when viewed in this way 
that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of good works is intelligible as an account of ethical 
action.  
A central argument MacIntyre deploys in support of this view rests on a 
putative difference between Løgstrup’s and Aquinas’s respective assessments of the 
ethical value of spontaneity: 
[W]ith regard to spontaneity there are two fundamental differences between 
Aquinas and Løgstrup. Where Løgstrup seems to identify spontaneity as itself 
a good, Aquinas requires us to distinguish between the spontaneity of the good 
and the spontaneity of the bad. And where Løgstrup treats spontaneity as 
something that presents itself spontaneously, Aquinas suggests to us that 
spontaneity of the good has to be acquired through learning. (MacIntyre 2007: 
160) 
MacIntyre challenges both of Løgstrup’s premises here. He argues, firstly, 
that it is absurd to blankly assert that spontaneity is inherently good and that 
reflection is inherently bad, for there are many examples of spontaneous 
responsiveness to others that we would hardly consider to be morally praiseworthy: 
                                                          
25 In particular, MacIntyre accuses Løgstrup of eliding the difference between virtues and character 
traits: ‘What then is the mark of a virtue? A virtue is a disposition to act in accordance with the 
judgments of reason, that is, to act so as to achieve that immediate end or good which in this or that 
situation is ordered to our ultimate good. Virtues differ both from skills and character traits, such as 
reliability and perseverance, precisely in that they are habits directed towards the good. They are not 
neutral powers, equally available for the pursuit of either goods or bads’ (MacIntyre 2007: 153). 
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for instance, ‘…the joyful malice of Schadenfreude or the witty and hurtful sneer that 
is voiced spontaneously and issues equally spontaneously in unreflective and 
unconstrained words and deeds’ (MacIntyre 2007: 159).26 Secondly, and more 
significantly for our present purposes, MacIntyre suggests that given the moral 
ambiguity of spontaneity, the spontaneous mercifulness showed by the Good 
Samaritan can only be intelligible as a form of ethical action if that mercifulness is seen 
to be the product of cultivation of and habituation to right reason. If the Samaritan’s 
spontaneous mercifulness was not informed by right reason then it simply was not 
the product of moral agency, but rather instinct or impulse. That is, spontaneous 
ethical actions (good works) are only intelligible as such on the presupposition of 
virtuous self-development: ethical spontaneity is only intelligible as learned 
spontaneity.  
MacIntyre, thus, turns to Aquinas in suggesting that any coherent account of 
good works must include some account moral agency that gives a central place to 
learning and habituation. On this conception of moral agency, the individual, through 
self-cultivating activity, can progress from primitive incontinence, through to 
continence where the agent ‘knows by the exercise of her or his reason what it is right 
to do, but desires, even strongly desires to do otherwise…’ (MacIntyre 2007: 15), and 
finally they may arrive at virtue. At this final stage, the virtuous individual 
[has] through habituation and reflection so reordered their desires and so 
developed their capacity for judgment in accordance with right reason that 
they are undivided in their inclination to act rightly. They know how to act 
on many types of occasions without immediately prior deliberation. 
Confronted by such situations they respond wholeheartedly and 
spontaneously. (MacIntyre 2007: 159) 
                                                          
26 Presumably, by extension, MacIntyre holds that there are many instances of deliberated 
responsiveness to others that are morally praiseworthy, particularly in morally delicate situations.  
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Thus, in contrast to the Kantian view, MacIntyre stands in agreement with 
Løgstrup in affirming the possibility of spontaneous ethical action. However, he 
argues that this possibility is only coherent on the presupposition of a certain 
construal of F2, viz. self-cultivation.  
MacIntyre’s argument, then, puts pressure on Løgstrup’s apparent rejection of F2 
in the following way. Whilst Løgstrup himself would certainly reject the Thomist-
Aristotelian appropriation of his thought undertaken by MacIntyre, MacIntyre 
argues that once some of Løgstrup’s misconceptions of the Thomist-Aristotelian view 
have been taken into account, this appropriating strategy presents a way out of some 
looming incoherences in Løgstrup’s own view – whilst preserving its major insights. 
Specifically, MacIntyre suggests that ethical spontaneity can best be rendered 
intelligible in terms of moral agency when viewed in the context of a Thomist-
Aristotelian framework. Viewed in this way, the Good Samaritan’s spontaneous 
showing of mercy can be seen to be an instance of ethical action insofar as it is the 
product of the Samaritan’s self-governing cultivation according to right reason, rather 
than merely instinctual or impulsive behaviour. Importantly, this does not take 
anything away from the spontaneity of the Samaritan’s mercifulness itself, rather it 
simply provides a moral framework within which our positive assessments of the 
moral value of that spontaneous mercifulness are rendered intelligible.   
1.5. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by offering a definition of what I call the standard view of 
moral agency, in which moral agency is said to be constituted by some combination 
of F1 and F2. Next, I offered a preliminary sketch of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of 
moral comportment, from this it emerged that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
appears to be incompatible with the standard view of moral agency. Based on this 
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observation I raised the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. In the final 
section, I canvassed two strategies for defusing the question of moral agency, the first 
strategy put pressure on Løgstrup’s putative rejection of F1 in his moral 
phenomenology and the second strategy put pressure on the coherence of Løgstrup’s 
rejection of F2 in his moral phenomenology. Both strategies proposed amendments to 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology which, whilst purportedly retaining the core of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, resolved the issues that led to the question of moral 
agency. Ostensibly, if these defusing strategies go through, this discussion has led to 
a positive outcome both for Løgstrup, in that they provide resources for underwriting 
the plausibility and coherence of his moral phenomenology, and for proponents of the 
standard view of moral agency, in that they can now gain from the riches of Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology. Yet, this happy conclusion is only warranted if the manner in 
which the two defusing strategies integrate Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology within 
the standard view of moral agency do not distort his phenomenology in significant 
ways. One of the tasks of the following two chapters will be to show that, on closer 
inspection, the two defusing strategies canvassed here do indeed distort important 
aspects of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. However, a second task of the following 
two chapters will be to show that even so it nonetheless remains possible to provide 
a positive answer to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics.  
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2. Ontological Ethics: The Hermeneutics of Trust 
 
Starting from his 1968 work Opgør med Kierkegaard, Knud Eljer Løgstrup 
began developing what would become his signature theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life. He developed this theory chiefly with a view to providing a 
phenomenological account of good works, such as those exemplified in the parable of 
the Good Samaritan. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the 
sovereign expressions of life. Central to this analysis will be an attempt to elucidate 
Løgstrup’s claim that the sovereign expressions of life are defined by their immediacy. 
For our purposes, this claim is of principal importance because it exacerbates the 
following worry concerning the compatibility of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral 
comportment, as codified in his theory of the sovereign expressions of life, with a 
plausible conception of moral agency: (1) moral agency constitutively involves a 
second-order insight into or awareness of the goodness or rightness of an occurent 
motivation for action. I labelled this core feature of moral agency F1 in the previous 
chapter.  (2) Løgstrup’s emphasis on immediacy in characterizing the sovereign 
expressions of life precludes such moral insight. Therefore, (3) the good works 
accounted for by Løgstrup with his theory of sovereign expressions of life precludes 
moral agency. In a word, the worry is that, by accounting for paradigmatic moral 
action in terms of immediacy, Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment 
precludes moral agency, where his position then looks to be incoherent.  
One strategy for assuaging this worry is to attack the second premise specified 
above. Another, bolder, strategy would be to attack the first premise. The argument 
I will prosecute in this chapter, however, lies between these two strategies. Namely, 
I will look to the phenomenological method underpinning Løgstrup’s theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life in arguing that whilst Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign 
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expressions of life does preclude the kinds of second-order moral insight subsumed 
under F1, this does not mean it precludes moral awareness on the part of the person 
performing that action per se. Rather, I will explore and explicate an alternative way 
of construing moral awareness that, being responsive to the phenomenological 
underpinnings of Løgstrup’s ethics, is well placed to meet the twin criteria of 
exegetical and philosophical plausibility. I shall call this the phenomenological defusing 
strategy.  
I will proceed as follows. Firstly, in keeping with Løgstrup’s phenomena-
driven approach to philosophy, I will introduce the sovereign expressions of life via a 
reconstruction of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of basic trust, as developed in The 
Ethical Demand (2.1). As a result, the worry concerning the compatibility of the 
characteristically immediate sovereign expressions of life with moral agency will be 
thrown into sharp relief. Thus, next, in 2.2., I will re-consider a strategy for defusing 
this worry by denying that Løgstrup, in his theory of the expressions of life, is 
rigorous in his commitment to immediacy and, thus, that his theory is in fact 
compatible with some variant of F1. Here, I will use Kantian defusing strategy 
canvassed in chapter one as a model for this line of interpretation. Ultimately, 
however, I will argue that this strategy is interpretatively problematic. Finally, in 2.3., 
I will bring Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology into dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology. Based on this comparative analysis, I will argue for an 
interpretation of the sovereign expressions of life along the lines of a broadly 
Heideggerian existential analytic, where they can be fruitfully construed as 
hermeneutic conditions. On this interpretation, it is possible to resolve the worry over 
the immediacy of spontaneous ethical action in a way that aligns with Løgstrup’s 
avowed ‘ontological ethics.’ Thus, I will conclude that Løgstrup’s emphasis on 
immediacy in his theory of the expressions of life, whilst precluding a certain 
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conception of second-order moral insight, does not necessarily preclude moral 
awareness as such.  
2.1. Trust as a Sovereign Expression of Life: A Reconstruction 
Any comprehensive study of Løgstrup’s ethics must include an assessment of 
his theory of the sovereign expressions of life[suværene/spontan livsytringer].1 First 
developed in his polemical 1968 work, Opgør med Kierkegaard, partly as a response to 
a perceived shortcoming of The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life became the centrepiece of his ethical philosophy for the rest of his 
career.2 Yet, as Kees van Kooten Niekerk has observed, it is not easy to get a good 
                                                          
1 As has been noted in the literature, the Danish ytring is a cognate of the English utterance. 
According to Søren Holm, this generates ‘translation problems because ‘ytring’ in Danish has 
connotations of both verbal and nonverbal communication,’ whereas in English ‘utterance’ has a 
predominantly (if not exclusively) verbal connotation (Holm 2009: 28). Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, Holm has translated spontan livsytringer in one place as ‘spontaneous utterances of life’ 
(ibid.). Russell Dees, by contrast, renders the term as sovereign or spontaneous life-manifestations 
(Dees 1995: ix, passim.), presumably to capture the sense in which the livsytringer manifest 
themselves in our conduct and behaviour. Throughout this thesis, however, I have opted for Dew’s 
and Flegal’s rendering of the term as sovereign expressions of life - not only because it has become 
the more or less standard translation, but also because it seems to best capture the various 
resonances of the term. For instance, it captures both the verbal and performative connotations of 
the original in the sense that the word ‘expression’ in English can refer both to a physical posture and 
to a turn of phrase. Furthermore, it aligns Løgstrup’s vocabulary with the parlance of 
Lebensphilosophie, which was a formative influence on Løgstrup’s thinking (Cf. Niekerk 2007: pp. 63-
65): the thought that life expresses itself was a central theme of Lebensphilosophie, as Hans-Georg 
Gadamer has pointed out with reference to a leading proponent of Lebensphilosophie, Wilhelm 
Dilthey: ‘…Husserl’s demonstration of the ideality of significance was the result of purely logical 
investigations. What Dilthey makes of it is something quite different. For him significance is not a 
logical concept, but is to be understood as an expression [Ausdruck] of life.’ (Gadamer 2004: 229). It is 
interesting to note that, in the German translation, livsytringer is rendered (by Løgstrup’s wife, no 
less) as Daseinsäußerung (see NS: 6 et passim.) which, along with the familiar associations of 
expression and utterance, also has an historical association with ‘self-emptying,’ at least when applied 
to God (see e.g. W. A. Suchting 1991 xxxiv). This latter association seems fitting (if maybe fortuitous), 
since it captures a – vaguely mystical - sense in which the expressions of life are phenomenal 
manifestations of life’s ‘self’-emptying or –outpouring.  
2 Cf. ‘In an article from 1967, the Danish theologian Ole Jensen has drawn attention to a peculiar 
ambiguity in The Ethical Demand. According to Jensen, Løgstrup on the one hand connects the ethical 
demand with trust as a fact and speaks of “the realities of trust and love,” which manifest the 
goodness of life” (Løgstrup 1997, 141). On the other hand, however, he states that he operates with 
natural love as an “imaginary entity,” because actually we know only “a natural love to which we 
have given our own self’s selfish form.” Similarly, there is no unadulterated trust because we “hold 
ourselves in reserve instead of surrendering ourselves” (ibid., 138-139)…Løgstrup subscribes to 
Jensen’s criticism and claims unambiguously that trust and natural love are realities in human life’ 
(Niekerk 2007a: xiv). See §3 for further discussion of this point. 
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grip on Løgstrup’s account of the sovereign expressions of life. This is partly due to 
the fact that, in Opgør med Kierkegaard, Løgstrup’s discussion of the expressions of life 
‘is embedded in a discussion with Kierkegaard in which Løgstrup controverts the 
latter’s view of Christian belief,’ and thus ‘the understanding of some 
passages…presupposes a certain familiarity with Kierkegaard’ (Niekerk 2007a: xiv). 
More generally, however, the difficulty of grasping Løgstrup’s account of the 
expressions of life stems from the incompleteness and fragmentariness of his theory: 
Løgstrup kept on developing and modifying [his] conception of [the 
sovereign expressions of life] until his death. He did not construct a consistent 
theory. Rather, he offers us a manifold of specific analyses, which do not always 
match and sometimes even contradict one another. (Niekerk 2017: 187) 
Notwithstanding these immediate interpretive difficulties, two initial 
observations can be made about Løgstrup’s theory of the expressions of life without 
controversy. Firstly, we can make a purely descriptive observation that the set of 
phenomena comprised by the theory of the sovereign expressions of life includes – but 
is not exhausted by – phenomena such as trust (M1: 89), mercy (BED: 76), openness 
of speech (M2: 110), sincerity (BED: 115), hope (M1: 295), frankness (M1: 89), 
sympathy (M1: 89), compassion (BED: 125), fidelity (BED: 117) and forgiveness (M1: 
281). Secondly, and more substantively, we can infer that with his theory of the 
expressions of life Løgstrup is attempting to account for the possibility of spontaneous 
ethical action or good works, such as those exemplified by the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. Beyond these initial observations, however, providing an exegesis of the 
sovereign expressions of life quickly becomes a delicate matter. Thus, in the spirit of 
interpretive fidelity, I will commence my interpretation by reconstructing Løgstrup’s 
analysis of trust from The Ethical Demand.3 Not only is trust the expression of life to 
                                                          
3 There is an obvious chronological issue that presents itself here, namely, that Løgstrup’s discussion 
of trust in The Ethical Demand pre-dates the development of his theory of expressions of life by some 
twelve years. In justifying my interpretive decision here, I submit the following points for 
consideration. Firstly, and purely pragmatically, no sovereign expression of life received nearly as 
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which Løgstrup devoted the greatest phenomenological attention, thus providing us 
with the most comprehensive insight into Løgstrup’s understanding of the 
phenomena subsumed under the category of sovereign expressions of life, but also, as 
we shall see, trust highlights the worry over immediacy particularly well.  
Trust [tillid] plays a leading role in The Ethical Demand. It is seen by Løgstrup 
to be expressive of the fundamental ‘fact’ [kendsgerning] of human interdependence, 
which constitutes the source or origin [udspringer] of the ‘silent’ [tavse] demand. In 
this relation, Løgstrup portrays trust as ‘basic’ [fundamentale] to human existence, in 
the sense that ‘it is part of what it means to be human’ and that ‘human life could 
hardly exist if it were otherwise’ (ED: 8). He avers: 
We would simply not be able to live; our life would be impaired and wither 
away if we were in advance to distrust one another, if we were to suspect the 
other of thievery and falsehood from the very outset (ED: 8-9).4  
Passages such as these have led commentators such as Stephen Darwall to 
construe sovereign expressions of life such as trust as ‘forms of mutual responsiveness’ 
that ‘bring us into a common life’ (Darwall 2017: 41). On this reading, we might think 
of the sovereign expressions of life as collectively forming a tacit ‘background’ that, 
                                                          
much phenomenological attention from Løgstrup as did trust. Therefore, Løgstrup’s analysis of trust 
provides us with the best resource for understanding the phenomenology involved in his theory of 
the expressions of life. Secondly, I think there is good reason to think of the relation between The 
Ethical Demand and the later works as one of development and refinement rather than as a sharp 
break. In this relation, consider the fact that in his ‘Rejoinder’ (1961), Løgstrup defends his analysis of 
trust in The Ethical Demand (BED: pp. 2-8). The only significant shifts in his thinking suggested in that 
text concern his claim concerning the understanding of life as a gift (BED: pp.10-14) and, in a separate 
text, his affirmation of the reality of the sovereign expressions of life (BED: 69). I deal with these 
issues separately. It is also important to note that there are wide ranging differences between the 
various phenomena that comprise the sovereign expressions of life: openness of speech, for instance, 
is very different from mercifulness. However, I take it to be one of Løgstrup’s aims in developing his 
theory of the sovereign expressions of life to claim that the phenomena that comprise the sovereign 
expressions of life share some core features. My discussion of trust here aims to bring out some of 
those core features.  
4 Løgstrup admits that in ‘special circumstances’ such as those where a ‘general climate of informing 
on each other’ prevails trust may be ‘destroyed.’ For instance, during the German occupation of 
Denmark, where Løgstrup ‘worked as a courier for the resistance and made his house available for 
wireless transmissions to England’ which rendered him ‘liable to torture and death’ (MacIntyre 2010: 
3). However, he clearly thinks that such circumstances reflect an ‘impaired’ and ‘withered’ form of life 
– and plausibly so.  
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in the first instance, enables our human form of sociality. Indeed, Løgstrup’s 
comments to the effect that ‘the expressions of life are what normally sustain all 
human interaction’ (BED: 84) and that ‘the spontaneous expressions of life exist to 
allow our coexistence and communal life to endure and develop’ (BED: 128) seem to 
support this reading. Viewed from a different perspective, Robert Stern has suggested 
that Løgstrup’s comments here point towards the conclusion that trust holds a weak 
transcendental status, in the sense that our form of life ‘would be impossible if people 
in general could not be trusted to speak the truth,’ for example (Stern 2017a: 280).5 
Thus, on first blush, the place trust and the other expressions of life have in Løgstrup’s 
architectonic of ethical life appears to be as transcendental background conditions for 
the possibility of ethical life.  
As Stern himself notes, however, difficulties attend this line of interpretation.6 
I want to set these difficulties to one side for the time being. For immediately after 
the passage from The Ethical Demand just quoted, Løgstrup lays out a substantive set 
of descriptions of trust: ‘To trust,’ he writes, ‘is to lay oneself open’ (ED: 9). It is, in 
other words, to surrender oneself to the other, to let oneself be exposed and vulnerable 
to the other (ED: 9). Or, to ‘go out of oneself’ and to place something of one’s life into 
the hands of the other person’ (ED: 16). Løgstrup admits that such definitions are 
                                                          
5 Although Stern does problematize a straightforwardly transcendental conception of trust as being 
compatible with Løgstrup’s phenomenology (see fn. 6), what he doesn’t mention in his discussion is 
that Løgstrup denies that that trust operates as an a priori transcendental condition, traditionally 
construed (see BED: 39-45). This makes matters more complex since it is clear that for Løgstrup trust 
and the sovereign expressions of life more generally are construed as being a priori in some sense, 
where in what follows I will suggest that the notion of hermeneutic condition can capture this sense. 
6 Cf. ‘…the problem with taking [a transcendental priority] to be the core of Løgstrup’s priority thesis 
is that it would seem to commit him to a predictive rather than affective conception for trust…for the 
transcendental claim would appear to ground trust in something other than the role our dependence 
has in motivating the other person, and instead ground it in what we take to be the way in which life 
operates…’ (Stern 2017a: 282). Below, I express reservations about whether Løgstrup can be seen to 
be committed to an affective form of trust, however, Stern’s point here holds nevertheless.  
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‘metaphorical and subject to misunderstanding’ (ED: 16), yet he does offer a somewhat 
more tangible definition of trust amidst his descriptions:  
[T]o trust is to let the other person emerge through words, deeds, and 
conduct [rather than] to hinder this instead by our suspicion and by the 
picture we have formed of him or her… (ED: 14) 
At root, Løgstrup’s thought here appears to be this. The other persons I 
encounter in my everyday navigation of the world, whether they happen to be well 
known to me or perfect strangers, are always to a significant degree other than the 
particular conception I happen to have of them – regardless of how well-informed and 
multifaceted that conception may be. So, just as the homeless drug addict I pass on 
the street is not reducible to his homelessness and addiction – and the various 
prejudices and stereotypes such descriptions often trigger – neither are my friends 
and family reducible to the character traits and habits I have, through long experience, 
observed in them. Rather, there is an irreducible otherness to the other person, in the 
sense that their existence cannot be fully subsumed under propositional statements. 
Hannah Arendt has rendered a similar thought succinctly: 
The manifestation of who the speaker and doer unexchangeably is, though it 
is plainly visible, retains a curious intangibility that confounds all efforts 
toward unequivocal verbal expression. The moment we want to say who 
somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we 
get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others 
like him; we begin to describe a type or a “character” in the old meaning of the 
word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us. (Arendt 1958: 
181) 
In its primitive form, then, for Løgstrup trust is the phenomena in virtue of 
which the other’s otherness can ‘emerge’ to me through her ‘new words, new deeds, 
and new conduct’ (ED: 14), where these words, deeds and conduct (potentially) 
provoke the constant (and in principle infinite) revision of our previously held 
conceptions of the other – and even in some cases ‘erasing’ them entirely (ED: 13). 
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That is, to trust is to allow for ‘the ongoing renewal of life’ (ED: 14) in ways that 
transcend our finite representational resources.  
Viewed in a certain light, Løgstrup’s thinking here appears to be in step with 
some of the foremost thinkers of his age. For instance, apart from Arendt, we might 
think of Emmanuel Levinas, for whom the other is exterior to the horizon of 
intelligibility – or ‘totality’ – of the ‘Same’ – or representational intentionality – in an 
ethically important way.7 We might also think of Theodor Adorno’s criticism of 
‘identity thinking,’ glossed by Fabian Freyenhagen as 
the thought that any subsumption under concepts, even the most apt one, 
misses something about its object and if this mismatch is not reflected upon, 
then thought does injustice to the object. (Freyenhagen 2013: 43) 
That is to say, just as for Levinas and Adorno, for whom thinking on the 
exteriority of the Other (Levinas) or the ‘non-identical’ or ‘non-conceptual’ more 
generally (Adorno) was seen to be a matter of ethical and political urgency, Løgstrup 
too appears to have been concerned in his definition of trust to place a fundamental 
and radical relation to otherness at the heart of his ethical enquiry.8  
                                                          
7 Cf. e.g. ‘The ontological event accomplished by philosophy consists in suppressing or transmuting 
the alterity of all that is Other, in universalizing the immanence of the Same (le Même) or of Freedom, 
in effacing the boundaries, and in expelling the violence of Being (Être). The knowing I is the melting 
pot of such a transmutation. It is the Same par excellence. When the Other enters into the horizon of 
knowledge, it already renounces alterity…The Other (l’Autre) thus presents itself as human Other 
(Autrui); it shows a face and opens the dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows the 
bounds of knowledge…the Other lays him- or herself bare to the total negation of murder but forbids 
it through the original language of his defenceless eyes’ (Levinas 1996: 11-12). 
8 The comparable dimension of Løgstrup’s thought is well captured in his discussion of a story by the 
writer Jørgen Nielsen, in which the protagonist, Nima Collman, plots to murder his wife. Ultimately, 
Collman cannot go through with his plan, and he confesses all to his wife. Løgstrup describes the 
moment in which Collman realizes he cannot go through with his plan as follows: ‘When Nima 
Collman no longer in fantasy, reflection and planning but in deed must assault the life of another 
human being, he is filled with a horror which he had not for a moment contemplated. It does not 
happen that, when the actual deed is at hand, he finds sympathy for his wife or that some of his 
former love renews itself or that the amicable feelings which have returned to him achieve power 
over his mind. No, it is nothing of this nature which brings on his sudden reversal. What occurs does 
not belong to the human-civil sphere. It is life itself, the life of another human being which rises up in 
its inviolability. It is a powerless inviolability, because Nima Collman is still able to murder his wife. 
Rather, it is inviolable, because he cannot do it without committing sacrilege and annihilating himself. 
Life’s own inviolability makes itself felt in his horror, in his complete spiritual breakdown’ (M1 85). 
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Yet, based on what we have seen of Løgstrupian trust so far, we have been 
given no real sense of the ethical import of the trust relation comparable to the 
analyses provided by Levinas, for instance, concerning the ethical demandingness of 
the encounter with the Other. Indeed, based on what we have seen so far, Løgstrupian 
trust, insofar as it is a background condition, might initially appear to refer to a purely 
neutral state of thinking ‘nothing in particular’ (Lagerspetz 1998: 25), as Olli 
Lagerspetz puts it in his Løgstrup-inspired monograph, whereby ‘my unreflective 
trust is shown – to others – in the fact that I do not think I am trusting’ (ibid. 30).9 
Trust in this basic sense, then, could be seen as denoting an unimpeded mode of 
relating to others that is in principle definable in purely negative terms: as an absence 
of ‘reservation’ and ‘spiritual reticence’ (ED: 16), ‘aloofness’ and ‘guardedness’ (BED: 
79), where such impediments would be a sign of a ‘deficient’ (ED: 18 fn. 5) mistrustful 
mode of relating to others. However, a conceptual worry attends such a construal of 
trust. Namely, that on such a thin definition of trust, the conceptual distinctiveness of 
trust as a phenomenon risks being lost. For instance, as Lars Hertzberg has noted, 
would it not be just as – if not more - accurate to label the neutral state described here 
                                                          
What is being emphasised here is the way in which, for Løgstrup, the simultaneous vulnerability and 
inviolability of another living being forms the material but obligating basis of ethical life. One might 
speculate that the experience of the rise of Nazism (and totalitarianism more generally), and the evil 
it represented, which so indelibly marked the thinking of all three philosophers, coupled with a 
common interest in eschatology (Løgstrup) and messianism (Levinas and Adorno) perhaps serve as 
common sources for the similarities of their respective philosophical projects. I will develop these 
comparisons further in §5. 
9 Along with Løgstrup, Wittgenstein is an important source for Lagerspetz. In particular, in On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein asserts that ‘I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one 
trusts something (I did not say “can trust something”)’ (Wittgenstein 197: 9 §509). In the context of 
Wittgenstein’s notes, what this assertion can be taken to mean is that the form of life we inhabit, the 
kind of language-game we play, necessitates that many features of that form of life ‘stand fast’ for us; 
that is to say, in order to inhabit a form of life at all, we cannot ‘doubt everything;’ some aspects of 
that form of life must remain, in a sense, indubitable. In relation to trust, then, we can see the 
Wittgenstinian flavour of Lagerspetz’s conception of trust presented here; in order for us to have the 
kinds of friendships we do, our friends must ‘stand fast’ for us, i.e. they must be trusted. And the way 
in which they are trusted is that certain thoughts do not occur to us with reference to that friend – 
and our behaviour expresses this. In a sense, this Wittgenstinian notion of trust chimes with the 
theological notion of trust, discussed below.  
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as an ‘absence of distrust’ (Hertzberg 1998: 316) rather than trust proper?10 Given 
this, it is hard to see how trust in this thin, background sense could fulfil the ethically 
significant role allotted to it by Løgstrup in his phenomenology of ethical life, viz. the 
source of the ethical demand.  
It is significant, then, that in the paragraphs after Løgstrup proposes this 
initial definition of trust, he goes on to characterize a ‘silent’ or tacit demand he views 
to be implicit in it:11 
In its basic sense trust is essential to every conversation. In conversation as 
such we deliver ourselves over into the hands of another. This is evident in the 
fact that in the very act of addressing a person we make a certain demand of 
him. This demand is not merely for a response to what we say. And the self-
surrender is not essentially a matter of what is said: its content or importance 
or even intimate character. What happens is that simply in addressing the 
other, irrespective of the content of what we say, a certain note is struck 
through which we, as it were, step out of ourselves in order to exist in the 
speech relationship. For this reason the point of the demand – though 
unarticulated – is that the speaker is accepted. (ED: 14-15) 
Here, Løgstrup adds a significant feature to his definition of trust. Namely, 
that the ‘self-surrender’ it involves makes a certain demand on the trustee, viz. a silent 
demand for acceptance. Indeed, in the pages that follow, Løgstrup ramps up the 
severity of the demand that ‘grows out’ of trust to include the ‘protection of the life’ 
                                                          
10 Cf. Stern (2017a): ‘To see the space for this possibility, consider the child who asks me for the first 
time on a long car journey: ‘Are we there yet?’. If young enough, and if this really is the first time it 
has happened, and if generally our relations have given her no cause to question me up to this point, 
it could be argued that it just doesn’t even occur to her that I might say anything other than the truth, 
so she is not taking it that my dependence on her figures in my thinking about her in a way that we 
have said is fundamental to the trusting attitude: she just takes it for granted that I will answer her 
correctly. It could thus be said that while she clearly doesn’t distrust me, she actually doesn’t trust 
me either, but is in some state prior to both, where the distinction has not even yet arisen’ (281).  
11 It is here that interpretive issues concerning my reading of Løgstrup’s corpus as being a continuous 
body of work arise. For, in his later work, Løgstrup comes to associate the term ‘demand’ [fordring] 
exclusively with those cases in which the sovereign expressions of life have failed to materialize (BED: 
69). This is not to say that the sovereign expressions of life do not themselves have a ‘bindingness.’ 
Rather, he uses a different term to denote that bindingness: ‘claim’ [krav]. At the time of The Ethical 
Demand, however, Løgstrup has not developed this distinction. Nonetheless, Løgstrup’s use of the 
modifier ‘silent’ [tavse] signals an embryonic formulation of his later distinction between fordring and 
krav. Thus, I take it that when Løgstrup talks about the silent demand implicit in trust, he is referring 
to what he would later designate as ‘claim’ and not as ‘demand.’  
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of the other (ED: 17). Thus, trust is not merely a neutral state of thinking nothing in 
particular; it involves a receptivity to a ‘silent’ or tacit demand. To anticipate: it is the 
nature of this awareness and how it relates to the above-mentioned ‘background’ 
status of trust that will animate the analysis in the following sections.  
Read in a certain way, these additions can be seen to bring Løgstrup’s 
discussion of trust onto more familiar territory covered by contemporary 
philosophical debates about the moral significance of trust.12 More specifically, it has 
been argued that these features of Løgstrupian trust signal that Løgstrup held an 
affective conception of trust. As Paul Faulkner defines it, the notion of affective trust 
captures the sense that ‘…to say that A trusts S to φ is to say that A depends on S φ-
ing and expects this to motivate S to φ’ (Faulkner 2014: 1977-8). Stern has developed 
a reading of Løgstrupian trust along the lines of affective trust, writing that  
Trust is therefore important to Løgstrup because it reveals 
how…interdependence works: in trusting another person, I am placed in their 
hands and make myself vulnerable to them, while also expecting that 
‘surrender’ of myself to play a role in their response to me; if they do not 
respond accordingly, I will feel resentment and hurt in a way that can quickly 
become moralized, sometimes in exaggerated ways. (Stern 2017: 274)  
I fully agree that for Løgstrup trust is seen to be closely linked to human 
interdependence. Moreover, Stern’s construal of Løgstrupian trust along affective 
lines is certainly attractive in that it provides an account of the second-person claims 
involved in trusting and, thus, potentially helps to clarify the ethical demandingness 
Løgstrup associates with basic trust. Yet, I have some reservations about this 
construal as it stands. 
                                                          
12 Annette Baier article ‘Trust and Antitrust’ is the locus classicus for contemporary philosophical 
debates on trust and its relation to morality. However, pace Løgstrup, Baier argues that ‘there are 
immoral as well as moral trust relationships, and trust-busting can be a morally proper goal’ (Baier 
1986: 232). Løgstrup, by contrast, holds that ‘the [ethical] positivity of trust and the negativity of 
distrust are not some evaluative accretions of which trust and distrust are subjects, but inhere in the 
phenomena themselves’ (BED: 115).  
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The first reservation is interpretive: whilst it is true that Løgstrup draws 
attention to the place of expectation in trust, I can find no evidence that for Løgstrup 
the referent of this expectation is the perceived motivational impact of one’s 
vulnerability in trusting. Rather, the referent appears to be, more straightforwardly, 
the projected and hoped for outcome of the encounter. This is apparent in Løgstrup’s 
illustration of his point about expectation by appeal to an encounter between Leonard 
Bast and the Schlegel sisters in E. M. Forster’s novel Howard’s End. Of this encounter 
Løgstrup writes that ‘Leonard was disappointed in his expectations for the afternoon. 
He had hoped to discuss books and to keep his visit with them in a romantic vein and 
at all costs to keep it from getting mixed up with his routine, uninteresting life at the 
office’ (ED: 12). Here it seems clear that, for Løgstrup, Leonard’s disappointed 
expectation referred to the kind of meeting he envisaged when he received an 
invitation to meet with the Schlegel sisters and not to the perceived impact his 
trusting vulnerability might have in motivating the Schlegel sisters to behave in 
certain ways.  
Secondly, I have philosophical reservations about the potential implications of 
imputing a form of affective trust to Løgstrup. These reservations stem from a risk 
that the notion of affective trust imports a calculative dimension into the trustor’s 
expression of trust which would be anathema to Løgstrup. The thought I have in 
mind here has been neatly expressed by Phillip Petit in his article ‘The Cunning of 
Trust.’ Pettit writes that: 
As Hegel spoke of the cunning of reason, so we can speak here of the cunning 
of trust. The act of trust is an investment by the trustor which will pay 
dividends only in the event that the trustee behaves appropriately. Like any 
investment it may have a risky side, for the trustee may not be bound to act as 
required. But it is not by any means as risky as it may first seem. For in the 
very act whereby the trustor is put at risk, the trustee is given a motive not to 
let that risk materialize. The trustor can bank on the fact that if the trustee 
does let the risk materialize they will suffer the loss of the trustor’s good 
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opinion and, in all likelihood, the cost of gaining a bad reputation among those 
who learn what has happened. (Petit 1995: 216) 
Pettit’s comments here perhaps pertain more readily to game theory-inspired 
‘risk-assessment views’ of trust than affective trust.13 Nonetheless, they surely touch 
on a more general implication that bears on affective trust and that is completely alien 
to Løgstrup’s thinking on trust. Namely, that the risk and ‘surrender’ involved in 
affective trust is a calculated risk. It is calculated just in the thin sense that, in trusting, 
the trustor expects her trust to constitute a normative reason for the trustee to act or 
behave in certain ways.  
By contrast, Løgstrup’s notion of trust has a theological lineage. In a footnote 
towards the end of The Ethical Demand, for instance, we find Løgstrup referring 
approvingly to the theologian Rudolf Bultmann’s assessment that ‘trust and love 
among people are “not based on any trustworthiness or loveableness in another which 
could be objectively ascertained, but upon the nature of the other apprehended in the 
love and in the trust”’ (ED: 216, fn. 5). More generally, it is worth noting the 
importance a particular understanding of trust has within the Lutheran tradition to 
which Løgstrup belonged. As Tage Kurtén puts it, ‘in systematic theology there is a 
long tradition of emphasising trust in God (religious faith – fides qua) alongside the 
understanding of the content of belief in God (religious belief – fides quae).’ According 
to this tradition, trust is ‘unfounded,’ ‘spontaneous and without explicit reasons’ 
(Kurtén 2008: 111).14 Arguably, this theological conception of trust as being 
                                                          
13 ‘Risk assessment views’ of trust are those according to which it is held that ‘people trust other 
people whenever they assume that the risk of relying on other people to act a certain way is low – 
because it is in the self-interest of these people to act that way – and so they rely on them’ (McLeod 
2015). 
14 Cf. ‘Luther casts his theology in terms of a relationship to a promise…a promise to which one 
responds in trust or faith (Fiducia)…For Luther, the spiritual person is one who trusts, has faith…’ 
(Hampson 2004: 15). And Karl Barth, who writes in one place that ‘faith means trust’ (Barth 1988: 18), 
where, according to Barth, ‘faith-as-trust’ is a gift from God which frees us to hear (and have 
confidence in) God’s Word. 
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‘unfounded’ and ‘spontaneous’ contrasts with affective trust: trust on the theological 
model is envisaged not as an attitude rooted in the trustee’s desires and interests, but 
rather as a phenomenon in light of which the other’s ‘nature’ is apprehended, as 
Bultmann puts it. That is, trust is a mode of being comported in relation to the other 
that is sensitive to the other’s otherness. 
Yet, if affective trust is a less than perfect fit for elucidating the ethically 
demanding dimension of Løgstrup’s conception of trust, then how else can we 
understand the ethical import of Løgstrupian trust and the demand implicit in it? This 
turns out to be a delicate matter since, based on what we have seen so far, Løgstrup’s 
description of trust is at best bivalent - and at worst equivocal. One valence of trust 
and the demand implicit in it can be characterized as follows. When I address the 
other I make myself vulnerable to them in the sense that I, as it were, deliver part of 
myself over to them. Such vulnerability might be made particularly acute if it is 
combined with certain expectations I have for the encounter, as we have seen (ED: 9). 
Now, in virtue of this vulnerability alone (that is, aside from the particular content of 
my address or the expectations I have for the encounter), my address ‘forces’ upon the 
trustee the alternative: ‘either we take care of the other person’s life or we ruin it’ (ED: 
18, fn. 6). That is to say, in slightly less hyperbolic language, that in virtue of my 
address, the trustee is placed in a position whereby she simply cannot not respond to 
my address, to the part of myself I have delivered over to her, for even feigning 
ignorance and turning a deaf ear to my address will constitute a – potentially ruinous 
– response. The trustee is made, in a quite literal sense, responsible. Concerning this 
valence, then, we can make the following conclusion concerning Løgstrup’s 
understanding of trust. (1) In trusting, I surrender part of myself into the hands of 
the other. (2) This surrender - just in virtue of the vulnerability and exposedness 
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involved in surrendering; in ‘daring to make an overture’ (ED: 15) – places a demand 
or claim on the trustee to respond to or to ‘accept’ the trustor.  
However, seen from a different direction, we might equally construe the demand 
Løgstrup has in mind with respect to trust in the following manner. In the encounter 
with the other, trust is elicited in me in the sense that the other’s presence compels me 
to ‘break down’ my guard and potentially ‘erase’ the picture or theory I might happen 
to have of them (ED: 13), thus leaving me exposed to the other who stands before me, 
here and now. In other words, we might think that the demand implicit in trust is 
elicited by the presence of the other in the sense that the other’s concrete presence 
‘demands’ attention – that is, it demands that we attend to the other in their otherness 
rather than reducing them to a caricature, regardless of how convenient such a 
reduction may be. This, recall, is the central point of Løgstrup’s initial description of 
trust. To wit, to trust is to be exposed to the other’s and, more generally, life’s capacity 
to renew itself in ways that may diverge from one’s pictures and theories. Moreover, 
plausibly, this is what it could mean to say that the demand implicit in trust demands 
that we ‘protect the life’ of the other, in that it demands that we attend to – rather 
than ‘encroach’ [overgreb] upon or negate (ED: 22) – the other’s vulnerable otherness.  
Taken together, we can begin to see one possible way in which these two valences 
of trust purport to provide an account of the ethical demandingness primitive to face-
to-face encounters, where this sense of ethical demandingness forms a common core 
of the variegated phenomena that comprise the category of the sovereign expressions 
of life. Stern, in his forthcoming monograph, has captured this sense perspicuously in 
terms of Joseph Raz’s notion of a ‘protected reason.’ A protected reason is a special 
kind of reason that ‘excludes’ other reasons as having justificatory force in our 
practical deliberations. To use Stern’s example, say I am walking to the pub to meet 
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a friend when I encounter a badly injured person at the side of the road who 
desperately needs assistance. The thought is that the reason I have to come to the aid 
of the injured person excludes other reasons – such as my reasons to get to the pub on 
time or any misgivings I may have about the injured person according to their 
particularity – as having any weight in my deliberations over how to respond to the 
situation I find myself in. Stern suggests that on Løgstrup’s view the living 
vulnerability of the other as encountered in the trust relation constitutes just such a 
protected reason, where this explains the normative authority of the claim or demand 
made on us in our trusting encounters with others (See Stern: forthcoming). That is, 
in the trust-relation, one’s encounter with an other person as living and, thus, a fortiori 
injurable constitutes the ‘source’ of the ethical demand, for Løgstrup.  
Despite this point of clarification, it is worth emphasising the subtle but important 
difference between the two valences of trust at work in Løgstrup’s phenomenology. 
According to the first valence trust is seen as that which provokes the demand: I, by 
‘placing’ trust in the other, tacitly place a demand on the other. According to the 
second valence trust is seen as that which is demanded by the presence of the other: 
I, in my exposure to the living presence of the other, am impelled to trust the other. 
That is, I am impelled to respond and attend to the other standing before me, here 
and now. This valence resonates with theological definitions of trust as fides qua. 
Given this, we might think that Løgstrup has left himself open to the charge of 
equivocation, in that his initial definition of trust implies a certain construal of the 
demand implicit in it (the second valence), whereas his latter characterization of that 
demand potentially implies a slightly different conception of trust and how it 
functions (the first valence).  
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In order to illustrate the bivalence of Løgstrupian trust further, I will turn to a 
particularly illuminating example taken from Les Misérables, as discussed by Stern 
(Stern 2017a: pp. 288-289). The scene in question depicts an encounter between 
Bishop Charles Myriel and the ex-convict and now vagrant Jean Valjean in which the 
Bishop invites Valjean to stay in his home. On Stern’s interpretation, the Bishop’s act 
of ‘compassion’ and ‘pity’ is expressive of Løgstrupian trust, firstly, to the extent that 
it involves the Bishop ‘laying himself open’ and becoming vulnerable to Valjean. 
Further to this, however, Stern notes that 
what seems to be emphasized by Hugo’s narrative, at least from a Løgstrupian 
perspective, is that while everyone else sees Valjean as what he has done and thus 
become – a criminal, a vagrant, an outcast – the Bishop…see[s] him as an 
individual human being standing before the Bishop as such. Even Valjean seems 
shocked by this openness the Bishop shows to him, and seeks to remind him of 
how he should be characterized. (Stern 2017: 288)  
Thus, in reflecting on the Bishop’s behaviour in a letter, his sister, Mademoiselle 
Baptistine, writes the following: 
[M]y brother did not so much as ask the man where he was born. He did not ask 
his story. For the story must have included some account of his crimes and my 
brother clearly wished to avoid all reference to these…Thinking it over 
afterwards, I believe I know what was in my brother’s mind. He must have 
reflected that the man, this Jean Valjean, was sufficiently oppressed already by the 
burden of his wretchedness, and that it was better to distract his thoughts and 
make him feel, if only for a little while, that he was a man like any other. Was this 
not true charity? … I can also affirm that if this was his thought he gave no sign 
of it, even to me. From start to finish he was his ordinary self, and he dined with 
Jean Valjean precisely as he would have done with the provost or the curé of the 
parish. (Hugo 1982: 89-90)  
What is remarkable about this scene, at least from a Løgstrupian point of view, is 
the ambiguity of the trust relation it describes: who is the trustor and who is the 
trustee? On the one hand, Jean Valjean is the trustor: he is the powerless one who 
places trust in the kindness of strangers to help him in his hour of need. Yet, on the 
other hand, the Bishop is the trustor in that by opening his home to an ex-convict and 
vagrant, he is exposing himself and his family to a potentially dangerous criminal. 
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Moreover, on whom does the implicit demand fall? Does it fall on the Bishop who, 
upon encountering Valjean, is compelled to view him as a human being rather than as 
a criminal? Or does it fall on Valjean, who is perhaps obliged to prove his 
trustworthiness to the Bishop (an obligation he initially fails to meet)? 
Viewed sympathetically, the ambiguity of trust in the face-to-face encounter 
illustrated here is precisely what Løgstrup seeks to capture with his bivalent account 
of trust. Indeed, this ambiguity can be seen to be productive insofar as it discloses 
something important concerning the basicness of interdependence to human existence 
as Løgstrup sees it. It is noteworthy in this connection that towards the end of his 
discussion of trust, Løgstrup places his analysis back within the broader context of 
human interdependence. He states that ‘the fact is…we constitute one another’s world 
and destiny’ (ED: 17). And, substantiating this point, he claims that 
By our very attitude to one another we help shape one another’s world. By our 
attitude to the other person we help to determine the scope and hue of his or 
her world; we make it large or small, bright or drab, rich or dull, threatening 
or secure. We help shape his or her world not by theories and views but by 
our very attitude toward him or her. Herein lies the unarticulated and one 
might say anonymous demand that we take care of the life which trust has 
placed in our hands. (ED: 18) 
In light of these comments we get a better sense of what Løgstrup means by 
human interdependence. He does not mean, for instance, that we are interdependent 
in a contractual sense – that I depend on you to keep your side of the bargain and vice 
versa. Rather, he means that the very texture and intelligibility of ‘my’ world – the 
meaning and sense of the world for me – is not exhausted by my personal 
circumstances and projects. Fundamentally, ‘my’ world is shaped by the other who, 
through the vulnerability of their address and the tacit demand therein, opens my 
world to an otherness (the first valence of trust). We might say that the other draws 
my attention or ‘care’ (in the sense of what shows up as mattering to me) outwards, 
beyond myself, thus, expanding my world. Correlatively, just as the shape of my world 
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depends on the other, who co-constitutes it in the way just mentioned, so too does the 
other – and the shape and hue of ‘their’ world – depend on me, where this dependency 
is disclosed to me by the vulnerability and exposure of their address (the second 
valence of trust). Thus interpreted, the two valences of trust outlined above can be 
seen to interact in a way that is disclosive of a fundamental interdependence basic to 
human existence. This point is exemplified by the trust relation between Bishop 
Myriel and Jean Valjean: confronted by the vulnerable presence of Jean Valjean, the 
Bishop’s care was drawn outwards towards the otherness of Jean Valjean as another 
living being. Conversely, the shape and hue of Jean Valjean’s world was emphatically 
dependent on others: on whether they would ‘accept’ him or deny him, where 
ultimately this informed his moral transformation as charted through the course of 
the novel.  
The important point to focus on here for what follows is that, for Løgstrup 
trust is a basic mode of interpersonal human relation that is expressive of a 
fundamental openness to and a dependency on the other in their otherness for the 
meaningfulness of our world. One way in which fundamental interdependence is 
disclosed by trust is by way of a tacit demand in which the presence of the other, just 
in virtue of the vulnerability of their exposure, impels us to break down our pictures 
and theories and to attend to the other as another living being standing before us. 
The trust relation, so construed, is disclosive of fundamental human interdependence, 
then, in that it reveals to us the sense in which the meaningfulness of our world is co-
constituted by the other, who draws our care out beyond our projects towards an 
otherness that outstrips our habitual ways of rendering the world intelligible.   
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2.2. Immediacy and Moral Agency 
The preceding discussion has shown Løgstrup’s analysis of trust to be protean 
and complex. Yet, as I will presently argue, in appreciating this complexity we are 
better able to assess the nature and severity of a central worry attending Løgstrup’s 
theory of the sovereign expressions of life. In a word, the worry I have in mind can be 
specified as follows: (1) moral agency constitutively involves a second-order insight 
into or awareness of the goodness or rightness of an occurent motivation for action 
(F1).15 (2) Løgstrup’s emphasis on immediacy in characterizing the sovereign 
expressions of life precludes such awareness. Therefore, (3) the good works accounted 
for by Løgstrup with his theory of sovereign expressions of life precludes moral 
agency. In this section I will firstly elucidate the terms of this worry in light of our 
discussion of trust in 2.1. Then I will show that one initially attractive strategy for 
assuaging this worry by attacking (2) - the Kantian defusing strategy - is 
interpretively problematic. Rather than trying to assuage the worry by adumbrating 
further, more refined, variations of this defusing strategy, however, I will conclude 
the section by suggesting that a more promising strategy for assuaging the above-
stated worry might be had through attending to phenomenological underpinnings of 
Løgstrup’s discussion of trust. I will develop this phenomenological strategy in 2.3.  
In the previous chapter, I presented the following premise as axiomatic: 
(Premise1) Moral actions presuppose a moral agent or, what is the same, moral 
agency.  
                                                          
15 Here the term ‘moral awareness’ stands for the most general sense in which one is aware of the 
moral import of a situation one encounters. F1 is one way of fleshing out moral awareness, where I 
will sometimes use the term ‘moral insight’ to designate this more specific form of moral awareness. 
In what follows, I will present what I take to be Løgstrup’s distinctive way of fleshing out moral 
awareness.  
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Furthermore, I observed that (F1) Self-Regulation is widely seen to be a 
necessary feature of moral agency, where F1 is defined as follows: 
(Def) F1: Self-Regulation = the evaluation of one’s desires, mental states, 
motivations or incentives according to one’s moral insight. 
In relation to these premises, we saw that Løgstrup appears to affirm Premise1 
but to deny that spontaneous ethical action involves F1. It thus emerged that there is 
a question concerning the compatibility of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral 
comportment with moral agency1.  
Based on our foregoing analysis of Løgstrupian trust, we can specify the 
reasoning behind Løgstrup’s apparent denial of F1 with respect to good works with 
greater determinacy. To wit, Løgstrup’s rejection of F1 with respect to good works is 
based on his affirmation of their putative immediacy: 
(Def) Immediacy = A relation to the other that is not mediated by pictures and 
theories, up to and including moral principles.   
This definition of immediacy can be inferred from Løgstrup’s discussion of 
trust in The Ethical Demand. On Løgstrup’s view the trust relation contrasts with 
what we might call a ‘subjective’ relation in which the self’s relation to the other is 
mediated by pictures and theories generated by subjective prejudices and inclinations. 
More importantly, however, the trust relation also contrasts with what we might call 
an ‘objective’ relation to the other in which that relation is mediated by the self’s moral 
beliefs. Løgstrup terms this latter kind of relation ‘encroachment;’ that is, what we 
might otherwise term ‘paternalism.’ And according to Løgstrup, encroachment 
happens when a person’s understanding of life becomes ‘hardened into an ideology’ 
(ED: 23). In such cases, the person assumes that 
Whatever concerns his or her own life must logically concern the life of all 
others as well. The ultimate truth which he or she possesses must be the 
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ultimate truth also for them – obviously, because otherwise it would of course 
not be ultimate truth! In the name of this ultimate truth he or she therefore 
also knows – with incontrovertible certainty – what is best for the other 
person. Consequently, he or she needs not concern him or herself with the idea 
of respect for other people’s independence and autonomy. (ED: 24) 
As with the case of subjectivism, then, encroachment tends to subsume the 
other person under a particular set of beliefs which then determine one’s relation to 
the other person. In both cases, the other’s otherness is occluded, where the difference 
between the two cases consists in the sense that in the latter case this occlusion is 
justified by the self in terms of putatively objective or universal normative standards. 
By contrast, the trust relation is one that ‘protects the life’ of the other, in the sense 
of being sensitive to the other’s otherness and life’s capacity for renewal in ways which 
transcend one’s subjective pictures and ostensibly objective theories. 
In his later writings on the sovereign expressions of life, Løgstrup is more 
explicit in his characterizations of immediacy: 
[T]he immediacy of human interaction is sustained by the immediate 
expressions of life, whose sovereignty is such that they defeat our past 
experiences and private musings. (BED: 84-5) 
Since the sovereign expressions of life attaches to the immediate relationship 
between one person and another, that is where it ends, ethically speaking, by 
which is meant that it cannot be subordinated to goals more remote than the 
intended outcome of the agency that meets the other’s needs. (BED: 88) 
Before the relevant requirements on agency are requirements imposed by 
principles, they are requirements imposed by the specific and concrete 
situation, which latter enjoin us to act in ways answering to ethical predicates 
with descriptive content…including especially requirements prescribing 
communication acts whose descriptions involve such predicates – a sovereign 
expression of life, the showing of trust, the offering of help, veracity, and the 
like. The correspondence is immediate, and the requirement of substantive 
conduct of some form or other imposed by the situation is not necessarily 
mediated by some moral principle. There exist expressions of life, which are 
already intrinsically moral or immoral – they do not become so only in virtue 
of principles. (BED: 106) 
In short, the immediacy of the sovereign expressions of life refers to a mode of 
interpersonal relation that is not mediated by subjective prejudices, extrinsic teloi or 
moral principles. Recall here the theological lineage of Løgstrup’s understanding of 
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trust as fides qua; as an unfounded and spontaneous apprehension of the other in their 
otherness: the point is that there is a primitive ethical significance to the face-to-face 
encounter with the other which ‘defeats’ our finite representational resources. So 
construed, Løgstrup’s notion of Immediacy shares an affinity with Levinas’ 
phenomenology of the face-to-face encounter. As Michael Morgan describes Levinas’ 
position: 
The first things to remember about the face-to-face encounter between the self 
and the other person are that it is concrete and particular. It is not an idea or 
a concept, nor a type of action or event. It is a concrete reality, an event; it 
occurs. Furthermore, it occurs as utterly particular: the self is a particular 
person, and the face-of-the-other is a particular revelation of a particular 
person. What is occluded, hidden, or forgotten in our ordinary lives is not 
some idea or value; it is the presence of the other’s face to me – and my 
responsibility to and for this person. Moreover, this reality or event or 
encounter, which in a sense is beyond our thinking, our concepts and our rules, 
and prior to them, is determinative and unconditional. (Morgan 2011: 59) 
Similarly, Løgstrup’s emphasis on Immediacy aims at an irreducible, concrete 
and particular relation to the other that, in a sense, ‘overmasters’ (BED: 68) our moral 
concepts and rules.  
It follows from Løgstrup’s emphasis on Immediacy that the sovereign 
expressions of life preclude F1. Formally speaking, this is because the Immediacy of 
the face-to-face encounter ipso facto precludes mediation by moral concepts, principles 
and rules, where such mediation is precisely what F1 consists in. Phenomenologically 
speaking, this is articulated in terms of the primitive ethical significance of the face-
to-face encounter, where this encounter is thought to make demands on the subject 
prior to the subject’s second-order awareness of the moral duties required of them in 
the encounter.  
A crucial upshot of this is that, in his theory of sovereign expressions of life, 
Løgstrup appears to be committed to two prima facie mutually exclusive propositions, 
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viz. Premise1 and Immediacy: F1 is a necessary feature of moral agency1, and moral 
agency1 is presupposed by Premise1 but Immediacy precludes F1. 
One strategy for defusing this problem is to argue that Løgstrup was not 
entirely consistent or rigorous in his application of Immediacy and that, despite his 
assertions to the contrary, his phenomenology does in fact allow for some version of 
F1. I sketched an attractive version of this strategy in the previous chapter under the 
auspices of a broadly Kantian defusing strategy. Recall: the Kantian defusing strategy 
hinged on the following argument. Pace Løgstrup, primary motivations, such as 
immediate inclinations stemming from the suffering of another, and secondary 
motivations, such as those determined by a good will are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive on a Kantian view: it does not follow that just in virtue of having a second-
order awareness of the rightness of a primary motivation that that second-order 
awareness inevitably becomes the sole motivating reason for action. Rather, on a more 
nuanced Kantian view, the obvious needs of the other can constitute a primary 
motivation for action, where this primary motivation shows up as reason giving in 
light of the agent’s (tacit) commitment to the right. With this more nuanced view of 
Kantian moral agency in hand, it was thus argued that since Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology, as exemplified by his phenomenology of the Good Samaritan, allows 
that the Samaritan was committed to the good of the injured traveller, his position is 
in fact not incompatible with a nuanced conception of the Kantian moral agent: both 
views hold that the Samaritan is primarily motivated by the urgent needs of other, 
where these needs show up as reason giving in light of a commitment to the good 
(Løgstrup) or the right (Kant).  
The benefits of this defusing strategy are clear: trading on the putative 
inconsistency with which Løgstrup applies Immediacy, it re-integrates Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology within the terms of moral agency1, thus defusing the problem 
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of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. But what are the costs? Clearly, a chief cost is 
that it gainsays Løgstrup’s core phenomenological insight concerning the primitive 
ethical significance of ‘the immediate relationship between one person and another’ 
(BED: 88).  
Put in Kantian terminology, the issue is this: to the extent that the second-
order commitment to the right or the good included as part of the Kantian defusing 
strategy appears to require the positing of an independent, mediating faculty, perhaps 
resembling the Kantian Wille, that is, a capacity for practical reasoning meaningfully 
distinct from one’s primary motivations and inclinations, it is incompatible with 
Immediacy. On Løgstrup’s view the sovereign expressions of life purportedly 
appropriate and determine the will (qua Willkür) a priori and without remainder, that 
is, without mediation by the will (qua Wille).16 Therefore, even if in ‘obvious’ cases of 
moral action such as the Samaritan’s this second-order commitment to the good is 
ostensibly tacit and, thus, does not enter thematically into the Samaritan’s 
deliberations as a motivating reason in the way Løgstrup feared, in virtue of the fact 
that it nonetheless performs a mediating role, viz. ‘treat[ing] this feeling [of mercy] 
or state of affairs [of the injured traveller] as reason giving’ and, thus, ‘regulating’ 
the primary motivation (Stern 2015: 228), it surely stands at odds with the strong 
sense of immediacy Løgstrup associates with the sovereign expressions of life.  
Yet, if we reject the Kantian defusing strategy – and other possible non-
Kantian strategies like it - on interpretive grounds and take Løgstrup’s commitment 
to Immediacy seriously, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology quickly begins to look 
                                                          
16 I take the Wille/Willkür distinction from Kant, where, roughly stated, Wille stands for the capacity 
to act for the sake of a universal principle and Willkür stands for our ‘power of choice.’ Cf. Kant 2013: 
6:3-5. 
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unpalatably deterministic.17 For instance, on an interpretation that applies Immediacy 
rigorously, it would appear that in his showing of trust, Bishop Myriel really did think 
‘nothing in particular:’ he was un-reflectively and anteriorly bound by trust, which 
then determined the scope of possible actions open to him. At no point did he pause 
to consider whether his showing of trust was right or good; he was simply determined 
by it. Similarly, on this reading, the Good Samaritan is seen to be perfectly ignorant 
of the normativity of the situation and of his actions as having any moral significance; 
in the grip of mercy he simply reacted to the situation in a manner not dissimilar to 
instinctual actions of Korsgaard’s Lioness mentioned in the previous chapter. Clearly, 
when interpreted in this way, it becomes hard to see how moral agency could be 
plausibly attributed to the Bishop or the Good Samaritan; indeed, they appear to look 
rather more like ‘responsive automatons,’ to borrow Stern’s phrase, than autonomous 
moral agents.18  
This conclusion, however, is implausible both on phenomenological and 
exegetical grounds. It is phenomenologically implausible because it patently 
mischaracterizes the situations and actions it seeks to describe. That is to say, it is 
implausible to think that the Good Samaritan and Bishop Myriel were simply 
automatically reacting to the situations that they encountered. The Samaritan’s actions 
clearly involved some kind of ‘common human understanding’ of the good - even if this 
                                                          
17 We might think that other possible non-Kantian strategies in a similar vein, such as, for instance, a 
Humean or an Aristotelian strategy may be less susceptible to the kind of problems that the Kantian 
strategy incurs. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, even if such strategies fared better in 
relation to the problem at issue here, they would still prove to be incompatible with Løgstrup’s 
conception of the self, more generally. In anticipation of this, I leave considerations of possible non-
Kantian strategies out of this discussion for the sake of clarity.  
18 It is noteworthy, given their shared commitment to the immediacy of the face-to-face encounter, 
that Levinas has also been subject to similar accusations. Especially with respect to his later writing in 
Otherwise than Being, where he argues for a ‘radical passivity’ in which the self is ‘hostage’ to the 
other. With reference to this, Peter Zeillinger wonders: ‘[D]oes this observation actually explain or 
enable concrete ethical agency? Instead of opening up a clear possibility for thinking the basis of 
effective action, Levinas seems to achieve the opposite: the utter failure or incapacitation of any self-
conscious agency as such’ (Zeillinger 2009: 98). 
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did not quite reach ‘the dizzying heights of the categorical imperative,’ as Stern puts 
it (Stern 2015: 230). Similarly, Bishop Myriel’s expression of trust was surely 
informed to some degree by his Christian background – a point for which 
Mademoiselle Baptistine’s letter, cited above, provides testimony. Secondly, it is 
exegetically implausible: recall Løgstrup’s assertion in Norm og spontaneitet that ‘the 
expression of life does not determine the behaviour or dictate the action, and it does 
not preclude rational reflection or judgment. On the contrary, it demands them’ (BED: 
132). Løgstrup also claims that: 
 The expression of life does not permit deeds to be pointed out to it that it 
must perform whatever the circumstances. On the contrary, it sees and listens 
its way towards what, in the given circumstances, can be done to turn the 
situation round. The expression of life is what kindles the deliberations of the 
imagination and the intellect about what to say and do. (BED: 72) 
As we have seen, Løgstrup’s assertions here are borne out in his 
phenomenological analysis of the Good Samaritan, which seems to allow that the 
Samaritan was committed to the good of the injured traveler in some way. Thus, on 
the balance of evidence, it is implausible to think that Løgstrup was committed to a 
picture of the human being as a responsive automaton; he clearly allows for some form 
of moral awareness.  
The question is, then, are these two aspects of the sovereign expressions of 
life, Immediacy and moral awareness, compatible? On a reading that subsumes moral 
awareness under the definition F1, the answer seems to be no: if Løgstrup were to 
rigorously apply his commitment to Immediacy, F1 would be precluded – and vice 
versa. We are, thus, seemingly faced with two unsatisfactory options in providing a 
consistent interpretation of the sovereign expressions of life. Either rigorously apply 
Immediacy, at the cost of portraying the human being as a ‘responsive automaton,’ or 
allow for moral awareness in terms of F1, at the cost of deflating Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology. Yet, on second blush, we might question whether F1 exhausts the 
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conceptual space for thinking about the ways in which we can construe moral 
awareness. In what follows, I will suggest that when viewed phenomenologically, that 
is, in terms of the phenomenological method, Løgstrup’s dual commitments to 
Immediacy and moral awareness can be seen to be compatible. On this strategy space 
is opened up for a reconciliation of Immediacy and moral awareness by 
disambiguating a particular form of ethically significant ‘ontological’ awareness from 
the forms of moral awareness I have subsumed under the definition F1. I submit that 
elucidating this alternative will not only resolve the problem concerning the 
compatibility of Immediacy with moral awareness, but it will also illuminate the sense 
in which Løgstrup claims to be providing an ‘ontological ethics’ (ED: 265).   
2.3. Sovereign Expressions of Life as Hermeneutic Conditions 
I began my discussion of Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life 
by noting the exegetical difficulties involved in providing an account of the 
expressions of life. These exegetical difficulties stem in part from the incompleteness 
and fragmentariness of Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life and they 
pertain to questions as basic as those concerning how to construe the form and 
function of the expressions of life in Løgstrup’s architectonic of ethical life. So far we 
have been working on the assumption that the expressions of life are a species of 
affective primary motivation, perhaps comparable with Kant’s notion ‘immediate 
inclination’ (Cf. Kant 2008: 4: 397-398).19 Yet, as we have seen, so construed, 
Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life faces an interpretive dilemma 
concerning its compatibility with a plausible conception of moral agency.  
                                                          
19 In the literature, the sovereign expressions of life are often taken to refer to a kind of immediacy 
whereby one unthinkingly jumps into action in response to a critical situation (Cf. e.g., MacIntyre 
(2007); Niekerk (2007a)). However, whilst this is a natural supposition, it is inaccurate: for instance, 
we have already seen that Løgstrup often refers to the sovereign expressions of life in conjunction 
with deliberation.  
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Despite the naturalness of supposing that the sovereign expressions of life are 
a species of primary, immediate inclination, however, this supposition is textually 
unsupported. Recall: Løgstrup describes his so-called ‘ontological ethics’ in terms of 
an attempt to account for a 
[D]etermining [of] the will that is neither purely formal (as is that of reason) 
nor through natural causation (as is that of inclinations), but is rather material 
and at the same time obligatory because it arises from the basic givens of 
existence. (ED: 289-90) 
The important interpretive point to be drawn from this quote here is the 
implication that Løgstrup views the sovereign expressions of life not as primary 
motivations, such as immediate inclinations, nor as secondary motivations, such as a 
commitment to the right or the good, but rather as what he calls ‘basic givens of 
existence,’ which are both material and obligating. The obvious question is: what does 
it mean to construe the sovereign expressions of life as basic givens of existence? My 
aim in this section will be to show that by providing an answer to this question it is 
possible to overcome the apparent incompatibility of Løgstrup’s dual commitments to 
Immediacy and Premise1.  
In providing an answer to this question, I will analyse Løgstrup’s ontological 
ethics comparatively with Martin Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology. The 
influence Heidegger’s phenomenology had on Løgstrup’s conception of his 
ontological ethics has been widely noted.20 For instance, Svend Andersen has claimed 
that ‘the importance of Martin Heidegger for Løgstrup’s philosophical thinking is 
indicated by the fact that Heidegger is the only philosopher besides Kant about whom 
Løgstrup wrote a monograph for teaching purposes’ and that ‘in calling his own ethics 
                                                          
20 It is important to point out that the now largely un-read German phenomenologist Hans Lipps is 
often credited with being equally – if not more – influential on Løgstrup’s thought than Heidegger (Cf. 
Andersen 2007: pp. 42-48 & Fink & MacIntyre (1997): pp. xvi-xix). Important work remains to be done 
on the specific influences Lipps’s phenomenology had on Løgstrup’s ethics. However, this is not my 
task here.  
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“ontological,” Løgstrup places himself, beyond any doubt, in a Heideggerian context’ 
(Andersen 2007: 39-40; Cf. Christoffersen (2017)). However, as far as I am aware there 
exists no detailed examination of how this ‘Heideggerian context’ works itself out in 
Løgstrup’s ontological ethics. Clearly, this is not the place to provide a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of Heidegger’s infamously labyrinthine and terminologically 
dense ontological phenomenology and Løgstrup’s ontological ethics. Thus, I restrict 
myself here to a discussion of those elements of Heidegger’s ontological 
phenomenology which are of direct relevance to the task of correctly construing the 
sovereign expressions of life. I will begin by providing a brief exposition of the 
relevant aspects of Heidegger’s phenomenology (2.3.1) before drawing on this 
exposition in giving definition to the sovereign expressions of life (2.3.2). I will 
conclude by showing how my exegesis of the sovereign expressions of life along 
Heideggerian lines resolves the apparent incompatibility between Immediacy and 
moral agency.  
2.3.1. Heidegger’s Ontological Phenomenology 
One way of précising Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is that of 
‘provid[ing] an account of the existential conditions constitutive of interpretation’ 
(Carman 2003: 2). That is to say, Being and Time aims to lay out the conditions 
presupposed by intentionality or comportment (Verhalten).21 So construed, 
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time formally resembles Kant’s attempt in the 
transcendental analytic to uncover the ‘scheme’ underlying everyday experience (Cf. 
Carman 2003: 10). Amongst the ways in which Heidegger departs from Kant, 
                                                          
21 The term ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) is employed here to qualify the term ‘intentionality’ in that, 
for Heidegger ‘intentionality is not a mere objective relation between two things, a subject and an 
object, but rather “a structure that makes up the relational character of Dasein’s comportment as 
such.” Intentionality is not just a feature of events and states of affairs, that is, but essentially 
involves agency, meaningful behaviour or “comportment” (Verhalten)’ (Carman 2003: 103).  
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however, is Heidegger’s central claim that ‘propositional intentionality is 
explanatorily derivative on some prior, nonpropositional level of experience’ (Golob 
2014: 5). In Heidegger scholarship, this central claim is often taken to signal 
Heidegger’s prioritization of nonpropositional and, some argue, nonconceptual 
‘everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility’ (Dreyfus 1991: 3), where this 
prioritization putatively ‘breaks with Husserl and the Cartesian tradition by 
substituting for epistemological questions concerning the relation of the knower and 
the known ontological questions concerning what sort of beings we are and how our 
being is bound up with the intelligibility of the world’ (Dreyfus 1991: 3). Debates 
amongst Heidegger scholars concerning how to approach this central claim are 
notoriously disputatious and it is not my aim here to take up a stance within these 
debates. Rather, in the exposition that follows I will draw mostly on the work of Sacha 
Golob (2013) and Taylor Carman (2003), whilst referencing others where necessary. 
Central to Heidegger’s account of the conditions of intentionality is his notion 
of the ‘as-structure.’ Golob explains the as-structure as follows: 
Suppose I understand ‘a as b’: for example, I understand the kitchen table as 
ready-to-hand. The a variable here stands for an actual, physical object: the 
kitchen table. Contra Føllesdal’s Husserl, there is no mediating noema that 
picks out the table. Contra the Lockean indirect realist, there is no mental 
image of the table. Contra the McDowell of Mind and World, the a variable is 
not a proposition or a fact with a propositional structure – for example, the 
fact that there is a table in front of me. Rather, it is simply the particular 
wooden object, the table itself. Heidegger’s view is that I am able to intend 
that entity, and in this case to intend it as ready-to-hand, insofar as I locate it 
within the teleologically structured social context he calls “world” (SZ: 86). 
My act of locating the physical object within that context gives it significance 
(SZ: 87): it is no longer simply a brute physical entity, instead it is now “freed” 
or “allowed to be involved” by being understood in terms of a set of meaningful 
relations…He thus labels the b variable “meaning”: it is that ‘as’ which, or in 
terms of which, the entity or entities, the a variable, are understood (SZ: 324, 
86). (Golob 2013: 80)  
In other words, a key innovation of Heidegger’s account of intentionality 
consists in the claim that our capacity to intend entities involves locating those 
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entities within a relational context of significance that Heidegger calls ‘world.’ 
Importantly, this distinguishes Heidegger’s view from forms of representationalism, 
such as ‘mediational representationalism,’ according to which my capacity to intend 
an entity ‘should be individuated and explained by appeal to abstract entities which 
are ontologically distinct from their referents, and yet which enable access to those 
referents’ (Golob 2013: 77). On Heidegger’s view, the b variable does not function as 
a representational mediator, rather its function is to ‘explain how I understand 
whichever one of these entities my experience is about by locating it within a 
meaningful context’ (Golob 2013: 93). This point will become important when we 
return to consider Løgstrup’s commitment to Immediacy below.   
An entailment of Heidegger’s account of intentionality in terms of the ‘as-
structure’ is that we have a prior ‘familiarity’ (Golob 2013: 107, passim.) with the 
meaningful relational context Heidegger calls ‘world.’ An obvious question arises 
here: how do we have a familiarity with the ‘world?’ It can’t be the case that this 
familiarity is acquired through intending a particular entity - ‘world’ - on pain of 
regress: we would then need to account for how we are able to intend that entity and 
so on. Thus, Heidegger introduces his famous distinction between entities and being, 
namely, the ontological difference, and he argues that it is our prior familiarity with 
being - as distinct from entities - that conditions our capacity to intend entities. Hence, 
Heidegger terms this ‘familiarity’ as ‘understanding of being’ (SZ: 5, passim.).22 And, 
on Golob’s interpretation, understanding of being is established through a ‘familiarity 
with a special class of prototypes, those which exemplify the relations that define 
                                                          
22 Cf. ‘We may keep in mind, then, that understanding, as the projection which has been portrayed, is 
a basic determination of the Dasein’s existence. It relates to the Dasein itself, hence to a being, and is 
therefore ontical understanding. Because it is related to existence, we call it existentiell 
understanding. But since in this existentiell understanding the Dasein, as a being, is projected upon its 
ability-to-be, being in the sense of existence is understood in it. An understanding of the being of 
existence in general is enclosed in every existentiell understanding’ (BP: 279).  
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contexts such as “world”’ (Golob 2013: 111). More specifically, Heidegger’s major – 
but unsubstantiated - claim in Being and Time is that that ‘time…manifest[s] itself as 
the horizon of Being’ (SZ: 437). That is to say, a familiarity with ‘time, in some sense 
of that word, is the relevant prototype for world’ (Golob 2013: 112). In other words, 
Heidegger’s claim is that time serves as the explanatorily basic instance of the 
b variable, the prototype in terms of which entities are understood as standing 
in the teleological and social relations that define the basic level of Dasein’s 
intentionality. (Golob 2013: 112) 
Golob stresses that this familiarity with time should not be construed in a 
trivial way such as with claims like ‘all our experience is temporal’ or that ‘temporal 
properties should play a central role when distinguishing different kinds of entities’ 
(Golob 2013: 112). Rather, Heidegger construes this familiarity with time in an 
existential way according to what he calls the structure of ‘care’ (fallenness-
thrownness-projection) that characterises the mode of being of Dasein in a 
primordially temporal way, namely, as a ‘thrown projection fallen into the world’. As 
Stephen Mulhall explains it: 
Dasein’s thrownness…shows it to be already in the world; its 
projectiveness…shows it to be at the same time ahead of itself, aiming to 
realize some existential possibility; and its fallenness shows it to be 
preoccupied with the world. (Mulhall 1997: 111)   
In short, on Heidegger’s view our capacity to intend entities as entities 
presupposes a prior familiarity with time, understood as a prototype that exemplifies 
the contexts and relations that define world. And Heidegger accounts for this 
familiarity with time in terms of a characterization of Dasein as a primordially 
temporal thrown project fallen into the world.  
Yet, one may wonder how a characterization of the mode of being of Dasein is 
supposed to establish Dasein’s familiarity with prototypical time. It does not appear 
to follow that just in virtue of the claim that Dasein is characterized by a certain kind 
of temporality that Dasein is thereby familiar with time in the way required for 
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Dasein’s capacity to intend entities. It is with respect to this issue that the existential 
dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology requires further elucidation. More 
specifically, it is crucial to emphasize how Heidegger’s characterization of the mode 
of being of Dasein as ‘care’ – his so-called ‘existential analytic’ – differs from, for 
instance, logical or psychological accounts of the conditions presupposed by our 
capacity to intend entities. The key distinguishing feature of Heidegger’s existential 
approach for our purposes is that Heidegger’s existential characterization of Dasein 
aims to capture the conditions constitutive of our intending of entities.  
Taylor Carman has captured this difference perspicuously by drawing a 
distinction between causal conditions and what he terms as Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
conditions:23 
What is essential to hermeneutic conditions…is that they are constitutive of 
what they condition in a way that causal conditions are not. That is, whereas 
causal conditions bring it about that one as a matter of fact has some 
interpretive understanding of something as something, hermeneutic 
conditions constitute what it is for something to fall under an aspect, and thus 
to be interpretable at all. For a condition to be constitutive of what it 
conditions, it is not enough that it merely bring the thing about. It must also 
figure into an adequate understanding of the conditioned phenomenon as the 
thing it is. For hermeneutic conditions to be constitutive of the interpretability 
                                                          
23 Carman’s interpretation aims to show that while in certain crucial respects Heidegger’s existential 
analytic is designed to resemble Kant’s transcendental analytic, where the constitutive structures of 
existence (‘existentials’) Heidegger proposes can be seen as roughly analogous to Kant’s ‘“epistemic 
conditions,” or conditions of knowledge’ (Carman 2003: 12). Henry Allison deployed the term 
‘epistemic condition’ in an effort to elucidate and define Kant’s ‘crucial notion of ‘condition’’ as it 
relates specifically to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Allison defines an epistemic condition as that 
which ‘is necessary for the representation of an object or an objective state of affairs. As such, it 
could be called an “objectivating condition”; for it is in virtue of such conditions that our 
representations relate to objects or, as Kant likes to put it, possess “objective reality”’ (Allison 1993: 
10). According to Allison, the aim of Kant’s transcendental analytic is ‘to establish a set of epistemic 
conditions, namely the pure concepts of the understanding.’ (Allison 1993: 10) Crucially for Allison, 
epistemic conditions are different to logical conditions, insofar as logical conditions concern only the 
rules for ‘consistent thinking, but not for the representation of objects’ (ibid.) and they are different 
from psychological conditions which offer empirical descriptions of the neurological mechanisms of 
the brain. Finally, they differ from ontological conditions which are conditions of the possibility of the 
being of things in themselves, not merely beings as objects of human experience. Carman notes that 
Heideggerian hermeneutic conditions, like epistemic conditions, contrast with logical and 
psychological conditions, but that their relation to ontological conditions is more complex ‘since the 
point of fundamental ontology is precisely to deny any sense of ontological commitment independent 
of an account of our own every day, pre-ontological understanding of being’ (Carman 2003: 21). 
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of entities, then, any explicit understanding of those entities as the entities 
they are must involve some understanding, however unthematic, of the 
hermeneutic conditions that render them intelligible. So, although we can 
remain perfectly oblivious of the causal conditions bringing about or 
sustaining our understanding of things, we must have at least some 
prephilosophical inkling, however primitive and inarticulate, of the 
hermeneutic conditions that constitute their ordinary intelligibility for us. 
(Carman 2003: 26-7) 
The key point here is that the set of hermeneutic conditions Heidegger 
proposes in characterizing Dasein are distinct from, say, causal conditions such as 
‘psychological or physiological processes’ (Carman 2003: 23) of which the subject to 
whom they apply can be completely unconscious, in the sense that Dasein possesses, 
at least at a pre-thematic level, a familiarity with hermeneutic conditions conditioning 
the ordinary intelligibility of entities. This is because hermeneutic conditions not only 
function as conditions on the possibility of intending entities – they also constitute in 
part the meaningfulness of entities they condition in a way that informs the Dasein’s 
fluent practical involvement with them. Put formally, we can define hermeneutic 
conditions in the following way: 
 (Def) Hermeneutic condition = α is only intelligible in the way that it is 
because of φ, where φ is a constitutive feature of α. 
In order to get a better sense for hermeneutic conditions, it is worth 
investigating an example taken from Being and Time. Consider the hermeneutic 
conditions Heidegger terms ‘affectedness’ or ‘disposedness’ (Befindlichkeit) and ‘mood’ 
(Stimmung) (SZ: 134).24 At their most general, affectedness and mood simply refer to 
‘…affective inflections of Dasein’s temperament that are typically experienced as 
‘given’, as states into which one has been thrown…’ (Mulhall 1996: 76). For instance, 
                                                          
24 Zygmunt Bauman has claimed that the sovereign expressions of life bear resemblance to 
Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit: ‘The “sovereign expressions of life” may be seen as another 
name for Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit (being situated – an essentially ontological notion) combined 
with Stimmung (being tuned – the epistemological reflex of being situated)…by insisting on its 
spontaneity, Løgstrup suggests the “an sich” status of life-expressions, reminiscent of that of 
Befindlichkeit and Stimmung’ (Bauman 2007: 119).  
85 
 
Heidegger mentions anxiety, boredom and joy as moods that inflect the way in which 
entities show up to Dasein. More precisely, affectedness and mood refer ‘to Dasein’s 
capacity to be affected by the world, to find that the entities and situations it faces 
matter to it, and in ways over which it has less than complete control’ (Mulhall 1996: 
76). In other words, Heidegger’s phenomenological point is that Dasein does not 
intend entities in an affectless vacuum; rather, as Heidegger puts it, ‘in every case, 
Dasein always has some mood’ (SZ: 134). That is, Dasein’s intending of entities always 
takes place against an affective backdrop in virtue of which the entities Dasein intends 
matter to Dasein in various ways. This affective backdrop, then, is no mere adornment 
to Dasein’s intentionality according to Heidegger; it is partly constitutive of the 
significance and meaning of Dasein’s intending of entities, of the way those entities 
show up as mattering to Dasein. Hence, we can see how hermeneutic conditions, such 
as affectedness and mood, are constitutive of Dasein’s intending of entities in a way that 
causal conditions are not: the significance and meaning of an intended entity is in 
some part constituted by the affective backdrop against which the entity is intended. 
Beyond this, Heidegger’s ontological point is that affectedness and mood are 
disclosive of a primordial ecstasis of Dasein’s temporality, namely, thrownness: 
‘disposedness or mood is the disclosure of Dasein’s thrownness (Geworfenheit), which 
establishes our primordial sense of pastness or having been’ (Carman 2003: 192). The 
thought here is that Dasein’s intending of entities, insofar as it is constituted in part 
against an affective backdrop, involves a primordial and pre-thematic familiarity with 
a sense of always already finding oneself in some mood. That is, of finding oneself as 
having been thrown into a world that always already matters to one in some way.  
Thus, on Heidegger’s view, Dasein’s intending of entities is constituted in part against 
the backdrop of affectedness and mood. And this affective backdrop involves – in 
however inarticulate and pre-thematic a way – a familiarity with a primordial sense 
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of time, viz. pastness, where it is in virtue of this familiarity that entities can be 
intended as the meaningful entities that they are.  
In sum, according to Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology, Dasein’s 
capacity to intend entities presupposes a familiarity with prototypical time, viz. 
understanding of being, where this familiarity – as articulated through a set of 
hermeneutic conditions - is constitutive of the way entities show up to Dasein as the 
entities that they are. In what follows, I will suggest that, on a formal level, Løgstrup’s 
ontological ethics can be seen to be isomorphic with this basic Heideggerian account 
of intentionality, albeit with some substantial differences, where the sovereign 
expressions of life can then be fruitfully construed as hermeneutic conditions.  
2.3.2. Løgstrup’s Ontological Ethics 
In Heidegger’s usage, phenomenology refers primarily to a method – he would 
call it the method – of philosophical research.25 As such, Heidegger’s usage of the term 
phenomenology differs markedly from its usage in contemporary analytic philosophy 
of mind, where the term often refers to a description of what a given sensation is like. 
Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Being and Time is dominated by an 
attempt to properly articulate phenomenology as a method for philosophy, conceived 
of as ontology. By contrast, Løgstrup hardly ever discusses methodological issues in 
his writing: The Ethical Demand contains under two pages devoted to ‘methodological 
remarks!’ Nonetheless, Løgstrup repeatedly refers to his work as being 
phenomenological (BED: 10; 13; 20; 41). And there is much textual evidence to 
                                                          
25 Cf. ‘The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies’ primarily a methodological conception. The 
expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, 
but rather the how of that research’ (SZ: 27); ‘Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be 
the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, 
is ontology possible’ (SZ: 35). 
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support the claim that Løgstrup understands his work to be phenomenological in a 
broadly Heideggerian sense of the term.  
For instance, in a late article, Løgstrup provides a definition of 
phenomenology broadly consonant with Heidegger’s method: 
[Phenomenology] precisely consists in bringing into the light of day the 
understanding of human nature and relations in the world that lie hidden in 
pre-philosophical knowledge. The philosophizing person is therefore not 
merely interested, but involved. It is one’s own knowledge and one’s own 
possibilities and one’s own world, which one occupies oneself with in order to 
reveal one’s own nature and the world’s character. The philosopher has always 
already understood the world, his own life and his life with the other. (FP: 117) 
More significantly, however, his brief – and, admittedly, rather obscure - 
methodological remarks in The Ethical Demand contain clues that point to a 
phenomenological approach along broadly Heideggerian lines. For example, he writes 
that he will ‘proceed from the standpoint of our own existence [existens]’ (ED: 15), 
where this appears to refer to the fact that the starting point of his analysis is how we 
‘normally encounter one another’ (ED: 8) in our average everydayness – that is, in the 
‘contexts, contradictions and conflicts of our own existence’ (ED: 7). This clearly 
resonates with Heidegger’s methodological prioritization of the first-personal 
‘average everyday’ experience of meaning.26 Furthermore, Løgstrup writes that 
‘methodologically, our task will be one of making distinctions’ where he contrasts this 
approach from those which first lay out an abstract ‘conceptualizing apparatus’ (ED: 
6 fn. 5) and then ‘schematically’ (ED: 6) apply it to different philosophical problems. 
This chimes with the important hermeneutic dimension of Heidegger’s 
                                                          
26 This commitment was shared by Husserl as well. But as Irene McMullin notes ‘Heidegger’s 
understanding of this point manifested itself in his greater focus on the preconceptual and non-
theoretical dimensions of lived experience. Heidegger moves Husserl’s phenomenological project 
forward by recognizing the practical and affective modes whereby preconceptual dimensions of lived 
experience manifest themselves first-personally…’ (McMullin 2013: 23). 
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phenomenological method whereby he stresses the ‘need for painstaking attention to 
avoid forcing concepts drawn from one domain on to another’ (Golob 2013: 254).27 
Given this evidence, in what follows I will draw on the Heideggerian 
phenomenological framework provided above in elucidating Løgstrup’s so-called 
ontological ethics. My emphasis here will be on properly construing the sovereign 
expressions of life as ‘basic givens of existence,’ where a central claim I will make is 
that the sovereign expressions of life can be fruitfully construed as hermeneutic 
conditions. Bluntly, my claim is this: just as Heidegger’s project in Being and Time can 
be read as an attempt to provide an account of the existential conditions constitutive 
of Dasein’s capacity to intend entities as the entities they are, so can Løgstrup’s theory 
of the sovereign expressions of life be read as an attempt to provide an account of the 
existential conditions constitutive of our capacity to comport ourselves to the other 
in their otherness.28  
In his late work, Source and Surroundings (1976), Løgstrup notes approvingly 
that the ‘phenomenological philosophers, Husserl, Heidegger and Lipps, realized that 
the world was not only a surrounding for human existence, but belonged to its 
                                                          
27 As Fehér (1994) puts it: ‘The hermeneutic turn of philosophy that Heidegger carried out implies not 
only the elaboration of the operation called Verstehen. More importantly, it implies that 
interpretation is no longer seen as an auxiliary discipline of the human sciences, as dealing with the 
rules of the interpretation of texts. Rather, it emerges as an autonomous philosophical perspective, 
insofar as the human being is viewed as an interpreting animal in all the modes of everyday activities 
and not just in the handling of classical texts in human sciences’ (74).  
28 Thus, to return to the issue concerning the extent to which the sovereign expressions of life should 
be read as having a transcendental status, my answer is that the sense in which the sovereign 
expressions of life have a transcendental status is formally similar to the sense in which hermeneutic 
conditions have a transcendental status is Heidegger’s Being and Time. McMullin summarizes 
Heidegger’s position in this respect neatly: ‘In contrast to traditional characterizations of the a priori 
as an unchanging, complete set of categories, Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time is to ground the 
aprioricity of the I in its particular existence, emphasizing the fact that the existence character of the I 
is precisely what cannot be bracketed. The existential analytic’s shift away from traditional accounts 
lies in its insistence on recognizing that the a priori categories are only ever found within this or that 
Dasein’s particular, finite existing’ (McMullin 2013: 88). When viewed in this way, we can understand 
Løgstrup’s claim that the sovereign expressions of life, as basic givens of existence, are ‘material’ (ED: 
290); that is, they are derived from the concrete, existing human and not from logical analysis.  
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structure. Our existence is an existence in complicity with the world’ (M2: 126). 
Løgstrup’s commitment to this phenomenological conception of ‘world’ has 
precedence in The Ethical Demand. Recall the final stage of my reconstruction in 2.1. 
where I considered the concluding passage of Løgstrup’s discussion of trust. There he 
claims that trust is expressive of the ‘fact’ that we ‘shape’ or ‘constitute one another’s 
world,’ i.e. that we are fundamentally interdependent. Clearly, these locutions present 
a notion of world at odds with traditional philosophical understandings of the world 
as the ‘totality of objects’ or the ‘totality of facts.’29 Not least because, as we have seen, 
Løgstrup goes on describe the ways in which our worlds are co-constituted by 
invoking a series of affective qualities such as ‘large’ and ‘small,’ ‘bright’ and ‘drab,’ 
‘rich’ and ‘dull’ and ‘threatening’ and ‘secure.’ We can extrapolate: ‘world’ on 
Løgstrup’s view designates an existential context of meaning and significance in 
terms of which entities and others show up as mattering in the way that they do: 
others show up as the others that they are in light of our familiarity with a context of 
relations and significance designated by the term ‘world.’ 
A Heideggerian question immediately arises in relation to this observation: in 
virtue of what is our familiarity with world established? We have seen that Heidegger 
accounts for our familiarity with world, and thus our capacity to intend entities, by 
appeal to what he calls Dasein’s understanding of being. On Golob’s reading, Dasein’s 
understanding of being is construed as a familiarity with prototypical time, where 
time in this sense is said to exemplify the relations that define contexts such as ‘world.’ 
Does Løgstrup have in his ethical philosophy anything resembling Heidegger’s 
notion of understanding of being? My suggestion here is that Løgstrup’s notion of 
                                                          
29 See e.g., Gabriel, M., 2015 Ch. 1 for a discussion of these senses of world.  
90 
 
‘understanding life as a gift’ can be seen to be isomorphic with Heidegger’s notion of 
understanding of being.30  
Løgstrup’s claim that we understand life as a gift is notoriously contentious, 
particularly as it bears on questions concerning whether Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology is intelligible in secular terms or whether it presupposes theological 
notions.31 At this stage in my argument I remain neutral on these questions. Here I 
am interested only in the formal role Løgstrup’s notion of understanding life as a gift 
plays in his architectonic of ethical life. In this relation, it is important to note that 
according to Løgstrup an understanding that life is a gift is presupposed by our capacity 
to relate to others in the way that we do; as demanding care and acceptance. Thus, 
Løgstrup writes that the demand made on us by the presence of the other 
‘presupposes…that a person has his or her life and the world in which it is lived only 
as a gift which he or she has received’ (ED: 171). Interestingly, Løgstrup substantiates 
this claim in a footnote by relating it explicitly to ontology, writing that ‘the one-
sided demand contains an ontology, a fundamental and constitutive determination 
[bestemmelse] of being, namely, that human life and the world that goes with it have 
been given to human beings as a gift’ (ED: 171, translation modified). What these 
comments suggest is that our capacity to relate to others in the ethically inflected way 
                                                          
30 In Løgstrup’s later writings, the notion of ‘understanding life as a gift’ disappears. Indeed, in his 
Rejoinder, Løgstrup notes his dissatisfaction with how he dealt this notion in The Ethical Demand 
(BED: 11). My sense is that Løgstrup does not abandon his line of thinking concerning the notion that 
life is a gift in his later writings; rather it is increasingly replaced with the notion of ‘creation.’ If I am 
right, what I say about Løgstrup’s notion of life as a gift below, viz. life’s givenness and our significant 
passivity in relation to it, still holds in his later writings. Although I do not have the space to develop it 
here, it seems to me that there are parallels between Løgstrup’s thinking on creation and Levinas’, 
where, as Jeffrey Kosky has argued, Levinas’ notion of creation refers to the thought that ‘since the 
self has been called into being before it exists, it is a creature…’ (Kosky 149). Similarly, Løgstrup’s 
thinking on life as a gift and as a creation carries with it the Lutheran thought that our existence as 
self-conscious, active individuals is in some sense ethically pre-determined by life. See §3 for further 
examination of the Lutheran dimensions of Løgstrup’s though and §5 for further considerations of 
Løgstrup’s notion of life as a gift.  
31 See Fink (2007) and Reinders (2007). 
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that we do is established by a prior familiarity with life as a gift, where this prior 
familiarity exemplifies the relations and contexts that define ‘world’ as that in which 
others shows up as intelligible as the other human beings that they are.  
Clearly, despite the formal isomorphism between Heidegger’s notion of 
understanding of being and Løgstrup’s notion of understanding life as a gift, there are 
many substantial differences between Heidegger’s and Løgstrup’s respective notions. 
One fundamental difference is that whereas Heidegger argues that time is the 
prototype for the contexts and relations that define world, where this relates to 
Heidegger’s temporal characterization of Dasein in terms of care, Løgstrup argues 
that life, understood as a gift; that is, minimally, as something given, is the prototype. 
That Løgstrup takes life, in some sense of that word, to be the prototype for the 
contexts and relations that define world is unsurprising given both the influence of 
Lebensphilosophie on his philosophy and the centrality of the notion of creation to his 
theology.32 As Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre note in their introduction to The 
Ethical Demand, Løgstrup’s variation on this Lebensphilosophische theme held that 
Life has been given to us and it is a precondition of any cultural ordering that 
the basic expression of life is both to receive and to give. Life, thus, is 
necessarily interpersonal and involves that basic trust which informs all 
communication. (Fink & MacIntyre 1997: xxi) 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a detailed explication 
and assessment of Løgstrup’s thinking here. Nonetheless, it seems plausible based on 
what we have seen to think that a prior understanding of life as a gift serves as a 
prototype for the contexts and relations that define ‘world’ for Løgstrup, in the sense 
that it exemplifies a sense of ‘giveness’ Løgstrup takes to characterize human 
                                                          
32 It is perhaps worth noting in passing that in some early lecture courses, Heidegger himself used the 
word ‘life’ to designate what he would later call Dasein and that Heidegger’s notion of life there was 
in a significant sense indebted to theological conceptions of life – particularly those found in St. Paul’s 
Epistles. See, for example, Heidegger 2009: pp. 61-97 & Campbell (2012), Ch. 2.  
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existence and, thus, a sense of passivity and receivership as being definitive of our 
relation to the world and its meaning.33 Indeed, Løgstrup writes that ‘life is not of our 
own making, it is given’ (ED: 18) and that life ‘is greater than we are; it is superior to 
us’ (ED: 165), where the implication is that human existence is characterized in terms 
of a passively finding oneself in a world with anteriorly given meaning and 
significance that transcends our finite conceptual and representational resources.  
Yet, just as with Heidegger, we must ask: how is this characterization of 
human existence supposed to establish our familiarity with life as a gift, in the way 
Løgstrup’s analysis suggests? If my suggestion concerning the isomorphism between 
Heidegger’s notion of understanding of being and Løgstrup’s notion of understanding 
life as a gift is correct, then we should expect that Løgstrup’s notion of understanding 
of life as a gift to be disclosed through something like Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
conditions. And this indeed appears to be the case. For instance, Løgstrup writes that 
‘…trust and love…contain an understanding of the fact that our life and the person 
who is the object of our love have been given as gifts. From this understanding of life 
– however unconscious – trust and love cannot be separated’ (ED: 138, my emphasis). 
According to the interpretation I have been prosecuting, Løgstrup’s claim here can be 
understood to be suggesting that our understanding of life as a gift qua prototype for 
the contexts and relations that define ‘world’ is ‘disclosed’ by, to use Heidegger’s 
terminology, or ‘contained within,’ to use Løgstrup’s, the sovereign expressions of 
life, such as trust and love, in virtue of which we are ‘bound to’ and ‘embedded in’ the 
world (BED: 71).  
Another way to put this point is as the claim that sovereign expressions of life 
are hermeneutic conditions: they are existential structures basic to human existence 
                                                          
33 In this respect, Løgstrup’s conception of life as a gift bears resemblance to Heidegger’s notion of 
thrownness mentioned above.  
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that are constitutive of the way entities show up to us in the way that they do. And 
they perform this function insofar as they are those features of existence that disclose 
or contain a pre-thematic, affective familiarity with life as a gift, where it is in virtue 
of this familiarity that our capacity to make sense of entities within the contexts and 
relations that define ‘world’ is established.  
Yet, at this stage it is important to broach a further substantial difference 
between Heidegger’s account of hermeneutic conditions and Løgstrup’s theory of 
sovereign expressions of life. Namely, whereas Heidegger’s account of hermeneutic 
conditions in Being and Time is primarily aims at explaining Dasein’s capacity to 
intend ready-to-hand entities such as hammers and tables, Løgstrup’s theory of 
sovereign expressions of life is aimed at explaining our capacity to relate to other 
human beings. That is to say, the sovereign expressions of life are a special class of 
hermeneutic conditions that pertain specifically to our capacity to comport ourselves 
to others in their otherness. It is with respect to this observation that the sense in 
which the sovereign expressions of life are expressive of a fundamental 
interdependence becomes significant: what the expressions of life disclose is a sense 
in which my life is not my creation; it is given, sustained and, indeed, co-constituted 
through the multifarious social relations that fundamentally mark our human form of 
life.  
Appreciating this, we can offer a preliminary formal definition of sovereign 
expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions:  
 (Def) Sovereign Expressions of Life qua Hermeneutic Conditions = the other 
is only intelligible in the way they are because of the sovereign expressions of 
life, where the sovereign expressions of life are constitutive of the way the 
other is intelligible. 
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Two key questions that need to be answered in explicating this definition are: 
(1) what is the ‘way’ in which the other is intelligible to us? And (2) how are the 
sovereign expressions of life constitutive of this? With respect to question (1) we have 
already seen in our discussion of Løgstrupian trust that, for Løgstrup, in paradigmatic 
cases of moral action the other shows up to us in their otherness, that is, as another 
vulnerable and living being irreducible to our pictures and theories.  
How, then, are the sovereign expressions of life, construed as hermeneutic 
conditions, constitutive of this way of being comported to others? In answering this 
question, it is important to recall Løgstrup’s claim that in the face-to-face encounter 
the other shows up as ‘mattering’ just in virtue of their living vulnerability. That is, 
the other shows up as making a claim on us to ‘protect’ their life; they draw our ‘care’ 
out beyond our projects to an irreducible otherness and make a demand on us to attend 
to that otherness. In Heidegger’s terminology, we might say that the other ‘solicits’ 
or ‘concerns’ us in a way that ready-to-hand entities, such as tables and hammers, do 
not.34 We have seen how this kind of relation is founded upon a familiarity with life 
as a gift, that is, as something given and as something that outstrips our finite 
conceptual and representational resources. Following the isomorphism with 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, my further claim is that this familiarity with life as a gift 
is articulated through the sovereign expressions of life, where the expressions of life 
can be seen as the existential structures in virtue of which our capacity to relate to the 
other in their otherness is established: The sovereign expressions of life manifest a 
                                                          
34 Cf. ‘Generally translated as “solicitude” or “concern,” Fürsorge is meant to designate a mode of 
care specific to encountering other Dasein. Thus Heidegger insists that Fürsorge is not the same as 
taking care of things…Ecstatic transcendence or “being toward” characterizes both taking care of 
things and solicitude for others, but the fact that in the latter case it is another Dasein to whom I am 
related marks an insuperable difference…In concern Dasein recognizes a being that differs 
fundamentally from the innerworldly  things experienced in Zuhanden and Vorhanden modes of 
encounter. Fürsorge designates Dasein’s way of being towards others who express their originary, 
ecstatic temporality in a co-constituting of the world.’ (McMullin 2013: 142) 
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familiarity with life as something given and, thus, as something that exceeds our finite 
resources of representation and conceptualization. And it is in virtue of this familiarity 
that the other shows up in their otherness, that is, as another vulnerable living being, 
irreducible to our pictures and theories.  
The constitutive dimension of the expressions of life, then, consists not in 
projecting meaning onto the other, but rather in the sense that the expressions of life 
are constitutive of a mode of relation with the other – a mode of one’s having to do 
with another – that is open to the other as a living being who transcends my pictures 
and theories. This, I submit, is attested to by the phenomena that comprise the 
category of sovereign expressions of life. For example, trust denotes an openness to 
the other as another living being with the capacity for renewal and change. Similarly, 
mercy denotes a way of relating to the other that transcends what the justice 
adumbrated in moral theories might prescribe. Both phenomena share a common core: 
that the other is another vulnerable, living being irreducible to our pictures and 
theories. And, thus, both phenomena constitute an openness and receptivity to the 
demand to protect the life of the other that, as we have seen, arises just in virtue of 
the other’s living vulnerability.  
With these two explanatory points in hand, we can add further determinacy 
to our formal definition of the sovereign expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions 
as follows. The other is only intelligible in the way they are – as making a normative 
claim on us just in virtue of their otherness - because of the sovereign expressions of 
life, where the sovereign expressions of life are constitutive of the modes of relating 
to the other that are open to that otherness. 
By way of illustration, consider again the examples of the Good Samaritan and 
Bishop Myriel. Løgstrup writes that in the parable of the Good Samaritan, ‘the call to 
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us is to engage with the situation – through the corresponding sovereign expression 
of life’ (BED: 76, my emphasis). Based on my interpretation, Løgstrup’s strange 
locution here makes perfect sense: the Good Samaritan’s responsiveness to the 
situation of the injured traveller constitutively involved a mode of relating to the 
injured traveller in light of the sovereign expression of life mercy, where this merciful 
mode of relation ‘let’ the injured traveller show up in the primitively ethically 
demanding way that he did. This contrasts with Løgstrup’s Kantian Samaritan, whose 
mode of relating to the injured traveller was mediated by moral principles - which 
according to Løgstrup occlude the other’s otherness. Similarly, as concerns the 
example of Bishop Myriel, on an interpretation of trust as a hermeneutic condition, 
the Bishop’s actions can be explained in the following terms. The Bishop’s relating to 
Valjean as another living human being with the capacity for renewal and change 
constitutively involved trust in the sense that trust opened the Bishop up to Valjean’s 
otherness – as a vulnerable, living being – where this then informed and inflected the 
range of actions open to the Bishop.  
To conclude this section, I return to the twin criteria of exegetical and 
philosophical plausibility that have been motivating my discussion. Firstly, the 
criterion of exegetical plausibility related to Løgstrup’s designation of the sovereign 
expressions of life not as primary motivations, such as immediate inclination, nor as 
secondary motivations, such as practical rationality, but as ‘basic givens of existence.’ 
This claim forms the cornerstone of Løgstrup’s so-called ontological ethics. In my 
analysis, I have shown that Løgstrup’s conception of the sovereign expressions of life 
can be fruitfully read as being isomorphic with a Heideggerian notion of hermeneutic 
conditions. As such, we can understand Løgstrup’s designation of the sovereign 
expressions of life as ‘basic givens of existence’ in the sense that they are existential 
structures constitutive of our capacity to relate to others in the way that we do. 
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Furthermore, this reading sheds light on why Løgstrup refers to his ethics as 
‘ontological:’ Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life aims to capture 
the existential structures presupposed by our capacity to intend a particular class of 
entities, namely, other human beings. Thus, it broadly follows the methodological 
framework laid out in Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology.  
More importantly, however, we must ask whether my analysis meets the 
criterion of philosophical plausibility. I framed this criterion in terms of an apparent 
incompatibility immanent in Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life in 
which he seems to be committed to two incompatible premises, namely, Premise1 and 
Immediacy. The crux of the issue rested on whether there is any conceptual space in 
Løgstrup’s account of the sovereign expressions of life in terms of Immediacy for some 
form of moral awareness. And the worry was that if there is no conceptual space for 
such awareness then the realization of the sovereign expressions of life in actions, such 
as those of the Good Samaritan, appear to reduce figures such as the Samaritan to 
‘responsive automatons’ rather than moral agents. In response to this worry, we can 
now appreciate that with Immediacy Løgstrup is referring not to ‘mindless’ behaviour 
or instinctual reaction but rather to a mode of relating to the other in a way that is 
un-mediated by pictures and theories, including moral theories: it is a mode of relating 
to the other in their otherness, rather than a mode of relating to them in terms of 
one’s subjective projections on to them.  
In appreciation of this, I have argued that the sovereign expressions of life are 
existential structures constitutive of a receptivity to the other in their otherness. We 
might say, figuratively, that they open us up to the other as another vulnerable, living 
being. It follows that the mode of relating to the other constituted by the sovereign 
expressions of life is a mode of relation receptive to a demand or claim made on us by 
the other – on the Løgstrupian premise that the presence of the other makes a 
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primitive ethical demand on us just in virtue of their living vulnerability. In this way, 
the sovereign expressions of life can be seen to involve a form of moral awareness, in 
that they are constitutive of a receptivity to a primitive ethical demand arising from 
the other in their living vulnerability. And this form of moral awareness is in fact 
definitive of Immediacy in the sense that the primitive ethical demand the sovereign 
expressions of life are receptive to is one arising from the other’s otherness. Of course, 
this is not to say that mode of relating to the other ‘silences’ the everyday 
intelligibility of the world to us: Løgstrup explicitly states, for instance, that the 
ethical demand is ‘refracted’ through social norms (ED: 107) and that it ‘kindles’ 
practical deliberations concerning how to respond (BED: 72).35 Rather, the point is 
that the sovereign expressions of life constitute a mode of relating to the other for 
their own sake, as an other - rather than for the sake of social norms or our subjective 
pictures and theories.   
An important upshot of this, of course, is that it opens up some conceptual 
space for providing an answer to the question of moral agency. It does this because, it 
shows how Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life is compatible with 
a core feature often taken to be necessary for moral agency to obtain, namely, moral 
awareness – albeit in a way that is substantially different from variants of moral 
awareness subsumable to F1.  
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to provide an account of Løgstrup’s signature 
theory of sovereign expressions of life. I have framed my discussion around one 
                                                          
35 Cf. ‘The expression of life gives rise to actions, and just as unconditional as the expression of life is, 
so conditional on the given situation and circumstances are the actions to which it gives rise. And just 
as conditional as the action is on the situation and its circumstances, so numerous will the reflections 
and arguments in the given situation be for anyone seeking to determine the right action’ (BED: 130).  
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dimension of what I am calling the problem of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics, 
namely, does Løgstrup’s commitment to Immediacy in his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life preclude moral agency, in the sense that it precludes all forms of 
second-order moral awareness? In response to this worry, I have argued that by 
interpreting the sovereign expressions of life along Heideggerian lines as hermeneutic 
conditions, it can be seen how Løgstrup can be consistent in his commitment to 
Immediacy whilst also maintaining that this commitment does not preclude some 
form of moral awareness. 
Clearly, however, this conclusion alone does not constitute a full answer to the 
problem of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics: whilst it provides an account of how 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology can be seen to provide a competing conception of 
moral awareness to those subsumed under F1, it does not provide any sense of how 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology can be seen to provide a competing conception of 
agential activity to those subsumed under F2. That is, it does not show how one 
incorporates the moral awareness constituted through the sovereign expressions of 
life into one’s actions through the exercise of agency. Indeed, my account of sovereign 
expressions of life here might seem to make the chances that Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology has the resources to provide such a competing account of agential 
activity to F2 even more remote. Since, based on what we have seen so far, the 
sovereign expressions of life appear to be phenomena to which one is passively 
subjected: just as with Heidegger’s affects and moods, they ‘assail’ us; we do not have 
any active regulating, sanctioning or evaluating control over them. They are ‘basic 
givens of existence’ which we passively receive. How can such passivity be compatible 
with a plausible conception of moral agency? 
I presented an attractive strategy for defusing this worry in chapter one under 
the auspices of an Aristotelian defusing-strategy. According to this strategy, the 
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agent’s activity in relation to the sovereign expressions of life can be construed in 
terms of a capacity to cultivate in oneself and become habituated to the sovereign 
expressions of life. Interestingly, such an Aristotelian strategy has been applied to 
Heidegger’s conception of the hermeneutic conditions affectedness and mood, 
discussed above. As Katherine Withy has argued in her article ‘Owned Emotions: 
Affective excellence in Heidegger on Aristotle:’  
[A]ffective life can involve a choice…I can choose to let my pathé be 
themselves; I can let myself be genuinely moved. Such letting be is in some 
sense active, but it is not a matter of becoming “master of [my] moods” (SZ: 
136) and controlling my pathé as might a continent person, who (for example) 
struggles to be angry at the appropriate person or at the appropriate 
time…The effort and control are directed towards removing impediments. 
The choice or resolution is an exercise of agency that aims at proper 
receptivity…We might speak of learning to experience certain pathé – learning 
to love or learning to grieve – but this is not a matter of practicing bringing 
about a particular result. It is a matter of holding ourselves open and letting 
ourselves be moved, and of doing so every time. (Withy 2015: 30) 
Could such a broadly Aristotelian model of agency be applied to Løgstrup’s 
theory of the sovereign expressions of life? It is to this question that I now turn.  
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3. Løgstrup’s Lutheran Dialectic 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and elucidate the Lutheran 
dimension central to Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics. The Lutheran 
dimension of Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics can be seen most evidently in 
his striking claim that human life contains the possibilities for goodness whilst the 
self is pervasively wicked and selfish. My aim is to provide an interpretive context for 
this puzzling claim and assess the implications it has with respect to the question of 
moral agency. The chief implication of the Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s ethical 
thought for the question of moral agency, I will argue, is that it appears to preclude 
the possibility that the self qua agent can play any active role in the ‘realization’ 
[realisere] of the sovereign expressions of life and their good works, where this 
implication casts serious doubt on the chances of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
being compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency.1  
My strategy in this chapter will be heuristic. I will begin in 3.1. by returning 
to Alasdair MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy. I will employ 
MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy to help bring out the 
distinctively Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s ethical thought, where MacIntyre’s 
Thomism serves as a helpful contrast to Løgstrup’s Lutheranism. The important issue 
that emerges from this contrast is that the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s 
thought appear to preclude any form of self-governing activity (F2) on the part of the 
agent when it comes to the realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their 
good works. Without any active role for an agent, it then becomes mysterious how 
the sovereign expressions of life can be realized in good works. In the remainder of 
                                                          
1 Løgstrup’s use of the term realisere means to ‘accomplish’ something or, maybe more correctly ‘to 
actualize’ something. Thus, when Løgstrup talks of ‘realizing’ the sovereign expressions of life we can 
interpret him to mean the actualization of the sovereign expressions of life in good works. Bjørn 
Rabjerg drew my attention to this linguistic point.  
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the chapter, I will canvass two ways of overcoming this problem. One taken from the 
work of Patrick Stokes (3.2.) and one taken from the work of Bjørn Rabjerg and 
developed by Stern (3.3.). Whilst both of these strategies can be seen to move in the 
right direction with respect to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics, I 
will suggest that they are both subject to philosophical and interpretive problems. 
Thus, in the next chapter I will build on these strategies, taking account of their 
philosophical and interpretive problems, in providing a positive answer to the 
question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. 
3.1. MacIntyre’s Critical Appropriation of Løgstrup 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the sovereign expressions of life can be 
fruitfully interpreted as hermeneutic conditions. The benefit of this interpretation is 
that it can make sense of how the sovereign expressions of life can offer a competing 
account of moral awareness to those subsumed under the label F1 – in such a way as 
to be compatible with Løgstrup’s commitment to Immediacy. However, I concluded 
by noting that, on Løgstrup’s view, the sovereign expressions of life appear to be 
features of our existence in relation to which we, qua agents, are wholly passive. In a 
way analogous to Heidegger’s notions of mood and affectedness, the sovereign 
expressions of life assail us in ways we do not control. With this observation, the 
question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics reasserts itself. According to the 
standard view of moral agency I presented in chapter one, along with self-regulation 
(F1), some form of self-governance (F2) is seen to be a necessary feature for moral 
agency to obtain. That is, moral agency is typically thought to involve some degree 
of active involvement on the part of the agent. This active element can be specified in 
a variety of different ways: for instance, as guidance or direction by the agent; as 
rational self-control or as second-order volition. It is sometimes associated with a 
process of self-constitution. But at its core, F2 designates a distinctive mode of activity 
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involved in moral agency whereby the moral agent actively takes up or identifies with 
a motivation or incentive for action in light of its normativity, thus making that 
motivation or incentive efficacious. By contrast, on what seems to be Løgstrup’s view, 
we are passively subjected to the sovereign expressions of life. In Løgstrup’s words, 
they ‘overmaster’ (BED: 68) or ‘overwhelm’ (BED: 68) us. And, as we shall see, any 
attempts we make to actively engage with them qua agents leads to their ‘distortion’ 
or ‘corruption’ (BED: 68; 69), in the sense that in trying to ‘govern’ the sovereign 
expressions of life we transmute them into ersatz or counterfeit phenomena. Thus, we 
are compelled to ask: to what extent, if at all, are the sovereign expressions of life 
related to moral agency?  
In chapter one, I presented one possible way of construing a form of self-
governing activity (F2) that looked prima facie to be compatible with a significant part 
of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of the sovereign expressions of life in the form of 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy. The spirit in which 
MacIntyre approaches Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is broadly sympathetic. He 
writes that he finds himself ‘strongly inclined…to assent to Løgstrup’s central claims’ 
(MacIntyre 2008: 148) and that Thomists, such as MacIntyre himself, have ‘much to 
learn’ from Løgstrup (MacIntyre 2007: 147). MacIntyre is attracted to Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology because it engages seriously with the themes of human 
vulnerability and interdependence, and considerations concerning what constitutes a 
proper response to them, where MacIntyre thinks these that themes have been 
underexplored in Thomist-Aristotelian virtue ethics – and moral philosophy more 
generally.2 Indeed, one cannot fail to notice the striking parallels between Løgstrup’s 
                                                          
2 Cf. MacIntyre (2009): ‘[W]hile Aristotle understood very well the importance of the relevant kinds of 
experience for rational practice…in neither ethics nor politics did he give any weight to the 
experience of those for whom the facts of affliction and dependence are most likely to be undeniable 
[…] Aristotle thus anticipated [Adam] Smith – and a great many others – in importing into moral 
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theory of the sovereign expressions of life, where the notion of mercy plays a central 
role, and MacIntyre’s development of the so-called virtues of acknowledged 
dependence, of which mercy (or, in Aquinas’s language Misericordia) is a leading 
example (MacIntyre 2009: pp. 123-126): both Løgstrup’s sovereign expressions of life 
and MacIntyre’s virtues of acknowledged dependence reflect attempts to re-configure 
moral philosophy in such a way as to ‘treat the facts of vulnerability and affliction and 
the related facts of dependence as central to the human condition’ (MacIntyre 2009: 
4). 
Yet, despite the considerable overlap between Løgstrup’s and MacIntyre’s 
respective philosophical concerns, MacIntyre’s engagement with Løgstrup bears the 
hallmark of his signature ‘tradition-constituted’ mode of enquiry.3 He avers, for 
example, that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is an ‘historical residue, [a] report 
of what remains when some larger scheme for understanding the moral life has, for 
whatever reason, lost its credibility’ (MacIntyre 2010: 14). Moreover, he claims that 
Løgstrup’s notion of the ethical demand is ‘what is left when the framework of 
Lutheran ethics is no longer available’ (MacIntyre 2010: 13). In other words, 
MacIntyre takes Løgstrup to have articulated some important moral truths, viz. his 
focus on the themes of human vulnerability and interdependence, but that these truths 
                                                          
philosophy the standpoint of those who have taken themselves to be self-sufficiently superior and of 
those who take their standards from those who take themselves to be self-sufficiently superior. And 
he also and correspondingly anticipated them in being unable to give due recognition to affliction and 
to dependence’ (6-7).  
3 Cf. MacIntyre (2001): ‘[C]entral to a tradition-constituted enquiry at each stage in its development 
will be its current problematic, that agenda of unsolved problems and unresolved issues by reference 
to which its success or lack of it in making rational progress toward some further stage of 
development will be evaluated. At any point it may happen to any tradition-constituted enquiry that 
by its own standards of progress it ceases to make progress. Its hitherto trusted methods of enquiry 
have become sterile. Conflicts over rival answers to key questions can no longer be settled rationally. 
Moreover, it may indeed happen that the use of the methods of enquiry and of the forms of 
argument, by means of which rational progress had been achieved so far, begins to have the effect of 
disclosing new inadequacies, hitherto unrecognized incoherences, and new problems for the solution 
of which there seem to be insufficient or no resources within the established fabric of belief’ (362). 
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have lost their bearings; they have been cut off from the larger scheme of moral 
understanding out of which they initially emerged and which rendered them 
intelligible.  
Given this, it is important to appreciate that MacIntyre’s Thomist-
Aristotelian defusing strategy takes the form of a critical appropriation of Løgstrup’s 
ethics rather than as an attempt to amend or defend Løgstrup’s own position. Patrick 
Stokes has captured MacIntyre’s stance well, writing that 
MacIntyre’s Løgstrup turns out to be a sort of degraded Thomist, who still 
dimly discerns the significance of Misericordia despite his – and our – 
disconnection from the form of life that once gave that virtue its normative 
force and meaning. (Stokes 2017: 277) 
MacIntyre’s critical appropriation of Løgstrup, then, is restorative in nature: 
it aims to re-contextualize Løgstrup’s phenomenological observations within the 
Thomist-Aristotelian framework from which – on MacIntyre’s view –  they originally 
derived their ethical significance and intelligibility.  
One way of glossing MacIntyre’s appropriating agenda is as an attempt to re-
cast the sovereign expressions of life as virtues of acknowledged dependence. So 
construed, MacIntyre can be seen to view the sovereign expressions of life as a special 
class of virtues – virtues of acknowledged dependence - that are to be cultivated, as 
with the other virtues, through reflection on and habituation to right reason. As such, 
the natural place for the sovereign expressions of life, on this MacIntyrean view, is as 
part of a Thomist-Aristotelian framework of moral learning and development: our 
lives as moral agents chart a passage from an initial state of passive subjection to 
desires and instincts through to a stage of continence directed towards the 
achievement of virtue. Ultimately, then, the seeming passivity and spontaneity of our 
relation to sovereign expressions of life can in fact be interpreted as ‘the effortlessness 
that comes at the end point of the process of self-conscious moral character formation 
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[…] like the seeming effortlessness of a dancer who has spent years assiduously 
practicing his steps in a continually self-reflexive and self-evaluative way’ (Stokes 
2017: 289). So construed, it becomes possible to see how Løgstrup’s theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life can be compatible with a form of self-governing activity 
(F2).  
In a Thomist mode, MacIntyre concludes his discussion by suggesting that 
the spontaneous realization of the sovereign expressions of life in good works reflects 
‘lives that have progressed beyond that stage [of continence], the lives of those in 
whom the openness to the grace of charity has allowed them to become spontaneously 
responsive to whatever is demanded of them’ (MacIntyre 2007: 165). Immediately 
after writing this, however, he continues: 
[T]o say this is to have reached a point at which the issues that divide 
Thomists from Løgstrup in moral philosophy turn out to reflect theological 
issues that have always divided Catholics from Lutherans. (MacIntyre 2007: 
165) 
Unfortunately, this is where MacIntyre’s text ends. The implication here is 
that MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy diverges from Løgstrup’s 
way of thinking about ethics in a significant way. And that the source of this 
divergence can be found in the difference between MacIntyre’s Thomist 
presuppositions and Løgstrup’s alleged Lutheran presuppositions.  
But what are Løgstrup’s Lutheran presuppositions, if indeed he has any? And 
how do they conflict with MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy? In 
what follows, I will pick up where MacIntyre left off. My aim is to expose the putative 
Lutheran presuppositions underlying Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics in 
order to clarify the extent to which MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing 
strategy diverges from and potentially conflicts with Løgstrup’s own view. 
Underlying this endeavour is a general concern that if Løgstrup’s way of thinking 
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about ethics turns out to be incompatible with some variant of F2, whether construed 
in Aristotelian terms or not, then the chances that his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life can be compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency will 
be substantially diminished.  
It is helpful, first of all, to provide some context: Løgstrup was a committed 
Lutheran. He briefly served as a pastor on the island of Funen whilst revising his 
thesis before becoming a professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion in the faculty 
of Theology at the University of Aarhus. In this latter capacity, he was deeply 
engaged in the theological debates of the day: along with many articles, he wrote an 
original work of theology, Creation and Annihilation (1978), as part of his unfinished 
four-volume Metaphysics. Moreover, as is plainly evident from even the first pages of 
The Ethical Demand, theological and philosophical themes were to a significant degree 
interlinked in Løgstrup’s thinking.4 Indeed, Svend Andersen has gone as far as 
suggesting that ‘Løgstrup, in working out his ethics, shows himself to be a Lutheran 
philosopher’ (Andersen 2007: 29).  
It is important to note, however, that, although in what follows I will draw on 
the theology of Martin Luther in elucidating certain dimensions of Løgstrup’s ethical 
thinking, I am mindful that he departs significantly both from Luther himself and the 
Lutheran theological milieu of his own time. Thus, I take it that Løgstrup is a Luther-
inspired philosopher and not a straightforwardly Lutheran philosopher, as Andersen 
has it, where an important implication is that, whilst Løgstrup’s moral 
                                                          
4 Cf. Løgstrup’s avowed mission in The Ethical Demand as an ‘attempt to give a definition in strictly 
human terms of the relationship to the other person which is contained within the religious 
proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth’ (ED: 1).  
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phenomenology might be seen to draw on certain Lutheran themes, it does not follow 
from this that it presupposes any Lutheran theological dogma.5 
With this preliminary in hand, I turn to the subsection of The Ethical Demand 
entitled ‘The wickedness of human beings [menneskets onskab] and the goodness of life 
[menneskelivets godhed],’ where a central Lutheran presupposition of Løgstrup’s 
thought can be seen to find its most decisive expression. Løgstrup writes:  
To show trust and to expose oneself, to entertain a natural love is goodness. 
In this sense goodness belongs to our human life though we are evil. Both 
apply completely so that no reckoning in terms of more or less can be made of 
this. Even though this is done often enough when it is said, there is “at least 
some” good in human beings! To this we can only reply, no, there is not! When 
speaking of the notion that there is “at least some” good in human beings one 
means to subtract something from evil and then add it to goodness – on the 
individual’s own account. As if trust and natural love were not given to human 
beings, but were a human being's own achievements and belonged to the 
account of the self. 
But there is nothing to subtract from the evil of human beings. The self brings 
everything under its selfish power. In it the human will is bound. The demand 
to love, which as a demand is addressed to our will, is an unfulfillable demand. 
Nor can anything be added to the goodness of human life. It is there and is 
there in completeness, but beforehand – always beforehand, among other 
things in the realities of trust and love. (ED: 140-1, translation modified) 
                                                          
5 As we shall see, given the considerable influence of Luther’s theology on Løgstrup’s thought, it is 
easy to get carried away and to surreptitiously impose elements of Luther’s thinking onto Løgstrup’s 
ethics. We must be careful to remember that, as Heinz Schilling puts it, ‘Luther’s world is not our 
world, but that distinction does not mean that these worlds are unconnected. As we look for lines 
that run from Luther and the era of the Reformation through the modern age and up to today, we 
must be careful to ensure…that we do not make Luther one of us. […] Over the centuries the 
reformer and his work have been interpreted in light of the perceptions and with the terminology of 
each new age’ (Schilling 2017: 3). Løgstrup’s Luther is one that has been refracted through the prisms 
of Kierkegaard’s theology and the dialectical theology of Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann and the 
Tidehverv movement. Furthermore, it is important to remain sensitive to the delicate and often 
ambiguous relation between theology and philosophy in Løgstrup’s thinking. This relationship has 
been the subject of much debate in the literature. Some, such as Hans Reinders, have suggested that 
Løgstrup’s ethics contains theological presuppositions, where Reinders takes Løgstrup’s notion of life 
as a gift as an example of where Løgstrup’s thinking seems to rely on theistic premises. Others, such 
as Hans Fink (2013), however, have taken Løgstrup’s stated aim to be proceeding in ‘strictly human 
terms’ to mean that Løgstrup was pursuing a resolutely secular agenda with his ethics, and have 
interpreted him as such. This is not the place to put forward an interpretive stance on this issue. 
However, my reading of Løgstrup holds that his phenomenology – which includes his theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life – should in principle be secularly intelligible (NB. Not simply secular). I 
try to remain neutral on the broader metaphysical question as to whether Løgstrup’s phenomenology 
does indeed suggest a religious interpretation, as he sometimes claims.  
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Løgstrup’s position here is uncompromising: on the one hand he affirms 
human life’s potential for goodness, as reflected in ‘natural’ – that is, erotic and filial 
– love and the ‘natural’ trust with which we ‘normally encounter one another’ (ED: 
8). Yet, on the other hand he claims that the wickedness of the human being or the 
self (ED: 139) is so pervasive that ‘the only love we know anything about from our 
own actual existence is a natural love to which we have given our own self’s selfish 
form…’ (ED: 138).6 Crucially, the claim is not that, when we are at our best, we can 
overcome our selfishness, but most of the time we can’t, as N. H. Søe has suggested.7 
Rather it is the much stronger claim that human life or existence itself contains the 
possibilities for goodness; these possibilities for goodness are always already there and 
nothing can be ‘added’ to them by our own efforts, however well-intentioned they may 
be.8 And, conversely, the self or the human being is pervasively evil and wicked, from 
which nothing can be ‘subtracted’ no matter how hard one tries.9 My suggestion is 
                                                          
6 The nature of distinction between human life or existence [menneskelivets, tilværelse] and the 
human being or self [menneskets, selv] is left unexplained by Løgstrup. In what follows I will refer to 
the wickedness of the self – rather than the wickedness of the human being – in anticipation of 
Løgstrup’s later focus on the self. Bjørn Rabjerg (2017) has interpreted the distinction in terms of a 
distinction between ontology (human life, existence, ‘world order’) and anthropology (human nature, 
the self). Whilst this distinction is to some extent clarifying, it seems to be a misnomer to refer to the 
wickedness of the self in anthropological terms, where this brings with it the implication of human 
wickedness being an empirical claim about a local or accidental feature of human life. It seems to me 
that Løgstrup’s claim about human wickedness is not an empirical claim, but an a priori one, of some 
kind. I will return to this issue in §4. 
7 Cf. ‘[Professor Søe] says I will not get one single person who is not a Christian to agree with [this 
claim]. No one “save a Christian theologian could ever think of saying something like that.” Søe 
invokes the non-Christian, who will certainly find that here I have “risen too high.” “They will say 
something to the effect that our self-assertion and desire to get ahead…do, as a matter of course, 
have their own justification, but that we must remember not to tread on others too brutally. And of 
course, most nice people will admit that we are probably more prone to err in favour of self-
assertion. But people will not treat these drawbacks as high tragedy, although they will hope that by 
and large, these aspects will be offset by ‘exceedingly’ unselfish actions.”’ (BED 27-8)  
8 It is important to note that Løgstrup is not making the absurd claim that life is wholly good. Indeed, 
Løgstrup explicitly notes that loneliness, grief and suffering are just as much signs of life, so to speak, 
as are the sovereign expressions of life (see ED: §7.3 & M1: §4.3).  
9 With this assertion, Løgstrup is breaking with the Barthian-inspired Tidehverv theological movement 
with which he was briefly affiliated. Rabjerg characterizes Løgstrup’s central disagreement with the 
Tidehverv movement as follows: ‘It is well known that Løgstrup was critical of the theological 
existentialism of his time, and of Kierkegaard. Now, it is important to stress that Løgstrup did indeed 
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that Løgstrup’s puzzling line of thinking here becomes somewhat more intelligible 
when viewed in light of what, following Daphne Hampson, I will refer to as the 
dialectic central to Luther’s theology. 
In the preface to the Wittenberg edition of his works, written just a year before 
his death, Luther provides an insightful autobiographical précis of this dialectic as 
follows:  
I had been overcome with a wonderful and certain desire to understand St Paul 
in his letter to the Romans, but what had hindered me thus was not any 
“coldness of the blood” so much as that one phrase in the first chapter: “The 
righteousness of God is revealed in it.” For I hated that phrase “the 
righteousness of God” which, according to the use and custom of all the 
doctors, I had been taught to understand philosophically, in the sense of the 
formal or active righteousness (as they termed it), by which God is righteous, 
and punishes unrighteous sinners.  
Although I lived blamelessly as a monk, I felt that I was a sinner with an 
uneasy conscience before God; nor was I able to trust that I had pleased him 
by my satisfaction. I did not love – in fact, I hated – this righteous God who 
punished sinners, if not with silent blasphemy, then I was certainly angry with 
God with much grumbling, saying “As if it were not already enough that 
miserable sinners should be eternally damned though original sin, with all 
kinds of misfortunes laid upon them by the Old Testament law, and yet God 
adds sorrow upon sorrow through the gospel, and even brings his wrath and 
righteousness to bear upon us through it!”  
[…]  
At last, God being merciful, by meditating day and night on the connection of 
the words “the righteousness of God is revealing in it, as it is written: the 
righteous shall life by faith,” I began to understand that “righteousness of God” 
as that by which the righteous lives by the gift of God, namely by faith, and 
this sentence, “the righteousness of God is revealed,” to refer to a passive 
righteousness, by which a merciful God justifies us by faith, as it is written, 
“The righteous lives by faith.” (Luther, quoted in McGrath 2011: 128-130) 
The fundamental issue that is tormenting Luther in this retelling is the 
question of justification (iustitia), that is, how can sinners become justified or righteous 
                                                          
criticize Kierkegaardian theological existentialism, but his dispute concerned the view of human life 
(ontology) – not human nature (anthropology). Theological existentialism placed not only the human 
being within the confines of sin, but the whole of existence, life – or finitude as Kierkegaard calls it – 
was placed under the sign of sin. That life is created was understood by Danish existentialists to mean 
that life is alien to God – finitude is godless – because God is transcendent. This ontological 
disagreement resulted in Løgstrup’s emphasis on the positive valuation of existence; human beings 
are not first and foremost the subject of God’s wrath, but of God’s love’ (Rabjerg 2017: 201). 
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in the eyes of God? Or, as Alister McGrath puts it, ‘if iustitia means rendering good 
for good and evil for evil, how can God justify sinful humanity? How can God, being 
righteous, render good for evil?’ (McGrath 2011: 135). According to the theological 
custom of Luther’s time, God was viewed as a judge who ‘rendered someone their due’ 
and, thus, punished sinners and saved the righteous.10 Yet, since according to Luther’s 
doctrine of the sin we are all sinners and we are sinners through and through, it is 
unclear under what circumstances any of us would escape the wrath of God.  
Within the theology of the humanist via moderna, in which Luther was trained, 
typical responses to this problem appealed to the notion of ‘covenantal causality.’ On 
this view, God was seen to have established a covenant or pactum with humans 
whereby so long as humans do quod in se est (what lies within us), God will justify us. 
And, in Luther’s early theology, what doing quod in se est meant is the sinner owning 
up to his sinfulness and crying out to God for help; doing quod in se est involves 
lowering oneself in self-humiliation so as to be led to salvation. In his later theology, 
however, Luther broke decisively with the soteriology of the via moderna. At an 
existential level, the task of self-humiliation was the source of much Anfechtung for 
Luther, as the quote above indicates: how will we ever know if we have done quod in 
se est and, thus, if we are justified?11 As we shall see in more detail below, a central 
conviction provoking Luther’s Anfechtung here was the thought that the sinner has an 
irrepressible knack for ‘seeking himself in all things’ and, thus, perverting humility 
into pride. In turn, this conviction informed the thinking characteristic of Luther’s so-
                                                          
10 Interestingly, McGrath (2011) notes that this conception of God could have come about as the 
result of the difficulties of translating Hebrew in to Latin, where, as a result, ‘the Hebrew notion of 
divine justice was assimilated to prevailing secular notions of entitlement. The inevitable outcome 
was the gradual belief that God, when acting righteously, rewarded people with what they were 
entitled to – in other words, to a covert notion of justification by achievements, merit, or works, 
rather than the Pauline notion of justification by faith, or the justification of the ungodly’ (137). 
11 Anfechtung literally means ‘being fought against.’ In Luther’s usage, it is the opposite of faith and, 
thus, has connotations of insecurity and doubt. 
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called theological breakthrough, namely, that ‘[he] no longer believed that humanity 
is capable of the true humility required in order to receive the gift of grace; rather 
grace is required in order to achieve this true humility in the first place’ (McGrath 
2011: 173). Thus, as regards the question of justification, the sinner is no longer cast 
an active role as a party to a covenant with God, but is rather now seen to be passive 
in relation to God’s saving gift of grace; there is nothing the sinner can actively do to 
be justified. 
Yet, perhaps surprisingly, acknowledging our radical passivity with respect to 
our justification did not lead Luther back into a state of despondent Anfechtung, but 
rather to joy. To understand why, we must introduce the peculiar dialectic operative 
in Luther’s mature theology: 
The formula simul iustus et peccator encapsulates the structure of Lutheran 
thought…the Christian lives by Christ’s righteousness, a righteousness which 
is extrinsic to him. Thus he is, at one and the same time, both a sinner (in 
himself) but also righteous (in that he lives by God’s righteousness)…On the 
one hand God, for Christ’s sake, holds the sinner to be just; he acquits 
us…Thus we may say that we are indeed to be considered fully just. On the 
other hand when the human is placed coram Deo (before God), faced with God’s 
goodness he must necessarily judge himself a sinner. But again it is not so 
much that the human is a sinner in himself. It is not that there is nothing good 
in the human. It is simply that when one considers the nature of God, the 
human cannot bring anything to God, on account of which God could accept 
him. In relation to God, he must count himself a sinner. The human thus has 
a double sense of himself, as both fully just and yet also as a sinner. (Hampson 
2004: 24) 
In other words, Luther’s solution to the problem of justification is to say that 
under a certain aspect we are justified – our sins forgiven – but under a different aspect 
we are and will remain sinners: we are simultaneously justified and sinful. According 
to Hampson, the key to making sense of this dialectically is appreciating the relational 
nature of Luther’s conception of justification.12 The human stands in an external 
                                                          
12 Admittedly, on this point, Hampson may be accused of inserting a level of dialectical sophistication 
into Luther’s view that is not textually justifiable. However, as I have already highlighted, Løgstrup’s 
approach to Luther will have been marked decisively by the development of Lutheran theology by the 
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relation with God, where righteousness is seen not in terms of an intrinsic 
transformation of the self but rather in terms of God’s ‘alien righteousness’ covering 
the sinner extra se. As McGrath notes, ‘Luther uses familiar images such as Boaz 
covering Ruth with his cloak (Ruth 3.9), or a mother hen covering her chicks with her 
wing (Luke 13.34), to illustrate how God clothes the sinner with the alien 
righteousness of Christ’ (McGrath 2011: 183).  
Importantly, for Luther it is only upon receiving God’s alien righteousness in 
the form of the gifts of grace and faith that we are capable of performing good works, 
that is, ‘external’ actions or deeds that fulfil God’s law. As Luther puts it in The 
Freedom of a Christian: 
Behold, from faith thus flow forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a 
joyful, willing, and free mind that serves one’s neighbour willingly and takes 
no account of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, of gain or loss. For 
a man does not distinguish between friends and enemies or anticipate their 
thankfulness or unthankfulness, but he most freely and most willingly spends 
himself and all that he has, whether he wastes all on the thankless or whether 
he gains a reward. (Luther 2007: 2: 43)   
In other words, our capacity for works of agapic love is wholly dependent on 
our having received the gifts of grace and faith from God. Luther’s mature 
interpretation of the sentence ‘the righteous shall live by faith,’ then, can be glossed 
as the thought that the righteous are those who have passively received, or have been 
‘clothed in,’ the alien righteousness of God in the form of the gift of faith. And only 
by having received God’s alien righteousness is sinful humanity able to perform good 
works.  
Now, what I take this brief excursus into Luther’s theology to provide is a 
suggestive interpretive context for understanding Løgstrup’s puzzling dual claims 
                                                          
likes of Kierkegaard, Freidrich Gogarten and Rudolf Bultmann and so a dialectical reading of Luther is 
not inappropriate in the context of a discussion of Løgstrup’s philosophy.  
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that human life or existence contains the possibilities for goodness but that the self is 
pervasiveness evil and wicked. Løgstrup’s dual claims here look to be isomorphic with 
the Lutheran doctrine of justification: the self is pervasively wicked and is, as such, 
incapable of bringing about life’s goodness through his or her own self-governing 
activity. However, human life nonetheless contains the possibilities for goodness, 
namely, in the form of what Løgstrup will come to call the sovereign expressions of 
life. On this point it is worth noting that Løgstrup asserts that the sovereign 
expressions of life are the ‘grace of existence’ (BED: 69) and that whilst ‘there are no 
limits to our iniquity…there are limits to the devastation it can effect; which limits 
are evidenced by our inability to prevent the sovereign expressions of life from forcing 
their way through and realizing themselves’ (ibid.). In a word, the possibility of good 
works, that is, of actions expressive of agapic love, depends not on the self-governing 
activity of the agent, but rather on the grace of existence, the sovereign expressions 
of life, which have the power to ‘overmaster’ the self’s pervasive wickedness.  
Despite this apparent isomorphism, there are some obvious differences 
between Luther’s doctrine of justification and Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical 
comportment, where some of these differences presage some potential difficulties in 
rendering Løgstrup’s position philosophically plausible and coherent. For instance, 
whereas Luther’s doctrine of justification is resolutely theistic, where this allows him 
to posit an external or ‘alien’ agent - God – who can justify the self by the bestowing 
of the gifts of grace and faith, on Løgstrup’s purportedly secularly intelligible moral 
phenomenology no such direct appeal to divine agency is made. Rather, on Løgstrup’s 
view, it might appear that some form of quasi-agency is attributed to life itself, which 
is said to have ‘a spontaneity with an inexplicable power of breaking-through’ (M1: 
91). The fact that Løgstrup refers to this ‘power of breaking-through’ as inexplicable 
is telling. Moreover, we might register initial scepticism concerning Løgstrup’s 
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assertions about the imputed wickedness of the human being or the self: in what sense 
is the human being of the self pervasively wicked and on what grounds does Løgstrup 
make this claim?  
Yet, it is perhaps worth noting here that, quite apart from the Lutheran 
presuppositions underlying Løgstrup’s view, there is something intuitively 
compelling about Løgstrup’s phenomenology here. The phenomena under discussion 
are phenomena such as trust, love and mercy. And it is natural to suppose, firstly, that 
these are not the kinds of phenomena that one can simply bring about through a heroic 
act of the will. Rather, they are all phenomena in relation to which we are passive to 
a significant degree. For instance, we talk of falling in love, where the implication is 
that love is something undergone rather than chosen. Moreover, it is plausible to think 
that attempts to try and be loving, merciful or trusting will have an ersatz character 
just in virtue of the fact that one’s efforts will be focused on doing what one imagines a 
loving, merciful or trusting person would do rather than straightforwardly being loving, 
trusting and merciful. We might think, that is, that learned spontaneity may lack a 
certain genuineness or authenticity that belongs to the phenomena with which 
Løgstrup is dealing.  
Nonetheless, clearly much more work needs to be done in order to render 
Løgstrup’s claims here philosophically intelligible and plausible. And the purpose of 
this chapter is to probe the Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s thought in search of 
greater clarity. However, at this stage in my discussion, we can mark an initial and 
negative definition: 
(Def) Human Wickedness = The human being or the self is incapable 
of bringing him or herself into identity with the sovereign expressions of life 
through self-governing activity.  
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We can register one implication of Human Wickedness right away: it is flatly 
incompatible with the conception of moral agency canvassed as part of MacIntyre’s 
Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy. The incompatibility here is stark: on a 
Thomist-Aristotelian view, the self is part good and part bad; we are created good but 
we have fallen into sin, and, thus, with the help of God’s grace, we are tasked to 
become better through reflection on and the cultivation of the virtues, both 
theological and cardinal. By contrast, on a Lutheran view, ‘all attempts to become 
integrated (to come to oneself) on one’s own as a self-subsisting entity (for example 
with the help of God’s infused grace) must fail’ (Hampson 2004: 12). Rather, for 
Lutherans ‘the [righteous] human is said to live extra se (outside himself) by an alien 
righteousness’ (Hampson 2004: 12). And, as I have suggested above, Løgstrup’s 
conception of the sovereign expressions of life as the ‘grace of existence’ appears to be 
isomorphic with the Lutheran view on this point. In a word, for a Thomist it is 
possible to move towards righteousness through one’s own moral and spiritual efforts 
– one can become more loving, more trusting and more merciful through spiritual 
practice. Conversely, for a Lutheran, we depend entirely on God’s gift of grace for our 
salvation, where Løgstrup seeks to present a secularly intelligible version of this 
whereby our capacity for performing good works is wholly dependent on our passive 
receiving of the grace of existence, the sovereign expressions of life. Thus, by re-
configuring the sovereign expressions of life as virtues of acknowledged dependence, 
MacIntyre is forced to discard a central Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment.  
It is important to stress at this point that MacIntyre is perfectly entitled to 
discard Løgstrup’s Lutheran presuppositions: he is not attempting to defend 
Løgstrup’s ethical thought, but rather to critically appropriate it for his own 
philosophical project. And, indeed, having brought the nature of the incompatibility 
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between MacIntyre’s Thomism and, thus, his Thomist-Aristotelian defusing strategy, 
and Løgstrup’s Lutheran presuppositions to light, we might think that MacIntyre has 
good reason to discard the Lutheran dimension of Løgstrup’s way of thinking about 
ethics. Not least because the foregoing elucidation of the Lutheran presuppositions of 
Løgstrup’s ethical thought seems to have exposed an impending inconsistency 
internal to Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, where this inconsistency has 
potentially grave implications for our attempt to provide a positive answer the 
question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. 
Ole Jensen, an early follower of Løgstrup, has captured the potential 
inconsistency as follows: 
If we read [The Ethical Demand] with our current knowledge of Løgstrup’s 
view-point, one will immediately think that with trust and love’s ‘reality’ he 
must have meant the fulfilled life expressions of trust and love. But precisely 
here the ambiguity manifests itself, for if you turn back three pages to p.158 
one is astonished by the formulations such as this: ‘What we know about love 
from our own existence…can only be a natural love, to which we have given 
our own self’s selfish form.’ What does this mean? Does ‘the selfish form’ mean 
that the love is never fulfilled, or that selfishness does not come in until after 
the fulfilment as the exploitation of it? On p.158, the first is the case. [By 
contrast] we have…his use of trust at the beginning of the book. Here 
Løgstrup makes use of trust as an elementary fact in our life together, and as 
we know, he claims that with the power over another person that trust gives 
us, we immediately stand under the ethical demand to take care of the part of 
the other person’s life…It goes without saying that the whole of this basic 
argument…would become meaningless, if trust were really not 
fulfillable…Harmonizing these views is impossible. (Jensen 2017) 
In short, the inconsistency Jensen highlights consists in the fact that Løgstrup 
appears to simultaneously affirm as a fact that phenomena such as trust and love are 
indeed realized and ‘fulfilled’ in good works and that, given human wickedness, they 
remain unfulfilled and are, thus, construed by Løgstrup as ‘hypostatizations’ and 
‘imaginary entities’ (ED: 138).  
Plausibly, the apparent inconsistency in Løgstrup’s thinking here arises from 
a premise operative in The Ethical Demand to the effect that ‘we cannot give [life’s 
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goodness] direct expression’ (ED: 19-20); trust and love are not realized in general, so 
to speak, rather they are refracted and given concrete form through our agency. Yet, 
if we human beings are as pervasively wicked as Løgstrup suggests in The Ethical 
Demand, then as soon as phenomena such as trust and love are given concrete form 
through our agency they have ipso facto become distorted and corrupted by the self’s 
selfishness. So, the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology go 
beyond the thought that we are largely passive with respect to the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life to the much stronger claim that the passivity with which 
we receive the sovereign expressions of life is matched by a self-assertive activity that 
distorts and corrupts the sovereign expressions of life per force. 
This inconsistency is, of course, grist to the mill of MacIntyre’s claim that 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is an ‘historical residue’ of a well-nigh lost 
framework of moral understanding. To understand why, it is instructive to turn 
briefly to a central line of argument developed by MacIntyre in After Virtue. In his 
critical discussion of enlightenment moral philosophy, MacIntyre suggests that the 
Aristotelian framework of moral understanding, from which enlightenment 
philosophy putatively derived many of its moral concepts, is undergirded by a 
threefold teleological scheme. Namely, 
human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be (human nature in its untutored state) 
[which] is initially discrepant and discordant with the precepts of ethics and 
needs to be transformed by the instruction of practical reason and experience 
into human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos. (MacIntyre 2007a: 
53) 
He continues: 
Each of the three elements of the scheme – the conception of untutored human 
nature, the conception of the precepts of rational ethics and the conception of 
human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos – requires reference to the 
other two if its status and function are to be intelligible. (MacIntyre 2007a: 
53) 
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The proponents of enlightenment morality, MacIntyre avers, abandoned a 
teleological view of human nature, that is, they abandoned ‘any view of man as having 
an essence which defines his true end’ (MacIntyre 2007a: 55). As a result, they 
operated with an incomplete and, for that reason, unintelligible two-fold moral 
scheme: ‘There is on the one hand a certain content of morality: a set of injunctions 
deprived of their teleological context. There is on the other hand a certain view of 
untutored-human-nature-as-it-is,’ where these two features of are ‘expressly designed 
to be discrepant with one another’ (MacIntyre 2007a: 55). What is lacking, according 
to MacIntyre, is the third feature of the Aristotelian threefold scheme of moral 
understanding, namely, the sense that the purpose of moral injunctions is to ‘improve 
and to educate that human nature’ (MacIntyre 2007a: 55) such that it can move 
towards and realize its true end. 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology can be seen to fit into MacIntyre’s analysis 
in an interesting way. Contra the epigones of enlightenment morality, Løgstrup 
appears to have held on to a notion of the human telos, viz. his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life. Indeed, in one place, Løgstrup suggestively states that to realize 
oneself in the sovereign expressions of life is to become one’s ‘true self’ (BED: 53). 
Similarly, and in a way that goes beyond many enlightenment philosophers, Løgstrup 
holds an uncompromising view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is, viz. the 
wickedness of the self. Yet, for reasons that are rooted in Løgstrup’s Lutheran 
presuppositions, he is resolutely opposed to any sense that the ‘untutored’ self can, 
through her own efforts, ‘pass from [her] present state to [her] true end’ (MacIntyre 
2007a: 55).  
On a MacIntyrean view, then, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology captures 
some important fragments of a scheme for understanding morality – for instance, the 
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regulative ideals of the sovereign expressions of life, and a conception of the human 
being in his or her untutored state – but these fragments have been cut off from that 
broader scheme of moral understanding and development and are, thus, rendered 
incoherent. One way of construing this claim is as the thought that Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment depends on the theistic and dogmatic 
presuppositions of Lutheran theology for its coherence: for instance, the possibility of 
the realization of the sovereign expressions of life might seem to depend on the 
activity of an ‘external’ agent, where some notion of divine agency is the most likely 
candidate to fill this role. However, plausibly, MacIntyre’s criticism runs deeper: 
Lutheran theology itself reflects a fragmented framework for understanding morality, 
and that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is in effect a symptom of a more 
fundamental ‘epistemological crisis’ that has discredited the Lutheran tradition of 
moral and theological enquiry. 
Notwithstanding issues such as these, in his later work Løgstrup confronts 
the putative incoherence of his dual claims concerning the ‘reality’ of life’s goodness 
and the wickedness of the self present in The Ethical Demand head on. Indeed, his 
development of the theory of the sovereign expressions of life was in part motivated 
by the need to overcome this incoherence. In Opgør med Kierkegaard he makes this 
point explicitly: 
The sovereign expression of life is…not concealed by selfishness or stifled by 
self-enclosedness. The power so to conceal does not lie within our volition. 
Admittedly, I once thought that this power should be conceded to the latter 
when in The Ethical Demand (in the section “The wickedness of human beings 
and the goodness of life”) I claimed that natural love and trust are “constructs” 
with which we operate “speculatively.” Ole Jensen has criticized this claim, and 
I fully endorse his criticism, which produced clarity. For it will not do, Ole 
Jensen points out, simply to draw a parallel between the ethical demand and 
the sovereign expressions of life. To be sure, it is the sovereign expressions of 
life and their works that are demanded, but the difference between the ethical 
demand and the sovereign expressions of life “lies precisely in their 
realization.” The demand is unfulfillable, the sovereign expression of life is not 
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produced by the will’s exerting itself to obey the demand. The sovereign 
expression of life is indeed realized, but spontaneously, without being 
demanded. (BED: 69) 
Here, Løgstrup unambiguously affirms the ‘reality’ of the sovereign 
expressions of life. And he explains the possibility of this reality by clarifying the 
difference between the manner in which the sovereign expressions of life are ‘realized’ 
in contrast to the manner in which the wicked self attempts to fulfil the ethical 
demand: namely, the self’s attempt to fulfil the ethical demand is marked by the 
exertion of the will; it consists in a deliberate attempt on the part of the self to do what 
the ethical demand requires. And according to Løgstrup, exerting one’s will in an 
attempt to fulfil the ethical demand results in distortion and corruption because the 
self’s attention is focused on the ethical demand qua demand rather than on the needs 
of the other which gave rise to it. By contrast, the sovereign expressions of life 
‘precedes the will; its realization takes the will by surprise’ (BED: 68). That is, as 
concerns the realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their works, the will 
is ‘overmastered’ (BED: 68); it does not ‘rely on its own efforts’ (BED: 68) but is rather 
‘pre-empted’ (BED: 68) by the sovereign expressions of life.  
Plausibly, the kind of thought Løgstrup has in mind here can be seen to 
parallel Luther’s characterization of the will as a ‘beast of burden:’ 
If God rides it, it wills and goes whence God wills…If Satan rides, it wills and 
goes where Satan wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, nor which 
it will seek. But the riders themselves contend who shall have and hold it. 
(Erasmus & Luther 2011: 97) 
In Løgstrupian terms, the point would be this: the will can be determined by 
the sovereign expressions of life or the self. If the will is determined by the sovereign 
expressions of life then it manifests as a capacity to perform good works whereas if it 
is determined by the self – if it is ‘in the power’ (ED: 141) of the self, as Løgstrup puts 
it - it manifests as deliberate effort and exertion, which results in ersatz action.  
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Now, whilst this clarification helps us to avoid the immediate worry 
concerning the overall coherence of Løgstrup’s position, it brings with it its own 
difficulties. Firstly, it generates a worry over a kind of determinism. For if we follow 
the analogy with Luther, then it appears that concerning the performance of good 
works the will is bound to or determined by the sovereign expressions of life, where this 
entails that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment precludes any variant 
of F2, and, thus, potentially any plausible conception of moral agency. Secondly, there 
is a worry over a possible ‘mysticism’ that appears to attach to Løgstrup’s position as 
presented here: as we have seen, Løgstrup appears to attribute an ‘inexplicable power’ 
(M1: 91) to the sovereign expressions of life, namely, a power by which they can cast 
the self aside and determine the will. When assertions such as these are read against 
the background of Lutheran theology, one begins to get the impression that Løgstrup 
assigns a mysterious quasi-agential status to the sovereign expressions of life 
themselves, where this impression threatens to reduce the plausibility of Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology.  
Given these worries we might think that MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian 
defusing strategy remains an attractive option for interpreting Løgstrup, in that it 
renders Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment compatible with a variant 
of the standard conception of moral agency. And, arguably, it retains the bulk of 
Løgstrup’s phenomenological insights whilst jettisoning some of the less plausible 
Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology.   
But is this conclusion too quick? Are there alternative ways to construe a 
plausible conception of moral agency such that it can be seen as compatible with the 
Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology? In what follows I will 
consider two strategies that purport to do just this. The first strategy, taken from the 
work of Patrick Stokes, is another defusing strategy in that it attempts to render 
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Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology compatible with a variant of the standard 
conception of moral agency. Unlike MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian defusing 
strategy, however, it aims to capture more of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology and 
to remain truer to Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics. The second strategy, taken 
from the work of Bjørn Rabjerg and developed by Stern, is a bullet-biting strategy: it 
fully embraces the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, 
where it proposes a distinctive conception of agency that is compatible with them.  I 
shall discuss each in turn.13    
3.2. Via Purgativa: An Alternative Route? 
In this section, I will consider an alternative way of approaching Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology that purports to be compatible both with Human Wickedness 
and with a variant of the standard conception of moral agency. This is the so-called 
via purgativa (the purgative way) interpretation proposed by Patrick Stokes. Like 
MacIntyre, Stokes thinks that Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life 
is compatible with a perfectionist conception of moral agency, viz. moral agency as 
character formation. But he suggests that there is ‘a radical difference in the 
                                                          
13 There are two other strategies that present themselves that I will not consider here. Firstly, there is 
what we might call a theological strategy, namely, a strategy that argues Løgstrup accepts the kind of 
theistic presuppositions that would render his affirmation of the sovereign expressions of life 
compatible with his Lutheran conception of the self. On this strategy, space would be made for 
agency - but in the form of theological voluntarism: The realization of the sovereign expressions of 
life would depend on the intervention of divine agency. Hans Reinders (2007) can be seen to hold an 
interpretation of Løgstrup along these lines. Alternatively, on what we might call a deflationary 
strategy we might reject Løgstrup’s affirmation that the sovereign expressions of life expressions of 
life are realities. On this strategy, moral agency could be seen to play a role in Løgstrup’s ethics – but 
only as concerns our always already failed attempts to fulfil the ethical demand. Neither of these 
strategies are satisfying. The theological strategy runs roughshod over the previously mentioned 
delicate balance Løgstrup is attempting to strike between theology and philosophy, whereby his aim 
is to show that a secularly intelligible phenomenology of ethical life suggests – but does not 
presuppose – a religious interpretation. The deflationary strategy, by contrast, reduces Løgstrup’s 
later development of the theory of sovereign expressions of life to speculation and hypostatization. 
And this reduction, it seems to me, is too high a price to pay for very little gain. 
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directionality of agent formation between MacIntyre and Løgstrup’ (Stokes 2017: 289). 
Stokes articulates the difference as follows: 
[F]or Løgstrup, fundamental phenomena of moral life point to a diametrically 
opposed form of perfectionism [to MacIntyre’s], one in which the agent does 
not so much acquire virtue as become divested of positive evil that impedes the 
operation of a good that ultimately comes from outside the agent. For 
MacIntyre, spontaneous goodness can only be an outcome of moral education; 
for Løgstrup, the road to spontaneous goodness could only run in the opposite 
direction. (Stokes 2017: 289-90) 
In other words, whilst for MacIntyre the effortless spontaneity that attaches 
to the realization of the sovereign expressions of life in moral action can only be 
intelligible as spontaneity informed by moral reflection and reasoning; ethical 
spontaneity is learned spontaneity, Løgstrup views moral reflection as ‘inimical to 
properly moral motivation’ (Stokes 2016: 146). Indeed, one might say that the moral 
value of spontaneity, on Løgstrup’s view, lies precisely in the fact that it is unformed; 
that it is primitive and particularistic in the sense that ‘the sovereign expression of 
life draws its content from the specific situation and the relation to the other’ (BED: 
53) and not from a set of engrained principles or moral norms.  
In light of this difference, Stokes’ raises what he calls ‘the problem of 
spontaneous goodness’ in relation to Løgstrup’s ethics. Namely, ‘How can we try to 
be spontaneous? Surely the very attempt would be self-defeating?’ (Stokes 2017: 148). 
That is to say, if the sovereign expressions of life can only be realized through a 
primitive ‘reaction’ to the other and their situation, how can we qua moral agents 
improve the quality of our reactions so that they align more readily with the sovereign 
expressions of life? Will all such attempts be necessarily self-defeating, where this 
again casts doubt on the compatibility of Løgstrup’s theory of the expressions of life 
with a conception of moral agency? 
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Stokes’ response is to re-configure the perfectionist notion of character 
formation in terms of what, echoing Simone Weil, we might refer to as character 
deformation or decreation.14 On this conception, the task set for the agent is not that 
of building oneself up, but of breaking oneself down. Taking inspiration from the 
notion of the via purgativa found in the work of mystical medieval theologians such as 
Johannes Tauler and Meister Eckhart, Stokes, thus, proposes a model of character 
deformation whereby the agent, through practices of self-renunciation and self-
annihilation, becomes ‘a mirror or conduit for the ontological good’ (Stokes 2016: 
155). Putting the point in Løgstrupian terms, Stokes argues that 
we can’t exactly choose to realize a sovereign expression of life, for this would 
already be excessively reflective, nor cultivate these expressions within 
ourselves directly. Does this mean we cannot become more trusting, more 
sincere, more spontaneously merciful? No, for we can at least become aware of 
habitual patterns of thought, beliefs and motivations that generate distrust, 
insincerity and mercilessness, and work to remove these from our cognitive 
and dispositional repertoire. (Stokes 2016: 155-6)15 
It is noteworthy that this model of moral agency as self-purgation appears to accord 
with Løgstrup’s comments that 
To decide to show trust and mercifulness is to decide to surrender oneself to 
trust or mercy. Trust and mercifulness must already be there as life-
possibilities. If they are not, no decision can elicit them. So the expression “to 
decide to show trust or mercifulness” is somewhat inadequate, but it is not 
incorrect because the decision consists in the renunciation of attitudes or 
movements of thought and feeling that are incompatible with trust and 
mercifulness – such as, for example, aloofness, guardedness, reticence, 
glibness, vengefulness, arrogance. The spontaneity accruing to the decision 
springs from the spontaneous expression of life – trust, mercifulness, sincerity 
and so forth – to which the person decides to give free rein. (BED: 79-80) 
                                                          
14 Cf. Weil (2002): ‘Decreation: to make something created pass into the uncreated […] He emptied 
himself of his divinity. We should empty ourselves of the false divinity with which we were born. 
Once we have understood we are nothing, the object of all our efforts is to become nothing. It is for 
this that we suffer with resignation, it is for this that we act, it is for this that we pray. May God grant 
me to become nothing. In so far as I become nothing, God loves himself through me’ (33-4). 
15 The original text reads ‘…we can at least become aware of habitual patterns of thought, beliefs and 
motivations that generate distrust, sincerity and mercy…’, however, I take the highlighted words to be 
a mistake and have altered them to insincerity and mercilessness in the quote.  
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That is, whilst, given our pervasive wickedness, we cannot actively bring 
about trust and mercifulness through virtuous striving or exertions of the will, we 
can engage in practices of self-renunciation whereby we work to remove those aspects 
of our ‘cognitive and dispositional repertoire’ which are incompatible with the 
sovereign expressions of life. 
Prima facie, then, Stokes’ notion of the via purgativa appears to provide a way 
to accommodate a mode of moral agency within Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
that is compatible with Løgstrup’s commitment to Human Wickedness: the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life is possible for those agents who have 
engaged in the work of self-purgation and have, thus, become ‘conduits’ for the 
sovereign expressions of life. On this view, the wickedness of the self and its inability 
to improve its nature is taken in its full seriousness. But it is seen to be compatible 
with a mode of agency aimed at owning up to and purging oneself of one’s wickedness. 
As such, Stokes provides a neat strategy for answering the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics, but in a way that looks compatible with Løgstrup’s commitment 
to Human Wickedness, for now we can see that there is a role for moral agency in the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life – albeit a purely negative one. Yet, 
while I think Stokes’ suggestion here helps to move the debate forward, I have some 
reservations about any direct application of the via purgativa to Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology, one philosophical and one interpretive.  
The philosophical reservation pertains to the worry over mysticism outlined 
above. Indeed, the appeal to the notion of via purgativa can be seen to sharpen and 
exacerbate the worry over mysticism in Løgstrup’s ethics. For what is essential to the 
thought of the mystical theologians such as Meister Eckhart, on whom Stokes draws 
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in developing his argument is a notion of a divine agency that can work through the 
purged self. As Eckhart puts it:  
When we go out of ourselves through obedience and strip ourselves of what 
is ours, then God must enter into us; for when someone wills nothing for 
themselves, then God must will on their behalf just as he does for himself. 
(Eckhart 1994: 3) 
In a word, the via purgativa – at last from Eckhart’s perspective - relies on the 
thought that the self’s attempts at self-annihilation will be matched by God’s divine 
agency which ‘enters into’ the space the self has opened up through its purgative 
activities. By implication, then, if the via purgativa works by removing the 
impediments to the sovereign expressions of life from our cognitive and dispositional 
repertoire and if, on Løgstrup’s Lutheran view, the self as such is an impediment to the 
sovereign expressions of life because the self is pervasively wicked, then it appears to 
follow that the sovereign expressions of life could only be realized if the self qua agent 
has been annihilated in toto. But then one wonders, if the self qua agent has been 
annihilated in toto, how are the sovereign expressions of life realized or, rather, what 
or who is supposed to realize them? Short of including theistic presuppositions in our 
interpretation of Løgstrup, we appear to be left with the puzzling conclusion that the 
sovereign expressions of life somehow realize themselves in action - without reference 
to an agent.  
Together with this philosophical worry, I have a further interpretive 
reservation. Namely, that whilst the via purgativa appears to accommodate the claim 
that we cannot through our own efforts ameliorate our pervasively wicked natures, it 
remains incompatible with the specific Lutheran sense in which that wickedness 
manifests. Recall here my discussion of Luther’s theology in 3.1. There I noted that 
Luther ultimately rejected the view that we can work towards our own righteousness 
through practices of self-humiliation. One way to understand why Luther rejected 
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this view is to appreciate one central dimension of his conception of human sinfulness, 
namely, sin as incurvatus in se (incurvedness or inturnedness). As Luther describes it 
in his Lectures on Romans 
[D]ue to original sin, our nature is so curved in upon itself at its deepest levels 
that it not only bends the best gifts of God toward itself in order to enjoy them 
(as the moralists and hypocrites make evident), nay, rather, “uses” God in 
order to obtain them, but does not even know that, in this wicked twisted 
crooked way, it seeks everything, including God, only for itself. (Luther 1961: 
159) 
The key idea here is that, for Luther, the nature of human sinfulness consists, 
in part, in a human proclivity to seek everything only for ourselves; to make 
everything – even God’s gifts – about ‘me.’ This extends to practices of self-
humiliation. Hence, as I noted above, according to Luther all attempts by sinful 
humanity at self-humiliation will be irrepressibly recuperated back into the self’s 
selfishness and thus transfigured into a perverse sort of pride rather than proper 
humility.16  
An important question, then, is the following. Does Løgstrup follow Luther in 
holding human sinfulness to render hopeless even our attempts at self-humiliation? If 
                                                          
16 By way of a contemporary philosophical comparison, it is noteworthy that something like this idea 
has been captured by Iris Murdoch in her memorable description of the ‘fat relentless ego’ which 
‘relentlessly looks after itself’ (Murdoch 1997: 342; 364). As Maria Antonaccio writes in her study of 
Murdoch, ‘the relentlessly “machine-like” nature of the psyche makes self-scrutiny dangerous 
because the psyche is in effect “programmed” to look after itself…So relentless is the psychic 
machinery in Murdoch’s view that even a negative judgement of oneself may perpetuate a consoling 
self-absorption’ (Antonaccio 2000: 133). As with Murdoch, Luther holds that human sinfulness is so 
pervasive that it effects even the self’s capacities for self-humiliation. It is perhaps also worth noting 
in this context that, in Norm and Spontaneity, Løgstrup refers approvingly to aphorism 133 in Dawn, 
where Nietzsche attempts to expose what he sees as the complexly self-interested motives 
underlying purportedly compassionate or selfless actions. The aphorism in question runs as follows: 
‘One ought indeed to ponder the question seriously: why do we jump in after someone who has 
fallen into water right in front of us even though we are not drawn to that person? […] [W]e never do 
anything of this sort from one motive; as surely as we wish to free ourselves of suffering through such 
an act, we are, with the same act, just as surely surrendering to an impulse for pleasure – pleasure 
arises in viewing a contrast to our own situation, in the very idea of being able to help if only we do 
desired, in the thought of praise and gratitude were we to help, in the very activity of helping insofar 
as the act is successful and succeeds step by step, thus allowing the performer to delight in himself, 
but especially in the sensation that our action has put an end to an injustice that arouses our 
indignation (already the release of indignation in itself is invigorating)’ (Nietzsche (1997)). 
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so, then the availability of the via purgativa as a possible way of resolving the problem 
from human wickedness will be cast into further doubt. For, plausibly, on a Lutheran 
view, even our attempts at self-annihilation will ultimately ensnare us yet further in 
our sinfulness rather than freeing us from it. This question, moreover, is not of merely 
local interest: we have reason to further investigate Løgstrup’s commitment to 
Human Wickedness just in virtue of the fact that, baldly stated, it might seem to strain 
credibility. Is the self really as selfish and wicked as Løgstrup seems to think? We 
might object, as did N. H. Søe, that Løgstrup is simply asserting a piece of Christian 
dogma here, whilst turning a blind eye to the richness and complexity of human 
existence. It is important, then, to get a full picture of Løgstrup’s thinking about 
human wickedness in view. Here I will focus on Løgstrup’s discussion of the 
wickedness of the self in The Ethical Demand, while referring to his later works where 
necessary. 
In The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup associates human wickedness with 
selfishness [selviskheds]. As we have seen, he claims that ‘the self brings everything 
under the power of its selfishness’ (ED: 141), where he further qualifies this thought 
in his later writings variously in terms of ‘self-centredness’ (BED: 33) and ‘self-
enclosedness’ (BED: 68). Far from presenting this claim as a bare assertion, however, 
throughout his writings Løgstrup pays much phenomenological attention to the 
nature of selfishness and the way it manifests in ethical life. In one of his most 
sustained discussion of this subject in The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup presents a series 
of phenomenological accounts of what he takes to be three dominant ways in which 
selfishness manifests itself, namely, as ‘dispassionate selfishness’ [Ulidenskabelige 
selviskhed], ‘passionate selfishness’ [Lidenskabelige selviskhed] and ‘sentimentality’ 
[Sentimentaliteten]. I shall take each in turn.  
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‘Dispassionate selfishness,’ Løgstrup writes, ‘means that in whatever a person 
does and in whatever happens to him or her he or she has him or herself in mind, 
though for no objective reason’ (ED: 132). Dispassionate selfishness captures a human 
proclivity for ‘self-righteousness’ that consists in the ‘vain desire to be worshipped’ 
and in which ‘the other person exists only to provide me with my meritoriousness; 
beyond that he or she is of no interest to me’ (ED: 133). Despite what this rather 
hyperbolic description may suggest, dispassionate selfishness is not confined to 
extravagant cases of Donald Trump-like megalomania. Rather it is supposed to 
describe something very mundane and basic: it describes a delusional yet, for 
Løgstrup, pervasive and unselfconscious human tendency to view ourselves as 
standing at the centre of the world, where this might manifest in a vague paranoia 
that the world is against us or, conversely, in a self-aggrandizing belief in one’s own 
importance to others. Dispassionate selfishness is ‘dull and truncated’ and the 
dispassionately selfish person is ‘opaque to him or herself’ (ED: 132). In his later 
works, this sense of selfishness can be seen to attach most readily to his descriptions 
of a tendency for ‘self-righteousness’ (BED: 69) by which we ‘corrupt the sovereign 
expression of life by…crediting ourselves with what the sovereign expression of life 
achieves and thus, flattering our will, we deprive the former of its sovereignty’ (ibid). 
It is a simple and spiritless self-centredness.  
Passionate selfishness, by contrast, refers to a selfishness that is self-conscious. 
That is, it is a selfishness that is aware of its ‘inconsiderateness,’ as Løgstrup puts it. 
This self-consciousness, however, is not therapeutic: rather, Løgstrup avers that it 
‘either fails to face up to its inconsiderateness and looks in all other directions in the 
hope of finding excuses and ameliorating circumstances, or else it runs amuck and in 
its passion loses control of itself’ (ED: 133). I think what Løgstrup has in mind here 
is well illustrated in David Foster Wallace’s short story ‘Good Old Neon.’ The story 
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takes the form of a confessional in which the protagonist has become aware that ‘my 
[meaning: his] whole life I’ve been a fraud. I’m not exaggerating. Pretty much all I’ve 
ever done all the time is try to create a certain impression of me in other people. 
Mostly to be liked or admired’ (Wallace 2004: 141). As the story progresses, the 
narrator recounts his various (vain) attempts to reach out for help in combating his 
feeling of fraudulence. For instance, going to an analyst: 
By that time I already knew I was a fraud. I knew what my problem was. I just 
couldn’t seem to stop. I remember I spent maybe the first twenty times or so 
in analysis acting all open and candid but in reality sort of fencing with him or 
leading him around by the nose, basically showing him that I wasn’t just 
another one of those patients who stumbled in with no clue what their real 
problem was or who were totally out of touch with the truth about themselves. 
When you come down to it, I was trying to show him that I was at least as 
smart as he was and that there wasn’t much of anything he was going to see 
about me that I hadn’t already seen and figured out. And yet I wanted help 
and really was there to try to get help. (Wallace 2004: 143) 
The issue here is that no matter how counter-productive or inhibiting it may 
be, the protagonist is aware that he can’t help but assert himself in relation to his 
analyst and try to prove himself to be the master and sovereign of his own life - in 
this case by proving himself to have a level of self-knowledge that far exceeds 
whatever the analyst could muster. In fact, his relation to his analyst is reduced to an 
occasion for the protagonist to show off his intellectual depth – all the while his 
gnawing sense of fraudulence is left untouched.  
Notice the vicious circle the protagonist finds himself in: he is disturbed by his 
pervasive feeling of fraudulence, but his active attempts to address that feeling by 
going to analysis and going to meditation classes (where he suffers a similar fate) end 
up ensnaring him yet further in his fraudulence.17 This illustrates well how, to 
                                                          
17 Cf. ‘Right from the first class meeting, even though the small, brown instructor had told us to shoot 
for only ten minutes of stillness at the outset because most Westerners’ minds could not maintain 
more than a few minutes of stillness and mindful concentration without feeling so restless and ill at 
ease that they couldn’t stand it, I always remained absolutely still and focused on breathing my prana 
with the lower diaphragm longer than any of them, sometimes for up to thirty minutes, even though 
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someone in the thrall of passionate selfishness, the task of extricating themselves from 
it by their own efforts can seem futile. Notice also that there is clear overlap here with 
Luther’s Anfechtung concerning the possibility of self-humiliation: self-assertion and 
self-righteousness tend to beget self-assertion and self-righteousness, so that 
attempts at self-effacement – attempts to escape from self-occupation – from the 
standpoint of self-assertion and self-righteousness are often self-defeating.18 
A similar structure can be found in what Løgstrup refers to as ‘sentimentality,’ where 
It is not that the other person is not a vital part of the sentimental person’s 
life. It is rather that the sentimental person is not content to live in that 
dependence. Instead he or she draws it into him or herself, introverting it in 
order to be able to observe it. Instead of just depending he or she seeks to taste 
the dependence. He or she wants to feel sentimental happiness at knowing that 
his or her own vital happiness is dependent on the other person’s vital 
happiness. (ED: 133)  
In contrast to the assertive self-righteousness characteristic of dispassionate 
selfishness and the self-stultifying Anfechtung of passionate selfishness, sentimentality 
reposes in its own weakness, finding some perverse emotional pleasure in being so 
dependent. In a way analogous to dispassionate selfishness, however, the other on 
                                                          
my knees and lower back were on fire and I had what felt like swarms of insects crawling all over my 
arms and shooting out the top of my head – and Master Gurpreet, although he kept his facial 
expression inscrutable, gave me a deep and seemingly respectful bow and said that I sat almost like a 
living statue of mindful repose, and that he was impressed. The problem was that we were also 
supposed to continue practicing our meditation on our own at home between classes, and when I 
tried to do it alone I couldn’t seem to sit still and follow my breath for more than even a few minutes 
before I felt like crawling out of my skin and had to stop. I could only sit and appear quiet and mindful 
and withstand the unbelievably restless and horrible feelings when all of us were doing it together in 
the class – meaning only when there were other people to make an impression on.’ (Wallace 2004: 
159) 
18 Luther’s own experience of monastic life provides another vivid example of this vicious circularity. 
As Rabjerg reports: ‘According to [Luther], monasticism is institutionalized selfishness, it is pharisaic, 
because monastic life is centred on the attempt to secure oneself and one’s relationship to God. One 
of Løgstrup’s existentialist contemporaries, who specialized in Luther, expresses it like this: ‘He 
[Luther] knows that he must seek and serve God and fellow man, but he experiences that he is 
inescapably turned inward on himself, so that he steals any action – even the one appearing to be the 
most unselfish – for himself, seeks himself in everything, undertakes no action that is not an attempt 
at securing himself, saving himself, or earning merit, so that he is protected by God’’ (Rabjerg 2017: 
201). 
133 
 
whom the sentimental person is dependent is essentially occluded, in that the 
sentimental person ‘introverts’ their dependency.  
Consider another illustration provided by David Foster Wallace, this time 
from his aptly named Brief Interviews with Hideous Men:  
For she was frightened, the depressed person confessed to the trusted and 
convalescing friend, profoundly, unprecedentedly frightened by what she was 
beginning to feel she was seeing and learning and getting in touch with about 
herself in the grieving process following the sudden death of a therapist who 
for nearly four years had been the depressed person’s closest and most trusted 
confidante and source of support and affirmation and – with no offence in any 
way intended to any members of her Support System – her very best friend in 
the world. Because what she had discovered, the depressed person confided 
long-distance, when she took her important daily Quiet Time now, during the 
grieving process, and got quiet and centred and looked deep within, was that 
she could neither feel nor identify any real feelings within herself for the 
therapist, i.e. for the therapist as a person, a person who had died, a person 
who only somebody in truly stupefying levels of emotional agony and isolation 
and despair which were comparable to or perhaps – though it was only on a 
“head” or purely abstract intellectual level that she seemed to be able even to 
entertain this possibility, the depressed person confessed over the headset 
telephone – even exceeded the depressed person’s own. The depressed person 
shared that the most frightening implication of this (i.e., of the fact that, even 
when she centred and looked deep within herself, she felt she could locate no 
real feelings for the therapist as an autonomously valid human being) appeared 
to be that all her agonized pain and despair since the therapist’s suicide had in 
fact been all and only for herself, i.e. of her loss, her abandonment, her grief, her 
trauma and pain and primal affective survival. And, the depressed person 
shared that she was taking the additional risk of revealing, even more 
frightening, that this shatteringly terrifying set of realizations, instead now of 
awakening in her any feelings of compassion, empathy, and other-directed 
grief for the therapist as a person, had – and here the depressed person waited 
patiently for an episode of retching in the especially available trusted friend to 
pass so that she could take the risk of sharing this with her – that these 
shatteringly frightening realizations had seemed, terrifyingly, merely to have 
brought up and created still more and further feelings in the depressed person 
about herself. (Wallace 2011: 56-7) 
The central realization tormenting the depressed person is her inability to 
genuinely care about others for their own sake rather than in terms of herself and her 
own needs. And this very realization traps her yet further in her encircling and 
introverted self-concern. Despite her acute awareness of her own imprisonment in 
herself, she is unable to change herself on the basis of that awareness. And in fact this 
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realization exacerbates and nurses her obsessive self-concern rather than releasing 
her from it.19 
We can draw two important conclusions from the foregoing discussion. 
Firstly, despite their differences, the unifying core common to all of these 
manifestations of selfishness is that they are self-enclosing; they occlude the Immediacy 
of one’s relations with other and turn the self in on itself in a manner comparable with 
Luther’s definition of sin as incurvatus in se. In other words, Løgstrup’s claim 
concerning human wickedness consists in the thought that the self-governing activity 
of attempting to bring oneself into identity with the sovereign expressions of life in 
the performance of one’s actions involves thinking about one’s relation to the 
sovereign expressions of life or, more generally, to one’s goodness. And as soon as 
one becomes concerned with the one’s relation to goodness, the Immediacy definitive 
of the sovereign expressions of life has been lost. One way in which self-enclosedness 
manifests, as per dispassionate selfishness, is as a concern for one’s moral standing in 
relation to the other; it is a desire to be thought of as a good person. Another way in 
which it manifests, as per passionate selfishness, is as a gnawing awareness that one’s 
putatively other-regarding actions are incessantly accompanied by a concern for one’s 
moral standing in relation to the other, where this then generates a further level of 
self-concern but this time in terms of a self-defeating will to rid oneself of one’s self-
concern. Yet another way in which self-enclosedness manifests is as introverted 
sentimentality, whereby in acknowledging one’s selfishness as a weakness, one comes 
                                                          
19 These latter two senses of selfishness, passionate selfishness and sentimentality, are fleshed out in 
Løgstrup’s later writings in terms of what he calls ‘obsessive’ or ‘encircling’ phenomena such as 
offence, jealousy, and envy (BED: 51). According to Løgstrup, these phenomena, in contrast to 
dispassionate selfishness, ‘spring from powerlessness’ (BED: 52) and ‘pursue their own obsessive 
course;’ ‘they are fixations, whose paltry emotionality consists in the self’s forcing them to revolve 
around him’ (ibid).  
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to, as it were, love one’s weakness; one lets oneself be defined and consumed by one’s 
weakness thus cutting oneself off further from the outside world. 
Secondly, given that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of human wickedness appears 
to constitute a fairly transparent attempt to render the Lutheran doctrine of sin (as a 
‘basic proneness toward evil that determines man’s whole being’ (Pauck 1961: xliii)) 
secularly intelligible, we can plausibly infer that Løgstrup considers Human 
Wickedness to be a fundamental tendency built in to the structure of self-regulating, 
self-governing activity. That is, the forms of self-enclosedness Løgstrup describes are 
not meant to represent just some heap of random phenomena that the author 
happened to find interesting or important about human experience, which can be 
removed from the self’s cognitive and dispositional repertoire by a fiat of the will, as 
Stokes’ analysis suggests. Rather, they reflect an attempt to uncover or disclose 
fundamental existential features of the self. 
In this regard, and to anticipate a central line of argument in §4, it is 
noteworthy how seamlessly Løgstrup’s various characterizations of human 
wickedness map on the forms of despair (Kierkegaard’s definition of sin) discussed by 
Kierkegaard in The Sickness unto Death: dispassionate selfishness is comparable with 
what Kierkegaard calls ‘despair that is ignorant of having a self’ (spiritlessness), 
passionate selfishness is similar to the ‘despair to will to be oneself’ (defiance) and 
sentimentality reflects what Kierkegaard calls ‘despair not to will to be oneself’ 
(inclosing reserve) (See Kierkegaard 1983: pp. 42-7, pp. 67-8 and 61, respectively). I 
will explore the Kierkegaardian themes present in Løgstrup’s ethics in more detail in 
the next chapter. But it is worth noting in anticipation of that discussion that for 
Kierkegaard the forms of despair are not epiphenomenal but rather represent a 
structural tendency of the self. And, as I shall suggest, Løgstrup can be seen to follow 
Kierkegaard in this estimation.  
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Given these clarifications, we can enrich our definition of Human Wickedness 
as follows: 
 (Def) Self-Enclosedness = Human Wickedness remains true because of a 
structural tendency of the self to turn in on itself and, thus, cut itself off from 
Immediacy. 
To wit, if Human Wickedness holds that the self is incapable of bringing itself 
into identity with the sovereign expressions of life through self-governing activity 
because of a structural tendency built in to it that undermines Immediacy in its very 
performance we are, thus, returned to Stokes’ problem of spontaneous goodness. But 
now we have the added complication that, for Løgstrup, even one’s attempts to 
expunge oneself of the perceived impediments to the realization of spontaneous 
goodness that attach to one’s nature are complicit in sustaining the very impediments 
that they aim to expunge. For example, it is plausible to think that self-conscious 
attempts to try to be less dis-trustful are, for Løgstrup, performatively self-
undermining in just the same way that self-conscious attempts to be more trustful are, 
namely, in that ‘the notion of trust is logically tied up with the fact that our trust will 
implicitly be called into question once we start talking [or thinking] about it’ 
(Lagerspetz 1998: 32). Naturally, Løgstrup’s Self-Enclosedness claim is disputable. 
My aim here has not been to fully defend Løgstrup’s phenomenology of human 
wickedness, but rather to explicate it. 
However, as concerns questions of moral agency, an important upshot of this 
discussion of Løgstrup’s way of thinking about human wickedness is that it looks to 
be incompatible with the kind of purgative work appealed to by Stokes in his solution 
to the problem of spontaneous goodness. In a way that parallels Luther’s notion of 
incurvatus in se, on Løgstrup’s view, human wickedness is apt to re-assert itself even 
in one’s attempts to rid oneself of one’s wickedness through practices of self-purgation 
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where such practices tend to ensnare oneself further in one’s self-obsessiveness and, 
thus, intensify it rather than purging it.  
Furthermore, what this discussion has helped bring in to view is a central issue 
concerning the attempt to provide a positive response to the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics. Namely, how can the self be considered as an agent capable of 
performing the good works called forth by the sovereign expressions of life? If it is 
concluded that, on Løgstrup’s view, the self must be set aside in order for the 
sovereign expressions of life to realize themselves, then Løgstrup’s position appears 
to court the worry over mysticism. But, conversely, it appears that any agential role 
granted to the self with respect to the realization of the sovereign expressions of life 
and their good works necessarily transgresses Human Wickedness. Can this pending 
dilemma be resolved?  
3.3. The Split-Self 
Let us take stock. So far we have established that the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life and their good works constitutively involves Immediacy 
(§2), where there is a question as to how – and indeed whether – Immediacy is 
compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency. This question is compounded 
by Løgstrup’s commitment to Human Wickedness as Self-Enclosedness, according to 
which the self qua agent is seen to be incapable of playing an active role in the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life (Human Wickedness) due to a 
structural tendency built in to self-governing activity which cuts the self off from 
Immediacy (Self-Enclosedness). Given the importance of the notion of self-governing 
activity to standard conception of moral agency it, thus, seems as if Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment is likely to be incompatible with a plausible 
conception of moral agency. I have considered various strategies for resisting this 
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conclusion, yet none of these strategies have met the twin criteria of philosophical and 
exegetical plausibility.  
In the literature, however, there is a further strategy for interpreting 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology in such a way as to be compatible with a conception 
of moral agency, namely, the ‘split-self’ view, first outlined by Bjørn Rabjerg and 
developed in relation to the question of agency by Robert Stern. In contrast to the 
other strategies considered, the split-self view is a bullet-biting strategy rather than a 
defusing strategy. Instead of trying to amend or appropriate Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology in a way that makes it compatible with a variant of the standard view 
of moral agency, where this involves weakening Løgstrup’s commitments to 
Immediacy and Human Wickedness, the split-self view embraces Løgstrup’s 
commitments to Immediacy and Human Wickedness, arguing that these 
commitments are compatible with a mode of moral agency – but one which departs 
substantially from the standard view.  
In his forthcoming monograph, Stern has framed the problem of finding a 
mode of moral agency compatible with Løgstrup’s commitment to Human 
Wickedness in terms of an inconsistent triad:  
[I]f the will is bound by the self’s inherent selfishness which is what makes us 
wicked, and if good acts can therefore only be performed when the self is no 
longer involved, how can such acts be attributed to the self as an agent, and if 
they cannot, how can they be acts at all? We seem to have an inconsistent 
triad:  
1. Actions require a self 
2. Good actions require a good self 
3. The self is inherently evil  
Given Løgstrup’s Lutheran conception of (3), it would appear that he must end 
up denying either (1) or (2), or else concluding that there are no good actions. 
(Stern: forthcoming). 
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In other words, the problem framing Stern’s discussion of the split-self view 
is the following. How can Løgstrup’s affirmation of the reality of the sovereign 
expressions of life and their good works ever be compatible with Løgstrup’s 
commitment to Human Wickedness? Prima facie it seems that in order for Løgstrup’s 
affirmation of the reality of the sovereign expressions of life to be coherent he must 
posit an agent, where the self looks to be the most likely candidate to fill this role. But 
given Løgstrup’s Lutheran conception of the self, this option appears to be 
unavailable.  
In attempting to resolve the inconsistent triad, Stern appeals to Bjørn 
Rabjerg’s split-self reading of Løgstrup. On Rabjerg’s view 
Løgstrup operates with a split self, between what we could call respectively an 
original spontaneous self and a reflective, inturned self. When we are left to 
ourselves, we are in the power of our inturnedness. In reflection we are caught 
up with ourselves, and in this way our circling around ourselves prevents us 
from being ourselves. But when the expression of life seizes us, we are opened 
up to the outside world and fellow human beings, so the sovereign expressions 
of life provides an escape from our self-encircling self. The sovereignty of the 
expression of life creates the possibility of realizing the original self that it 
otherwise obscured by self-absorption and inturnedness. (Rabjerg 2014: 130).  
Here, Rabjerg is essentially challenging the second premise of the inconsistent 
triad; it is not the case for Løgstrup – at least from the perspective of his later writing 
- that the self is inherently wicked in the sense that ‘the self brings everything under the 
power of its selfishness’ (ED: 141, my emphasis). But the claim is rather that, when 
‘left to ourselves’ our tendency is to turn inwards in self-reflection. However, when 
we are ‘seized’ by sovereign expressions of life our inturnedness and selfishness can 
be ‘overmastered,’ where this then allows for the possibility that an ‘original 
spontaneous self’ – a self seized by the sovereign expressions of life – can perform 
good works.  
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At first glance, the split-self view may seem to involve a non sequitur in its 
positing of an ‘original spontaneous self,’ where this seems to simply run roughshod 
over Løgstrup’s Lutheran conception of the self. Rabjerg’s positing of an original 
spontaneous self, however, is in fact well founded in Løgstrup’s later texts, where 
Løgstrup appears to nuance his conception of the self so as to allow for a form of 
selfhood capable of performing good works. In Opgør med Kierkegaard, for example, 
Løgstrup writes that ‘to say that the expressions of life are sovereign is to say that in 
them, the human person is – ipso facto – himself’ (BED: 53) and that ‘a person comes 
his true [eigentlige] self, and concretely so, by realizing himself in the sovereign 
expressions of life and identifying himself with them’ (BED: 54). On Rabjerg’s view 
what these comments imply is that the self is capable of performing good works and 
thus performing the role of an agent with respect to the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life, but for it to be compatible with Human Wickedness the realization 
of the self qua agent capable of performing good works is only possible when the 
sovereign expressions of life ‘overwhelm our self-enclosedness’ (BED: 68).  
Stern has taken up and developed Rabjerg’s split-self reading of Løgstrup 
more explicitly with regard to questions of agency. Citing Løgstrup’s student 
notebooks, Stern suggests the following interpretation: 
‘[F]reedom is given to us by our fellow men’ insofar as other people free us 
from our self-absorption and the centripetal power it exerts upon us, thus 
transforming us from being wicked to being good in a way that we could not 
achieve on our own. To this extent, ‘the self brings everything in the power of 
selfishness’, as left to itself, this selfishness cannot be overcome. However, in 
being exposed to the other person we are precisely drawn out of ourselves in 
a manner we do not control, but once we are we are thereby transformed into 
agents who are capable of acting for the sake of the other in a way that was 
not possible previously; we can thus be treated as agents who bring about the 
good, even though this agency is only made possible by forces beyond our 
control. Thus, the self is not inherently wicked in the sense that it must be 
controlled by an other if it is to do good, as this would threaten the idea that 
such actions can be attributed to it as an agent; rather, it is inherently wicked 
because it cannot escape from this wickedness on its own, but once it is hereby 
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free to do good, then it acts on its own behalf, not under the control of another. 
(Stern: forthcoming) 
On Stern’s interpretation, there are two constraining conditions that must be 
observed in presenting a conception of moral agency compatible with Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology. Firstly, given Løgstrup’s Lutheran conception of the self, any 
sense that the inturned self can be seen to be taking ‘initiative’ or playing an active 
role with respect to the realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their good 
works must be rejected. Yet, equally, Stern accepts that in order for the split-self view 
to amount to a conception of moral agency, it cannot be the case that the spontaneous 
self is taken over and controlled by the other; the agent must be in some respect free. 
In order to harmonize these requirements Stern holds that the possibility for the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their good works arises out of our 
ethical encounter with the other: the ethical encounter with the other frees us to 
become moral agents and it does this because the presence of the other draws our 
attention away from ourselves, so that our capacity to act spontaneously is no longer 
impeded by self-enclosing reflection. In this respect, the split-self view can be seen to 
correspond roughly to the Lutheran view of justification in which the sinner is 
justified extra se and is, thus, made capable of performing good works in the sense that, 
for Stern’s Løgstrup, it is in virtue of the other that we are ‘justified,’ so to speak, and 
are thus freed to perform good works. 20  
Stern likens the conception of agency he has in view here with Iris Murdoch’s 
notion of ‘attention,’ as evocatively illustrated in the following passage from The 
Sovereignty of the Good: 
                                                          
20 It is worth noting that Stern’s interpretation of Løgstrup appears to have changed considerably 
between his article discussed in §§1-2, where he sees an underlying compatibility between Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology and a Kantian conception of moral agency, and his forthcoming monograph, 
where he is less sanguine about the possibility of a rapprochement between the two thinkers.  
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I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, 
oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my 
prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything 
is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is 
nothing now but the kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter 
it seems less important. (Murdoch 1997: 369) 
In essence, the thought here is that by virtue of something completely exterior 
to the inturned self, the self and its world can be transformed; a new aspect can dawn, 
a moral vision can crystallize. And it is from out of this new way of seeing the world 
and the other that new possibilities for agency are opened up that were previously 
occluded or distorted. It is important to stress that the split-self view overcomes the 
worry over mysticism for Løgstrup’s ethics by positing the other as the external agent 
with the capacity to free the self of its self-enclosedness thereby making the true self 
qua agent free to perform the good works called forth by the sovereign expressions of 
life. 
Rabjerg’s and Stern’s development of the split-self view, then, appears to 
provide a way of accommodating a form of moral agency as part of Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology without having to jettison the Lutheran presuppositions of 
Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics. But is it plausible? Whilst I believe that the 
split-self view, in appreciating the later Løgstrup’s more nuanced conception of the 
self, has made an important step forwards in answering the question of moral agency, 
in what follows I shall register three reservations I have with the split-self view as it 
stands. The first two reservations stem from ambiguities internal to the split-self view 
concerning the relations between the self, the other and the sovereign expressions of 
life. The third reservation, which follows from the first two by implication, concerns 
whether, viewed externally, the split-self view constitutes a plausible and satisfying 
conception of moral agency.  
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 One way of explicating my first reservation is with reference to the parable of 
the Good Samaritan discussed in chapter one. In the parable, Jesus speaks of a priest 
and a Levite who passed the injured traveller by before the Samaritan mercifully came 
to his aid. On the split-self interpretation under consideration here, the Good 
Samaritan’s merciful actions would likely be explained in terms of his being drawn 
out of his self-enclosedness by the injured traveller. But, one wonders, what of the 
priest and the Levite? Why were they not drawn in a similar manner? One response 
might be to say that it is ultimately a matter of contingency as to whether one is 
drawn out of one’s self-enclosedness by the other or not. Yet, the worry that attends 
this kind of response is that it leaves the nature of the transition from the inturned 
self to the true self as a mystery: it is just something that happens sometimes – but 
sometimes it doesn’t. And a potential implication of this worry is that if the 
proponents of the split-self view were to opt for this response, the split-self view 
would turn out to not so much constitute an answer to the problem of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics as put a label on it: it would, on this construal, amount to simply 
re-asserting Løgstrup’s claim that the realization of the sovereign expressions of life 
and its good works presupposes a split-self, whilst leaving the operations of this split-
self a mystery.  
Another response might be to suggest that the priest and the Levite were not 
drawn out of their self-enclosedness by the injured traveller because they actively 
resisted the injured traveller’s appeal; they refused to be drawn. This response has 
precedence in Løgstrup’s writings. Consider, for instance, Løgstrup’s rather 
breathless introduction to Norm and Spontaneity:  
 At four o’clock in the morning there is an insistent ring at the door. When 
the woman descends the secret police are outside, demanding that she open 
up. Once inside they ask her for her husband. They are informed that, as it 
happens, he is not home but away on business. One of the two men, the 
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subordinate, heavily armed, ugly as sin, and looking capable of every kind of 
brutality, starts searching the house. The other, possessed of an engaging 
manner, all amiability and courtesy, is talking to the woman meanwhile and 
assuring her that the visit is of no consequence, merely a routine procedure. 
The woman acts obligingly, appearing surprised – a composed and polished 
performance. She is perfectly aware that his charming insistence on the 
insignificance of their visit is aimed solely at getting her to talk, and is not 
taken in by anything that he says. She knows that from the least unconsidered 
remark ammunition will be forged for use against her husband and herself. In 
spite of that – and this is probably the oddest thing of the whole business – she 
needs constantly to rein in an inclination to talk to the man as to another 
human being, as though he might be drawn from his destructive enterprise to 
properly human perceptions and good sense. Unremittingly, she must keep a 
cool head. Why? What manifests itself in that inclination? Nothing other than 
the elemental and definitive peculiarity attaching to all speech qua 
spontaneous expression of life: its openness. To speak is to speak openly. That 
is not something the individual does with speech; it is there beforehand, as it 
were, qua anonymous expression of life. We yield to its sovereignty at the very 
moment in which we begin to speak. (BED: 83-4) 
Here, Løgstrup allows that the woman actively resists or ‘reins in’ the 
‘inclination’ to speak openly in her encounter with the secret police, where this implies 
that the self qua agent has the power to defy the sovereign expressions of life. Thus, 
we might imagine that the priest and the Levite likewise resisted the claim made on 
them by the injured traveller.21 However, if the proponents of the split-self were to 
opt for this line of response, it would compromise a central aspect of the split-self view 
itself, namely, that in the ethical encounter ‘we are precisely drawn out of ourselves 
in a manner we do not control,’ since the thought that we can actively resist the claim 
made on us by the other in the ethical encounter appears to contradict the thought 
that the other draws us out of ourselves in a manner we do not control.  
The second ambiguity I wish to highlight can be elucidated in terms of a worry 
about the example from Murdoch that Stern appeals to in illustrating his position. 
Concerning Murdoch’s example, my worry is this. If Murdoch was totally wrapped 
                                                          
21 Arguably, this is one of the places where Løgstrup risks contradicting himself. Compare his 
comments here, which imply that the self can resist or defy the appeal of the sovereign expressions 
of life to his comments quoted above to the effect that ‘The sovereign expression of life is…not 
concealed by selfishness or stifled by self-enclosedness. The power so to conceal does not lie within 
our volition’ (BED: 69). I shall investigate this issue further in §4. 
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up in herself and ‘oblivious to her surroundings,’ then how could she have ‘suddenly 
observed’ the hovering kestrel in the way she describes? Surely the very fact that she 
observes the kestrel shows that she was not totally wrapped up in herself and 
oblivious to her surroundings after all. However minimally, it seems she must on the 
contrary have been sufficiently open to her surroundings for the kestrel to show up 
as salient within it. This kind of ambiguity, I would suggest, ramifies in the split-self 
view. For it appears that being seized by the other presupposes an openness to the 
other that belies the radical self-enclosedness of the inturned self. Conversely, being 
seized by the expressions of life – which is ex hypothesi a precondition for an open 
relation to the other – appears to equally require initiation by the other to come about. 
Thus, being seized by the other and being seized by the sovereign expressions of life 
appear to presuppose one another.  
It is noteworthy in this regard that the ambiguity identified here appears to 
be reflected in a subtle difference between how Rabjerg and Stern construe the split-
self view: whereas Rabjerg holds that it is when the expressions of life seize me that I 
am opened up to my fellow human being, Stern holds that it when the other draws me 
out of my inturnedness that I am made free to realize the sovereign expressions of life 
in action. Indeed, there is a deadlock between our capacity for openness to the other 
through the expressions of life and the capacity of the other to draw us out of our 
inturnedness that appears to be intractable.22 At least we can say that there is some 
ambiguity in the split-self view, concerning how the two selves, the other and the 
sovereign expressions of life are related in the realization of good works. 
                                                          
22 Interestingly, there is a parallel problem in Levinas’ ethics. As Diane Perpich (2008) writes, ‘…it is 
unclear whether it is the face that undoes and “ruins” representation or whether the conditions for 
this undoing are already there before the face-to-face encounter in the sensuous existing of the lived 
body. Can the face call me into question if the ground for such a call is not prepared in the body? Are 
sensibility and embodiment pre-ethical conditions for ethics, or are they themselves ethical? Here the 
initial dilemma reasserts itself, since if they are already ethical we can ask what makes them so’ (64). 
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My third reservation concerns whether, viewed externally, the split-self view 
constitutes a plausible conception of moral agency. The strength of the split-self view 
may seem to consist in its apparent exegetical fidelity: it enthusiastically embraces 
Løgstrup’s commitment to Human Wickedness; the self is portrayed as being entirely 
passive in relation to the realization of the sovereign expressions of life. However, an 
obvious general worry with this construal of agency is that it is too thin to constitute 
a plausible conception of moral agency; the agent is too passive with respect to the 
sovereign expressions of life and the other for it to count as moral agency. Indeed, one 
might wonder in what sense the agency of the original spontaneous self posited by 
the split-self view differs from the agency attributable to Korsgaard’s Lioness or 
Stern’s responsive automaton: can agency in this thin sense justifiably be called moral 
agency rather than mere agency? This worry, of course, returns us to the problematic 
with which we began this chapter, namely, that if we are wholly passive in relation to 
the sovereign expressions of life, it becomes unclear to what extent, if at all, the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their good works is a matter of 
moral agency.  
In response, it could be argued that the Løgstrup would likely reject of the 
terms underlying this kind of objection: Løgstrup was often critical of the ‘over-
exaggerated’ role given to reflection in moral theory (ED:  273-80) and was keen with 
his phenomenology to challenge the assumption that human agents are optimally 
autonomous and self-governing when it comes to the performance of moral actions 
(M1: 297). Indeed, as Stokes has suggested, arguably the interest of Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology lies precisely in his attempt to disclose ‘a class of action for which 
lack of reflection over whether to act or not enhances rather than diminishes our moral 
appraisal of the agent’ (Stokes 2016: 145).  
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Yet, even so, what my first two reservations concerning the split-self view 
have revealed is that there are significant ambiguities that need to be resolved in 
making a case for the plausibility of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology in this regard 
such that it could sway a neutral reader. For instance, one might wonder, on the one 
hand, whether it is plausible to suppose that the self can be wholly passive with respect 
to being freed for good works, and, on the other hand, whether the idea of a 
spontaneous self freed for the good is enough to underwrite attributions of moral 
agency. In a word, what is lacking in the split-self view as it stands is an account of 
the distinctive structural characteristics of the mode of agency involved in the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their good works that justify our 
appraisal of them as moral actions. If we content ourselves with the thought that, on 
Løgstrup’s view, the realization of the sovereign expressions of life in good works is 
something that just happens, in effect we could be accused of simply admitting that 
the problem of moral agency in Løgstrup’s ethics is insoluble. If, however, we want to 
respond to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics by providing an account 
of the structural characteristics of the mode of agency involved in the realization of 
the sovereign expressions of life and their good works, then it seems that we need to 
go beyond the resources provided by the split-self view as it stands. Thus, in the next 
chapter my aim will be to build on the important interventions made by the split-self 
view in providing an account of the structural characteristics of a mode of moral 
agency that is compatible with Løgstrup’s commitments to Immediacy and Human 
Wickedness.  
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to bring the important Lutheran dimension of 
Løgstrup’s way of thinking to bear on the question of moral agency. It has emerged 
that Løgstrup’s Lutheran conception of the self appears to preclude any form of self-
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governing activity (F2) on the part of the agent in the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life and their good works, where this, in turn, casts doubt on the 
compatibility of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology with a plausible conception of 
moral agency. I have considered two possible responses to this problem, but have 
argued that, whilst these strategies move us in the right direction, ultimately neither 
of them satisfy the twin criteria of philosophical and exegetical plausibility. However, 
in light of this discussion, we have clarified and enriched our understanding of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, where as a result, we are in a better position to 
respond to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. 
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4. The Self, the Sovereign Expressions of Life and Medio-
passive Agency 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer to the question of moral agency 
for Løgstrup’s ethics, namely, that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment 
is compatible with what I shall call, following the work of Béatrice Han-Pile, a medio-
passive mode of moral agency. In 4.1., I will provide a précis of my findings so far, where 
I will focus on clarifying the conditions of adequacy that must be met in answering 
the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics - as well as the difficulties we face 
in meeting these conditions. In particular, I will focus my attention on the ambiguities 
surrounding the relation between the self and agency in Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology, ambiguities that were gradually exposed in my previous discussion. 
In an attempt to clarify these ambiguities, I will, in 4.2. and 4.3., argue that Løgstrup’s 
conception of the self qua agent can be elucidated in light of his critical discussion and 
appropriation of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self: insofar as Kierkegaard draws an 
intimate connection between the self and agency, this discussion will provide a model 
for a plausible and satisfying conception of agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. In 4.4. I will 
build on this model in arguing that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment 
is compatible with a medio-passive conception of moral agency. In arguing for this 
conclusion, I hope not only to make a contribution to Løgstrup scholarship, but also 
to philosophical debates concerning moral agency, where the distinctive conception 
of moral agency captured by Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment can 
be seen as providing a genuine alternative to the standard conception of agency 
discussed in chapter one.  
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4.1. The Self and Agency in Løgstrup’s Ethics: Framing the Chapter 
So far we have established that for a conception of agency to be compatible 
with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment it must be compatible with 
(1) Immediacy, namely, the thought that the ethical relation with the other in which 
the sovereign expressions of life are realized is not mediated by pictures and theories, 
up to and including moral principles; and (2) Human Wickedness, namely, the claim 
that there is a self-enclosing tendency built in to self-governing activity that cuts the 
self-governing agent off from Immediacy. As I have argued previously, these two 
features central to Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment are 
incompatible with the standard conception of moral agency, which, according to my 
definition in chapter one, is often characterised in terms of some combination and 
variation of (F1) self-regulation and (F2) self-governance. There remains, then, a 
question as to what conception of moral agency, if any, is compatible with Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of ethical comportment.  
In the previous chapter, I considered two strategies that attempt to respond 
to this question. Patrick Stokes’ Via Purgativa represents a move in the right direction 
in that it presents a mode of agency compatible with the thought that the possibilities 
for realizing ‘ontological goodness’ are in fact impeded by the self, so that the task 
facing the self qua agent is to negatively purge oneself of these impediments rather 
than attempting to build oneself up, as it were, through virtuous self-striving. This 
conception of agency as character deformation appears to accord with Løgstrup’s 
comments to the effect that ‘the decision [to surrender oneself to trust or mercy] 
consists in the renunciation of attitudes or movements of thought and feeling that are 
incompatible with trust and mercifulness’ (BED: 79). However, I registered some 
potential problems concerning the applicability of the via purgativa to Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of moral comportment as it stands: firstly, the via purgativa appears 
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to court an objection on grounds of mysticism, in that if the self is purged in toto, and 
if we do not posit an external agent (such as God) to will in the self’s place, then we 
risk, implausibly, attributing a form of quasi-agency to the sovereign expressions of 
life themselves. Secondly, the via purgativa implies that the self is capable of removing 
those aspects of the self’s cognitive and dispositional repertoire that impede the 
sovereign expressions of life by a fiat of the will, where this appears to be incompatible 
with the specifically Lutheran conception of human wickedness operative in 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology: for Løgstrup, as with Luther, even one’s attempts 
to purge oneself of one’s wickedness, to lower oneself in humility, will irrepressibly 
ensnare the self yet further in its self-enclosedness.  
Bjørn Rabjerg’s and Robert Stern’s split-self view moved our discussion 
forward by bringing to light Løgstrup’s more nuanced configuration of the self in his 
later writings, where he allows for a ‘true’ [eigentlige] self along with an ‘inturned’ 
self. Moreover, the split-self view importantly emphasised the role of the ethical 
encounter with the other in the transition between the ‘inturned’ self and the ‘true’ self, 
where the other is viewed as an external centre of agency with the power to draw the 
self out of its inturnedness. Yet, I have suggested that there remains considerable 
ambiguity concerning how the two selves, the other and the sovereign expressions of 
life are related in the split-self view. For instance, we might wonder if, on the split-
self view, it remains a matter of sheer contingency as to whether one is drawn out of 
one’s self-enclosedness by the other or not. Moreover, there is a question as to how 
the inturned self can be drawn out of its radical self-enclosedness by the other if, as 
the proponents of the split-self view imply, a defining feature of self-enclosedness is 
that it renders us deaf to the other’s appeal. These two ambiguities contributed to a 
general worry concerning the plausibility of the split-self view as a conception of 
moral agency. At worst, it could be argued that the split-self view merely puts a label 
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on the problem of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics – that is, as a problem 
concerning Løgstrup’s positing of two selves – whilst leaving the operation of these 
two selves a mystery. At best, it might be suggested that the split-self view does allow 
for a form of agency, but that the form of agency it allows for is too thin to constitute 
a satisfying conception of moral agency that could sway a neutral reader.  
In appreciation of both the insights and the ambiguities of the via purgativa 
and the split-self interpretations, I will begin my argument here by making a 
diagnostic move. It seems to me that much of the ambiguity generated by the via 
purgativa and the split-self interpretations alike can be attributed to the conception of 
the self implicit in both interpretations: both interpretations encourage the thought 
that the self, on Løgstrup’s view, is a ‘substance’ or ‘entity’ with accidental qualities 
or attributes.1  Call it a substantivist conception of the self. By conceiving of the self in 
substantivist terms, the problem of how the condition or state of the entity or 
substance labelled as the inturned self can be overcome becomes seemingly 
intractable: it cannot be overcome by the purgative work of removing those attributes 
or qualities of the self that make up its inturnedness, since the activity of self purgation 
itself is precisely an exercise of the self-enclosing attributes that it seeks to expunge. 
And it is mysterious how inturnedness can be overcome solely by the other, as per the 
split-self view, since this possibility appears to presuppose the very attribute, viz. 
openness of the other’s otherness, that it seeks to establish.   
What my analysis of Løgstrup’s way of thinking about human wickedness in 
the previous chapter suggested, however, is that, for Løgstrup, human wickedness is 
not a state, condition or attribute of the self considered as a substance or entity, but 
                                                          
1 Rabjerg’s description of the two selves in terms of an ontological ‘true’ self and an anthropological 
‘inturned’ self in particular invites the thought that the two selves at play in the split-self view refer to 
two different conditions or states.  
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rather a structural tendency of the self. In the first part of this chapter, my aim is to take 
this as my clue in proposing that Løgstrup’s conception of the self can be fruitfully 
read in relational rather than substantivist terms. That is to say, that Løgstrup’s 
conception of the self can be read as consisting in a reflexive structure of self-relation. 
More specifically, I will suggest that Løgstrup’s conception of the self can be seen to 
be in some respects isomorphic to Kierkegaard’s relational conception of the self as a 
dynamic process of self-relating, a process that can be done well or poorly, where an 
important upshot of this will be that in viewing Løgstrup’s conception of the self in 
this way, we can interpret Løgstrup’s conception of the self, like Kierkegaard’s, as 
reflecting the fundamental structural characteristics of moral agency. 
My second move will be to suggest that, in light of this construal of Løgstrup’s 
conception of the self, we can unravel the mystery of how the transition between the 
mode of being a self in inturnedness and the mode of being a self in truth happens in 
terms of a conception of moral agency. Here, I will focus on Løgstrup’s use of terms 
such as ‘surrender,’ ‘letting’ and ‘allowing’ in describing the process by which the 
sovereign expressions of life are realized, where, bluntly, my suggestion will be that 
the mode of being a self in truth can be explained as follows. In the ethical encounter 
with the other, the true self comports itself surrenderingly in relation to the sovereign 
expressions of life that tacitly frame that encounter. Crucially, whilst this reading can 
make sense of how Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment is compatible 
with a mode of moral agency, the mode of agency thereby conceptualized does not 
involve features F1 and F2 constitutive of the standard view. Rather, I will suggest 
that the mode of agency compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is best 
construed in terms of a medio-passive mode of agency. It is with this agenda in mind 
that I turn, firstly, to an investigation of selfhood and agency in Kierkegaard’s 
thought.   
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4.2. Selfhood and Agency in Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard provides his most methodical – if notoriously prolix – definition 
of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus.2 There, 
the self is defined as ‘a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself 
relates to another’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 128). From this we can immediately see that 
Kierkegaard conceives of the self as a complex relation – in contrast, for instance, to 
conceptions of the self as a substance with accidental qualities or attributes (as per the 
Cartesian ‘thinking thing’).3 More specifically, Kierkegaard here defines the self as 
being composed of no less than three interrelated relations (or syntheses). I will 
investigate each in turn. 
The first relation is what John Davenport refers to as a ‘hylomorphic’ 
synthesis between the physical or bodily and the psychical or soulful, whereby the two 
sets of polarities characteristic of the human being (finitude, temporality and necessity 
on the bodily side and infinitude, eternity and possibility on the soulful side) are held 
together (Davenport 2013: 235). As Michelle Kosch illuminatingly describes it: 
The basic opposition is between an individualizing/concretizing element 
(finite, temporal, necessity) which is required for existing as an individual (for 
being at all, for being in a particular situation, and therefore for being free), 
and an idealizing/integrating element (infinite, eternal, possibility) that 
                                                          
2 My intention here is not to take a position in the debates concerning Kierkegaard’s conception of 
the self. Here I rely mostly on the interpretation developed by Michelle Kosch (2006), and refer to 
others where relevant.  
3 Cf. C. Stephen Evans (2006): ‘The philosophical roots of this [metaphysical view of the self] go back 
to Greek philosophy. Aristotle tells us that human beings are rational animals. In the Middle Ages, 
philosophers attempted to say what kind of entity the human self is by specifying where humans are 
in the Great Chain of Being: we rank lower than God and the angels; higher than the other animals. In 
the early modern period, Descartes employs the concept of “substance” to tell us that he (and 
presumably other human persons) is a “thinking thing”’ (263). Interestingly, Hampson (2004) notes 
that Kierkegaard’s distinctive notion of the self perhaps has roots in his Lutheranism: ‘As will at once 
be evident, what we have here are the Lutheran structure and definitions. The self can only be itself 
as it is grounded in God. Kierkegaard writes: ‘In relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the 
self rests transparently [Kierkegaard’s previous translator, Lowrie, has here ‘grounded transparently’] 
in the power that established it.’ This is the Lutheran understanding of faith. Indeed Kierkegaard says 
as much. ‘Faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God.’ 
(274) 
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involves an abstraction from and transcendence of individuality/concreteness, 
and so integration into some ideal structure: some aim of action, some set of 
goals, some view of life. (Kosch 2006: 201) 
Yet, the ‘animal unity’ (Davenport 2013: 235) accomplished by this first 
synthesis, while being enough to generate a distinctive notion of the ‘human being,’ 
is ‘still not a self’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 127) according to Kierkegaard. Thus, we 
move to a second relation in which the relation just described ‘relates itself to itself’ 
(Kierkegaard 1983: XI 127). That is to say, this first relation bears some additional 
reflexive relation to itself in the sense of relating back to its polar aspects. The second 
relation thus generated, which is the self for Kierkegaard, is what we might term, 
imperfectly, the relation of self-consciousness. The term ‘self-consciousness’ is imperfect 
because the relation it labels is both more and less than ‘self-consciousness’ as this 
term is usually understood in the Cartesian tradition. It’s less because it needn’t 
involve any reflective or thematic self-awareness. But it’s more because it involves 
something like taking a stand on how the poles of the synthesis are related.  
As Kosch notes, up to this point, Kierkegaard’s conception of the self in many 
ways parallels – to the point of almost re-iterating – the conception of the self held by 
some German idealists, where Kosch mentions Fichte in particular. However, at this 
point, Kierkegaard introduces a further consideration. Namely, that the ‘relation that 
relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established itself or have been established 
by another’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 127). In affirming the first option – that the self 
establishes itself – we would presumably end up with something like a Fichtean 
conception of the self in which the ‘self-relating synthesizing activity [just 
mentioned] must see itself as absolutely self-positing’ and, as such, ‘it must see itself 
as absolutely spontaneous (its actions having no external causal source) and rationally 
self-determining (its actions following from its own laws)’ (Kosch 2006: 202-3).  
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Kierkegaard, however, affirms the second option, where this then generates a 
further level of relationality: 
If the relation that relates itself to itself has been established by another, then 
the relation is indeed the third, but this relation, the third, is yet again a 
relation and relates itself to that which established the entire relation. 
(Kierkegaard 1983: XI 128) 
In other words, if we accept that the self is established by and, thus, is 
grounded in another, then in relating itself to itself it relates to another – namely, that 
which established it. One way of understanding this third and final synthesis is to say 
that ‘just as [the self] is (in some way or other conscious of its own activity, it is also 
(in some way or other) conscious of that fact [that it is established by another]’ (Kosch 
2006: 203). Accordingly, in contrast to the Fichtean view, for Kierkegaard, the self 
that in relating itself to itself relates itself to another is not just self-conscious – in the 
cautious way we have previously employed that term – but also ‘conscious’ (again, in 
some way or other) that it is not the source of its own existence as a self.  
With the basic contours of Kierkegaard’s conception of the self in view, we can 
now ask: How, if at all, is agency related to the self, on Kierkegaard’s view? In a sense, 
we have already answered this question just in describing Kierkegaard’s conception 
of the self. For, as Kosch observes, ‘the description of the self as a synthesis of this 
sort is supposed to reflect the fundamental structural characteristics of human 
agency,’ whereby 
Such agency is at the same time that of a naturally situated being and that of 
one not exhaustively defined by its natural situation, a being tied to and 
constrained by a past which likewise does not exhaustively define it, a being 
with concrete characteristics which place limits on its powers and at the same 
time with power to transcend (at least some of) those limits. (Kosch 2006: 201) 
It is with respect to this this remark that we can begin to understand 
Kierkegaard’s well-known claim that a self is not something which we statically ‘are’ 
nor something we inalienably ‘have,’ but rather it is something we continually become 
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through the synthesizing activity the term self designates. That is to say, the self 
reflects the fundamental structures characteristic of human agency in the sense that 
the task of becoming a self constitutively involves one’s taking a stand in relation to 
oneself with respect to the way that the various syntheses that comprise the self are 
carried out.  
Yet, further to this, by claiming that the self is established by another, 
Kierkegaard integrates a distinctive normative dimension into his account of what it 
is to become a self. As Kosch puts it, this is because Kierkegaard’s ‘account of the 
structure of the self, by making the self dependent on and oriented towards an outside 
source of norms, makes structurally possible a genuine alternative: turning away from 
that source and turning towards it’ (Kosch 2006: 209). Thus, not only is the self 
something we continually become; it is also, to that extent, something we continually 
‘achieve’ or win or, conversely, fail to achieve.4 In other words, the Kierkegaardian 
self describes the fundamental structures of human agency and it posits a distinctly 
normative dimension as being inherent in those structures of the self so that we can 
‘win’ or ‘lose’ ourselves in the very way we relate to ourselves as agents. I will 
investigate both alternatives, starting with Kierkegaard’s characterization of what it 
is to fail to become a self. 
In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard identifies three modes of failing to 
become a self which, along with the possibility of ‘winning’ oneself, exhaust the 
structural possibilities of self-synthesis as Kierkegaard has set it up. He characterizes 
these three ‘mis-relations’ as forms of despair, which, as I noted in the previous 
chapter, constitute Kierkegaard’s definition of sin. They are: (1) the despairing 
ignorance of having a self and an eternal self (spiritlessness); (2) the despair not to 
                                                          
4 Evans (2006) uses the terminology of achievement when he argues that Kierkegaard holds a 
‘relational achievement theory’ of the self (264). 
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will to be oneself (the despair of weakness) and; (3) the despair to will to be oneself 
(despair in defiance). With his characteristic psychological perspicuity, Kierkegaard 
offers a rich tapestry of different variations that each of these forms of despair can 
take, which should be taken to represent archetypal and sometimes exaggerated and 
caricatured illustrations of what are often subtler and more subterranean features of 
our existence.  
I shall briefly discuss each basic form of despair in turn. But it is important to 
preface these discussions with a more general comment about Kierkegaard’s 
conception of despair. At root, despair in its various forms is a mis-relation in the sense 
that the self in despair has failed to relate to itself as the kind of agent that it is. This 
is why the concept of the will is so prominent in Kierkegaard’s latter two 
characterizations of the forms of despair; to be in despair is to fail to have a proper 
conception of oneself as an agent, where this manifests itself in an excessive tending 
to one pole or other of the two sets of polarities that define the human being: for 
instance, either by emphasizing one’s finitude and the sense of one’s being determined 
by a causal order or, conversely, over emphasizing one’s infinitude and the sense of 
one’s existence as possibility to an exaggerated degree. 
Spiritlessness, the first form of despair, is the failure to relate to oneself as an 
agent at all. That is, it is a failure to take a stance on oneself as a synthesis of the finite 
and the infinite, of the temporal and the eternal and of freedom and necessity. The 
spiritless person is not only in despair – but she is ignorant of being in despair; she 
lives a ‘merely vegetative life’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 157) in which she fails even to 
recognize that she is ‘intended to be spirit’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 156). As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Løgstrup’s description of dispassionate selfishness 
can be seen to correspond to spiritlessness in that they both designate modes of 
existence that are ignorant of their own selfishness or despair, respectively.  
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The despair of weakness, by contrast, which is defined as the despair of not 
willing to be oneself, describes a failure to see oneself as a responsible agent. Kosch 
notes that the character of the aesthete as portrayed in Either/Or serves as an 
archetype for this form of despair: ‘A [the aesthete] is…a compatibilist – but one who 
embraces determinism. His situation is that of an individual stymied by his own 
refusal to believe anything is up to him. The judge characterizes A’s attempt to see 
himself as a spectator in life rather than a participant in it…as the aesthetic attitude 
made explicit’ (Kosch 2006: 149). The despair of weakness, I have suggested, 
corresponds to Løgstrup’s notion of ‘sentimentality,’ where, as per my illustration 
from David Foster Wallace’s story ‘The Depressed Person,’ the sentimental self 
reposes in her own exaggerated sense of powerlessness and dependency.  
Finally, the despair of defiance – the despair of willing to be oneself – is the 
opposite; the self in this form of despair ‘wants to be master of itself or to create itself, 
to make itself into the self he wants to be, to determine what he will have or not have 
in his concrete self’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI 179). Viewed in a certain way, this second 
form of despair may not seem to be particularly problematic. Indeed, from a Fichtean 
perspective, this may even seem to be precisely what is required of a self. Yet, since 
Kierkegaard holds that the self is established by another, the will to self-mastery – 
insofar as it fails to acknowledge its dependence on the power which established it – 
is also a form of despair; just as with the two previous forms of despair it fails to have 
a proper conception of itself as an agent. This form of despair can be seen to 
correspond to Løgstrup’s notion of passionate selfishness where the self, whilst being 
conscious that it is selfish, tries to overcome its selfishness through self-assertion.  
So much for despair, what is it to ‘win’ ourselves on Kierkegaard’s scheme? 
Unsurprisingly, it is to have a proper conception of oneself as an agent. And this, 
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according to Kierkegaard, involves the self’s ‘resting transparently in the power that 
established it’ (Kierkegaard 1983: XI). Yet, unlike his discussion of despair, we find in 
Kierkegaard little by way of psychological exposition as to what it is for the self to 
rest transparently in the power that established it. This is due partly to the fact that, 
for Kierkegaard, what is under discussion here is no less than Christian faith. And 
Kierkegaard was notoriously doubtful of the possibility of Christian faith per se, let 
alone the chances he himself had to ‘win’ himself in faith. Thus, in a sense, Kierkegaard 
did not take himself to be an authority on what faith is like. Furthermore, however, in 
contrast to despair, Kierkegaard held that faith resists representation in terms of 
disinterested philosophical and psychological exposition. Indeed, a central aspect of 
Christian faith for Kierkegaard consists in passionately embracing a belief in that 
which cannot be thought – namely, the ‘absolute paradox’ of God (the eternal and 
infinite) in time. Thus, not only is Kierkegaard reticent to make psychological 
pronouncements about faith out of a sense of humility, but, perhaps more significantly, 
according to Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christian faith it simply cannot be 
grasped by the disinterested stance of philosophical enquiry. Nonetheless, there is a 
general shape given by Kierkegaard as to what it is to occupy the standpoint of faith 
which is of moment for our present purposes. 
We can get a sense for what this right conception of oneself in faith consists 
in by turning to a recent paper by Daniel Watts on Kierkegaard’s notion of truth. In 
the paper, Watts tackles a perennial difficulty in Kierkegaard scholarship concerning 
Kierkegaard’s puzzling division of truth into two: objective truth and subjective truth. 
However, rather than claiming that objective and subjective truth stand for different 
kinds or species of truth, Watts maintains that Kierkegaard holds a unitary conception 
of truth – truth as self-coincidence – which manifests differently as a ‘standard of 
success’ across different contexts of enquiry. Watts interprets Kierkegaard’s 
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definition of truth – that is, a redoubling which is nevertheless cancelled at the very 
same moment – to hold agents, rather than propositions, as the primary candidates for 
truth. This is eminently the case with God’s agency, about which Watt’s notes that 
‘on Kierkegaard’s understanding, there is within divine agency an in-built duality, 
between God’s self-awareness and God’s being notwithstanding their perfect agreement’ 
(Watts 2017: 6). This understanding of God’s agency provides a model in light of 
which Watts offers the following elaboration on Kierkegaard’s conception of truth as 
self-coincidence: 
[Kierkegaard] holds that, if it is to be substantive, the concept of truth must 
apply, paradigmatically, to a certain form of agency. This is, namely, a form of 
agency that satisfies two conditions: (i) it must exhibit the duality of self-
relation; and (ii) it must remain in agreement with itself, being in no wise self-
estranged. A certain form of agency that perfectly satisfied both of these 
conditions would be neither a simple unity, since it would exhibit the duality 
of self-relation, nor a complex multiplicity, since it would also exhibit perfect 
self-coincidence. (Watts 2017: 7) 
On the basis of this definition we can see more clearly how an agent can be a 
candidate for truth, for, as Watts continues,  
on this account, an agent is ‘in the truth’ – or, as we may also put it, she 
comports herself truly – just to the extent to which she exercises her agency in 
a self-coinciding way. Conversely, you are ‘in untruth’ – you comport yourself 
untruly – just to the extent to which you are characterized by self-division, 
duplicity, self-estrangement. (Watts 2017: 10-11) 
Tellingly, according to Kierkegaard’s understanding of God as ‘the very 
archetype of self-coincidence,’ Watts writes that ‘Divine agency is truth itself; there 
is in God no opacity, duplicity or shadow of turning’ (Watts 2017: 7). Thus, returning 
to Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as the self’s resting transparently (i.e. not 
opaquely) in the power that posited it, we can see how the self’s having the ‘right’ or 
‘true’ conception of itself as an agent can be understood in terms of the self’s 
transparent coinciding with itself as established by another and, thus, as oriented in a 
particular way.  
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The question remaining, then, is what is it to exercise one’s agency in a self-
coinciding way? We can, by via negationis, suggest what such agency is not. Namely, it 
is not robustly active: it does not aim at self-mastery, as this is a form of despair. Yet, 
conversely, it is not, as it were, fully passive for this would be to fail to take oneself as 
an agent at all and, thus, to despair in one’s weakness. Can we provide a more positive 
account of the agency of faith? 
One way of answering this question, favoured by ‘virtue ethics’ readings of 
Kierkegaard promoted by commentators such as John Davenport, appeals to 
Kierkegaard’s theory of the stages or spheres of existence, as developed in Either/Or, 
Stages on Life’s Way and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.5 On the account provided in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Christian faith or ‘religiousness B’ is a regulative 
ideal which can be achieved through the activity of self-resignation and religious 
suffering characteristic of the ‘immanent’ religiousness of ‘religiousness A.’ On 
Kosch’s reading, religiousness A ‘is characterized by a consciousness of necessary 
guilt, what Kierkegaard calls the ‘immanent expression’ of the ‘terribleness’ of the 
religious: one cannot, of one’s own power, make the finite commensurate with the 
absolute’ (Kosch 2006: 166): 
The ideal of religiousness A, the task it sets for the individual, is to overcome 
those aspects of his being in which finitude consists: not only finite desires and 
attachment to the world (the task of ‘dying to immediacy’), but also existence 
as a particular individual, and indeed the will itself in so far as it is the 
particular will of the particular individual. This is the meaning of the 
imperative of self-annihilation…what is demanded is a strenuous effort to 
overcome one’s individuality. (Kosch 2006: 167) 
In other words, in a way that parallels Stokes’ notion of via purgativa, the agency 
of faith is to be seen in terms of the ongoing attempt to ‘root out’ despair through 
practices of self-renunciation and religious suffering. And, as with Stokes’ notion of 
                                                          
5 See, e.g. Davenport (2001) 
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via purgativa, the difficulty with – or, more precisely, the impossibility of – this task 
rests in the fact that ‘since individual agency is among those characteristics of finite 
existence that one is supposed to attempt to overcome, it is clear that any such effort 
is doomed to failure’ (Kosch 2006: 167).  
Yet, as George Pattison has noted, on one reading, it might be precisely upon 
confronting this self-defeating limit that a site of potential transformation is opened 
up. With reference to an example given in one of Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses, 
Pattison elucidates this possibility as follows: 
In the discourse ‘To desire God is a human being’s highest 
perfection’…Kierkegaard tells the story of a self that grows dissatisfied with 
merely being part of the world or nature rather than a self-directing centre of 
conscious freedom. As a result, it sets about trying to master itself and to get 
control of its own life. But this is not so easy. In fact, Kierkegaard seems to think, 
it is downright impossible, since no one is stronger than their self. In seeking to 
get a grip on ourselves, to permeate our existence with subjective freedom, we put 
ourselves in a scenario that Kierkegaard likens to a wrestling match between two 
exactly equal combatants. In such a situation, the self is fated to fight itself to a 
standstill, an impasse, in which it effectively annihilates itself. Yet this 
‘annihilation is his truth’ and, to the extent that a person accepts this annihilation 
as his subjective truth, the new possibility of the God-relationship, a relationship 
that restores him to himself but on a new and unshakeable basis, opens up. This 
shipwreck of human will and understanding clears a space for a foundational 
dependence on God that encompasses and permeates every aspect of the subject’s 
life in the world. (Pattison 2015: 67) 
In other words, while the tasks set by self-mastery or self-annihilation that, 
according to Pattison, follows from it are impossible tasks for the individual agent, the 
dialectical tension built up through our taking up of these tasks might nevertheless 
set the scene, as it were, in which the possibility of faith – the possibility of the self’s 
resting transparently in the power that established it – is opened up.  
It might be objected, however, that the ideas presented here do not constitute 
an account of what the agency of faith itself consists in, but rather an account of the 
agency involved in properly relating to faith as a regulative ideal of agency. Does 
Kierkegaard provide any positive account of what the agency of faith itself consists 
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in? Kierkegaard can be seen to come closer to providing a direct answer to this 
question with his so-called ‘theory of the leap,’ as developed in Philosophical Fragments. 
As Watts notes, however, Kierkegaard’s development of the theory of the leap took 
place primarily in response to a set of logical rather than religious considerations, 
where in responding to Hegel’s putatively presuppositionless and self-contained 
system of logic, Kierkegaard argues that ‘demonstrative reasoning ultimately depends 
on certain kinds of non-deductive, non-inferential judgment’ (Watts 2017a: 9). The 
image of the ‘leap,’ then, should primarily be taken to signify precisely this form of 
non-deductive, non-inferential judgment whereby a movement is made from ‘A to B 
without touching the intervening ground;’ the leap, that is to say, is ‘a primitive act of 
judging, in the sense of an act of judging that is unmediated by any prior judgement’ 
(Watts 2017a: 9). 
Now, Kierkegaard admits that the phrase ‘leap of faith’ when used in common 
parlance perhaps brings with it certain associations of, for example, ‘A “Münchausen” 
type leap, where “one closes one’s eyes, grabs oneself by the neck…and then stands 
on the other side”’ (Ferreira 1998: 215). Indeed, it is this association that has led some 
to criticize Kierkegaard’s theory of the leap as representing a form of decisionism 
consisting of a ‘criterionless choice’ (MacIntyre 2007a: 39) and, for that reason, it 
signals Kierkegaard’s affirmation of a form of irrationalism. But, as Jaime Ferreira 
insists, Kierkegaard opposed his notion of the leap to the kind of criterionless 
‘deliberate act of willpower’ illustrated by the Münchausen type of leap. 
Notwithstanding his characterization of the leap as ‘the category of decision,’ there is 
an important passive and receptive dimension constitutive of the substance of the leap 
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for Kierkegaard that belies any talk of straightforward decisionism.6 Rather, as 
Ferreira emphasizes, the leap is said at once to involve a ‘letting go,’ where we can 
think of this in terms of a letting go of our attempts to comprehend the absolute 
paradox, and passion, which is understood by Kierkegaard in terms of the embracing 
of ‘extreme opposites together and, existing, to understand oneself in them’ (Ferreira 
1998: 223).7 In other words, Kierkegaard’s theory of the leap is constituted by both 
active and passive dimensions which qualify one another and which Ferreira 
interestingly characterizes as a ‘captivating yet free engagement:’ 
To paraphrase Kierkegaard, then, we could say that, for Climacus, passion is 
the substance of the leap, the transition to the infinite consists in passion…that 
is, with a decisive interestedness or attraction, with the surrender constituted 
by captivating yet free engagement. […] The surrender of interestedness, of 
being grasped by something or decisively engaged by it, can account for both 
the letting-go that constitutes the leap and the passion that also constitutes it. 
(Ferreira 1998: 226)  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop anything like a comprehensive 
account of Kierkegaard’s ‘theory of the leap.’ Nonetheless, we can see from this brief 
exposition how the leap can be seen to designate a form of agency that is neither 
problematically passive, as with the despair of weakness, nor problematically active, 
as with the despair of defiance: the leap, in a word, designates the mode of self relation 
that relates to itself transparently as the agent that it is. Importantly, in contrast to 
                                                          
6 Ferreira is quick to add that this passive dimension should not be understood to reduce the leap to a 
cumulative or automatic notion whereby ‘something passively “flops over” by “immanental 
necessity”’ (Ferreira 1998: 210). 
7 C.f. Kierkegaard: ‘By beginning, then, I have presupposed the ideality, I have presupposed that I will 
succeed in accomplishing it, but what else is that but presupposing that the god exists and actually 
beginning with trust in him. And how does the existence of the god emerge from the demonstration? 
Does it happen straight away? Is it not here as it is with the Cartesian dolls? As soon as I let go of the 
doll, it stands on its head. As soon as I let go of it – consequently, I have to let go of it. So also with 
demonstration – so long as I am holding on to the demonstration (that is, continue to be one who is 
demonstrating), the existence does not emerge, if for no other reason than that I am in the process of 
demonstrating it, but when I let go of the demonstration, the existence is there. Yet this letting go, 
even that is surely something; it is, after all meine Zuthat [my contribution]. Does it not have to be 
taken into account, this diminutive moment, however brief it is – it does not have to be long, because 
it is a leap.’ (1985: IV: 210-11). 
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the theory of the spheres of existence, the ‘theory of the leap’ is not a precursor to faith, 
but is its realization.8  
 With this all too brief characterization of the relation between the self and 
agency in Kierkegaard in hand, I will now return to Løgstrup. My guiding intuition 
will be that Løgstrup’s conception of the self can be seen to parallel Kierkegaard’s in 
certain key respects, one of which is the sense that the self is a reflexive self-relation 
that describes the fundamental characteristics of human agency. And, if I am right, 
this isomorphism will provide a way of establishing a conception of agency that is 
compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology.  
4.3. Løgstrup and Kierkegaard: Controversion and/or Appropriation?  
The purpose of this extended excursus into Kierkegaard’s conception of the self 
has been to show one way in which a relation between the self and agency can be 
articulated. And it seems to me that, prima facie, Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
can be seen to readily map on to this Kierkegaardian conception of the self, albeit with 
some important differences. It is conceivable to suppose that Løgstrup, as with 
Kierkegaard, conceives of the self in terms of a relation that in relating to itself relates 
to an ‘outside source of norms.’9 This is what Løgstrup can be seen to be arguing 
when he claims that the true self is one which identifies with the sovereign expressions 
                                                          
8 One way to illustrate this point is to consider Kierkegaard’s claim that the leap represents the 
‘closest [thing] to being in two places at once’ (Kierkegaard 2009: 168). The point of the leap is not 
that the self has been substantially transformed in the sense that it’s contingent attributes – namely, 
those associated with despair and sin - have been altered. Rather, it is to say that the self has come to 
embrace or hold together the opposing sets of polarities that constitute the human being in 
equilibrium - rather than trying to sublate them. This is what it is to have a transparent conception of 
oneself as an agent. One may venture the thought that in this respect Kierkegaard’s ‘theory of the 
leap’ is comparable to Luther’s doctrine of simul iustus et peccator: In both cases, the difficulty of 
faith consists in embracing the inherent paradoxicality of the human being in recognizing that one is a 
sinner, given over to finitude and worldliness, whilst simultaneously believing in the forgiveness of 
sins; that is, that one stands in an absolute relation to a God for whom all things are possible. 
9 Indeed, Løgstrup often refers to the sovereign expressions of life as being, at once, ‘anonymous,’ 
suggesting a sense of ‘outsideness,’ and ‘personal,’ suggesting that they are related to the self’s 
existence (M1: 91, passim; BED: 59; 84; 163). 
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of life, which, as we have seen, Løgstrup refers to variously as the ‘givens’ or ‘grace’ 
of existence. But whereas for Kierkegaard, this outside source of norms is God, for 
Løgstrup, this ‘outside’ source of norms can be seen to come from the fundamental 
fact of human interdependence which is disclosed by the sovereign expressions of life 
in our encounter with the other and which, in that encounter, orients us in a particular 
way.  
Given this possible initial parallel, it is plausible to think that the difference 
between the two selves in Løgstrup’s architectonic lies not in any accidental attributes 
or qualities predicable to the inturned self and the true self, respectively, but rather in 
the way that the self relates to that ‘outside source of norms’ in their encounter with 
the other. On this conception, we could understand Løgstrup’s conception of Human 
Wickedness as reflecting a mode of being a self that stands in a mis-relation to itself 
as the agent that it is: for instance, by taking itself to be ‘sovereign’ over its own 
existence or, conversely, by sinking back into reflective ‘sentimentality.’ By contrast, 
we have seen that, for Løgstrup, ‘a person comes his true [eigentlige] self, and 
concretely so, by realizing himself in the sovereign expressions of life and identifying 
himself with them’ (BED: 54). This assertion can be readily understood in 
Kierkegaardian terms as the self’s transparently coinciding with itself; Løgstrup’s 
‘true’ self is a self that, in the ethical encounter with the other, has come into identity 
with the sovereign expressions of life disclosive of its fundamentally interdependent 
existence. We might expect, then, that like Kierkegaard, Løgstrup understands this 
coming into identity with the sovereign expressions of life as consisting in a special 
form of agency – a leap of faith. And it is feasible that Løgstrup’s notion of ‘receiving 
life as a gift,’ as discussed in chapter two, could fruitfully be read in this way: what it 
is to receive life as a gift is to exercise one’s agency in a self-coinciding way, which 
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involves holding a proper conception of oneself as the fundamentally interdependent 
agent that one is. 
Yet, despite the initially promising possibilities opened up through this 
comparison, there are many interpretive and philosophical difficulties involved in 
proposing a Kierkegaardian reading of Løgstrup in the manner just outlined. In this 
section, I will investigate some of the interpretive difficulties involved in drawing a 
direct analogy between Kierkegaard’s and Løgstrup’s conceptions of the self and some 
of the philosophical problems that arise in light of them. However, ultimately, I will 
suggest that the interpretive and philosophical difficulties encountered here are not 
insurmountable and that the comparison with Kierkegaard opens up a promising way 
of conceiving of a conception of moral agency compatible with Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology.  
There is little doubt that Kierkegaard’s philosophy had a profound and lasting 
impact on Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics. It is equally clear, however, that 
Løgstrup’s relation to Kierkegaard’s thought was not one of straightforward 
influence. Although Kierkegaardian themes and ideas permeate Løgstrup’s thought, 
his relation to Kierkegaard was fraught and often polemical. Therefore, any attempt 
to trace a line of Kierkegaardian influence in Løgstrup’s thought must be approached 
with caution.  
We can get our first sense for Løgstrup’s relation to Kierkegaard in his Berlin 
lectures of 1949, which were published in 1950 under the title Kierkegaards und 
Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung [Kierkegaard’s and 
Heidegger’s Analyses of Existence and their Relation to the Proclamation]. At the time of 
these lectures, Løgstrup was broadly sympathetic to what he calls Kierkegaard’s 
‘analysis of existence:’ he registers his agreement with what he takes to be 
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Kierkegaard’s claim that human existence is subject to an infinite demand, but he 
disagrees with Kierkegaard as concerns the nature of that demand. In a word, the 
issue is this. Whereas for Løgstrup’s Kierkegaard the demand is a demand to relate 
absolutely to the absolute, God, and relatively to the relative, i.e. the finite, temporal 
and worldly, Løgstrup’s ethical demand, while being ‘infinite’ in that it is 
unconditioned and absolute, registers in ‘concrete existence,’ namely, in one’s relation 
with the other.10 Thus, we find Løgstrup writing: 
[T]he question necessarily arises, whether it is possible to talk of the infinite 
demand in a different way from Kierkegaard. One can indeed ask: Are we not 
posed with the alternative, either to give up all thought of an infinite, an 
absolute, an unconditioned demand – or to put up with the difficulties that are 
present in Kierkegaard’s account? The critique that has been levelled here 
against Kierkegaard therefore obliges us – if we do not want to give up all 
thought of the infinite demand and thereby reject Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of existence – to clarify that the infinite demand announces 
itself in concrete, external existence. (KHE: 84-5)11 
Putting Løgstrup’s critique of Kierkegaard to one side for the moment, what 
I want to draw attention to in this passage is Løgstrup’s implied desire to hold on to 
Kierkegaard’s ‘understanding of existence:’ At this stage in his thinking, Løgstrup 
clearly wants to build on a Kierkegaardian foundation rather that raze it.   
In the subsequent years, however - partially as a result of his polemical 
engagements with contemporary Danish Kierkegaardians such as Olesen Larsen - 
Løgstrup’s enthusiasm for Kierkegaard’s understanding of existence waned and his 
criticisms of Kierkegaard intensified. By the time he introduced his theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life, Løgstrup no longer saw Kierkegaard as a fellow 
traveller and ally but rather as his main philosophical adversary, as the title of his 
1968 work, Opgør med Kierkegaard [Controverting Kierkegaard], suggests. However, 
                                                          
10 In this respect, Løgstrup’s position in the Berlin lectures prefigures his claim in The Ethical Demand 
that one’s relation to God is determined at the point of one’s relation to the neighbour (ED: 4).  
11 Here and in what follows I mostly rely on the forthcoming translation of Løgstrup’s Berlin lectures 
by Stern et al.   
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clearly, this is not to say that the influence of Kierkegaard on Løgstrup’s way of 
thinking simply faded away or that Løgstrup lost interest in the themes and problems 
that animated Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence. Rather, Løgstrup develops his 
theory of the sovereign expressions of life expressly in contrast with certain 
dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought: indeed, in Controverting Kierkegaard Løgstrup 
states his aim as that of ‘tak[ing] up Kierkegaard’s own concepts to use them against 
him’ (BED: 67). Now, what Løgstrup means when he says this is deeply enigmatic: 
does he mean, for instance, that he is attempting to immanently critique Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy? Or, does he mean that he will employ Kierkegaard’s concepts in a way 
that stands Kierkegaard on his head, as Marx famously purported to have done to 
Hegel?  We can gain some clarity on this issue by looking to the major points of 
contestation that Løgstrup articulates in his discussion in Controverting Kierkegaard. 
Løgstrup begins to elucidate his theory of the sovereign expressions of life in 
terms of a contrast with Kierkegaard’s understanding of how ‘the human person [can] 
accomplish the task of becoming a self’ (BED: 54). Thus, Løgstrup’s conception of 
what it is to be a ‘true’ [eigentlige] self capable of realizing the sovereign expressions 
of life is developed explicitly in relation to Kierkegaard’s conception of the self.12 This, 
I want to suggest, is crucially important. However, it is equally important to 
appreciate the nature and scope of Løgstrup’s disagreements with Kierkegaard here, 
where these disagreements helped to shape Løgstrup’s own positive account of the 
‘true’ self. The two major points of contestation relevant to our present discussion are 
the following. Firstly, Løgstrup contests Kierkegaard’s imputed claim that becoming 
a self in truth requires religious reflection. And, secondly, Løgstrup contests 
Kierkegaard’s imputed claim that it is ‘decision’ alone that renders an individual’s life 
                                                          
12 It is noteworthy that Løgstrup’s employment of the term eigentlige, here translated as ‘true,’ has 
resonances of Heidegger’s notion of ‘authenticity’ [eigentlichkeit]. 
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definitive. I shall look at each point in turn. But, firstly, I want to preface my 
reconstruction with the caveat that my aim here is not to judge the incisiveness or 
veracity of Løgstrup’s criticisms of Kierkegaard as criticisms. Indeed, Løgstrup’s 
combative and often uncharitable critique of Kierkegaard has been subject to many 
rebuttals and refutations - I do not wish to enter this debate.13 Rather, I am interested 
in establishing how and in what ways Kierkegaard’s thinking on the self influenced – 
either negatively or positively – Løgstrup’s own conception of the self, particularly as 
it relates to questions of agency.  
The first point of disagreement, then, concerns the claim that winning oneself 
in faith requires dying to immediacy in religious reflection. This, recall, is the task of 
religiousness A: in order to stand in an absolute relation with the absolute, God, one 
must overcome one’s finite and relative desires and attachments to the world – that 
is, one must give up one’s comfortable conformity within the ‘crowd’ (i.e. public norms 
and mores) - in order to stand as an individual before God. Løgstrup’s critical response 
to this is twofold. Firstly, he prosecutes an argumentum ad ignorantiam, suggesting 
that ‘Kierkegaard never spared the sovereign expressions of life so much as a thought’ 
(BED: 53). Løgstrup’s claim here is that, given Kierkegaard’s commitment to the idea 
that the ‘self can only be won in relation to eternity’ (BED: 54), he dismisses the 
worldly and concrete phenomena that comprise the sovereign expressions of life, such 
as ‘natural’ love and trust, a fortiori as reflecting the kind of relative and finite 
attachment to the world that the self must overcome in order to win itself.14  
                                                          
13 C.f. Ferreira (2001) Ch. 5, esp. pp. 76-78. 
14 In the ‘Polemical Epilogue’ to The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup explicates this point in relation to 
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. There, Løgstrup turns his critical attention to the distinction made by 
Kierkegaard in Works of Love between Christian love, on the one hand, and ‘natural’ love, on the 
other. ‘Natural’ love is associated with the finite, temporal and worldly; it is preferential in that it is 
directed at a particular other rather than at the other qua neighbour and it is finite in that it 
inevitably comes to an end. Christian love, by contrast, is associated with the infinite; it loves the 
neighbour not the particular other and it is mediated by God, thus giving it eternal stability. When it 
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In a certain sense, here Løgstrup is not so much attacking Kierkegaard as 
positioning himself in relation to Kierkegaard. Whereas Løgstrup’s Kierkegaard 
thinks that relating absolutely to the absolute can only occur when the individual, 
divested of all worldliness, stands alone before God, Løgstrup believes that the 
individual’s relation to the absolute is determined at the point of one’s concrete 
relation with the other, where the sovereign expressions of life are determinative of 
this mode of relating to the other. Yet, Løgstrup’s point does have a critical edge as 
well. As George Pattison has observed, according to Løgstrup’s Kierkegaard ‘the self 
can only become itself in virtue of a double-movement between finite and infinite, 
temporal and eternal, so that, optimally, it learns to relate to itself in its finitude – but 
infinitely’ (Pattison 2017: 89, my emphasis). That is, dying to immediacy is only one 
part of what it is to become oneself for Kierkegaard. In addition, the self, having 
renounced the worldly, the finite, and the relative must take them up once again - but 
now under the aspect of infinity. And Løgstrup takes this second ‘finitizing’ movement 
to be impossible on the terms set up by Kierkegaard.  
Løgstrup provides many elaborations of this key objection throughout his 
writings, from the Berlin lectures to Controverting Kierkegaard. But, in essence, his 
objection turns on the following question. How can the ‘abstract’ (BED: 54) relation 
to the absolute and the infinite provide us with guidance in our finite and relative 
                                                          
comes to the question of how Christian love expresses itself concretely in relation to the neighbour 
on Kierkegaard’s account, however, Løgstrup sees nothing resembling ‘love’ – whether ‘natural’ or 
Christian. For what Christian love is seen as amounting to on Kierkegaard’s account is not caring for 
the other in a temporal and worldly way according to their needs, but rather in helping them to love 
God – which, insofar as it consists in breaking down the neighbour’s selfishness, for the most part 
consists in anything but caring for the neighbour in a worldly, temporal way. Løgstrup diagnoses 
Kierkegaard’s distorted view of Christian love as being a product of his positing of an abyss between 
the infinite and the finite: ‘The difference between the human and the Christian conception of what 
love is is therefore infinite. And infinity’s difference is expressed through the fact that love must 
willingly tolerate being hated by the loved one as a reward. […] Kierkegaard then, defines love of 
one’s neighbour as synonymous with helping one’s neighbour to love God, whereas a love which 
consists in fulfilling the other person’s temporal wishes has nothing whatever to do with love’ (ED: 
224).  
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relations with concrete others?15 On Løgstrup’s view, Kierkegaard creates an ‘abyss’ 
(KHE: 80) between the self’s abstract absolute relation to the absolute and their 
concrete relative relation to relative ends which can only lead to a sort of existential 
paralysis concerning the worldly and temporal decisions they must make in the run 
of their everyday lives. In a way that parallels Luther’s notion of Anfectung, the 
Kierkegaardian self, on Løgstrup’s view, is apt to become fixated on questions 
concerning whether or not their finite and worldly relations really are permeated by 
the infinite in the correct way; whether they are loving the other as a neighbour rather 
than in terms of their finite preferences and predilections to love the other as a 
particular other.16 And Løgstrup argues that, to that extent, the individual is 
irresistibly drawn back into a despairing and obsessive circle of religious 
introspection. As Løgstrup puts it in the Berlin lectures: ‘Religiously speaking there 
is nothing that can bring this circling of self-analysis to a halt, nothing that can 
interrupt this cycle of anxiety, dissolution of anxiety and renewal of anxiety’ (KHE: 
64).17 At root, then, Løgstrup’s major criticism is this. By construing what it is to 
                                                          
15 As Stern explains Løgstrup’s objection: ‘For Kierkegaard, to relate absolutely to the absolute we 
must take ourselves to be nothing before God; but this cannot help us determine how to act in the 
finite world, or why one action is better than any other’ (Stern: forthcoming). 
16 Kierkegaard’s discussion of the possibility of going to Deer Park [Dyrehaven] in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript is taken by Løgstrup to illustrate this problem. Løgstrup takes the animus 
behind Kierkegaard’s discussion to be whether and how an innocent and relative pleasure such as 
visiting Deer Park can be made compatible with one’s absolute relation to the absolute. And Løgstrup 
takes the prolixity of Kierkegaard’s discussion on this point to signify Kierkegaard’s failure to bridge 
the abyss between the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative.  
17 C.f. ‘[Kierkegaard] maintains that eternity alone is able to invest a decision with permanence; only 
eternity can put an end to the shrinking into oneself…But the difficulty of accepting such assistance is 
the greatest thinkable, Kierkegaard adds, and [this] is so because the person in need is allowed no say 
in how he is to be helped; he must leave it all to God, and unconditionally to boot. To be helped he 
must surrender his self and become as nothing in the hand of the succourer. […] But this means that 
the difficulty of accepting religious help is one Kierkegaard has rendered so acute that the needy 
individual is driven to cling to his distress. The religious remedy as a possible cure is rendered so 
impossible that it can only serve as an incentive to ever more intensified self-enclosedness. This is the 
result of making the relation to God abstract, of abstracting from all the opportunities for cure that 
life presents in the way of opportunities – in the individual’s relation to his work, to other people, to 
the world around him – for spontaneous flourishing. (BED: 60-1) 
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become a self in faith as involving an ‘abstract’ relation to the absolute, the 
Kierkegaardian self becomes paralyzed by self-reflection which cuts him off from the 
finite, the worldly and the relative, thus intensifying – rather than exorcising - his 
despairing ‘self-enclosedness.’  
A second criticism Løgstrup levels against Kierkegaard is this: 
Neglect of the sovereign and definitive expressions of life leads to two things: 
notions of choice determination, and freedom become abstractions, and the 
choice between existing as an individual in relation to the infinite idea or living 
a life in conformity takes centre stage, and we are left with existentialism’s 
vacuous talk of the vacuous self. (BED: 59) 
This criticism, again, has its roots in Løgstrup’s objection that the 
Kierkegaardian self is too abstract – to the point of being ‘vacuous,’ as Løgstrup puts 
it. However, this time Løgstrup’s focus is not on the possibility of performing the 
‘double-movement’ associated with faith, but is rather focused on the worry that by 
conceiving of the self in such an abstract way, notions such as choice and freedom that 
are associated with the self on Kierkegaard’s imputed conception become exaggerated 
and distorted. Thus, Løgstrup argues that 
Kierkegaard’s capital error, which the existentialists, both philosophical and 
theological, have perpetuated, is that he, and they with him, make the 
individual’s choice, decision, and freedom alone that which renders life 
definitive – as though our existence were not already and antecedently 
something definitive in each of its, as it were, anonymous expressions of life. 
That which is alone subject to the individual’s choice, determination, and 
freedom is whether to fulfil the definitiveness which, already and antecedently, 
attaches to the sovereign expressions of life through which the individual 
realizes himself – or to be guilty of its dereliction. (BED: 59) 
In other words, Løgstrup is arguing that the alleged central importance 
Kierkegaard, and existentialist philosophers and theologians inspired by him, place 
on an existential choice - for example, the choice putatively exemplified in the leap of 
faith - in becoming a true self misconstrues human existence: the self is not an abstract 
self-relation for Løgstrup; it is always already conditioned by ethically qualitative 
phenomena – namely, the sovereign expressions of life.  
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It is instructive that Løgstrup turns to Sartre in illustrating his point here.18 
On a Sartrean view, the core of ethics lies in the making of radical choices: Francois 
Raffoul glosses the Sartrean-existentialist position as follows, 
The core of existentialist ethics is responsibility because existentialism 
recognizes that human beings invent who they are and the values they live by, 
a responsibility that will be defined by Sartre as universal, hyperbolic, and even 
absolute…That means, at every moment and without any support, man must 
invent man. To that extent, he is absolutely responsible, not only for what he 
does but above all for what he is. (Raffoul 2010: 124) 
A similar emphasis on choice and decision can be found in the existential 
theology of Rudolf Bultmann: Bultmann defines faith as ‘the decision in the face of 
grace which confronts us in the proclamation of the word’ (Bultmann, quoted in 
Macquarrie 1973: 181). John Macquarrie explicates Bultmann’s thinking here as 
follows: 
Man is not an object, he exists. If God, therefore, will give to man salvation, 
he cannot impose it upon him as he might impose a property upon on an object 
– at least, not without taking away man’s distinctively human character, his 
existence, and so reducing him to the level of an object or an automaton. God’s 
gift of salvation can only be given as a possibility for which man can decide. 
The decision itself may be considered to be God’s gift, since God alone makes 
it possible, yet on the other hand it is also man’s, since he had the alternative 
of rejecting the possibility which God offers. (Macquarrie 1973: 184) 
In other words, Bultmann thinks that the human being ‘exists,’ that is, the 
human being is not a substance with attributes but rather a relation that relates to 
itself as possibility. As such, the human being is an issue for itself; we must, in a certain 
sense, decide what and how we are. Salvation (i.e. righteousness, justification), then, is 
not to be construed as a quality or a property that can be imposed or bestowed on the 
human being but rather it is a particular kind of possibility for the human being which 
                                                          
18 Indeed, Løgstrup’s criticism here, considered as a criticism of Kierkegaard, is particularly vulnerable 
to rebuttal: Even in our brief discussion of Kierkegaard in 4.2. it is clear that pinning a form of Sartre-
style radical choice on Kierkegaard is to egregiously misinterpret Kierkegaard. The fact that Løgstrup 
elucidates this criticism by appealing to Sartre perhaps betrays a sense that Løgstrup’s real target 
here, whether self-consciously or not, is his contemporary Kierkegaardians rather than Kierkegaard 
himself.  
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the human being can choose. And faith consists in the decision to take up that 
possibility.19 
What Løgstrup is objecting to here is the thought that becoming one’s true 
self is radically dependent on one’s making a decision to affirm or take up a set of 
values or beliefs that would otherwise fail to have absolute meaning for the self; that 
the self can only relate to values ‘authentically’ if they have affirmed them or taken 
them up through an existential decision. It follows from the existentialist view that 
the sovereign expressions of life such as trust, love, mercy and so on could only be 
definitive for a person’s selfhood if that person ‘chooses’ them to be so. By contrast, 
Løgstrup argues that ‘in the most elemental manner conceivable, claims are imposed 
on human beings: they are implicit already in the definitiveness of the sovereign 
expression of life’ (BED: 54). That is to say, the sovereign expressions of life do not 
become ‘definitive’ for the self on the basis of a decision made by the self to take them 
                                                          
19 A similar notion of faith as decision is operative in Gogarten’s theology. As Shiner explains, 
Gogarten’s notion of ‘decision’ is viewed not as ‘a decision by the self but with the self’, where it 
surely involves a ‘free decision of man’ but where that free decision does not ‘have its origin and 
ground in man’s decision but only in the reality which is believed’ (Shiner 1966: 125). Shiner breaks 
this notion of decision down into three components. Firstly, the decision originates in the ‘experience 
of the mystery as a passive preparation for faith in the Word of God’ where Shiner quickly adds that 
‘even this passive preparation has its active aspect since the readiness of man for faith is not a 
property automatically bestowed on him but a relation to the divine mystery’ (Shiner 1966: 125). 
Secondly, the decision of faith involves an awareness or self-consciousness of one’s already standing 
in a relation to the Divine mystery. Thus, Shiner: ‘Because faith involves man’s relation to the mystery 
in which he already lives even as he lives against it, his faith cannot have the sense of his producing or 
establishing this relation but only of his remaining in the relation into which he has been called and 
which he now perceives in hearing his call. This second dimension of the decision expresses the active 
element in faith, the freedom to refuse at any moment the call out of which man now lives’ (Shiner 
1966: 128). In other words, if the first – mostly passive – component of the decision refers to the 
relation to the mystery in which we always already stand, the second more active component 
concerns the activity of remaining in that relation, rather than turning a deaf ear to it or refusing it. 
Finally, ‘the third dimension of Gogarten’s understanding of the decision of faith emerges when we 
recall that the relation between man and the mystery of existence always includes the world…The 
receptive or God-ward side of this sonship is cared for by faith; the active or worldly side of sonship is 
cared for by works’ (Shiner 1966: 128-9). This is just to say that, as with Luther, faith is a necessary 
precondition for truly good works. That is; faith consists in the freedom which facilitates the proper 
or ‘authentic’ taking up of one’s responsibility for the neighbour and the world.  
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as such, rather they are anteriorly definitive of the self. Indeed, this is what makes 
them ‘sovereign.’ 
The two objections Løgstrup levels against Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard-
inspired existentialism here can be seen to provide a negative contrast to the two core 
features of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology elucidated in the previous two chapters, 
namely, Immediacy and Human Wickedness. The putative Kierkegaardian emphasis 
on the need to ‘die to immediacy’ in order to win oneself in faith can be seen to contrast 
with Løgstrup’s commitment to Immediacy. Indeed, as Kees van Kooten Niekerk has 
argued, whereas Løgstrup sees in Kierkegaard’s philosophy an aversion to and 
suspicion of living in immediacy because of the concupiscent self-interestedness 
Kierkegaard attributes to it, ‘from the beginning of his academic career Løgstrup 
cherished the ideal of living in immediacy:’20 
Løgstrup’s point is: living in immediacy is not wrong in itself; what is wrong 
is living selfishly in it. We can live unselfishly in immediacy, and often do so, 
by virtue of the expressions of life. Therefore it is not necessary to die away 
from immediacy in a self-reflective relation to infinity. (Niekerk 2017: 190) 
In other words, one way in which Løgstrup can be seen to ‘controvert’ 
Kierkegaard is through his valorisation of Immediacy and his suspicion of reflection. 
Secondly, Løgstrup’s criticism of the role that notions such as ‘decision’ and 
‘choice’ play in Kierkegaard-inspired existentialist theology and philosophy can be 
seen to parallel Løgstrup’s commitment to Human Wickedness: whilst from a 
contemporary perspective it strains credibility to pin a form a decisionism on 
Kierkegaard, in the philosophical milieu contemporary to Løgstrup, the Sartrean-
existentialist emphasis on radical choice was often seen to have its roots in 
Kierkegaard’s thought. And for Løgstrup, the notion of radical choice reflects not a 
                                                          
20 See also Niekerk (2007) pp. 63-5.  
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form of authentic of ‘true’ existence, but rather a form of human wickedness in which 
the agent takes herself to be sovereign over her own existence. By contrast, Løgstrup 
argues that one’s life is made anteriorly definitive by the sovereign expressions of life 
which ‘precede’ and ‘pre-empt’ the will (BED: 68) and that any attempt to take over 
the sovereign expressions of life through an exertion of the will inevitably distorts 
and corrupts them, generating ersatz or, we might say, ‘inauthentic’ versions of the 
phenomena.  
Baldly stated, then, these two points of contrast appear to pour a good deal of 
cold water on any attempt to trace a line of influence running from Kierkegaard to 
Løgstrup – particularly as concerns issues of the self and agency. Whereas for 
Løgstrup’s Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard-inspired existentialists, the self is an 
abstract self-relation that wins its identity by extracting itself from the ‘crowd’ and 
choosing itself, for Løgstrup himself the true self is something given; it is something 
one seemingly passively receives in one’s immediate ethical encounters with others. 
Indeed, Løgstrup’s comment to the effect that ‘winning one’s identity and becoming 
a self is something the individual should let happen unawares, by leaving it to the 
sovereign expressions of life’ (BED: 71) can perhaps most readily be interpreted as 
claiming that there is no agency – no choice - involved in becoming oneself; becoming 
one’s true self is an event that happens, not something the self achieves.  
However, I think we have reason to resist this conclusion. Whilst it is clear 
that Løgstrup’s conception of the self is not straightforwardly Kierkegaardian or 
existentialist, it would be rather flat-footed to then conclude that Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology is diametrically opposed to Kierkegaard’s thought on all counts. In 
fact, Løgstrup’s relation to Kierkegaard can be seen to be analogous Kierkegaard’s 
relation to Hegel: as with Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, Løgstrup’s relation to 
Kierkegaard is marked by polemic, but where that polemic is often actually targeted 
179 
 
at contemporary Kierkegaardians rather than Kierkegaard himself. And beneath the 
polemic, there remains substantial lines of influence and agreement that ought not to 
be overlooked.  
In expanding on this analogy, sensitivity to the theological milieu in which 
Løgstrup was writing is instructive. At that time, alongside the pre-eminence of 
existentialism, prominent theologians such as Karl Barth – who decisively influenced 
the Danish Tidehverv movement with whom Løgstrup had a fractious relationship – 
were emphasizing a notion of God as ‘wholly other.’ For Barth, God’s ‘otherness’ 
implies ‘exclusive separation,’ that is, an infinite qualitative difference to man.21 In 
contrast to this view, which, for Løgstrup, entails that one’s relation to the absolute 
must be abstracted from ‘all that is human,’ Løgstrup wants to claim that 
transcendence, the infinite and absolute source of value – whether we call it God or 
not, manifests itself in the immanent and seemingly relative, namely, in our loving, 
trusting, and merciful encounters with other’s. In this respect, Løgstrup’s 
‘controversion’ of Kierkegaard and, especially, the Kierkegaardian theologians of his 
day bares comparison with Levinas’ philosophical project, in the sense that, as Diane 
Perpich puts it: 
Levinas’s notion of alterity is developed in the service of restoring a meaning 
to the concrete other whereby it cannot be reduced either to dumb materialism 
or absorbed within an overarching and all-encompassing totality or system. 
Thus, what we have in Levinas is that greatest transcendence, spoken of by 
Jean Wahl: a transcendence that transcends transcendence for the sake of 
saving the immanent from (mere) immanence. (Perpich 2008: 23) 
 In other words, contra Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard-inspired theologians such 
as Karl Barth, Løgstrup is claiming that not all that is of immanent value to human 
                                                          
21 C.f. Barth (1968) ‘God, the pure and absolute boundary and beginning of all that we are and have 
and do; God, who is distinguished qualitatively from men and from everything human, and must 
never be identified with anything which we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship, as God…’ 
(330-1). 
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life can be dismissed as relative and, thus, a function of the ‘crowd.’ Rather, for 
Løgstrup, there is a transcendent normativity manifest in our immanent and concrete 
encounters with others – namely, as the sovereign expressions of life.  
 As for the underlying lines of influence and agreement, we can see that 
despite this clear and genuine moment of disagreement, Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology remains decisively shaped by patterns from Kierkegaard’s thought. I 
want to suggest that this is evident in two places: firstly, Løgstrup maintains a broadly 
Kierkegaardian relational conception of the self. And, secondly, that it can be argued 
that for Løgstrup the self’s self-relation can be seen to encapsulate the fundamental 
characteristics of moral agency.  
In order to bring out the dimension of the Kierkegaardian self that Løgstrup 
retains, it is instructive to turn to an important clarification Løgstrup makes 
concerning his conception of the self in Controverting Kierkegaard. Løgstrup appeals to 
a scene from Goethe’s drama Götz von Berlichingen in clarifying his position. In the 
scene in question, Götz is approached by an enemy, Weislingen. Weislingen is in acute 
difficulty, and asks for information and advice from Götz. Løgstrup speculates that 
Götz, being in a position of power, ‘may toy with the idea of exploiting the precarious 
situation in which Weislingen finds himself to lead him astray, bring about his 
downfall, and by doing so get him back for his past misdeeds’ (BED: 56). Indeed, he 
may, for purely pragmatic reasons, withhold important information, knowing that 
‘Weislingen will misuse whatever Götz offers him by way of support in word and 
action’ (BED: 55). Yet, notwithstanding these considerations, ‘he does not take 
advantage of Weislingen’s present difficulty to procure sweet revenge’ (BED: 56). 
Thus, Løgstrup asks: 
But why does Götz von Berlichingen not do precisely that? We say that it is 
against his nature to do so, he cannot bring himself to act in that way, he is 
181 
 
not sufficiently without substance to do so. But then how does a person acquire 
substance? (BED: 56) 
According to a Kierkegaardian-existentialist view, Løgstrup imagines an 
answer to this question would consist in one of two options. Either that Götz was 
simply conforming to the norms and conventions of his social milieu – perhaps norms 
of truth-telling or honour, for instance - or, conversely, that Weislingen’s request for 
information constituted a ‘moment of decision’ for Götz, whereby he is ‘removed from 
the great mass of people, from convention, set apart as a particular individual and 
rendered a self’ (BED: 56).  
By contrast, Løgstrup claims that Götz acquires ‘substance’ by ‘identifying 
[identificere] himself with the definitiveness inherent in the expressions of life through 
which he realizes his life’ (BED: 56). Løgstrup continues: ‘Through his identification 
with the definitiveness inherent in a complex of expressions of life, the individual 
becomes a concrete self’ (BED: 56). Løgstrup’s use of the term ‘identification’ is crucial 
here. For what it implies is that, like Kierkegaard, Løgstrup views the self as a relation 
– namely, a relation of self-identification.22 We can extrapolate: what it is to be a ‘true’ 
or ‘authentic’ self for Løgstrup is to come into identity with the fundamental features 
of one’s existence that comprise the sovereign expressions of life. By contrast, what it 
is to fail to be a self is to fail to come into identity with one’s existence as rendered 
definitive by the sovereign expressions of life: for instance, if Götz were to assert his 
own sovereignty in relation to Weislingen by wielding power over him and refusing 
to provide him with assistance, or if he were to turn a deaf ear to the needs of 
                                                          
22 Niekerk (2017) has made a similar observation: ‘At first sight it might seem strange that Løgstrup 
connects selfhood with the sovereignty of the expression of life. Does not this sovereignty mean that 
it is the expression of life that makes me act in a certain way? Yes, it does. But how, then, can I be 
myself in having myself ruled by something which is apparently different from me? Løgstrup answers: 
in surrendering to the expressions of life we identify ourselves with them. Therefore we do not 
experience their realization as being ruled by an alien power. On the contrary, we experience it as a 
form of self-realization in which we are truly ourselves’ (200). 
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Weislingen he would be failing to identify himself with the sovereign expressions of 
life and, thus, be failing to relate transparently to his own existence; he would fail to 
‘acquire substance,’ as Løgstrup puts it.23 Thus, my claim is that Løgstrup is not 
opposed to a relational conception of the self per se – in fact he can be seen to adopt 
such a conception – rather, he is opposed to a certain way of construing this 
conception of the self that emphasizes introspection and religious reflection over one’s 
concrete relations with others. 
Can Løgstrup’s adoption of a relational conception of the self be seen to 
encapsulate a mode of agency? Admittedly, there is some textual evidence in 
Løgstrup’s writing on the sovereign expressions of life that encourage the thought 
that the self’s coming into identity with the sovereign expressions of life is something 
that happens to the self – it is an ‘event’ that ‘overwhelms’ or ‘overmasters’ the self’s 
agency, taking the self ‘unawares’ – rather than something the self ‘achieves’ through 
his agency. And, clearly, any construal of the self in such a way as to associate it with 
a mode of agency that involves the making of existential decisions would be rejected 
by Løgstrup. Thus, we might conclude that the realization of one’s true self in the 
sovereign expressions of life is not a matter of agency for Løgstrup.  
However, this is not the only available way to interpret Løgstrup’s conception 
of the self in relation to the sovereign expressions of life. For what Løgstrup’s 
discussion of the scene from Götz von Berlichingen reveals is that Götz’s actions were 
at least expressive of a negative mode of agency with respect to the self’s relation to the 
                                                          
23 It might be objected here that it seems entirely reasonable for Götz to show reticence in providing 
information to his enemy. Løgstrup is alive to this worry: he argues in one place, for instance, that in 
some circumstances one must ‘suspend’ the sovereign expressions of life: ‘In a dictatorship, being 
sincere when dealing with the secret police is inadmissible’ (BED: 133). It is often thought that 
Løgstrup’s comments here and elsewhere are quasi-autobiographical, in that they refer back to his 
time as an informant for the Danish resistance.  
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sovereign expressions of life that belies the claim that the sovereign expressions of 
life or the other simply take over and determine the self. This mode of agency that 
can perhaps be characterized in terms of resisting the temptation to defy the sovereign 
expressions of life: Götz ‘acquires substance’ by not giving in to the temptation to take 
advantage of Weislingen. This negative valence of agency in relation to the sovereign 
expressions of life can be found in other places in Løgstrup’s work: for instance, it 
appears to be attested to in the above-quoted passage in which Løgstrup likens the 
realization of the sovereign expressions of life to a ‘decision to surrender oneself to 
trust and mercy [by the] renunciation of attitudes or movements of thought and 
feeling that are incompatible with trust and mercifulness…’ (BED: 79), where this 
remark clearly suggests that the realization of oneself in the sovereign expressions of 
life involves some form of agency on the part of the self, namely, a ‘spontaneous 
decision’ (BED: 79).24 
 What these examples suggest is that Løgstrup allowed that the self has some 
agential latitude with respect to the sovereign expressions of life – albeit just in the 
negative sense that we can resist defiance, so to speak. Yet, we must be cautious in how 
we interpret these comments. Clearly, in making these remarks, Løgstrup did not 
mean to suggest that the self qua agent, upon being tempted to defy the claim made 
upon them by the other, can through their own self-governing efforts resist that 
defiance and, thus, bring themselves into line with the claim made on them by the 
other, as this would lead to a conception of agency comparable to that of the Kantian 
                                                          
24 We might also note that Løgstrup’s example of the woman who reins in her inclination to speak 
openly to the secret police discussed in the previous chapter is relevant here, as are Løgstrup’s 
comments that ‘in certain cases the conditionality of the action can make it necessary to suspend the 
expression of life. The only ethically defensible course can be to go against the openness of speech, 
to put the other person on the wrong track, namely, when the other harbours destructive intent and 
holds power. The expression of life can therefore be suspended, and it can be necessary, indeed a 
duty, to do so’ (BED: 133). The important point for our purposes is to note that Løgstrup did not 
consistently hold that the sovereign expressions of life can ‘seize’ and ‘overmaster’ the agent; there is 
some agential leeway at play.  
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Samaritan that he explicitly rejects (see §1). However, I would suggest that it would 
be a mistake to simply write off Løgstrup’s comments here and in other places as 
aberrations, for what they potentially open up a way of unravelling the mystery of the 
relations between the self the other and the sovereign expressions of life.  
In this respect, it is important to observe that in each of the passages just 
discussed, Løgstrup does not describe the agency involved in the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life in terms of actively choosing or deciding but rather 
favours terms such as ‘letting,’ ‘surrendering,’ ‘yielding’ and ‘allowing.’ For instance, 
in his discussion of Götz von Berlichingen, he writes that ‘…it lies with the individual 
to let the definitive expression of life thrust its way through in even the most 
complicated and unpropitious of situations’ (BED: 58, my emphasis); and in his 
discussion of the ‘spontaneous decision’ (BED: 79) he talks of deciding to ‘surrender 
oneself to trust and mercy’ (BED: 79). We can add to these examples a further 
important remark from Controverting Kierkegaard: 
Either the will, allowing itself to be overmastered, surrenders to the sovereign 
expressions of life, or it relies on its own efforts, and though morality’s ersatz 
action we do what we surmise the sovereign expressions of life would have 
done had it pre-empted our volition. (BED: 68, my emphasis). 
Enten lader viljen sig overmande og giver sig livsytringen i vold, eller den forlader 
sig på sin anstrengelse og i moralens erstatningshandling gør vi det, som vi kan regne 
ud, at den suveræne livsytring ville have gjort, om den var kommet vor vilje i forkøbet. 
(OK: 116, my emphasis) 
Terms such as these have an ambiguous agential status, being neither fully 
active nor fully passive: they designate a mode of agency that is not well described in 
terms of autonomous self-governing activity, yet which is evidently more than being 
causally moved by a situation or being ‘controlled’ by the other. Can we clarify the 
mode of agency encapsulated by these terms? And will doing so provide us with a 
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conception of moral agency compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology? It is 
to these questions that I now turn.  
4.4. The Sovereign Expressions of Life and Medio-Passive Agency 
Let us take stock. We are investigating a possible way of conceiving of a mode 
of agency compatible with Løgstrup’s core commitments to Immediacy and Human 
Wickedness. The mode of agency under discussion has its roots in a broadly 
Kierkegaardian relational conception of the self according to which the self is seen as 
a reflexive relation that describes the fundamental characteristics of human agency. 
So far I have suggested that this conception of agency can be seen to map on to 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology in the following way. The ethical encounter with 
the other is framed by the ‘latent presence’ (BED: 125) of the sovereign expressions 
of life. As we have seen in §2, the sovereign expressions of life are hermeneutic 
conditions disclosive of what is for Løgstrup the ontological fact of human 
interdependence. Thus, according to Løgstrup’s architectonic, a self becomes a true 
self by identifying with the sovereign expressions of life in the ethical encounter with 
the other.  
Furthermore, we have seen that Løgstrup sometimes describes this process of 
identification as involving a peculiar form of agency that Løgstrup designates with 
terms such as surrendering, letting, allowing and yielding, which terms I shall refer 
to collectively as ‘surrendering,’ hereafter. In light of these comments, the question 
we face is this. How can we understand the mode of agency involved in ‘surrendering’? 
It is natural to suppose that surrendering differs from self-governing activity (F2). Yet, 
it is equally intuitive to think that surrendering is more than sheer passivity; more than 
being controlled by the other or being causally moved by a situation. My suggestion 
will be that the notion of medio-passive agency as developed in the work of Han-Pile 
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provides an invaluable resource for conceiving of a mode of moral agency that is 
compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. To be clear: my claim is not that 
my construal of Løgstrup on this point is the only way of interpreting Løgstrup. I 
readily admit that there is some textual evidence that supports the view that the 
realization of oneself in the sovereign expressions of life is something that happens to 
the self and is, thus, something in relation to which the self is wholly passive. What I 
am denying is that this is the only way to read Løgstrup: as we have seen, there is much 
evidence in support of the view that the self plays some role qua agent in the 
realization of itself in the sovereign expressions of life. And it is an interpretation in 
light of this evidence that I am presently pursuing.  
 A clear benefit of my interpretation will be that it reduces the ‘mysteriousness’ 
of Løgstrup’s account of the sovereign expressions of life and, thus, increases the 
plausibility of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. However, I recognize that in 
developing my argument here, I will need to countenance some obvious worries that 
potentially attend my interpretation of Løgstrup. Firstly, there is a worry that by 
conceiving of the mode of agency involved in the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life and their good works in terms of a broadly Kierkegaardian reflexive 
self-relation, I risk the accusation of importing a form of self-reflection into my 
interpretation of Løgstrup that transgresses his commitment to Immediacy. Indeed, 
as we have seen, a major criticism Løgstrup levels against Kierkegaard, rightly or 
wrongly, is that he neglects immediacy for the sake of reflection (BED: 53). Secondly, 
there is a worry that my interpretation might portray the Løgstrupian agent as 
playing too active a role in the realization of the sovereign expressions of life, where 
this would transgress Løgstrup’s commitment to Human Wickedness. As we have 
seen, Løgstrup was explicitly critical of what he saw as an exaggerated and distorted 
emphasis on notions such as choice and decision in Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard-
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inspired existentialist philosophy and theology. However, as I will presently show, 
neither of these worries prove to be intractable. In section 4.4.1, I will focus on 
providing a detailed account of medio-passive agency and demonstrating its relevance 
for and applicability to Løgstrup’s notion of surrender, where, in 4.4.2, I will then 
draw on this account in giving definition to my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency 
overall. 
4.4.1. Medio-Passivity 
The term ‘medio-passivity’ is derived from the ‘middle’ or ‘medial’ voice in 
ancient Greek grammar, which has been characterized as follows: 
…the ‘original’ or ‘essential’ function of the medial voice was…to denote that 
a process is taking place with regard to, or is affecting, happening to, a person 
or a thing; this definition includes also those cases in which we are under the 
impression that in the eyes of those who once used this category in its original 
function some power or something powerful was at work in or through the 
subject, or manifested itself in or by means of the subject on the one hand and 
those cases in which the process, whilst properly performed by, or originating 
with, the subject, obviously was not limited to the ‘sphere’ or the subject. 
(Gonda, quoted in Llewelyn 1991: ix) 
 
In other words, the middle or medial voice can refer to cases, firstly, in which 
we the subject appears ‘possessed’ by some force or power working through them. 
And, secondly, it refers to cases where the subject is seen to be involved in or 
participating in an event or process qua agent, but where the subject is not the 
originator or cause of the event or process. 
Phillipe Eberhard has provided an illuminating characterization of this latter 
use of the middle voice: 
Instead of focusing on the subject and the object, on the agent and patient, on 
who affects what/is affected by what, etc., the middle voice brings to language 
the subject in his or her relation to the process the verb expresses. In the 
middle voice, as opposed to the active, the subject is within the action which 
happens to him or her and of which he or she is subject. The subject does not 
control the action from outside. He or she is not in charge of the event. The 
key of the middle voice is that it allows one to conceive of a nonexclusive 
subject: the event happens, and I am its subject. The paradigmatic verb for this 
kind of involving action is the Greek middle…“to get married.” To get married 
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is more than actively taking a spouse. It suggests the medial involvement in 
the process of marriage which happens to the bride and the groom who marry 
each other. (Eberhard 2004: 2) 
 
In short, the middle voice refers to events or processes which ‘happen’ to the 
subject, but with respect to which the subject is not merely passive but is rather 
involved or participates in the event or process that encompasses it. The middle voice, 
in other words, articulates cases in which the subject is neither wholly active nor 
wholly passive. Along with Eberhard’s example of marriage, we might think of cases 
such as trying to get to sleep or trying to concentrate as being illustrative of ‘medial’ 
processes: for instance, in trying to fall asleep, I am ‘involved’ in the process of falling 
asleep, yet it is not something I actively cause; sleep comes to me. 
Immediately, then, the grammatical middle voice – medio-passivity – looks to 
be a promising way of capturing the modality of verbs like ‘surrendering,’ ‘letting’ and 
‘allowing’ insofar as they intimate a kind of agency that is neither fully active nor fully 
passive. However, the core meaning of the ‘middle voice’ is notoriously difficult to 
express in modern English, since – as many commentators have pointed out – the 
grammatical middle voice has gone out of usage. In a sense, we are condemned to use 
language which forces us characterize events by either active or passive expressions; 
we simply do not have the appropriate grammatical scaffolding to express middle 
voiced phenomena.  
Nonetheless, attempts to recapture the core of medio-passivity can be found in 
the work of many modern philosophers. For instance, Han-Pile has argued that 
Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati (love of fate) exhibits a medio-passive modality. Indeed, 
with reference to Luther, she writes that amor fati can be seen to represent a 
‘secularised version of grace:’ 
[T]he existential transformation [amor fati] entails is not dependent 
on our will (love cannot be willed into existence). What I have called its medio-
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passive modality captures the fact that even though we may try to prepare for 
it, we cannot ensure its coming: like grace (which, in the Lutheran tradition 
Nietzsche was raised in, cannot be secured by works either), love happens (or 
not) to us from the outside. (Han-Pile 2011: 242) 
Another clear example of an attempt to describe a medio-passive mode of 
agency can be found in the later Heidegger’s interest in the notion of Gelassenheit 
(releasement), a notion he appropriated from Meister Eckhart in attempting to 
articulate the possibility of ‘thinking without willing’ (Heidegger 2010: 33). In the 
characteristically obfuscating language of his later philosophy, Heidegger defines 
Gelassenheit in terms of a ‘waiting’ whereby one ‘let[s] oneself into an involvement in 
the open of the open-region’ (Heidegger 2010: 76-8).25 In elucidating this notion, Brett 
Davis has described Heidegger’s thinking here as follows: 
Renouncing his lordship over beings, man opens himself to the free space, the 
clearing, of being; in guarding the clearing of being, man takes part in letting 
beings be. In his role of guarding or shepherding, man neither actively creates, 
nor merely passively suffers, but rather “participates” in the opening up and 
preserving of a world by “corresponding” to being. In each of these expressions 
for the essential role of man, “guarding,” “shepherding,” “watching over,” 
taking part,” etc., what is at stake is hearing a “task” or “commission” that is 
no longer definable in terms of the opposition of passivity/activity in the 
domain of the will. (Davis 2007: 220-1) 
The core insight of Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit for our purposes is the 
thought of a mode of agency described in terms of a ‘letting beings be’ which is 
                                                          
25 More concretely, Heidegger likens Gelassenheit to an ‘authentic conversation:’ for a conversation 
to come into its own essence – that is, as an authentic conversation, Heidegger avers that language 
needs to be infused with ‘the word,’ which appears to mean something like the proliferation of a 
transformative ‘meaningfulness’ or depth of profundity between interlocutors. How is the word 
brought to language in conversation? According to Heidegger it is not a matter of ‘willing’ the word to 
language. In ‘deep’ conversations, it is often impossible to simply and bluntly say what’s on one’s 
mind - maybe because what one wishes to express is hard to grasp and express, or maybe also 
because the conversational context disallows such bluntness. What such conversations require is a 
kind of perambulation in which ‘the word’ is allowed to come into view, and a patient preparedness 
to let the conversation ‘reach that of which it speaks’ – to let ‘the word’ befall the conversation and 
transform its essence. Gelassenheit operates in this example as a mode of comportment or 
involvement within the conversation which ‘waits’ for ‘the word’ to come to the conversation.  
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portrayed by Heidegger as being undefinable in terms of the active/passive binary in 
the domain of the will.  
Yet another example can be found in Simone Weil’s notion of ‘attention,’ 
which she describes as ‘perhaps the greatest effort of all…but it is a negative effort’ 
(Weil 1950: 71): 
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and 
ready to be penetrated by the object, it means holding in our minds, within 
reach of this thought, but on a low level and not in contact with it, the diverse 
knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought 
should be in relation to all particular and already formulated thoughts, as a 
man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees also below him, without 
actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains. Above all our 
thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive 
in its naked truth the object which is to penetrate it. (Weil 1950: 71) 
 As with Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati and the later Heidegger’s notion of 
Gelassenheit, the notion of attention seeks to capture a mode of agency that is neither 
fully active; it does not involve ‘a kind of muscular effort’ (Weil 1950: 70), as Weil 
puts it. But neither is it fully passive either; the agent is not simply overtaken or 
causally moved by outside forces. It is interesting to compare this passage from Weil 
to Murdoch’s example of the kestrel quoted in the previous chapter as part of my 
discussion of the split-self view, since Murdoch’s thinking was, arguably, influenced 
by Weil on this point. What Weil emphasizes is that the capacity to ‘be penetrated by 
the object,’ say, the capacity to be drawn out of oneself by the kestrel, requires some 
form of agency on the part of the subject. But this agency should not be understood 
in terms of a self-governing act of the will; rather, it requires a certain mode of 
comportment, ‘attention,’ that is not well described by the active/passive binary.  
 As a final example, one is tempted to venture the thought that, pace Løgstrup, 
Kierkegaard’s ‘theory of the leap’ exhibits a medio-passive structure: Ferreira’s 
description of the leap as a ‘captivating yet free engagement,’ which consists in both 
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a sense of letting go of one’s attempts to grasp the absolute paradox along with a 
sense of passion whereby one embraces the paradox, could be seen to lend itself to 
medio-passive formulations.  
The point of presenting these examples of what I am calling medio-passive 
agency is to bring a sense of what is designated by the term medio-passivity into view, 
albeit in a preliminary and unsystematic way. And there are many other examples 
which could be appealed to in this regard.26 For our purposes, however, Han-Pile’s 
discussion of medio-passive agency in relation to the Heidegger of Being and Time 
provides perhaps the best substantive introduction to the notion of medio-passivity 
as a conception of agency: not only because, as we have seen, the Heidegger of Being 
and Time had direct influence on Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics (see §2), but 
also because Han-Pile’s discussion focuses on the mode of agency involved in 
becoming one’s ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ self.  
In her article ‘Freedom and the ‘Choice to Choose Oneself in Being and Time,’ 
Han-Pile is concerned to defuse an impending paradox concerning the putative 
                                                          
26 For instance, another illuminating example can be found in the philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. In Truth and Method, Gadamer discusses ‘mediality’ in describing his core notion of ‘play.’ 
For Gadamer, play is ‘a process that takes place “in between.” …play does not have its being in the 
player’s consciousness or attitude, but on the contrary play draws him into its domain and fills him 
with its spirit’ (Gadamer 2004: 113). On Gadamer’s view, the mediality of play consists in the sense 
that it is a ‘process’ or ‘event’ within which the subject finds herself but which also requires the 
participation of the subject in order to keep the play going. Gadamer elucidates the mediality of play 
with reference to what he calls the ‘sacred seriousness’ of play: ‘Play fulfils its purpose only if the 
player loses himself in the play. Seriousness is not merely something that calls us away from play. 
Someone who doesn’t take the game seriously is a spoilsport.’ (Gadamer 2004: 107). In other words, 
Gadamer is suggesting that play proper only occurs when the players are filled with the ‘spirit’ of 
play. There is an element of passivity here: For play to be play the subject must ‘lose himself in the 
play’ and this, Gadamer suggests, is something that happens to the subject – it is not something the 
subject ‘intends.’ Yet, by the same margin, Gadamer avers that part of what it is to be lost in play is to 
take the game seriously. That is, only if the player comports himself in relation to the game in such a 
way that, for example, is expressive of his commitment to the game and its rules can the play be 
wholly play. There is an element of activity here. The player is involved in or participates in the game: 
he keeps the game going through his taking the game seriously. We might imagine, counter-factually, 
that at any moment a player can ‘give up’ and destroy the spirit of play.  
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freedom of Dasein: according to Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein as ‘being-
in-the-world,’ Dasein ‘must be free’ (Han-Pile 2013: 291) insofar as it belongs to the 
structure of Dasein to transcend towards the world (Heidegger’s definition of 
freedom). Yet, in a way that recalls Luther’s notion of incurvatus in se, Heidegger often 
pictures Dasein as ‘anything but free: it “ensnares itself”, is “lost”, “alienated,” and 
needs to be “liberated”’ (Han-Pile 2013: 291): Dasein’s existence is defined by 
possibility, but Dasein, for the most part, falls into and is ensnared by the conventional 
postures of Das Man. Thus, there is a puzzle inherent in Heidegger’s conception of 
Dasein as the kind of being that must be free, yet where his phenomenological analyses 
show Dasein to be unfree: how can Dasein realize the freedom that defines its mode 
of being? 
 In order to solve this puzzle, Han-Pile focuses on Heidegger’s perplexing 
notion of the ‘choice to choose oneself’ as providing the key to understanding how 
Dasein’s freedom is realized. The choice to choose oneself, which is closely related to 
the possibility of authenticity, is described by Han-Pile as the ‘transparent self-
ascription of responsibility’ (Han-Pile 2013: 301) whereby 
Dasein is called to realize that although…projection is not fully under its 
control, it is not either something that simply happens to it…[E]ven though 
[Dasein] is aware that it does not have full control over its projection, Dasein 
is still prepared to own up to it. This means, inter alia, that it is still prepared 
to take the negative consequences of its pressing ahead into the possibility (if 
any) as consequences rather than accidents that befall it and about which it 
could complain…Such pre-reflective moral appropriation, in turn, transforms 
the meaning of Dasein’s comportment: its very pressing ahead into the 
relevant possibility becomes the implicit endorsement of its responsibility for 
doing so. (Han-Pile 2013: 310) 
In other words, choosing to choose oneself involves a mode of Dasein’s 
comportment in relation to its existence as that which, in its finitude, has to project 
into particular possibilities and, thus, foreclose on others that owns up to or takes 
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responsibility for its existence – despite, or, perhaps, in light of, the fact that Dasein’s 
projection is not fully in its hands.  
How, then, is this choice to choose made? Han-Pile notes that, as Heidegger 
describes it, the choice to choose oneself cannot be understood in ‘voluntaristic’ terms 
as a ‘rationalistic model of decision-making’ nor can it be understood as a ‘primordial 
act of willing.’ Rather, for Heidegger the choice to choose oneself is characterized in 
terms of Dasein ‘understandingly letting itself be called forth’ (SZ: 287) by what he 
terms the ‘call of conscience:’27 the possibility of choosing to choose oneself is 
dependent on Dasein’s hearing the call of conscience. But, crucially, hearing the call of 
conscience is not fully in the power of Dasein. Thus, on Han-Pile’s reading, there 
seems be a significant degree of passivity integrated into the choice to choose oneself: 
the choice, Han-Pile suggests, is ‘halfway between possession and abandonment 
(‘letting oneself’);’ it ‘seems made in me almost as much as by me’ (Han-Pile 2013: 308). 
And the important sense of passivity integrated in the choice to choose oneself, for 
Han-Pile, can best be understood in terms of a medio-passive conception of agency: 
‘ultimately, hearing the call [of conscience] is not up to me: yet I can take some 
responsibility for doing so in the sense that unless I try to attune myself in the right 
way it may never be heard at all’ (Han-Pile 2013: 309).  
                                                          
27 According to Mark Wrathall and Max Murphey, ‘conscience “shows” me myself, directs me to my 
own factical basis for decision, and not only enables authenticity but “demands it” of me…[The call of 
conscience] articulates the situation within which I find myself, and draws my attention to certain 
definite features of that situation…’’ (2013: 27). An obvious modification to be made to this definition 
from a Løgstrupian perspective would be to say that the other person is the source of the call of 
conscience. As Han-Pile interprets it, hearing the call of conscience ‘does not enable Dasein to give 
itself its own laws nor to have full control over itself or its life – it does not make it autonomous. On 
the contrary, it reveals the vacuity of the rationalist ideal of absolute self-mastery and the pernicious 
way it denies the constraints of finitude by blinding us to the medio-passive character of some of the 
most important aspects of our lives. It shows that Dasein needs to give up on freedom as total control 
to realize that, in Freud’s words, it is not the master in its own house and needs the call of conscience 
that brings the choice home to it. Yet by developing its receptivity to the pull of possibilities that 
cannot be disclosed without a greater degree of ontological transparency, the double choice gives 
Dasein more Spielraum, more room to manoeuvre’ (Han-Pile 2013: 312).  
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In sum, Heidegger’s notion of the choice to choose oneself is expressive of a 
medio-passive mode of agency insofar as it consists in an existential modification of 
Dasein’s mode of comporting itself in relation to its finitude in such a way that owns 
up to its finitude. That is, it is a way of comporting itself transparently in relation to its 
existence as a thrown project fallen into the world (see §2). Importantly, this mode of 
comportment is not something that Dasein can straightforwardly do, rather it is 
dependent on the hearing of the ‘call of conscience.’ And the medio-passive dimension 
of the choice to choose oneself consists in the fact that it integrates this sense of 
passivity in the way in which it comports itself to itself, viz. letting oneself be called 
forth.  
Clear parallels can be seen between Heidegger’s notion of what it is to 
transparently ascribe responsibility to oneself in making the choice to choose oneself, 
at least on Han-Pile’s reading, and Løgstrup’s notion of the ‘spontaneous decision’ to 
surrender oneself to the sovereign expressions of life.28 As an initial point, it is worth 
noting Han-Pile’s description of the choice to choose oneself as being an existential 
modification of a ‘pre-reflective’ mode of comportment.29 With this designation, Han-
                                                          
28 Indeed, we can add that there are significant parallels between Heidegger’s notion of the choice to 
choose oneself and Kierkegaard’s ontology of the self, as Han-Pile herself points out: for instance, 
both are centrally concerned with a notion of choice as transformative self-relation. However, Han-
Pile also notes that there are significant differences between Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s 
respective construals of this choice. One of which is Heidegger’s doubling up of the choice as a choice 
to choose. Another is the theological presuppositions underlying Kierkegaard’s conception. On this 
latter point, Kosch notes that: ‘Although Kierkegaard clearly intends this claim as one about the 
relation of human beings to their divine creator, the phenomenological fact that is its basis can be 
taken (as Heidegger and Sartre take it) as brute. What the condition means is just that the self has 
some degree of power over what it is or will become, but not over the fact that it is, nor over that it 
has the sort of structure which gives it power over what it will become’ (Kosch 2006: 203). In this 
relation, we might venture the thought that Løgstrup can be seen to lie somewhere between 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger: on the one hand, the reflexive self relation Løgstrup describes is a 
relation to an ‘outside’ source of norms that define its being and orient it in a particular way, and is, 
thus, not merely ‘brute,’ as with Heidegger. Yet, on the other hand, this outside source of norms, 
whilst ‘suggesting a religious interpretation’ is not theistic, but ontological.  
29 In a separate paper, Han-Pile defines ‘pre-reflective’ as denoting that ‘the content of the awareness 
[that] while not immediately available to the agent, is not hidden from her either’ (Han-Pile: 
forthcoming). She continues: ‘by analogy, in standard conditions we are not (or very marginally) 
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Pile signals that the choice to choose oneself is not to be understood in terms of a 
‘stepping back’ and thematically reflecting on one’s existence. Rather, plausibly, in 
using this term, Han-Pile has a Heideggerian notion of reflection in mind. In an oft-
quoted passage from Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger writes that 
The way in which the self is unveiled to itself in the factical Dasein can…be 
fittingly called reflection, except that we must not take this expression to mean 
what is commonly meant by it – the ego bent around backward starting at 
itself – but an interconnection such as is manifested in the optical meaning of 
the term “reflection”. To reflect means, in the optical context, to break at 
something, to radiate back from there, to show itself in a reflection of 
something…[The self] finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, 
tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in 
things. (BP: 158-9) 
In other words, the idea is that in all pre-theoretical comportment my own 
being is reflected back to me whenever I disclose the being of worldly entities. For 
instance, when a philosophy teacher walks into the seminar room, her comportment 
allows the equipment in that room to show up as useful in the particular way that 
serves her goals as an instructor - and so simultaneously reflects back to her, her 
practical self-understanding as a philosophy teacher: in pre-reflective life, the 
disclosure of entities is always self-disclosure.30 Choosing to choose oneself is an 
existential modification of this pre-theoretical mode of comportment, rather than a 
reflective interruption of it:  it means being ‘resolute’ and self-transparent in one’s pre-
theoretical comportment. 
This point is important because it helps us to deflect the potential objection 
that by conceiving of the self in relational terms, we automatically incorporate a form 
of thematic self-reflection into the process of identifying with the sovereign 
expressions of life that is alien to Løgstrup’s ethics. Identifying oneself with the 
                                                          
aware of the perceptual content of our peripheral vision; however, if need be we can refocus on such 
content and bring it to full awareness’ (Han-Pile: forthcoming). 
30 I am indebted to Matt Burch for providing me with this example.  
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sovereign expressions of life does not involve stepping back into self-enclosing 
reflection on oneself and one’s existence – quite the opposite: in pre-reflective life one 
relates to oneself pre-theoretically in one’s dealings with things. Or, to paraphrase 
Løgstrup, we might say that the point of one’s relationship to the sovereign 
expressions of life (and, thus, one’s relation to one’s fundamental interdependence) is 
determined at the point of one’s relation to the other. What is at stake is the way in 
which one’s pre-reflective or pre-theoretical comportment towards entities 
(Heidegger) or others (Løgstrup) is modified.  
An even more significant parallel, however, can be seen in the way that both 
Heidegger and Løgstrup start with the problem that whilst at a certain level human 
existence is defined by freedom – indeed, Løgstrup refers to the sovereign expressions 
of life as being expressive of the ‘freedom of existence’ (BED: 67) - their 
phenomenological analyses show the self to be for the most part ‘alienated’ from this 
freedom in ‘inauthenticity’ (for Heidegger) or inturnedness (for Løgstrup).31 Given 
this, what Han-Pile’s medio-passive analysis of Heidegger helps us to see is a way that 
agency can be seen to participate in the ‘transition’ from inauthenticity or 
inturnedness to authenticity or ‘truth,’ namely, through a medio-passive mode of 
comportment. Crucially the notion of medio-passive agency captures the sense in 
which the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity involves a choice, and is thus 
related to agency, but that this choice is qualified by a significant element of passivity; 
the substance of the choice is a medio-passive dependency on hearing the call of 
conscience. The medio-passive mode of agency described by Han-Pile here, then, 
looks initially promising as a way of conceiving of a mode of agency compatible with 
the realization of the sovereign expressions of life. 
                                                          
31 For a further discussion on the self’s freedom with respect to the sovereign expressions of life see 
§5. 
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 Yet, it might be objected that the medio-passive conception of agency as a 
choice to choose remains too active to be compatible with Løgstrup’s commitment to 
Human Wickedness. As Stern has argued,  
[I]f we now allow Løgstrup to be understood in this [medio-passive] 
manner, there is a worry that it would compromise his commitment to the 
model of human wickedness with which we began, and which he seems to 
inherit from Luther: namely that ‘nothing can be subtracted from the 
wickedness of man. The self brings everything under the power of selfishness. 
Man’s will is bound in this’ [ED: 141, translation modified by Stern]. For, if 
we take this claim seriously, how can the self or the will surrender itself to the 
sovereign expressions of life, which break through its selfishness? (Stern: 
forthcoming) 
In other words, the worry is that insofar as medio-passive agency might be 
seen to in some way rest on the thought that the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life is in some way dependent on or initiated by the inturned self’s 
surrendering itself, where this then allows that the self is justified in taking some 
credit for realizing the sovereign expressions of life, then the sovereign expressions 
of life will ipso facto be corrupted and distorted. Han-Pile’s remark that ‘I can take 
some responsibility…in the sense that unless I try to attune myself in the right way 
it may never be heard at all’ perhaps encourages this kind of worry with respect to 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology.  
In response, however, it must firstly be observed that the quote Stern appeals 
to here is taken from Løgstrup’s earlier construal of human wickedness in The Ethical 
Demand. And, as Løgstrup himself admits, his position on human wickedness altered 
in his latter writings on the sovereign expressions of life. As we have seen, in part 
thanks to the split-self view itself, the way in which Løgstrup’s construal of human 
wickedness changed is in allowing for a ‘true’ self capable of performing the good 
works of the sovereign expressions of life. Given this, we are compelled to ask: in what 
way is the ‘true’ self involved in the performance of good works? And this is the 
question I am seeking to answer in terms of a broadly Kierkegaardian account of the 
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structural characteristics of human agency. Stern’s objection, I submit, rests on the 
assumption that it is the inturned self that surrenders, where this seems to be linked 
to the idea of a substantive self in a state or condition of inturnedness that, as it were, 
lies behind surrendering considered as an action. By contrast, on the view shared by 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and, I would argue, Løgstrup, the self is conceived in modal 
terms as an ongoing process of becoming. A crucial implication of this is that the 
inturned self and the true self are seen as modes of being a self rather than as states or 
conditions of an entity. On the interpretation I am prosecuting, then, the inturned 
mode of being a self just is a function of one’s not surrendering to the expressions of 
life but rather asserting oneself in relation to them. And, conversely, the mode of being 
a true self just is to come into identity with the sovereign expressions of life by 
comporting oneself surrenderingly in relation to them, as we might put it. So it is not 
the case that the inturned self surrenders and, thus, becomes a true self, but rather that 
what it is to realize one’s true self is to comport oneself surrenderingly in the 
encounter with the other.32  
Even so, it might still be objected that the medio-passive mode of agency 
presented here places too much initiative in the hands of the self in the realization of 
the sovereign expressions of life, where Løgstrup is keen to emphasize that the 
sovereign expressions of life ‘overwhelm’ or ‘overmaster’ the self. In order to respond 
to this worry, it is important to further clarify the specific configuration of activity 
and passivity at play in the medio-passive mode of agency. With this agenda in mind, 
                                                          
32 Daniel Watts has captured this difficult thought well in his discussion of Kierkegaard’s ‘theory of the 
leap’ as a way ‘in which a new capacity seems to be acquired only through its very exercise’ (Watts 
2017a: 11). The point is that surrendering is not a preparatory move made by the inturned self, a la 
religiousness A, but rather the seemingly ‘spontaneous’ realization of one’s true self in the way one 
responds to a situation. 
199 
 
I will turn to Béatrice Han-Pile’s reconfigured conception of medio-passive agency in 
her recent paper ‘Hope and Agency.’  
In the paper, Han-Pile defines medio-passive agency as descriptive of those 
cases in which ‘…an agent responds to an experience of agential limitation in a 
manner that integrates this experience as presently ineliminable, and acts without 
trying to assert control’ (Han-Pile: forthcoming). Or, stated differently, medio-passive 
agency describes cases where ‘…agents can only act if they understand themselves as 
also passive in the acting itself: their acting integrates the perceived agential limitation 
into their agency’ (Han-Pile: forthcoming). Elaborating on this definition, Han-Pile 
delineates three defining moments of medio-passive agency: (1) medio-passive agency 
describes cases in which one understands oneself to be responding to a situation, rather 
than simply being causally moved; (2) the way in which the agent responds in such 
cases is best described as ‘letting go,’ which Han-Pile characterizes negatively as a 
refraining from trying to assert oneself or take control of the situation; (3) this ‘letting 
go,’ however, is experienced as forcing itself on the agent, given their agential 
limitation in relation to the situation. Han-Pile appeals here to Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of a ‘motive’ in further defining this experience of ‘having to let go,’ where a 
‘motive’ ‘…is neither a reason nor a cause: it picks out the manner in which our body 
influences how we experience and respond to the solicitations of the world’ (Wrathall 
2005: 113). In other words, a ‘motive’ describes the way in which responses are 
experienced as being ‘drawn out’ of the agent in virtue of ‘the way our environment 
and body work together to dispose us to particular ways of acting and experiencing’ 
(Wrathall 2005: 121).  
Han-Pile develops this conception of medio-passive agency with experiences 
of powerlessness in mind. Thus, her leading example of medio-passive agency is the 
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‘strong hope’ shown by a sufferer of a severe illness. In this respect, Han-Pile’s 
conception speaks to a different kind of case than the kind of case Løgstrup has in 
mind with the sovereign expressions of life. Moreover, whereas Han-Pile emphasizes 
the role of the body as a motive in her discussion, as far as I am aware Løgstrup pays 
little attention to the body in his phenomenology. Nonetheless, Han-Pile’s emphasis 
on the experience of agential limitation in her definition of medio-passive agency as a 
mode of agency that integrates this experience of passivity into the acting itself is 
instructive. For it helps us to elucidate the following distinction. What is distinctive 
about surrendering in contrast to other, more active, modes of agential comportment 
is precisely the sense of agential limitation it evokes. Surrendering to the sovereign 
expressions of life is not the same as taking up an incentive as a principle for action. 
Nor is it the same as - perhaps akratically – giving in to a desire to drink more coffee, 
for instance. Rather, it describes an experience of feeling as if one has no choice but to X, 
where this experience of agential limitation is integrated into the acting itself. One is 
reminded of Luther’s – perhaps apocryphal - cry: ‘Here I stand; I can do no other!’ 
More positively, we might think of the phenomenology of love, where it is natural to 
suppose that letting oneself fall in love is expressive of one’s having made a choice or 
a commitment - there is always the possibility of resisting one’s love - but that, first 
personally, there is a sense of inexorability involved in the process of falling in love. 
As with Heidegger’s choice to choose, falling in love is, arguably, experienced as a 
choice made in me rather than by me.33  
In relation to Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, we can readily see how this 
experience of agential limitation plays out in the face-to-face encounter. Recall my 
                                                          
33 Alternatively, perhaps more in keeping with Løgstrup’s focus on the other, we might think of the 
modality of this decision along Derridean lines as ‘the other’s decision in me,’ which Derrida describes 
as a ‘passive decision…of the absolutely other in me, of the other as the absolute who decides of me 
in me’ (Derrida, quoted in Critchley 1999: 263). 
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discussion in chapter two: on Løgstrup’s view, the presence of the other breaks down 
one’s pictures and theories; the other overflows or escapes categorization within one’s 
conceptual scheme. There are different ways that we can respond to this kind of 
encounter: we can try to cling on to our pictures, theories and concepts in attempting 
to reduce the other we encounter to a caricature, or we can let go of our pictures, 
theories and concepts. On Løgstrup’s view, clinging on to our pictures, theories and 
concepts is something we can actively try to do, but letting go of them is not: the 
possibility of letting go of or surrendering our attachment to our pictures, theories 
and concepts depends on our being called into question in the face-to-face encounter, 
which is experienced as overwhelming or encompassing. Yet, this is not to say that 
letting go of or surrendering our pictures, theories and concepts in the encounter with 
the other is something in relation to which the self qua agent is entirely passive. 
Rather, on a medio-passive conception, agency is expressed in the way that the self 
comports itself in relation to experiences of ineliminable agential limitation: rather 
than trying to actively assert oneself in the face of such experiences, the medio-passive 
agent integrates those experiences in the way they act. In a word, the agency involved 
in the true self’s realization of the sovereign expressions of life and their good works 
can be captured in terms of an existential modification of one’s mode of comporting 
oneself in the face-to-face encounter, whereby in comporting oneself surrenderingly 
(rather than self-assertively) in that encounter, one thereby integrates one’s perceived 
agential limitations within the overwhelming, encompassing encounter in the way 
one responds to it.  
To sum up, in this section I have presented the medio-passive conception of 
agency as it has been developed in the work of Han-Pile. In the process, I have 
attempted show its applicability to Løgstrup’s notion of surrender and to deflect some 
obvious objections to this interpretive move. In what follows, I will take an overview: 
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drawing on my discussion here, as well as my discussion in 4.3., I will present a 
consolidated picture of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology in terms of a medio-passive 
conception of agency.  
4.4.2. The Self, the Sovereign Expressions of Life and Medio-Passive Agency 
In this section, my aim is to bring together my argument concerning 
Løgstrup’s conception of the self and my discussion of medio-passive agency in 
presenting a medio-passive agency as a mode of agency that is compatible with 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. A good starting point here is to recall the 
ambiguities with which I began the chapter, namely, the ambiguities concerning the 
nature and conception of the ‘two’ selves operative in Løgstrup’s later 
phenomenology, and their respective relations to the sovereign expressions of life and 
the other. In parsing these conceptions and relations, I have, firstly, sought to avoid 
the potential ‘mysticism’ associated with granting the sovereign expressions of life 
themselves a quasi-agential status and, secondly, I have sought to avoid leaving the 
operations of the two selves in relation to the other and the sovereign expressions of 
life ‘mysterious.’ The way that I have attempted to clarify these two ambiguities is to 
argue for an account of the structural features of moral agency compatible with 
Løgstrup’s commitments to Immediacy and Human Wickedness, viz. a medio-passive 
mode of agency.  
The first argumentative move I made in this regard was to suggest that 
Løgstrup’s conception of the self can be fruitfully understood in broadly 
Kierkegaardian terms as a reflexive self relation. Like Kierkegaard, for Løgstrup this 
reflexive self relation involves relating to an ‘outside source of norms’ or a ‘power that 
established it.’ Unlike Kierkegaard, however, for Løgstrup, this ‘outside’ source of 
norms is not (straightforwardly) God, but rather the fundamental ontological fact of 
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human interdependence as disclosed by the sovereign expressions of life. There are 
two significant upshots from this. Firstly, as I have argued in chapter two, the 
sovereign expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions ‘constitute’ the way in which 
the other shows up to the self in the face-to-face encounter as the other that they are. 
That is, the sovereign expressions of life, in their latent presence, frame the self’s 
encounter with the other in such a way that one’s encounter with the other is always 
already oriented in a particular way: the other shows up as mattering to the self in a 
way that, say, ‘entities’ do not. Secondly, as Løgstrup’s emphasis on the basicness of 
interdependence to human existence suggests, the reflexive self relation, for Løgstrup, 
is not ‘won’ by the self by abstracting from worldly and seemingly relative relations 
with others, but rather the self’s self relation is determined at the point of the self’s 
relation to the other.  
The second argumentative move I have made is to suggest that, given my 
observations concerning Løgstrup’s conception of the self, it is plausible to think that 
there are two structural possibilities available to the Løgstrupian self: either turning 
towards one’s fundamentally interdependent existence by identifying with the 
sovereign expressions of life or, conversely, turning away from one’s existence in 
inturnedness. The question that naturally arises in light of this interpretation is the 
following. What role, if any, does the self play qua agent in effecting its mode of being 
a self? Answering this question is a delicate matter for, on the one hand, if it is argued 
that the self qua agent plays no role in this process, then we risk courting the above-
mentioned worries of mysteriousness and mysticism. Yet, given Løgstrup’s 
commitments to Immediacy and Human Wickedness, it seems that any form of agency 
that could be seen to fall under the description of self-regulating, self-governing 
activity must be rejected. Is there a way to navigate between these two eventualities? 
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By focusing on Løgstrup’s use of terms such as ‘surrender’ in his descriptions 
of what it is to realize one’s true self in the sovereign expressions of life, I have argued 
that Løgstrup’s phenomenology of ethical comportment can be seen to be compatible 
with a medio-passive mode of agency. According to this interpretation, the true self 
can be seen to participate or be involved in the realization of a process or action called 
forth in the encompassing or overwhelming encounter with the other by integrating 
this experience of agential limitation, this experience of feeling as if one has no choice 
but to X, in the way responds to the other and their situation. In this relation, the self 
has a primitive awareness of itself as an agent and, thus, as not simply being causally 
moved. But this awareness integrates both an experience of passivity in the face of a 
situation that is felt as encompassing and overwhelming, as well as an experience of 
(inter)dependency in that, in the encounter the self confronts the inadequacy of its 
pictures, theories and moral rules which, thus, discloses its dependence on an ‘outside’ 
source of norms for its capacity to act well, in the way that the self responds to the 
other and their situation. To use Ferreira’s phrase, this mode of agency is well 
expressed in terms of a ‘captivating yet free engagement’ whereby the self is, in a 
sense, captivated by the other and their situation – the self is drawn to the other and 
their situation. But through its way of comporting itself in relation to this captivation, 
viz. surrendering, the self is freed up to respond ‘spontaneously’ to the other and their 
situation.34 By contrast, the inturned self attempts to actively re-assert itself in its 
                                                          
34 Arguably, this is one way of fleshing out Løgstrup’s idiosyncratic definition of ‘spontaneity’ as 
meaning ‘what persons do, they do in accordance with the nature of things and of their own accord. 
In other words, what persons do spontaneously they do unconstrainedly and without ulterior 
motives’ (BED: 85). On this view, Løgstrup’s use of the term ‘spontaneity’ parallels Luther’s 
understanding of the will. As J. Packer and O.R. Johnston put Luther’s view, in their introduction to 
The Bondage of the Will, ‘human actions are genuinely spontaneous, and authentically express each 
man’s nature, for God works in all things according to their nature; but the fact that it is God who 
works all man’s works in him means that human action can never be independent of God in the sense 
required for it to acquire merit…Man cannot put God in his debt because man does not stand apart 
from God as a free independent agent. Luther thus undercuts the whole conception of merit by 
affirming the direct sovereignty of God’ (Packer and Johnston 1957: 51). By analogy, in surrendering 
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encounter with the other, perhaps by re-asserting its pictures, theories and moral 
principles, thereby cutting itself off from the immediacy of the encounter (the despair 
of defiance), or else by sinking back into ‘encircling’ and paralyzing self-reflection (the 
despair of weakness).  
Is this construal of moral agency compatible with the two core aspects of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, Immediacy and Human Wickedness? With respect 
to Immediacy, what I have tried to stress in my characterization of medio-passive 
agency is that the mode of being a true self surrenderingly in the ethical encounter with 
the other precisely involves a letting go of one’s attempts to subsume the ethical 
encounter with the other under one’s mediating pictures, theories and concepts: it is 
a way of responding to the experience of having one’s pictures, theories and concepts 
put into question by the other’s living vulnerability that does not try to re-assert 
oneself in the encounter. Rather, the self that surrenders to the sovereign expressions 
of life in the encounter with the other lets the other and their living vulnerability ‘hold 
sway.’ Moreover, I have tried to block the worry that by conceiving of the medio-
passive mode of agency in terms of a reflexive relation of the self, I surreptitiously 
import a form of ‘encircling’ self-reflection into my interpretation of Løgstrup that is 
alien to his thought. In contrast to Løgstrup’s Kierkegaard, Løgstrup’s self does not 
become a true self in identifying itself with the sovereign expressions of life by dying 
to immediacy and engaging in religious reflection. Rather, the mode of agency I have 
developed in relation to Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is what we might refer to 
as a decentred mode of agency: the self’s relation to the sovereign expressions of life – 
                                                          
to the sovereign expressions of life, the self is acting spontaneously in the sense that its actions are an 
expression of its will, but its actions are also expressive of its having come into identity with the 
sovereign expressions of life that are definitive of its existence. I discuss this further in §5.  
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the ‘outside source of norms’ definitive of its existence – is determined at the point of 
its relation to the other.  
As concerns Human Wickedness, in my account of medio-passive agency I 
have tried to emphasize that the process of coming into identity with the sovereign 
expressions of life is not the product of a self-governing choice; it is not the product 
of deliberate effort. Rather, it is a mode of agency that precisely integrates an 
experience of having one’s autonomy called in to question in the way that the agent 
responds to the other and their situation. In developing this point, I also deflected the 
objection that by allowing that the self plays some – any – role in the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life and their good works, the self will irrepressibly claim the 
sovereign expression of life as its own achievement, thus corrupting and distorting 
them. For what is distinctive about the medio-passive mode of agency is that it 
constitutively involves an awareness – however pre-reflective and un-thematic – on the 
part of the agent of their agential limitation and passivity with respect to their 
encounter with the other. Thus, in comporting oneself surrenderingly one’s agency is 
ipso facto expressive of an awareness that one’s ability to respond to the other and their 
needs is dependent on factors outside of one’s control.    
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is 
compatible with a medio-passive mode of agency, where this constitutes my answer 
to the question of moral agency for Løgstrup’s ethics. I have argued, firstly, that 
Løgstrup’s conception of the self can be fruitfully read in terms of a broadly 
Kierkegaardian relational conception of the self. On this view, the ‘true’ self and the 
‘inturned’ self reflect two different modes of being a self; the former is a mode of being 
a self that transparently comes into identity with its existence as fundamentally 
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interdependent, the latter is a mode of being a self that tries to assert its own 
independence, as manifest in various forms of selfishness. Secondly, I have suggested 
that by interpreting Løgstrup in this way, we are able to see a possibility for a 
conception of moral agency that is compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. 
More precisely, I have focused on Løgstrup’s use of terms such as ‘surrender’ in 
describing what it is to come into identity with the sovereign expressions of life, 
arguing, in light of this, that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is compatible with a 
medio-passive mode of agency. Whilst, in my discussion, I have tried to deflect some 
obvious objections to my account of Løgstrupian moral agency, many questions 
remain concerning (1) the overall plausibility of my construal of Løgstrupian moral 
agency and (2) whether my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency is genuinely 
compatible with Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. I will take up these questions in 
defending my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency in the next and final chapter.  
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5. Defending Løgstrupian Moral Agency: Between Radical 
Passivity and Moral Negativism 
In this concluding chapter, my aim is to clarify and defend my medio-passive 
interpretation of Løgstrupian moral agency against some likely criticisms. I shall 
frame my discussion with two basic questions: is my construal of Løgstrupian moral 
agency plausible as a conception of moral agency? And: what, if anything, is genuinely 
distinctive about the Løgstrupian conception of moral agency as I have construed it? 
These two questions are designed to stand in dialectical tension with one another: in 
defending my conception of Løgstrupian moral agency against charges of 
implausibility, I risk courting objections that I am deflating the distinctiveness of 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, and vice versa. My aim is to employ this dialectic in 
a productive way as a means of clarifying and defending my conception of Løgstrupian 
moral agency. 
I will begin the dialectic, in section 5.1., by providing a précis of my conception 
of Løgstrupian agency. I will focus on showing how Løgstrup’s phenomenology of 
moral comportment can be seen to provide a structural account of moral agency that 
can compete with the two core features of the standard view as defined in chapter one, 
where immediacy can be contrasted with self-regulation (F1) and surrender with self-
governance (F2). I will then appeal to a case study in order to illustrate how the 
Løgstrupian conception of moral agency can plausibly account for certain cases of 
moral action that cannot easily be accommodated by the standard view.  
In section 5.2., I will make a second step in the dialectic by raising the charge 
that the structural isomorphism drawn between my construal of Løgstrupian moral 
agency and the standard view in 5.1. in fact reveals that my construal of Løgstrupian 
moral agency has failed to capture the radical distinctiveness of Løgstrup’s moral 
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phenomenology. More specifically, the objection here will be that my conception of 
Løgstrupian moral agency remains too active and that it fails to take seriously the 
radical passivity of the self in relation to the other as implied by Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology. I shall frame this objection in terms of a Levinas-style objection, 
where my aim will be to defend the distinctiveness of my conception of Løgstrupian 
moral agency not only in relation to the standard view, but also against a comparator 
who can be seen as holding a non-standard conception of moral agency that is in some 
ways similar to Løgstrup’s.  
In a similar vein, in 5.3., I will raise what I shall call an Adorno-style objection 
to my Løgstrupian conception of moral agency. This objection will take the dialectic 
a step further: that is, in countenancing my response to the Levinas-style objection, it 
will contend that my conception of Løgstrupian moral agency ends up being too passive 
to count as a plausible conception of moral agency. I shall attempt to resolve this 
worry by clarifying the notion of surrender at the core of my construal of Løgstrupian 
moral agency, focusing on how it captures a plausible sense of agency whilst being 
genuinely distinct from the standard view. In concluding the chapter, I shall gesture 
towards an area of Løgstrup’s philosophy that requires further investigation, namely, 
Løgstrup’s conception of life. 
5.1. Is Løgstrupian Moral Agency Plausible?  
The central task of this thesis has been to investigate what, if any, plausible 
conception of moral agency is compatible with Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral 
comportment. This question arises out of Løgstrup’s rejection of the two features (F1 
and F2) that constitute the core of a wide variety of different conceptions of moral 
agency as being able to account for a class of moral actions central to his moral 
phenomenology, viz. spontaneous moral actions or good works. On the premise that 
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all moral actions require a moral agent (Premise1), I raised the question of moral 
agency for Løgstrup’s ethics: if the standard view of moral agency cannot 
accommodate spontaneous moral actions or good works then what, if any, conception 
of moral agency can? In the previous four chapters, I have considered a wide variety 
of possible responses to this question. The response I have sought to defend is that 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment is compatible with a medio-passive 
mode of agency. But is this response plausible? 
Now, I hope that the previous three chapters have served to increase the 
plausibility of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment. And I especially 
hope that my medio-passive construal of Løgstrupian moral agency has illuminated 
the distinctiveness of Løgstrup’s position vis-à-vis the question of moral agency. Here, 
I shall précis my findings from the previous three chapters with the aim of presenting 
an integrated and maximally plausible iteration of my construal of Løgstrupian moral 
agency. In particular, I am concerned to show, firstly, how on my construal Løgstrup’s 
phenomenology of moral comportment can be seen as offering distinctive account of 
moral agency that can compete with the core features of moral agency to that of the 
standard view. This will help clarify the plausibility of Løgstrupian moral agency at 
a formal level as providing a satisfying structural account of moral agency. Secondly, 
I will appeal to an example in illustrating how the Løgstrupian conception of moral 
agency can plausibly account for cases of moral agency that the standard view 
struggles to accommodate. This will increase the phenomenological plausibility of 
Løgstrupian moral agency.  
I began my analysis of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology in chapter two, 
where I proposed a reading of Løgstrup’s sovereign expressions of life as hermeneutic 
conditions. My aim there was to show how Løgstrup’s commitment to Immediacy, 
namely, a mode of interpersonal encounter that is not mediated or regulated by 
211 
 
pictures, theories and moral principles, is compatible with a first-personal experience 
of normative motivation. According to F1, a situation or encounter only gives rise to 
normatively motivating reasons if those reasons have been approved of or endorsed 
according to one’s moral insight. Christine Korsgaard, for instance, holds that ‘[i]f 
we [qua moral agents] find upon reflecting upon the true moral theory that we are 
still inclined to endorse the claims that morality makes on us, then morality will be 
normative’ (Korsgaard 1996: 59-50). By contrast, Løgstrup’s commitment to 
Immediacy is recalcitrant to any form of regulation, approval or endorsement 
according to the agent’s moral insight. Rather, in one’s immediate face-to-face 
encounter with the other one is confronted with a primitive normative claim that 
arises just in virtue of the living vulnerability of the other. One wonders, however, 
whether an implication of Løgstrup’s view is that the agent is simply coerced by the 
other or else given over to heteronomous desires and impulses. I have suggested, in 
response to this, that according to Løgstrup, the agent is not beholden to the wishes 
and desires of the particular persons they encounter nor are they simply enthralled by 
their own impulses for sympathy or pity. Rather, on my interpretation, the sovereign 
expressions of life are existential conditions constitutive of the particular way other’s 
show up in the normatively soliciting way that they do, where it is the living 
vulnerability of the other - to which the sovereign expressions of life give us access - 
rather than one’s moral insight, the wishes of the particular other or one’s sympathetic 
impulses that gives rise to normatively motivating reasons. Thus, Løgstrup’s moral 
phenomenology can be seen to allow for a form of moral awareness, but one that 
differs from those collected under that label F1. 
As I mentioned in chapter one, some variant of (F2) self-governance is often 
implicit in standard construals of F1. According to this feature, the moral agent is seen 
to have the capacity to act on the basis of or in light of one’s moral insight. That is, 
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the moral agent is seen to have ‘volitional powers’ that render her capable of taking 
up a normative reason as her principle or motivating reason for action. Løgstrup, as 
we have seen, is highly sceptical of the valorisation of the will in the standard view. 
Part of Løgstrup’s scepticism here arises as a consequence of his phenomenology of 
ethical comportment: this class of actions called forth by the sovereign expressions of 
life, being spontaneous, cannot be deliberately willed on the basis of one’s approval of 
the normativity of a given incentive for action. Rather, as Patrick Stokes neatly puts 
it, ‘[t]he impetus to moral action must be a spontaneous and non-reflective move to 
fulfil that demand that has as its object not the demand itself but the other who is the 
object of one’s concern’ (Stokes 2016: 145-6). However, more controversially, 
Løgstrup is sceptical of self-governing acts of willing given his Lutheranism. 
According to this dimension of Løgstrup’s thought, the will is ‘in the power’ (ED: 
141) of the self’s inturnedness, where, as a consequence, self-governing wilful activity 
is said to irrepressibly ‘steal’, and thereby corrupt and distort, the original and 
spontaneous impetus for action by, for instance, claiming credit for it as the self’s own 
achievement and as something for which the self deserves merit or, conversely, by 
facetiously trying to talk oneself out of the need to act. Yet, in rejecting self-
governance, we are forced to wonder whether the self that realizes the sovereign 
expressions of life in spontaneous moral action is not simply determined by the 
sovereign expressions of life or the other on Løgstrup’s view, where there thus 
appears to be no conceptual space for a substantive conception of agency at all.  
In response to this worry, I have suggested that the self-governing feature of 
the standard view is matched by Løgstrup’s notion of surrender. It is important to be 
precise in characterizing the notion of surrender. Surrender does not consist, for 
instance, in an active attempt by the inturned self to give up its wilful self-
assertiveness, in the manner of the via purgativa or the Kierkegaardian notion of dying 
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to immediacy, as, on Løgstrup’s view, such attempts will be self-defeating. Rather, the 
surrendering self is one who, in their absorption in encounter with the other, 
integrates their experience of agential limitation and the inadequacy of their pictures 
and theories, and their moral principles and rules in the way they respond to the other 
and their situation: confronted by the other, they feel as if they have to let go of their 
attachment to their pictures, theories and moral principles. And their responsiveness 
to the other and their situation is expressive of the agent’s absorption by the other 
and detached or loosened relation to their pictures and theories. By contrast, the 
inturned self attempts to re-assert control through moralistic reflection, where this 
can manifest in turning a deaf ear to the situation (e.g. ‘It’s not my business’ or; ‘I 
don’t want the situation to be framed in this way’) or in attempting to master the other 
through paternalistic encroachment. Surrendering, then, describes a mode of 
comportment; it is a mode of responding to the other and their situation, rather than 
of being causally moved. But it differs substantively from modes of agency that 
involve a sense of self-regulation and self-governance: the surrendering self does not 
take itself to be the autonomous cause of their actions, nor is their agency expressed 
by a perceived sense of self-restraint. Rather, their agency is expressed in the 
surrendering way that they comport themselves within the encounter with the other 
that absorbs and captivates them. This mode of agency, I have argued, is best 
described as medio-passive.  
In sum, then, on my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency, moral agency is 
not constituted through the self’s deliberative making of choices but rather thorough 
the surrendering self’s coming into identity with its interdependent existence - as 
disclosed by the sovereign expressions of life - in its encounter with the other. At the 
structural level, I have shown that on my construal Løgstrup’s phenomenology of 
moral comportment can be viewed as a plausible and satisfying account of moral 
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agency that can compete with the standard view. But, we might wonder, does this 
Løgstrupian conception of moral agency plausibly depict the way real moral agents – 
the ones we know and strive to be – actually experience their moral agency in the 
world? That is, is the Løgstrupian conception of moral agency phenomenologically 
plausible? Might it be the case that, in the end, the standard view of moral agency 
remains a much more intuitive and plausible description of what the moral agents we 
know are actually like than that described in Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology?  
As a first defensive move, I want to register the fact that the apparent 
plausibility of the standard conception of moral agency is increasingly coming under 
critical scrutiny. In analytic philosophy, the current revival of interest in Iris 
Murdoch’s ethics is a case in point. For part of the growing interest Murdoch lies in 
the way that she brings in to question the emphasis on deliberative choice and 
ratiocinative decision making as accurately reflecting our experience of agency, 
favouring instead what she terms ‘moral vision.’1 More pointedly, we might think of 
recent interventions made by thinkers of a continental background within 
contemporary debates about moral agency. Stephen Crowell, for instance, has taken 
Korsgaard’s conception of moral agency to task for ‘rationalistically distort[ing] the 
phenomenology of action’ (Crowell 2013: 256). According to Crowell, Korsgaard 
conceives of moral agency as being ‘wholly governed by the concept of reflection; by 
the deliberating agent “distanced” from its animal identity’ (Crowell 2013: 256). As 
                                                          
1 C.f. ‘When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their solutions to 
specifiable practical problems, we consider something more elusive which may be called their total 
vision of life, as shown in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of 
others, their conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they 
think funny: in short, the configurations of their thought which show continuously in their reactions 
and conversation. These things, which may be overtly and comprehensively displayed or inwardly 
elaborated and guessed at, constitute what, making different points in two metaphors, one may call 
the texture of man’s being or the nature of his personal vision’ (Murdoch 1997: 80-1). We might also 
think here of Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ argument (see Williams 1981a). 
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such, Korsgaard’s conception of moral agency cannot account for so-called ‘non-
deliberated action,’ since ex hypothesi such action ‘either…must be seen as a reversion 
to mere animal instinct, or the structure of deliberation must be smuggled back into 
it’ (Crowell 2013: 256). The suppressed premise here is that upon reflecting on our 
everyday engagement with the world as agents, so little of it seems to have a 
deliberative structure in a Korsgaardian sense. And it hardly seems accurate to reduce 
this whole diverse sphere of non-deliberated action to animal instinct. Thus arguably, 
the plausibility of the standard view of moral agency is not self-evident.  
Admittedly, some variants of the standard view of moral agency may be less 
susceptible to this kind of criticism. Yet, it is nonetheless instructive to think of 
Løgstrup’s phenomenology of moral comportment as being responsive to the 
contemporary concerns of philosophers such as Crowell who, in the name of 
phenomenological assiduousness, are seeking to understand ‘the kind of subject who 
can be an agent while being absorbed in the world’ (Crowell 2013: 260). Indeed, 
Løgstrup’s avowed mission to account for a ‘third possibility [of moral agency], 
namely, [a] determining [of] the will that is neither purely formal (as is that of 
reason) nor through natural causation (as is that of inclinations)’ (ED: 290) is highly 
germane in this regard.  
Of course, it is a further question as to whether Løgstrup’s account of this 
‘third possibility’ itself is phenomenologically plausible as an account of moral agency. 
One way of establishing this sort of plausibility is through illustration. As is evident 
from our discussion so far, Løgstrup’s writings are replete with illustrations and 
examples taken from literature, the bible and even his experiences during the second 
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world war.2 Here I provide my own. My illustration comes from an interview with 
the comedian Louis C. K. in which he reflects on his experience of becoming a father: 
It was a huge thing for me, because I always thought that life should be poured 
into work and doing what I want to do. […] I’ve always been obsessed with 
the projects I’m doing. […] When I had my daughter – when her mother had 
her in front of me – everything changed. I just fell in love with this kid. 
[…] 
You just don’t know until you see the kid’s face that there’s going to be another 
person with you for the rest of your life. And I didn’t know how that was going 
to feel. But when she came out, it wasn’t about my feelings. […] I didn’t 
understand I had a role in this kid’s life until that moment. And so it became 
about the kid. And she changed everything. I just had huge sympathy for this 
kid…and everything started to flow from that. I mean, I don’t like babies; I’m 
not wired for that. And before I had kids, I was really worried about having 
kids because I don’t like being around babies – I don’t like them. I didn’t feel 
sympathy for babies in the past. I thought it would just be taxing to have 
someone screaming and crying – things that, on paper, you know about being 
a parent; you don’t sleep very much, they get you up in the middle of the 
night…And I was like; ‘I can’t do that.’ […] What I learned was that I could 
do it all: I didn’t mind getting up; I didn’t mind being bleary and sleepy; I 
didn’t mind her screaming and crying because I just had sympathy for her, 
because I wanted her to be OK. […] And all this stuff about my own anxiety 
about my own life just went away…I instantly knew that I was going to get 
old and die and I wasn’t afraid of it anymore, because it’s about her now. It’s 
about giving her a chance to be happy and have her own confidence in her own 
life. That’s what it became about. (Louis C.K., Interview with Marc Maron)  
For our purposes, the focal point of this example is how Louis describes his 
experience of agency in responding to the primitive claim made on him by his infant 
daughter. And the questions arising from this are: is Louis’ responsiveness to his 
daughter a case of moral agency? Or is it, for instance, a manifestation of animal 
instinct? And: if we accept that it is a case of moral agency, how is that agency 
constituted? 
Now, concerning the first question, some may argue that Louis’ 
responsiveness to the needs of his daughter falls outside of the remit of moral agency. 
It might be argued, for instance, that Louis’ responsiveness reflects the hardwired 
                                                          
2 For a discussion of the significance of literature for Løgstrup’s way of thinking about ethics see David 
Bugge (2017).  
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biological instincts of paternity within our species and, thus, is an expression of his 
animal nature rather than moral agency. Yet, it is worth noting that even such a 
steadfast defender of the standard view of moral agency as Korsgaard would likely be 
inclined to see Louis’ responsiveness to his daughter in terms of moral agency. Recall 
in this respect the cases of the Lioness protecting her cubs from a marauding male 
Lion and Jack’s visiting his ailing mother in Chicago contrasted by Korsgaard and 
discussed in chapter one. An implication of Korsgaard’s discussion is that there is 
something morally appraisable about Jack’s actions, qua expressions of human agency, 
that put them above and beyond mere instinctual responsiveness born of his biological 
connection to his mother. Indeed, it is natural for us to suppose that cases such as 
Louis’ and Jack’s are expressive of more than merely biological instinct: we talk, for 
instance, of being a responsible or irresponsible father and of being a good or bad son. 
This is not the place to fully defend the view that Louis’ responsiveness to his 
daughter is a case of moral agency; all I am suggesting is that it is natural and 
plausible to suppose that it is. In accepting this, then, we face the question concerning 
how moral agency is constituted in cases such as Louis’ and Jack’s.  
We have already seen how Korsgaard would respond to this question: 
according to Korsgaard, the reason Jack’s actions are expressive of moral agency lies 
in the claim that the motivational structure prompting Jack’s actions was such that it 
was ‘essentially conscious of its own appropriateness’ (Korsgaard 2008: 214). That is, 
Jack’s actions count as expressions of moral agency on the understanding that Jack 
reflectively endorsed the incentive prompting him to visit his ailing mother as being 
a good and worthy course of action, thus making that incentive efficacious. 
Presumably, a similar kind of interpretation could be applied to Louis. Yet, it seems 
that it is precisely such kinds of analysis that are vulnerable to Crowell-style charges 
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of rationalistic distortion and the smuggling in of a deliberative structure that is, 
arguably, not evident in the examples.  
Like Korsgaard, Løgstrup too would likely consider Louis’ responsiveness to 
the needs of his daughter in ethical terms. Indeed, as we have seen, Løgstrup was keen 
to emphasize the ethical significance of ‘natural’ love and trust, as manifest in familial 
relations. How, then, would a Løgstrupian describe the constitution of moral agency 
in Louis’ case?  
In the first place, a Løgstrupian would draw attention to Louis’ emphasizing 
of the presence of ‘the kind’s face,’ as Louis puts it: the sheer living vulnerability and 
dependency of his infant child drew Louis out of himself and his inturnedness. In 
contrast to a Korsgaardian account, there was no space in Louis’ head from ‘standing 
back,’ reflecting and forming a judgment about how to respond. He was ‘captivated’ 
by his daughter. However, clearly, this is not to say that Louis was simply taken over 
and controlled by his daughter. Rather, his experience of being captivated by his 
daughter was matched by a re-configured sense of his own agency. Consider, in 
relation to this point, Louis’ description of his ‘understanding of life’ prior to becoming 
a father: he previously held the belief that the purpose of life consisted in self-striving; 
in pouring himself into his work and projects. Indeed, it is in relation to this self-
understanding that the prospect of becoming a father was a source of considerable 
anxiety for Louis. He hated the thought that his work and his projects would be 
compromised by fatherhood, and, moreover, he just did not think he had the capacities 
for the kind of selfless care he knew parenthood would require of him. Yet, he did not 
attempt to allay these anxieties by trying to restrain his ego. Nor did he try to 
overcome his anxiety by re-asserting control and integrating his daughter into his 
world-view as another project that he should pour himself into, i.e. the project of being 
a father. Rather, in his encounter with his daughter he was impelled to let go of his 
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understanding of life: his attachment to his projects and his anxieties about his own 
life no longer seemed so important – as Louis puts it, ‘it became about her.’  
On the Løgstrupian view I am defending, then, Louis’ responsiveness to the 
needs of his daughter is expressive of a mode of agency in which the experience of 
having to let go of one’s world-view – one’s pictures, theories and concepts – is 
integrated in one’s understanding of oneself as an agent and, thus, the way one 
responds to the situation as an agent. We might say, in the case of Louis, that in his 
encounter with his daughter his conception of himself as an agent was de-centred; he 
writes that it became ‘about giving her a chance to be happy and have her own 
confidence in her own life.’ These remarks suggest that Louis still saw himself as an 
agent; he was responding to the needs of his daughter rather than being causally moved 
by biological instinct. Yet, to extrapolate, his mode of responsiveness to his daughter 
was expressive of a sensitivity to her as an autonomous living being who cannot 
simply be mastered by theories and concepts. In this respect, Louis’ moral agency was 
constituted through the immediacy of his relation with his daughter – her living 
vulnerability - that challenged Louis’ world-view, where this experience of agential 
limitation and passivity in this encounter was integrated in his mode of responsiveness 
to his daughter.   
5.2. Too Much Activity? A Levinas-style Objection 
In the previous section, I tried to present a picture of my construal of 
Løgstrupian agency such that could be seen to be both philosophically satisfying and 
phenomenologically plausible. In this section, I will consider two likely objections to 
my presentation of Løgstrupian moral agency above. These objections will centre 
around the following major worry: that in making Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
appear compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency, I have reduced the 
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distinctiveness of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. More specifically, in making 
Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology appear compatible with a medio-passive mode of 
moral agency, I have deflated the radical passivity of Løgstrup’s phenomenology of 
moral comportment by smuggling an element of activity back into it. I will draw on 
ideas from the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas in articulating these two objections, since, 
like Løgstrup, Levinas was keen to emphasise the ethical passivity involved in 
encountering the other. In so doing, I hope to show that my interpretation of 
Løgstrupian moral agency is not only genuinely diverse from the standard conception 
of agency, but also how Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology differs from a relevant 
comparator.  
The first of the two objections concerns my construal of the sovereign 
expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions. On my interpretation, the sovereign 
expressions of life are existential conditions constitutive of the way the other shows 
up in their otherness; as making a claim on the self just in virtue of their living 
vulnerability. An obvious Levinas-style objection is this: how can Immediacy ever be 
consistent with the thought that the other’s otherness is ‘constituted’ by the sovereign 
expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions? Are the sovereign expressions of life 
qua hermeneutic conditions not simply another kind of ‘picture’ or ‘theory’ that 
mediates one’s relation with the other? The second of the two objections concerns my 
construal of surrender. The worry here is that on my construal, the sovereign 
expressions of life are only realized if the self surrenders to them, and that, so 
construed, my conception of Løgstrupian moral agency is only superficially diverse 
from the standard conception of moral agency, as it reflects a merely verbal solution 
to the problem of agency rather than a substantive one: the realization of the 
sovereign expressions of life in action appears still to be dependent on the agent’s 
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approval of the normative claim they elicit, where I then seem to have simply replaced 
the word ‘approval’ with the word ‘surrender.’  
The two objections outlined above are interrelated. In order to see why – and 
in order to home in on the targets of these objections more precisely – it is instructive 
to bring Løgstrup into dialogue with a Levinasian perspective.3 An initial point of 
apparent convergence between Løgstrupian and Levinasian approaches to ethics 
consists in the central role they both give to the face-to-face encounter. For Løgstrup 
and Perpich’s Levinas, in the face-to-face encounter, the other’s singular and concrete 
vulnerability makes a normative claim on me that is more primitive than my moral 
concepts and rules. Indeed, the face of the other challenges my very right or entitlement to 
frame the world in terms of those concepts and rules. Thus, on Diane Perpich’s reading, the 
‘fundamental thesis’ broached by Levinas’ discussion of the ‘face’ Totality and Infinity 
‘is the difference between the way in which objects are given to consciousness (the 
order of ontology) and the way in which human beings are encountered (the order of 
ethics)’ (Perpich 2008: 55).4 In essence, this difference is captured as follows: ‘whereas 
the transcendental ego retains its freedom and spontaneity in relation to the objects 
or world that it thinks, the “I” who encounters a face loses its naïve being at home in 
the world and discovers itself bound by the other in ethical responsibility’ (Perpich 
2008: 58). Similarly, as we have seen, for Løgstrup the encounter with the other 
‘breaks down’ and ‘erases’ my pictures and theories in a way that is ‘anterior to all 
                                                          
3 For comparisons of Løgstrup and Levinas, see Bauman (1993, 2007), MacIntyre (2010), Critchley 
(2012), Grøn (2017), Dews (2017), Stern (forthcoming). In what follows, I will draw mostly on Diane 
Perpich’s study of Levinas (Perpich (2008)) in my presentation of the Levinasian perspective.  
4 Levinas’ notion of ‘the face’ is notoriously slippery. However, the following passage from Totality 
and Infinity (2012) captures the basic idea Levinas uses the term face to denote: ‘The face of the 
Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my 
own measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by 
these qualities…it expresses itself. The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to 
contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression: the existent 
breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its “form” the totality of 
its “content,” finally abolishing the distinction between form and content’ (51-2). 
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morality and convention’ (ED: 13) and which ‘forces upon us the alternative: either 
we take care of the other person’s life or we ruin it’ (ED: 18). 
Furthermore, for Levinas, on Perpich’s reading, the logical terminus of this 
approach to ethics is an ‘inverted’ conception of moral agency in the sense that  
[I]f usually one can be held responsible only for actions done voluntarily or 
for events connected to the agent’s agency through the right channels, we are 
told of a responsibility that goes beyond anything I have done or freely 
committed to and of a responsibility for which the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction does not matter…From these inversions Levinas pushes still 
further: responsibility is so far from being an active commitment of a free ego 
that it is a passivity more passive than the passivity of receptivity – receptivity, 
after all, being still a capacity to receive. Responsibility is a passion undergone 
without there yet being anyone who submits to it or undergoes it. (Perpich 
2008: 119-120) 
This statement reflects the so-called ‘radical passivity’ of Levinas’ conception 
of moral agency.5 And it constitutes a logical terminus for a Levinasian approach to 
ethics in that in maintaining that the normativity of the face-to-face encounter is 
anterior to representational intentionality, it follows that the face-to-face encounter 
must be normative for the agent prior to the agent’s commitment to or endorsement 
of the claim made by the other in the face-to-face encounter as being normative. A 
similar view can be attributed to Løgstrup, as we have seen. Namely, that the self is 
passively drawn out of itself by the other when the self is seized by the sovereign 
expressions of life. 
We can now state the two objections iterated above with more precision. On 
my interpretation of the sovereign expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions, it 
might be objected that the sovereign expressions of life are cast as modes of 
                                                          
5 Cf. Levinas: ‘The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my decision. 
The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hitherside of my freedom, from a 
“prior to every memory,” an “ulterior to every accomplishment,” from the non-present par 
excellence, the non-original, the an-archical, prior to or beyond essence. The responsibility for the 
other is the locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question 
“Where?” no longer holds’ (Levinas 2011: 10). 
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representing the other as a vulnerable living being, where the normative claim made 
on the self by the other is then, arguably, no longer primitive but rather constituted 
by a mode of representational intentionality.6 This is the first objection. And the 
second objection is an upshot of the first. For it could be objected that, on my reading, 
representing the other in this way is remains a function of the agent’s activity: the 
other is only represented as a vulnerable living other if the agent ‘lets’ them be 
represented in this way, via surrendering. When viewed in this way, it could be 
argued, firstly, that my construal of Løgstrupian agency is incompatible with 
Løgstrup’s Lutheran presuppositions in that the possibility of realizing the sovereign 
expressions of life is portrayed as being to some degree an achievement of the agent. 
And, secondly, it could be argued that my construal of Løgstrupian agency is only 
superficially different to the standard view, as it represents a merely verbal solution 
to the problem of agency and not at substantive one: I have simply replaced words 
such as ‘approval’ and ‘endorsement’ with ‘surrender.’  
In responding to these objections, I need to clarify what distinguishes the 
sovereign expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions from representational 
intentionality and what distinguishes surrender from notions such as approval and 
reflective endorsement. Pursuant of such clarifications, it is worth briefly noting that 
the Levinasian conception of moral agency in terms of radical passivity is not itself 
unproblematic. Benda Hofmeyr, for instance, wonders ‘whether any moral 
significance can be attributed to radical passivity, if it does not coincide with at least 
                                                          
6 This Levinasian-style objection is certainly exacerbated by my construal of sovereign expressions of 
life along Heideggerian lines as hermeneutic conditions or ‘existentials,’ since the alterity of the Other 
for Levinas consists precisely in its alterity to the horizon of intelligibility that the ‘existentials’ 
purportedly constitute for Heidegger. Thus, Levinas would almost certainly claim that the sovereign 
expressions of life reduce the Other to ‘the Same.’ However, as I hope my following argument shows, 
we have good reason to resist this kind of Levinasian criticism. 
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a minimum of radical freedom, instead of merely incapacitating it’ (Hofmeyr 2009: 28). 
And Simon Critchley, thinking along similar lines, has suggested that  
[W]hat you get in Levinas is a wonderfully rich description of the ethical 
demand, indeed the infinite demand of the other’s face in all its precariousness, 
but no account of the approval that would bind a subject freely to that demand. 
If ethics does not include some dimension of conscious agency, then it risks 
becoming sheer coercion. (Critchley 2015: 88) 
Given these worries concerning the Levinasian view, we can sharpen the 
problem space at issue here. On the one hand, radical passivity looks to be flatly 
incompatible with moral agency and even can be seen to lead to sheer coercion. So, 
this would represent an unsatisfying response to the problem of agency from 
Løgstrup’s ethics. But on the other hand, it seems that by including an element of 
freedom in explaining the self’s relation to the sovereign expressions of life and the 
other we ipso facto deflate his phenomenology. And I wish to retain the distinctiveness 
of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. In this thesis, I have sought to show that, whilst 
Løgstrup is certainly interested in the agent’s passivity in relation to the primitive 
normative claim made on them by the other, he nonetheless has resources to make 
this observation compatible with a plausible conception of moral agency that can, 
thus, avoid the difficulties attending the Levinasian position. 
Stern has proposed a way of marking the difference between the Løgstrupian 
and Levinasian positions by making the following Løgstrupian response to the above-
mentioned worry raised by Critchley: 
It certainly seems right that for a demand to be anything but coercive and 
hence as compatible with their autonomy, the agent who falls under the 
demand must be able to see it as legitimate, and thus conforming to the good 
– but the agent does not have to see it as conforming to their own conception 
of the good conceived of as anything distinct from the good as such, from the 
agent’s perspective. (Stern: forthcoming) 
The distinction Stern is leveraging here is between a model of agency that 
constitutively requires an approval of demand’s legitimacy according to the agent’s 
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conception and representation of the good, and a model of agency whereby the agent, 
having been ‘overcome by the ethical task at hand’ (ibid.), approves of the demand 
according to a more ‘impersonal’ or agent-neutral conception of the good, namely, the 
goodness of life. Thus, as distinct from the Levinasian position, where the agent is 
seemingly coerced by the other, the Løgstrupian position can accommodate the 
premise that some conception of the good is at play in the encounter with the other. 
But rather than that conception of the good being indexed to the self or the particular 
other that they are encountering, it is indexed to life. 
Now, whilst I am in agreement with Stern that moral agency does not require 
that the agent approves of the claims made on her by the other according to her 
conception of the good – and that this certainly isn’t a requirement adopted by 
Løgstrup - I have reservations that the distinction between agent-relative and agent-
neutral conceptions of the good properly captures the distinctiveness of Løgstrup’s 
position. After all, one can imagine a figure such as Korsgaard protesting that having 
an agent-neutral conception of the good just is what it is to be in possession of the 
‘true moral theory,’ as she puts it, where Løgstrup then appears to be closer to 
Korsgaard and, thus, the standard conception of moral agency than initially thought. 
By contrast, what I want to suggest is that what my conception of the sovereign 
expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions allows for is a mode of relating to the 
other that is normatively qualified, and thus not coercive, but that is equally not 
qualified by one’s conception of the good – whether conceived of agent-relatively or 
agent-neutrally. Rather, the sovereign expressions of life open the self up in its 
relation to the other to a sense of normativity that transcends the self’s finite concepts 
and representations of the good. It is a normatively inflected mode of relating to other 
without a determinate conception of the good.  
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Before proceeding to develop this thought, I want to make a caveat. The issue 
under discussion here, namely, whether my conception of sovereign expressions of life 
qua hermeneutic conditions is incompatible with Immediacy, touches not only on 
questions concerning moral agency, but also questions concerning justification, 
questions like: how is the claim made on the agent by the other normatively justified? 
I want to reassert that my aim in this thesis has not been to answer questions of 
justification. What I am interested in here is whether my construal of the sovereign 
expressions of life as hermeneutic conditions implies a sense of agential activity that 
is alien to Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology. However, by framing the issue in this 
way, my aim in this concluding chapter is to begin to probe the question of 
justification for Løgstrup’s ethics as an area for future research.  
With this caveat in place, I will now attempt to flesh out my claim that what is 
distinctive about the expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions is that they allow 
for a receptivity to a primitive normative claim made on the self by the other without 
a determinate conception of the good. In order to do so, I will appeal to two models. I 
take the first model from Johnathan Lear’s book Radical Hope. In the book, Lear offers 
a detailed interpretation of the actions of the Chief of the Crow tribe, Plenty Coups, 
in the face of the collapse of the Crow way of life, viz. his decision to cooperate with 
the American government rather than to fight it. Although Plenty Coups knew that 
such cooperation would change the Crow way of life beyond recognition, he held out 
hope for some unknown good to come. On Lear’s interpretation, Plenty Coups’ 
decision to cooperate is reflective of a kind of reasoning which: 
…acknowledges that one is at some kind of practical horizon without thereby 
trying to peek over it. It is willing to reason into the future while at the same 
time admitting that it has no real conception of the good to work with. It is 
committed to the bare idea that something good will emerge. (Lear 2006: 94) 
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Based on this interpretation, Lear develops a conception of ‘radical hope.’ 
Namely, an orientation towards a future good which transcends one’s finite horizon 
of intelligibility. Thus, Lear: 
[W]hat makes this hope radical is that it is directed towards a future goodness 
that transcends the current ability to understand what it is. Radical hope 
anticipates a good for which those who have the hope as yet lack the 
appropriate concepts with which to understand it. (Lear 2006: 103) 
In other words, radical hope names a mode of being comported in a situation 
of un-certainty and conceptual break-down that, rather than attempting to cling on 
to and re-assert one’s conceptual scheme, or else despondently giving up on the 
possibility of being able to orient oneself within a radically fluctuating situation, holds 
out hope for some unknown good that is yet to crystallize. 
Lear anticipates some objections that placing radical hope in an unknown, 
transcendent good is either surreptitiously theological, in the sense of being messianic 
or eschatological, or else unjustifiably optimistic. He responds to the first worry by 
reasserting that 
The emphasis here is not on some mysterious source of goodness but on the 
limited nature of our finite conceptual resources. This, I think most readers 
agree, is an appropriate response for finite creatures like ourselves. Indeed, it 
seems oddly inappropriate – lacking in understanding of oneself as a finite 
creature – to think that what is good about the world is exhausted by our 
current understanding of it. Even the most strenuously secular readers ought 
to be willing to accept this form of transcendence. (Lear 2006: 121-122) 
Even so, Lear’s conception of radical hope may still face criticisms for being 
unjustifiably optimistic. In response to this worry, Lear argues that the radical hope 
manifested by Plenty Coups contrasts with ‘mere optimism’ to the extent that it 
constitutively involved the virtue of courage. Courage is defined by Lear as an 
excellence in responding to the risks that inevitably attend human existence, where 
according to this definition ‘courage would have to include the ability to live well with 
the risk of conceptual loss’ (Lear 2006: 193). Plenty Coups’ radical hope, then – insofar 
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as it was well deployed – ought to be seen as a manifestation of courage insofar as it 
reflected a phronetic response to the cultural devastation and conceptual loss facing 
the Crow way of life. 
Returning to Løgstrup, this discussion of radical hope can help clarify the 
following thought. The sovereign expressions of life, such as trust, mercy, openness 
of speech and, indeed, hope, can be seen to operate in a way similar to Lear’s notion of 
radical hope: in the encounter with the other, the other calls one’s pictures, theories 
and concepts – including one’s conception of the good – into question. The sovereign 
expressions of life are phenomena through which one can respond to a situation of 
conceptual loss without trying to reassert one’s limited pictures, theories and 
concepts. That is, the sovereign expressions of life designate phenomena through 
which one can orient oneself in relation to a good that one cannot grasp or 
comprehend in terms of one’s existing conceptual scheme. Thus, far from being a form 
of representational intentionality in which one projects a framework of understanding 
on to the other, the sovereign expressions of life are phenomena sensitive to the 
inadequacy of one’s representational intentionality in the encounter with the other.  
Now, clearly there are some important disanalogies between Lear’s notion of 
radical hope and my construal of the sovereign expressions of life as hermeneutic 
conditions. We might observe, firstly, the difference between the situations with 
respect to which Lear develops his notion of radical hope - the experience of facing an 
unknown future in light of cultural devastation – and Løgstrup’s theory of the 
sovereign expressions of life – an encounter with the other. More importantly, 
however, we may note that Lear justifies the moral appraisability of Plenty Coups’ 
agency as an instance of moral agency by appeal to the virtue of courage, where, as we 
have seen, Løgstrup was strident in his criticism of virtue. Thus, we might worry that 
when applied to Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life, Lear’s notion 
229 
 
of radical hope leaves us with one of two conclusions: either the sovereign expressions 
of life a form of unjustifiably optimistic confidence in life’s goodness or else the agent 
still appears to be coerced by the other. I shall return to some of the implications of 
this worry in more detail in the following section. However, in order to further clarify 
the position being argued for here, I will turn to a second model, this time coming 
from a recent article by Daniel Watts entitled ‘Kierkegaard and the Limits of 
Thought.’ 
Watts’ paper is concerned with the philosophical paradoxes generated by 
positing a limit of thought. For our purposes, the interest of Watts’ article lies in his 
delineation of two modes of thinking described in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
authorship, namely, ‘aesthetic-intellectual’ representation and ‘ethico-religious’ 
thinking. Aesthetic-intellectual representation is a mode of representation that is ‘apt 
to sustain an attitude of disinterested contemplation’ (Watts: forthcoming). That is, 
aesthetic-intellectual representation describes a mode of thinking in which the thinker 
thinks ‘about a thought or proposition, as when I think about the thought that just 
crossed my mind.’ (Watts: forthcoming). ‘Ethico-religious’ thinking, by contrast, 
describes a mode of thinking ‘directly…of or about some particular thing as thus-and-
so, as when I think of a particular person as a friend’ (Watts: forthcoming). More 
specifically, Watts writes that 
[I]t is constitutive of ethico-religious thinking to represent certain things 
precisely as such as to resist aesthetic-intellectual representation. It is part and 
parcel of such thinking to represent death, for example, as resisting any image 
or expression or symbol that is apt to sustain disinterested contemplation. 
(Watts: forthcoming) 
Taking thinking about death as paradigmatic of ethico-religious thinking, the 
point is that the ever-present possibility of one’s death ‘challenges us to rethink what 
it means to be human’ (Watts: forthcoming). But it only does so if thought concretely, 
that is, as a matter pertaining directly to your own individual existence; your own 
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‘ethical actuality.’ In this respect, the existential meaning of death defies or resists 
exclusively aesthetic-intellectual abstract representation: to represent death in 
abstracto is to miss the phenomenon. As Watts puts it: ‘the essentially human cannot 
be thought about in a merely abstract way; in this area, one’s thinking must also be 
concrete,’ where ‘to think in the appropriately concrete way in this domain must 
involve trying to delimit the proper domain of disinterested contemplation as such’ 
(Watts: forthcoming). In summarizing, Watts concludes that 
Kierkegaard’s view…does not imply two sorts of entities or ontic realms, the 
thinkable and the unthinkable. Rather, it relies on the idea of two spheres of 
human agency: viz. the aesthetic-intellectual and the ethico-religious. Genuine 
thinking about the essentially human, on this account, involves as it were 
keeping watch over the boundary between the two spheres; making room for 
the ethico-religious by delimiting the aesthetic-intellectual…What this 
means, I take it, is that we should resist any temptation to posit a realm of 
unthinkable things – McDowell’s ‘ineffable in itself’ – but think instead in 
terms of a modality or ‘sphere’ of human comportment, the first-personal 
sphere of an individual’s ‘ethical actuality.’ (Watts: forthcoming) 
The key insight to draw from this for our purposes is that some phenomena 
resist abstract, aesthetic-intellectual representation. One species of this set of 
phenomena concerns the ‘essentially human,’ where to say that the ‘essentially human’ 
resists aesthetic-intellectual representation is not equal to saying that it is unthinkable 
as such. Rather it is to say that it requires concrete thinking about one’s ethical 
actuality, where ethico-religious thinking names a mode of comportment that, in 
delimiting the sphere of aesthetic-intellectual representation, is sensitive to those 
phenomena that resist abstract representation. 
In terms of our discussion of Løgstrup, then, we can make the following 
analogy. The encounter with the other in their concrete otherness resists certain kinds 
of representation. Namely, those that subsume the other and their situation under 
moral principles and rules. However, this is not to say that the other in their otherness 
is recalcitrant to thought or understanding per se – as with Levinasian radical alterity. 
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Rather, relating to the other in their otherness calls for a certain kind of 
understanding; a practical understanding that is sensitive to the fact that the other 
and their situation resist being represented solely in terms of moral principles and 
rules. And the sovereign expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions are existential 
structures that are expressive of this kind of sensitivity. For example, it is plausible 
to think that love involves attending to the beloved in a way that – as Løgstrup 
himself puts it – ‘must necessarily manifest itself in openness’ (ED: 35) in the sense 
that love ‘insists unconditionally on allowing the other person to be a self and to 
remain free’ (ED: 72). Similarly, as suggested in §2, phenomena such as trust and 
mercy can likewise be seen to constitutively involve embracing, rather than trying to 
negate, indeterminacy with respect to the other. In sum, then, the sovereign 
expressions of life qua hermeneutic conditions are not equivalent to forms of 
representational intentionality, such as those captured by the terms ‘picture’ and 
‘theory.’ Rather, they are modes of relating to the other that are sensitive to the way 
that the other and their good transcends one’s capacities for representational 
intentionality.  
How does this clarification help us with respect to the second objection posed 
above? That is, does this clarification of my construal of the sovereign expressions of 
life help disambiguate the notion of ‘surrender’ from notions such as ‘approval’ and 
‘endorsement?’ I have been describing ‘surrender’ as a mode of agency whereby the 
agent integrates their experiences of passivity and agential limitation in the way they 
respond to the other and their situation. The first aspect of this description that we 
can clarify is the nature of the experience of passivity and agential limitation. This 
experience is the experience of being absorbed or captivated by the other and their 
situation. More specifically, it is the experience of being in a situation that resists 
certain kinds of reflection or deliberation; it disarms the agent’s capacity to frame the 
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situation in terms of disinterested rules or principles or even in terms of one’s 
subjective pictures and theories, where this capacity might be construed in terms of 
‘reflective endorsement’ or ‘approval:’ the other’s singular and concrete living 
presence calls any such attempts to take a disinterested stance in relation to them and 
their situation into question. It is in this sense that the realization of the sovereign 
expressions of life in good works can be seen to fall under the purview of Crowell’s 
description of ‘non-deliberated action,’ mentioned above. 
Furthermore, our present discussion helps clarify how my construal of the 
notion of surrender is compatible with the Lutheran presuppositions of Løgstrup’s 
thought. Recall, that Lutheran dimension held that the inturned self is apt to either 
claim credit for its actions as being its own achievement or else resist the claim made 
on them by the other. The surrendering self, by contrast, has integrated her 
experience of agential limitation and passivity in the way she responds to the other 
and their situation. That is to say, the surrendering agent is responsive in a way that 
is expressive of an understanding that her agency is not ‘sovereign;’ that her 
conception of the good is limited; and that she is dependent on the other for the 
constitution of their ability to respond appropriately in the given situation. We might 
say that there is a sense of humility in the surrendering agent’s mode of 
responsiveness, but this humility is not self-wrought, rather it is a humility born of 
having one’s sovereignty decisively brought into question.  
5.3. Too Much Passivity? An Adorno-style Objection 
In this section I will take a further step in the dialectic. That is, I will consider 
some objections to the effect that in my responses to the Levinas-style objections 
above I have rendered my construal of the Løgstrupian agent too passive to count as a 
plausible conception of moral agency. Here I will focus two worries: the first concerns 
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whether my construal of Løgstrupian agency implies irrationalism, the second 
concerns whether the ‘surrendering’ agent, on my conception, is unfree. Following the 
format from the previous section, I will proceed by bringing Løgstrup into dialogue 
with another relevant comparator: Theodor Adorno. In contrast to Levinas, however, 
who has been seen by many to serve as a natural comparator to Løgstrup, Theodor 
Adorno’s philosophical concerns may appear rather remote from Løgstrup’s. Thus, I 
will begin my discussion by noting some central points of contact between the two 
thinkers. As with my discussion of Levinas above, however, my aim here is not to 
provide an exhaustive or extensive comparison. Rather, it is to use resources from the 
Adornian reception in animating some issues and potential problems in Løgstrup’s 
moral phenomenology.  
The first point of contact between the two thinkers is their shared emphasis 
on the importance of the materiality or concreteness of the other – as a living being – 
in the constitution of moral agency. This point comes across most clearly in Adorno’s 
philosophy as part of his polemic against the Kantian notion of a transcendental self. 
On Freyenhagen’s analysis, Adorno asserts contra Kant that ‘initiating an action 
(understood widely to include decision-making) constitutively requires a non-rational 
somatic element (a physical impulse)’ (Freyenhagen 2013: 255).7 And as J. M. 
Bernstein has emphasized, Adorno often describes this somatic element in terms of a 
‘spontaneous’ responsiveness to the suffering of a living other, where, crucially, this 
somatic element is responsive to a non-discursive and non-conceptual sensuous 
                                                          
7 Cf. Adorno: ‘Kant, by allowing no movens of practice but reason, remained under the spell of that 
faded theory against which he devised the primacy of practical reason as a complement. This is what 
ails his entire moral philosophy. The part of action that differs from the pure consciousness which in 
Kant’s eyes compels the action, the part that abruptly leaps out – this is spontaneity, which Kant also 
transplanted into the pure consciousness, lest the constitutive function of the “I think” be imperilled’ 
(Adorno 2007: 229-30). 
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material particularity.8 In the language adopted by Bernstein, this somatic element is 
responsive to the ‘auratic individuality’ of the other as living and thus a fortiori as 
injurable and vulnerable.9 Thus, like Løgstrup, Adorno has been interpreted to place 
emphasis on spontaneous responsiveness to non-discursive vulnerable life as that 
which lies at the heart of ethical action.10 
The second point of contact between the two thinkers concerns the central 
role both give to radical evil or wickedness in their respective conceptions of ethical life. 
As Peter Dews has observed, in Adorno’s philosophy the pervasive and radical evil of 
the world is conceived of as a social category, emerging out of enlightenment 
rationality and the form of industrial capitalism that developed in tandem with it.11 
This historicized diagnosis of evil, of course, contrasts sharply with Løgstrup’s 
theologically inspired phenomenological diagnosis of human wickedness. However, it 
is nonetheless striking how much Adorno’s conception of human evil accords with 
Løgstrup’s own. Dews describes the Adornian conception of evil as follows: 
For Adorno, the self-understanding of the subject…falls prey to illusion when 
subjectivity comes to regard itself as something entirely distinct from the 
                                                          
8 Although I do not have space to develop it here, it strikes me that there is an interesting further 
point of convergence between Løgstrup and Adorno in their respective re-configurations of 
spontaneity as linked to nature or life, and not solely to the operations of the transcendental ego. In 
Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno writes the following on this theme: ‘…there is one further 
factor necessary for practice that is not fully explicable by theory and that is very hard to isolate. And 
I should like to emphasize it because I regard it as fundamental to a definition of the moral. We may 
perhaps best defined it with the term spontaneity, the immediate, active reaction to particular 
situations’ (Adorno 2001: 7). 
9 Cf. Bernstein: ‘The appearing of individuals as lodging claims is the appearing of those individuals as 
possessing animistic auratic individuality. Aura is nothing more than this – the appearing of 
individuals as in their sensuous particularity lodging claims – but equally it is nothing less’ (Bernstein 
2001: 450) 
10 Here I am in agreement with Stern (forthcoming) in claiming that an important difference between 
Levinas, on the one hand, and Løgstrup (and I would add Adorno) on the other is the role a 
conception of life plays in these latter thinkers, where this gives their respective thought a materialist 
– even naturalistic, in a certain qualified uses of these terms – dimension absent in the thought of the 
former. 
11 Cf. Bernstein: ‘The “dialectic of enlightenment” …at least in one of its construals refers to the 
rationalization of reason [and] is thus responsible for the destruction of experience, non-legal-
rational authority, and ethical knowledge, whose joint destruction explains the destruction of auratic 
individuality’ (Bernstein 2001: 76). 
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natural: as immaterial substance, metaphysical monad, self-positing ‘I’, or pure 
pole of transcendental constitution. The subject’s tendency to absolutize itself 
is – in one sense – built into the process of conscious reflection, since there is 
an almost irresistible temptation for the reflective subject to regard the 
experienced world as dependent upon its acts of cognition. Correlatively, the 
conceptual tools that the subject employs in cognizing reality are taken as 
capturing the essence of what is known, whereas concepts in effect shear away 
all the qualities which are irrelevant for self-preservation. It is this process, 
culminating in an unconscious repression of any difference between the 
qualitative ‘diffuseness’ of nature and the realm of conceptualized objects, 
which Adorno refers to as ‘identity thinking.’ (Dews 2013: 189) 
This construal of Adorno’s notion of radical evil accords with Løgstrup’s 
conception of human wickedness in many of its core aspects. Here Adorno is presented 
as defining human evil in terms of a tendency of the self to claim sovereignty over 
itself and the world in a way that would not be out of place in Løgstrup’s writings. 
Indeed, Løgstrup, in commenting on a similar tendency, similarly invokes the 
language of ‘illusion’ in accounting for the self’s proclivity to view the others and the 
world as being value-dependent upon its ‘acts of cognition’ (M1: pp. 70-77). Moreover, 
the Adornian picture presents this tendency to self-assertive illusion as being, in one 
sense, ‘built in’ to the structure of conscious reflection, where, as we saw in chapter 
three, Løgstrup also seems to hold the view that wickedness is built in to certain forms 
of reflection in a similar fashion. Finally, on the Adornian view presented by Dews, 
the pervasiveness of radical evil per force occludes and distorts the individual agents’ 
access to the ‘auratic individuality’ of the other that, as we have seen, is of central 
importance to the Adornian conception of moral agency. We can extrapolate: the 
radical evil of the subject manifests in a ‘shearing away’ of the ‘auratic’ qualities of the 
other which are irrelevant for the self’s ‘self-preservation,’ where this then distorts 
and corrupts the subject’s attempts to relate and respond to the other for their own 
sake. 
With these two points of convergence in view, we can note a further similarity: 
both thinkers are concerned to articulate the possibility of recovering the experience 
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of ‘auratic individuality’ (for Adorno) and a relation to the other in their otherness (for 
Løgstrup) in light of pervasive human wickedness. However, their respective 
approaches to this issue are radically divergent.  
From an Adornian perspective, the possibility of recovering experiences of 
‘auratic individuality’ depends on our capacities to negate the forms of instrumental 
enlightenment rationality that have led us into illusion and cut us off from experiences 
of ‘auratic individuality.’ More specifically, Gordon Finlayson has suggested that, for 
Adorno, what is required in order to recover experiences of ‘auratic individuality’ is 
an ethics of resistance. Finlayson identifies three ‘negative virtues’ proposed by Adorno 
that constitute the core of an Adornian ethics of resistance: Mündigkeit, humility and 
affection.12 Mündigkeit, itself a term taken from Kant, denotes ‘a capacity to take a 
critical stand, but which is also conscious of its own fallibility, and modified by 
continual self-criticism’ (Finlayson 2002: 7). So stated, Mündigkeit might appear to 
denote nothing more than the Kantian petition to Sapere aude! which Kant specifically 
contrasts with a pre-enlightened self-incurred ‘minority’ [Unmündigkeit] (Kant 2008: 
8:35). According to Finlayson, however, Adorno distinguishes his usage of Mündigkeit 
from Kant’s with an appeal to the negative virtue of humility: 
Humility is precisely what keeps Kantian moral autonomy in check, what 
prevents conscience from ossifying into moralistic righteousness and what 
differentiates Mündigkeit from mere rational self-assertion…It is the refusal of 
self-assertion, a refusal which implies the capacity ‘to do justice to what is 
other, won from reflection on one’s own limitations.’ (Finlayson 2002: 7) 
With the addition of humility, then, Finlayson takes Adorno to be distancing 
his ethics of resistance from Kantian autonomy by tempering the rational self-surety 
implied by Mündigkeit in its Kantian usage. The tempering effect of humility is 
                                                          
12 I put the term virtue in scare quotes here since, as Freyenhagen has noted, Adorno regards the 
concept of virtue as ‘obsolete’ (Adorno 2001: 98). However, I retain Finlayson’s designation here for 
the sake of clarity.  
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compounded by ‘affection,’ which Finlayson describes as including a ‘sensitivity to and 
solidarity with others’ vulnerability, a sense of dependence on other things and on 
other people and, above all, a kind of mutuality that is not mediated by exchange, 
reason or self-interest’ (Finlayson 2002: 7). In sum, then, the moral agent as figured 
in Adorno’s moral philosophy is a resisting agent, where moral agency is thought to 
be constituted through the cultivation of the negative virtues aimed living and acting 
less wrongly, where this is achieved through the activity of determinate negation and 
the fostering of a sense of solidarity with others.  
Now, there are clearly points of convergence between an Adornian ‘ethics of 
resistance’ and Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life: for instance, 
both can be seen to involve an affective dimension and a particular kind of orientation 
to one’s own limitations. Yet, Løgstrup would surely be dismissive of the thought that 
the recovery of experiences of ‘auratic individuality’ could be won through critical 
reflection, as Finlayson’s ‘ethics of resistance’ suggests. From a Løgstrupian 
perspective, all attempts to overcome one’s wickedness through the work of self-
renunciation and humility will inevitably ensnare the resisting agent yet further in an 
‘illusory’ self-understanding, as we have seen. Indeed, such attempts might make 
matters worse by leading the resisting agent into a kind of self-reflective paralysis.13 
Rather, on Løgstrup’s Lutheran view, while we needn’t to go to the extremes of a 
Levinasian radical alterity, our chances of relating to the other in their otherness are 
nonetheless radically dependent on the intervention of something extra se, so to speak: 
in the encounter with the other, our illusion of self-sufficiency, the ‘irresistible 
temptation for the reflective subject to regard the experienced world as dependent 
                                                          
13 Indeed, Adorno’s biography may seem to vindicate Løgstrup on this point since, as Freyenhagen 
has noted, Adorno was often criticised of intellectualistic quietism – especially concerning his 
decidedly muted response to the student movement in the 1960s – which would likely be diagnosed 
by Løgstrup in precisely this way (See Freyenhagen (2014)).  
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upon its acts of cognition,’ is broken down as our pictures, theories and concepts are 
put into question by the other in a way would could not accomplish through our own 
efforts. 
An Adornian might object to this Løgstrupian picture, however, as potentially 
signalling a reversion to a form of irrationalism. That is, if, in our encounter with the 
other, our capacity for rational reflection has been interrupted, how could our 
surrender to the claim made on us by the other in that encounter be anything but an 
‘uncritical acceptance of things as what they claim to be’ (O’Connor 2004: 159); of the 
other’s claims on us as being unqualifiedly justified, where ‘the idea that reflection has 
transformative capacities is excluded’ (ibid.)?14 Alasdair Morgan has levelled an 
Adornian charge of this sort against Levinas. He writes that Levinas’ emphasis on the 
immediate encounter with the other – an emphasis shared by Løgstrup - ‘can easily 
revert to a form of philosophical irrationalism’ whereby ‘this pre-reflective 
[immediacy] then becomes an absolutely other point beyond reason which cannot be 
                                                          
14 For another variation of this worry, Cf. O’Connor (2017): ‘Normative primitivism looks…like a 
commitment to what Adorno calls and exposes as the error of “immediacy”: i.e., that there are states 
of affairs whose truth is independent of human judgment. Adorno sees naïve realism in 
epistemology, for example, as a wrong-headed commitment to immediacy in that it does not 
recognise that what it takes to be given by the external world – the things of experience – are 
passively received by us have a historical background. That background determines most if not all 
(Adorno is ambivalent on this point) of how things appear to us and how we respond to them. 
Normative primitivism would, we might suggest, be guilty of an analogous naiveté in claiming that 
our normative interest in ourselves has a kind of independence from experience even though it 
comes replete with motivating interests shaped by historical considerations about human value and 
meaningful life. The untutored would be critically exposed as socialised, or, to put it another way, 
mediated by society and its values’ (6). There is evidence to suggest that Løgstrup himself was very 
much alive to this sort of worry. For instance, as Bugge notes ‘the other person’s presence is a two-
edged sword. In direct association with the other person, we are told in The Ethical Demand, the 
negative pictures which we have made of him normally break down. Not that the pictures are denied, 
but the personal presence somehow erases them. Which indicates a sort of “trust in life itself, in the 
ongoing renewal of life” (EF p. 23/ED p. 14). But in his later book Kunst og erkendelse from 1983 
Løgstrup calls attention to a less positive consequence of this breakdown of the picture one has made 
of the person: “In real life, the other person, by his very presence, is standing in the way of his own 
history.” His presence blocks my sight of his whole life world. I become short-sighted: “As the 
meeting is absorbing me, it clips my imagination. My imagination cannot move freely in the other’s 
history and world, for my attitude, thought and feeling are narrowed to being an answer to what is 
currently occupying the other person and what he requires and expects for me”’ (Bugge 2017: 224-5). 
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reflectively grasped but only converged with in an experience of dissolution which 
can never guarantee its outcome or preserve the freedom of the reflective subject’ 
(Morgan 2007: 84). In other words, the worry is that if the encounter with the other 
entails the disengagement of the self’s rationality and the incapacitation of self’s 
freedom in his or her relation to the other, then it seems that any plausible sense in 
which the self can be considered to be a moral agent in that relation has been dissolved. 
Indeed, arguably, my use of terms such as ‘surrender’ and ‘captivation’ in describing 
my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency above may seem to exacerbate this 
worry.15 
There are two objections here: one concerning irrationalism, and one 
concerning unfreedom. In responding to the first objection, it is important to further 
clarify what it is on a Løgstrupian view to be captivated or absorbed by one’s 
encounter with the other. As I have tried to clarify above, on Løgstrup’s view, when 
we encounter the other through the sovereign expressions of life we are exposed to a 
primitive normative claim that arises just in virtue of the other’s living vulnerability. 
To this extent, the primitive normative claim is indeterminate; it cannot be adequately 
represented solely in an ‘aesthetic-intellectual’ way in terms of moral rules or 
                                                          
15 Another variation of this objection might be raised from a Kierkegaardian perspective in defence of 
the need to include a relation to God as a ‘middle term’ in one’s ethical relation to the other. On this 
point, Kierkegaard scholar C. Stephen Evans has noted that Kierkegaard himself was certainly not 
‘unaware of the importance of human relationships,’ but he nonetheless saw a need to ‘stress the 
importance of “standing before God”’ precisely because ‘he [Kierkegaard] is so sensitive to the power 
of those [human] relations. It is not because he does not realize the importance of such human 
institutions as the family and the state, but because he sees how easily these relationships can 
become confining and even dehumanizing…When the criterion of the self is derived solely from 
relations to other humans, then that finite human identity becomes invested with ultimate authority. 
God in the sense of what is of ultimate worth is completely immanent; there is no place left for 
transcendence’ (Evans 2006: 272). In other words, we might say that in trying to show that the 
infinite demand registers in our concrete and immediate relations with others that Løgstrup runs the 
risk of simply collapsing the distinction between the category of transcendence and the category of 
immanence, perhaps ending up with something more like a ‘social command’ account of the face-to-
face encounter, but where the needs of the other are so exaggerated as to take on the semblance of 
the transcendent. 
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principles, to use Watts’ terminology. However, for Løgstrup, this does not entail that 
in the face-to-face encounter we are forced to abandon our practical rationality all 
together. In fact, for Løgstrup, the situation is quite the reverse.  
As we have seen previously, Løgstrup avers that ‘the expression of life does 
not determine the behaviour or dictate the action, and it does not preclude rational 
reflection or judgment. On the contrary, it demands it’ (BED: 132) and that ‘the 
expression of life is what kindles deliberations of the imagination about what to say 
and do’ (BED: 72). That is to say, relating to the other through the sovereign 
expressions of life does not necessarily entail the incapacitation or suspension of 
rational reflection. Rather, Løgstrup’s point is that in relating to the other through 
the sovereign expressions of life we are freed up for reflection on how to ‘turn the 
situation around’ (BED: 53) through our agency. The distinction Løgstrup is 
attempting to draw here, it seems to me, consists in the way the true self engages his 
or her practical rationality. We can capture the distinction by way of the notions of 
‘aesthetic-intellectual’ and ‘ethico-religious’ thinking introduced above. The true self, 
being absorbed or captivated by the other and their situation, relates to the normative 
claim contained therein in an ethico-religious way: when the true self relates to the 
other through the sovereign expressions life, the primitive ethical claim made by the 
other is incorporated into the way the situation shows up to the self. And the self can 
then engage her practical rationality ‘directly’ in responding to the task at hand, so to 
speak.16 As Løgstrup puts it in ‘Ethics and Ontology:’ ‘we will act upon a demand only 
                                                          
16 Løgstrup expresses a similar thought in a different context when he claims that trusting and loving 
actions are expressive of a mode of responsiveness that is distanced – but not cut off - from norms 
and rules. He explains what he means by this as follows: ‘What, then, is meant by the “distance” from 
the norm which one must observe with respect to the other person? This question arises in the 
situation of conflict where one is of the opinion that one has acted contrary to the norm. The 
distance then consists in our not using the norm utterly to write him off, to liquidate him. His action 
will indeed be censured to the extent that it was contrary to the norm. However, the distance means 
that we concede that he himself is something other and more than his action….In the confrontation 
concerning the norms love has a chance, provided that we refrain from laying exclusive claim to the 
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if we forget how we ourselves relate to the demand and concern ourselves instead 
solely with what the demand claims’ (ED: 154). 
The inturned self, by contrast, relates to the primitive normative claim made 
on them by the other as an ethical demand and thus it relates to the demand in an 
aesthetic-intellectual way, perhaps seeking to establish (or, more likely, delegitimize) 
the justifiability of the demand. In either case, the primitive normative claim made on 
the self by the other is reified into a principle, where this then cuts the self off from a 
free engagement with the other and their situation, as they become concerned with 
the principle rather than the situation. Captivation by the other, then, as expressed by 
the true self’s mode of responsiveness, does not entail the disengagement of rational 
reflection as such. Rather, it refers to a way in which the agent’s rational reflection is 
realized, namely, as a freedom for the normative claim tacitly incorporated in the 
situation, rather than as a freedom to step back from the situation in order to assess 
the normative claim made by the other on the self as a principle or norm. As a slogan, 
we might put Løgstrup’s view as follows: the inturned self has a binding and dependent 
relation to norms and moral principles and a free, non-binding relation to the other. The true 
self, in surrendering, has a binding and dependent relation to the other and a free relation to 
norms and moral principles. Importantly, the surrendering agent may still appeal to 
norms and principles in working out how to respond to the other – it is just that she 
                                                          
norms and from using them as an axe for bludgeoning him to death’ (ED: 42). In this sense, Løgstrup 
can be seen as a kind of ethical particularist in the sense outlined by Andrew Gleeson: ‘Morality has 
to do without principles not because they are almost certainly inadequate (i.e. have exceptions 
because the reasons they enshrine vary) but because deciding how to act by consulting a rule is one 
way in which we fail properly to attend to the detailed particularity of each individual case – even if 
the case falls squarely under some knowable rule (and even if it does not)’ (Gleeson 2007: 364). 
Viewed in this way, Løgstrup’s theory of the sovereign expressions of life can be seen as an attempt 
to account for how we qua agents can and do properly attend to the detailed particularity of the 
other and their situation. 
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is ‘distanced’ (ED: 41) from norms while being bound to the material particularity of 
the other and their situation.  
When viewed in this way, Løgstrup’s position might actually be seen to accord 
with some interpretations of Adorno. On Bernstein’s reconstructive interpretation, 
for instance, the ‘the whole weight of Adorno’s project…is to deny that there is a 
separable logic of the morally good’ (Bernstein 2001: 321):  
[T]he bindingness of moral claims is to be understood primarily as nothing 
other than material inferences from awarenesses of a state of affairs, from (the 
appreciation of) bleeding badly to (the response) I will apply a tourniquet. Material 
inferences of this kind do not operate in a void…[they] are articulations of 
the experiences of auratic individuality, that is of living beings that are 
injurable, and hence that there are practical demands at all depends on being 
aware of vulnerable life and developing modes of response that acknowledge 
vulnerability. (Bernstein 2001: 323) 
In other words, for both thinkers rational reflection or the making of practical 
inferences in one’s encounter with the other originally is – and ideally should be – 
attuned to the somatic, non-discursive and intransitive apprehending of vulnerable 
life. And, again for both thinkers, we become cut off from the other and their situation 
when our rational reflection is treated as a ‘separable logic,’ whereby we come to rely 
on the authority of rules and the conception of the good that emerges from them in 
how we relate to the other and their situation.17 An important difference is that 
Bernstein’s interpretation of Adorno’s ethics is reconstructive; it is conducted per 
impossibile in the sense that if we were to have the appropriate structures of awareness 
we could in principle make morally appropriate material inferences, but since we don’t, 
                                                          
17 Løgstrup expresses is concern about treating moral reasoning in terms of a separable logic under 
the auspices of a critique of the Kantian ‘universalizability test.’ He writes that: ‘In [the case of 
universalization] what applies is this: As specific as the moral situation may be – even if it is so specific 
that it is unimaginable that the situation should ever repeat itself – an action becomes morally good 
by virtue of the fact that anyone coming to be in the situation may be required to undertake it. In 
other words, morally good behaviour is behaviour that can be universalized. This means, however, 
that because it constitutes morality, the test of universalization is not itself a moral principle but a 
logical principle…This is unreasonable…[because] this means that here, too, we enter the sphere of 
morality only by means of a decision. We must decide in favour of the universalization test if we wish 
to be within the realm of morality’ (BED: 134-5). 
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we cannot. But Løgstrup, by contrast, does not hold that the structures of awareness 
through which we could make morally appropriate material inferences, so to speak, 
(i.e. the sovereign expressions of life) are unavailable to us; his point is rather that, in 
our wickedness, we are prone to neglect the living particularly of the other and defy 
the sovereign expressions of life by trying to assert sovereignty and control over the 
other and their situation. And thus a certain configuration of the latent presence of 
the sovereign expressions of life, the presence of the other and the self’s surrendering 
comportment to them is required in order to make morally appropriate material 
inferences (mutatis mutandis to perform spontaneous ethical actions).18 
Yet, whilst this clarification may deflect the worry concerning a putative 
irrationalism underwriting Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology, the related worry 
concerning the unfreedom of the surrendering agent might still be seen to have some 
traction. On an Adornian picture, the ‘ethic of resistance’ is aimed at resisting and 
negating those aspects of instrumental rationality which are constitutive of our 
current state of unfreedom with a view to realizing our freedom as autonomous 
subjects, freely responsive to the ‘auratic individuality’ of others.19 Thus, an Adornian 
may wonder in what sense the surrendering agent, insofar as it appears precisely to 
give up its autonomy in the encounter with the other, is free? Variations of this worry 
have lingered throughout the past three chapters: for instance, in relation to my 
                                                          
18 Of course, there is an important issue here concerning whose conception of radical evil and human 
wickedness is more defensible. I cannot hope to settle that issue here. 
19 One way of capturing this aim is in terms of Bernstein’s claim that Adorno holds the achievement of 
the ‘complex concept’ as something like a regulative ideal. According to Bernstein, Adorno’s concept 
of the concept holds that the concept is composed of two axes: a logical axis and a material axis. The 
logical axis captures the concept’s representation of an object in terms of general norms or rules 
‘imposed’ on the object by the subject in rendering it intelligible. The material axis captures a 
dependency of the concept on the irreducible particularity of the object (the materiality of the object 
– hence the label ‘material axis’). Part of Adorno’s polemic against modern society consists in the 
claim that, given modern society’s domination by ‘logical’ instrumental rationality, it operates with a 
‘partial’ concept of the concept, namely, a concept with the logical axis alone. Viewed in this way, the 
point of the ‘ethic of resistance’ consists in an attempt to recover the material axis of the concept, 
where this recovery will signal the realization of our autonomy, properly construed.  
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discussion of the split-self view, I registered a worry concerning how the agency of 
the true self can be distinguished from that of the ‘mere’ agency of a responsive 
automaton. And the worry re-emerged in my comparative discussion of Lear’s notion 
of radical hope with Løgstrup’s sovereign expressions of life above: whereas Lear 
distinguishes Plenty Coups’ agency as a form of moral agency in contrast to ‘mere 
optimism’ by associating radical hope with the virtue of courage, we saw that no such 
explanation can be appealed to in explicating Løgstrup’s notion of surrender. Indeed, 
the term ‘surrender’ seems to bring with it associations of giving up one’s freedom in 
the face of an overwhelming, but constitutively indeterminate claim.  
It is important to note in responding to this charge that Løgstrup consistently 
associates the realization of the sovereign expressions of life with freedom. For 
instance, he writes that the ‘freedom of existence…consists in the sovereign 
expressions of life’ (BED: 67) and that ‘the demand is the correlate of sin; the sovereign 
expression of life is that of freedom’ (BED: 69). Clearly, one sense in which the 
sovereign expressions of life are associated with freedom for Løgstrup lies in the sense 
that through our identification with the sovereign expressions of life, we are freed 
from self-enclosedness.20 However, in addition to this, what has been emerging in our 
present discussion is a sense that there is a further, more positive, valence of agential 
freedom at play in Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology; a valence of agential freedom 
that is gained in virtue of surrender. We might term this positive valence of agential 
freedom as a freedom for the (indeterminate) good. Importantly, however, this latter 
sense of freedom differs from freedom as autonomy – indeed, arguably, a central 
                                                          
20 Cf. ‘Reflection on the freedom to act is never an impetus to action. On the contrary, the impetus to 
action comes from a consideration of the action’s purpose, content and meaning. The realization of 
the freedom that I myself am, and in which my existence consists, is something I can achieve only by 
forgetting it’ (BED: 80-1). 
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motivation behind Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology is precisely to challenge the 
thought that one’s moral agency can be expressed only in terms of autonomy, of freely 
giving oneself the law. In closing this chapter, I will present some concluding 
exploratory suggestions concerning how the freedom for the (indeterminate) good 
gained in virtue of surrender might be understood. 
My suggestion in this regard can be captured in terms of the Augustinian 
distinction between liberium arbitrium, meaning the liberty of choice; the possibility of 
doing otherwise; freedom of the will, and libertas, meaning a freedom for the good or 
a propensio toward the truth.21 And my thought is this. While surrendering to the 
sovereign expressions of life clearly precludes the kind of freedom denoted by liberium 
arbitrium, it can be seen to be consonant with the sense of freedom as libertas (Cf. BED: 
80-1). In order to explore this possibility, it is instructive to return to Han-Pile’s 
                                                          
21 Cf. Rist (1994) ‘Augustine prefers to put it like [this]: man is free (liberum) to do what he likes, but 
he is not freed (liberatum) from sin (Rebuke and Grace 13.42) – and this latter unfreedom will be 
disastrous. As Augustine has said as early as On Human Responsibility, freedom (libertas) is being 
subject to truth; we need to be freed from fallen ‘free’ choice’ (132); ‘Augustine is always concerned 
to argue that in the course of our ordinary human life nothing outside the will determines the will; 
that is, whatever kind of will we have (good or bad, as the early parts of On Human Responsibility put 
it), we shall ‘will’ accordingly. That is the reason why when Augustine remarked of his Reply to 
Simplicianus that there he had struggled for the free choice of the will, but that the grace of God 
prevailed, he was not denying that the will is free to choose. He was asserting that only the wrong 
choices are possible unless the will is properly repaired and maintained by God. Hence, if it chooses 
badly, it is nothing but the will that chooses; if it chooses well, the will is ‘prepared’ by God, or, as 
Augustine eventually puts it, it enjoys full freedom (summa libertas), freedom being a condition in 
which the soul is in harmony with, and subject to, the truth and the will and love of God’ (186-7). 
Although I cannot pursue the thought here, it is plausible to think that Luther’s thinking on the 
bondage of the will is substantially influenced by Augustine on this point (Augustine, after all, was 
held by Luther as being ‘the Scriptural theologian who…had the right comprehension of the nature of 
sin and grace’ (Pauck 1961: xlvi)), where this goes some way to explaining Luther’s portrayal of 
‘Christians in their relationship to God as free, in their relationship to the world, however, as obliged 
to the service and compassion of their neighbour: Faith would set humans free from the compulsion 
for self-justification and therefore would render them free to serve their neighbours. In short, 
humans would be free out of faith in love’ (Beutel 2003: 11). These considerations form the 
background of my exploratory remarks here concerning a form of freedom gained in virtue of 
surrendering to life in confidence with it. To put it bluntly, one could say that for Løgstrup whereas 
the sovereign expressions of life correspond to grace, surrender (mutatis mutandis receiving life as a 
gift) corresponds to faith. And my point throughout the past two chapters has been to argue that 
surrender (viz. a secularized form of faith) can fruitfully be interpreted as being expressive of a 
medio-passive mode of agency.  
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discussion of freedom and the choice to choose in Heidegger, considered in the 
previous chapter. In her article, Han-Pile considers libertas as one possible way of 
articulating the possibility of ontological freedom for Dasein. On this reading, 
ontological freedom would be construed in terms of a ‘propensio toward authenticity 
[which] may be what enables Dasein to resist falling’ (Han-Pile 2013: 295).22 
However, Han-Pile notes that ‘the claim that ontological freedom is a propensio to 
authenticity suggests that Dasein can derive a priori ethical guidance from its very 
constitution. But the idea that Dasein should have such a constitution is in tension 
with Heidegger’s pronouncements about Dasein’s essence residing in its existence’ 
(ibid.).  
By contrast, as we have seen, Løgstrup, with his theory of the sovereign 
expressions of life, is expressly concerned to claim that, in a sense, the self can derive 
a priori ethical guidance from its existence (see my discussion at §4.3). Consider, for 
example, Løgstrup’s comments concerning openness of speech: he writes that ‘the 
elemental and definitive peculiarity attaching to all speech qua spontaneous 
expression of life [is] its openness. To speak is to speak openly. This is not something 
the individual does with speech; it is there beforehand, as it were, qua anonymous 
expression of life’ (BED: 84). He develops this thought in Norm and Spontaneity, adding 
‘who thinks of the act of speaking as ethical? Yet all speech is ethical, thanks to its 
innate openness’ (BED: 135). In other words, Løgstrup holds that life or existence 
contains the possibilities for goodness: the sovereign expressions of life always 
                                                          
22 Han-Pile bases her investigation of this possibility on Heidegger’s study of Cartesian freedom in the 
Introduction to Phenomenological Research, where Heidegger writes that ‘in order to be free, it is not 
required that I can move in both directions but rather: quo magis in unam propendeo eo liberius (the 
more I incline to the one, the freer I am). Here the Augustinian concept of freedom comes to the fore: 
the more primordially the propensio is for the bonum, the more authentic the freedom of acting … I 
am genuinely free if I Go towards what I understand’ (GA 14: 151, quoted in Han-Pile 2013: 294, her 
italics).  
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already orient us in the encounter with the other in such a way that involves a 
sensitivity to the good of the other’s vulnerable life, however un-thematic or 
inarticulable that sensitivity may be. We might say that, insofar as surrendering to 
the sovereign expressions of life involves letting the ‘ethical guidance’ they provide 
be ‘determinative’ of our mode of comportment, freedom from self-enclosedness is also 
freedom for the (indeterminate) good, as intimated by the sovereign expressions of 
life.  
In a way comparable to Heidegger, then, for Løgstrup, the freedom of human 
existence can be seen to lie in its mode of being as that which transcends towards the 
world (for Heidegger) or the other (for Løgstrup). And this is the freedom that the self 
is cut off from in inturnedness. However, by comporting itself surrenderingly in the 
encounter with the other, the true self is coming into identity with the freedom that 
it itself is. By analogy, we might say that in comporting oneself ‘surrenderingly’ in 
relation to life, one is not giving up one’s freedom, as an injured soldier might give 
himself up and surrender himself to an enemy combatant. Rather, one is surrendering 
oneself to life in confidence to it as containing the possibilities for goodness, as a lover 
surrenders himself to his beloved – even though those possibilities lie beyond one’s 
finite capacities for representational intentionality. It is this freedom, gained in part 
by our keeping ourselves attuned to the constitutively indeterminate good of the 
other, that belongs to us as the finite, interdependent creatures that we are.  
To develop the positive valence of freedom involved in surrendering as a form 
of confidence in life, we can note that Løgstrup discusses the affective relation of trust 
or confidence in life in The Ethical Demand when he is describing what it is to 
understand or receive life as a gift. He writes: 
If life is given to us, not once and for all but in every moment, it follows that 
we have it for the purpose of delivering ourselves over to it. If it is a gift, it has 
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been given in order that it be lived in confidence [tillid] to it. And the trust in 
the other person which we always have from the very outset, and which in a 
fundamental way belongs to human existence, is based upon and goes hand in 
hand with the confidence in life which comes with the gift itself…The 
onesidedness of the demand expresses the fact that we receive life in order that 
we should in confidence surrender ourselves to it [tillid til det at prisgive os til 
det]. In contrast to this, every moral theory based on the viewpoint of 
reciprocity is an expression of our desire to have control over existence. (ED: 
118)23  
Now, while the notion of life as a gift drops out of Løgstrup’s later work – 
indeed, in his Rejoinder, Løgstrup registers his dissatisfaction with his treatment of 
the notion in The Ethical Demand (BED: 11) – the core sense of that notion is retained 
in his development of the sovereign expressions of life. He clearly retains a sense that 
life contains the possibilities for goodness that are not of our own making. Moreover, 
as we have seen, he retains a sense that the appropriate way of comporting oneself to 
life construed in this way is to surrender to it.24 
Plausibly, Løgstrup’s notion of surrender parallels Luther’s conception of faith 
as a form of radical trust and confidence towards God. Luther’s homely illustration of 
faith in terms of a relation between husband and wife is instructive in this regard: 
When a husband and wife really love one another, have pleasure in each other, 
and thoroughly believe in their love, who teaches them how to behave one to 
another, what they are to do or not to do, say or not to say, what they are to 
think? Confidence alone teaches them all this, and even more than is necessary. 
For such a man there is no distinction in works. He does the great and the 
important as gladly as the small and the unimportant, and vice versa. 
Moreover, he does them all in a clad, peaceful and confident heart, and is an 
absolutely willing companion to the woman. But where there is any doubt, he 
searches within himself for the best thing to do; then a distinction of works 
arises by which he imagines he may win favour. And yet he goes about with a 
heavy heart and great disinclination. He is like a prisoner, more than half in 
despair, and often makes a fool of himself. (Luther 2007: 1: 108-9) 
                                                          
23 Cf. ‘It is in the very nature of human existence that it wants to be just as new as the other person’s 
new words, new deeds, and new conduct…We might call this a trust in life itself, in the ongoing 
renewal of life’ (ED: 14). 
24 Løgstrup’s thinking here, I would suggest, supports my reading of Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology 
along Heideggerian lines in §2. Namely, it supports the view that understanding or receiving life as a 
gift serves as a kind of ‘prototype’ for the contexts and relations that define the social world.  
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On Luther’s view, then, the faithful person ‘knows all things, can do all things 
[and] ventures everything that needs to be done’ (ibid.) whereas the doubter is forced 
into reflection concerning what is required of him. Importantly, the trust or 
confidence that defines faith for Luther is not self-confidence or trust in oneself; rather 
faith is a radical trust in another, namely, God. Hampson, for instance, talks of Luther’s 
conception of faith in terms of a ‘revolution in the self’ whereby ‘one’s sense of self is 
[now] bound up with another, with God, as one knows one’s self through God’s 
acceptance of one’ (Hampson 2004: 18). And Wilhelm Pauck writes that ‘Luther’s 
religion was a free trusting in God’s gift of forgiveness and therefore upon a “foreign 
righteousness” that entailed an utter self-surrender and becoming dependent on 
resources that no man can ever call his own’ (Pauck 1961: lxi).  
Similarly, for Løgstrup, surrendering involves a trusting or confident affective 
attitude towards life viewed as a good ever-renewing gift. That is to say, Løgstrup’s 
notion of surrender is expressive of the freedom of agency in that it involves an 
affective relation to the indeterminate claim made on them by the other, whereby the 
agent keeps himself attuned to that indeterminate claim in confidence with life’s 
possibilities for goodness. By way of illustration, we might think of the parable of the 
lily according to which we are advised to be like ‘the lilies of the field who sow not, 
nor do they reap, but who are willing to go with what God provides, which also means 
that they are ready for anything’ (Caputo 2001: 8). More prosaically, we might think 
of dancing with a partner, whereby one keeps oneself attuned to or in step with the 
movements or the other and the flow of the dance but where this attunement is 
expressive of one’s having surrendered oneself to the other and the dance, in 
confidence with them. The point is that through surrendering in confidence to life as 
containing the possibilities for goodness we are freed up for the good that, for 
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Løgstrup, transcends our finite, self-enclosing, capacities of aesthetic-intellectual 
representation.25  
Naturally, someone with Adornian sympathies might still object to the 
seeming insouciance and cloying optimism of Løgstrup’s thinking here; not least 
because of the strong emphasis Løgstrup places on the pervasiveness of human 
wickedness elsewhere. On what grounds does Løgstrup justify the claim that life 
contains the possibilities for goodness? Does Løgstrup’s thinking on this point betray 
some subterranean theistic commitments? I cannot hope to fully respond to these 
questions here. Moreover, it is beyond the remit of the present investigation to 
provide such a response, for the questions just posed move us beyond questions of 
agency towards questions of justification. And, as I noted in chapter one, in this thesis, 
I have been bracketing the question of justification for the sake of focusing on the 
question of agency. Nonetheless, I hope my exploratory comments here are 
illuminating in two respects. Firstly, I hope that they help bring out a distinctive 
contribution Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology makes to contemporary debates 
concerning moral agency, where, through his theory of the sovereign expressions of 
life, Løgstrup has provided resources for elucidating a genuinely distinctive way of 
thinking about the freedom of the moral agent who, to paraphrase Crowell once again, 
is the kind of subject who can be a free moral agent while being absorbed in the 
encounter with the other. Secondly, I hope that my exploratory comments provide 
                                                          
25 Although I do not have space to develop it here, it is worth noting an interesting contrast between 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard, on the one hand, and Løgstrup, on the other, in relation to the 
experience of freedom. Whereas, for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, our freedom revealed in anxiety, 
which ultimately directs us towards God (Kierkegaard) and death (Heidegger), respectively, for 
Løgstrup, our freedom is revealed in our confidence (i.e. trust, faith) in life (Cf. BED: 54 on Heidegger 
and BED: 66-8 on Kierkegaard). This difference, between anxiety/confidence and death/life, is surely 
one of the major issues that deserves further treatment, perhaps as part of an attempt to answer the 
question concerning Løgstrup’s conception of life that I raise in concluding this chapter.  
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the service of bringing in to focus a further dimension of Løgstrup’s ethics that is 
worthy of further investigation, namely, his conception of life.  
5.4. Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, I have sought, firstly, to defend my medio-passive 
construal of Løgstrupian agency as plausible, in the senses that it can be seen to provide 
a structural account of agency that can compete with the standard view and that it 
rings true as a description of our lives as moral agents. Secondly, I have sought to 
defend the genuine distinctiveness of my construal of Løgstrupian moral agency both 
in relation to the standard view of moral agency and in relation to the non-standard 
conceptions of agency of relevant comparators. In a word, my aim has been to 
elucidate and clarify my medio-passive definition of Løgstrupian moral agency as a 
mode of responding to a constitutively indeterminate normative claim made on the 
self by the other that integrates the self’s sense of agential limitation in the face of the 
other’s indeterminate claim in the way that the self responds to it.  
Yet, what my discussions above have gradually exposed is an area of 
Løgstrup’s ethical philosophy that requires further investigation. For instance, in my 
responses to the Levinas-style objections one may begin to wonder what is it about 
the living vulnerability of the other that issues in a normative claim? Does Løgstrup 
take this point to be self-evident? Does vulnerable life constitute the ‘bedrock’ where 
we are forced to turn our spades, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein? Many 
philosophers would be unsatisfied with this conclusion and demand further 
justification. Can Løgstrup provide any? Moreover, in my responses to the Adornian-
style objection, one may begin to wonder why the Løgstrupian agent is justified in 
having faith in life. Indeed, someone with Adornian sympathies would likely be highly 
suspicious of the seeming happy-go-luckiness of Løgstrup’s position. In other words, 
the question that emerges out of my discussion here is what conception of life did 
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Løgstrup hold? And: in what sense can life serve as a normative ground for ethics, as 
Løgstrup’s analysis seems to suggest? Such questions, of course, pass beyond the 
question of agency and broach the question of justification for Løgstrup’s ethics. I hope 
that the present thesis helps to motivate further investigation of these questions.
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